SOVIET PARTISANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01035R000100010025-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: August 6, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

NO. SY 40twou tolnoms
ti..?47 OMY 86 0520...
MASSIFad tTIO8 G T F ~1pp,gg
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1 F R I REPORT
COUNT ' U
SUBJECT moist Partisans
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE
ACQUIRE
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DATE DISTR.6 A ugus 31,
NO. O!yp PAGES 10 1947
NO. OF ENCLS.
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SUPPLEMENT 'TO
REPORT NO.
1. The outbreak of the was so ux , eoted to the entire country both in its
:",arms and its teapos0 that the Army Coe ad. "d the local party juid diet
e authorities were thrown into utter confusion and had no time to seriously plan
and organise the people for the coming struggle behind the ene y li;neo The
panic was co great that all the local leaders thought only of es ig before
the Gereena yea Only in a e> Ill number of districts did the District Committees
of the paurtyt, acting on their own initiatives:? leave behind certain party menbere
, 4r work in the rear of the ens o These party members later established contacts
with each other0 and drawing a part of the population into the work-0 organized
tgbting units.
3a ilar1ya a. number of the local offices of the l ZvD?) had not had time to leave
agents behind. However, even agents who remained bechi.nd did not play amy
';tiro roles but lived quietly through the occupations confining thseee3.ves to
s' apiling blacklists of all persons who had. in ar r measure cooperated with the
raaaao But sometimes these agents aided people who arrived from the other side
u-4 the-front and helped then to contact "reliable patriots."
3. g the whole,, the appearance in the sue ? a rear of n .erous axsee; peasant groups
:.`;.!artag the early months of the war was a purely spontaneous pho nomeenono M of
"}`base> groups", moreover, were little more than simple bandit atugs. lias3s:al1yo
groups consisted of young peasants, soldiers who escaped into the forest
fter their units were surrounded. and also of people who saw an opportunity for
i.ooti and 'enri nt in the prevailing Aso Only units which were Joined. by
she local intellectuals0 such as School teachers an. agronomistee engaged ;.a
struggle against the enemy by means of divorv4onary acts, sabotage and terrorise,
'i - obtained area from the retreating ar u bent these arms were Very primitive
and a ful only for mull-scale attacks on houses where the Germans owed in
drinking bouts,, an email storehouses and on German soldiers who bad accidentally
strayed from their units. All these acts were conducted by the ,guarrillos
ca their alma without any leadership and without coordination bet Teen the
$) The present Ministry of the Interior was known as the NX?D up to March:, i946a
Both designations are used in this report.
MASSIFICAMON SNOUT
STATE NAVY
WAS A70
DISTRIBUTION
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various detachments. There were even cases when the detachments, meeting
in the forests, open fire upon each other, suspecting a trap on the part
of the Germans.
Despite the noisy propaganda in the press, the government did not regard
these patriots in the enemy?s rear as a serious force, especially since
it had no contact with them and therefore could not direct their activi-
ties. However, this spontaneous. resistance movement convinced the govern-
meat that there were people'on the other side of the fighting lines who
might be of considerable value in the fight against the Germans and who
might help in diversionary activity and in destroying enemy communications
,if they were contacted and directed through trusted agents. By this time
the command decided to send a large number of loyal persons as diversionists
for the demolition of those bridges and strategic points which the retreat-
ing army had not had time to blow up and which were now proving of great
value to the Germans as means of co:mEUnication with their distant bases.
It was also decided to use the detachments active in the rear to help these
diversioniats in their work.
II. I OF SC FOE '
SCOUTS T HL FQRa 4TION OF S' UL .
5? Toward the and of July and in August, 1941, a, call for volunteers went out
to the Comsomol youth in the war factories and schools. The volunteers
were to be sent to districts under German occupation for dynamiting and
terrorist work. Party and Comsomol cells were instructed to launch an In-
tensive propaganda campaign and arouse patriotism in order to attract the
largest possible number of volunteers. And their number was great indeed.
In the Dzerzhinsky district alone (therefore 22 such districts in Moscow)
1100 volunteers registered in response to the can,, and the.total for Moscow
exceeded 10 thousand. All the volunteers were members of the party and the
Comsomol, between the ages of 18 and 28, with at least 7 years of elementary
school education. They regarded this dangerous work as something interesting
and romantic, and many were also prompted by preference for diversionist work
to service at the front, to which they were subject in any case in view of
their age and which seemed to them such more dangerous.
6. All the registrants were carefully screened by organs of the TNKVD, which
questioned each applicant about his entire family, his pcronte' occupations
before the revolution, the possible existence of relatives abroad, and so
forth. The answers were then checked with the files of the NKVD, and only
one tenth of the registrants was accepted for secret assignments, while the
rest were told to await the second call.
7. The author of the present report knows of only two schools. in existence at
that time in Moscow: a school for scouts, and a school for diversioniats.
Both were under the jurisdiction of NKVD departments and were under martial
law. These schools were located in.the "Dynamo" Stadium, on the Leningrad
highway, in the Petrovsk Park, which belongs to the Ministry of the Interior
and which was closed to public sports from the first days of the war.. There
the volunteers, selected according to their political reliability, were sub-
jected to thorough medical examination. The physical requirements were very
high; in addition to native physical endowments, they included athletic train-
ing, endurance and tenacity. These requirements were answered most closely by
professional athletes, as well as the students of special sport instit tea and
technical schools. Consequently, the athletes comprised 25-28% of the total
number of persons selected for training at the schools.
8. Applicants who passed, the medical tests were given military uniforms and as-
signed to dormitories and school auditoriums set up for them on the stadium
grounds. They were divided into sections and platoons, designated as com-
munications sections, scout platoons, dynamiting companies, and so forth,
according to their tasks. The 300-hour training program (30 school days of
ten hours each) were devoted to the following studies: a) topography and
orientation by the compass and natural tokens; b) radio communication; a)
explosives and their uses in diversion; d) military intelligence and espionage,
and the system of their organization in the rear; e) weapons and their use;
f) cryptography and codes; g) signalling by bird-songs; h) current events and
the political character of the rear. These subjects were taught by.professors
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of the regular military schools of the Ministry of the Interior and certain
specialists from the Military Academies. Since in selecting the students
preference was given to persons with high-school or college education, the
program consisted of brief courses in theory and subsequent emphasis on
practice.
9. Every morning all students were put through intensive physical training: run-
ning, jumping, grenade-throwing, overcoming obstacles and weight-lifting. These
were followed by breakfast. Then four,hours of uninterrupted theoretical
studies, After lunch the students engaged in practical studies in orientation
and topography, camouflage, organisation of diversions and other subjects.
For this they took trips to the country, where there were natural objectives,
and learnt their subjects by practice under the guidance of the instructors.
On their return, they were again assembled in the auditorium, where they were
given lectures in current events, taught how to select the people they could
depend on behind the German lines and how to judge the degree of their trust-
worthiness. In the evenings they studied radio.
10. Thirty days proved insufficient for the entire program, and the term was 07.!*
by another 12 days. After they mastered their subjects, the students
were given a short course in parachute jumping and were dropped two or three
times from the training planes. The final examinations were held before high-
ranking members of the AIinistry of the Interior, and the graduation ceremony
was attended by?the 2nd Secretary of the Moscow Party Organization, Popov, who
delivered a long speech which was meant to inspire the future diversionists to
self-sacrificing work for party and people...
11. The next step was the formation of detachments. The commanders appointed to
lead them were communists of long party experience and irreproachable past,,
who had distinguished themselves in their work by initiative, courage, and
loyalty to the party. Inasmuch as the basic tasks of these detachments con-
sisted of diversion and reconnaissance, it was preferred that the commander
be a person with technical training or a specialist in military-espionage re-
connaissance, according to the aims with which the detachments were being sent
to the rear. As a rule, they were also volunteers who requested the Central
Committee of the Party in Uoseow to. assign them to this type of service. After
a careful checking of their records by the NAVD, the entire material on them
was sent to the Central Committee of the Party, which finally approved each
detachment commander and assigned him to a district of operations. The politi-
cal commissars for the detachments were chosen from among party and Soviet
leaders who had managed to escape from the districts they directed before the
occupation and who were thoroughly familiar with the terrain of the area where
the detachment was being sent and with the local people with whom they would
have to deal. In addition to these, the posts of commissar were given to party
workers of the Loscow organizational apparatus who had served before the war as
instructors, propagandists, lecturers, and who had wide party experience and an
unblemished past. The detachment commander and, the commissar selected their
people in the school, having come to know them during the month and a half of
common study and choosing those who, they felt, satisfied the all-round require-
means.
12. The detachments consisted of 40 to 80 people; these were divided into a commani-
cations section, a scout squad, a mine-layers' and dynamites"s' squad, a sharp-
shooters' squad, and a quartermaster. The command consisted of 3 ter 4 persons;
the commander, the commissar, and the chief of staff. Thus, for instance, the
detachment under the engineer iynkov, who became known among the partisans as
"Batya" ("Daddy") and later became famous throughout Russia and was awarded the
Order of Hero of the Soviet Union, consisted of 54 persons; 16 radio men, 2
nurses-radio operators, 5 scouts, 12 specialists-dynamiters, 1 quartermaster,
and the rest - privates. Of the latter, 12 were professional athletes and for-
mer members of sports organizations or students of sports schools. Each group
of this detachment formed a section or squad, which was led by a group-commander
subject to the detachment commander,
13.
Practically all the detachments were transported to the German rear in September
and the beginning. of October, 1941. They were transported by the Division of
long-range bombers TB-3, which were also loaded with explosives, arms, radio-
apparatus, instruments, ammunition, canned-foods, medical supplies, etc. Thus,
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Lynkow'a detachment was transported by. 7. plane. with a total carrying capacity
of 20 tons.
III. kWING RU=N= AND TAB--T
COREMIN I MR -
14. The most suitable points for partisan activity are forested areas where it is
both easy to hide, and to sat up entire4living camps. The landings were there-
fore made in such areas, including the Bryanak forests, the Bakhmach district,,
Sins, Zhitouir, Shepetovka. In addition, theme points were situated near
strategic communication lines and important railroad junctions through which
passed a large part of the German troop and ammunition transports. About 50%
of all. the diversionists were dropped in the area of the Bryansk forests, from
where they subsequently made their way to their assigned points.
15, What were 'the assignments net before these detachments? Their first task was
to find in these areas the people who had been left behind by the communist
organizations for underground work, to establish liaison with them, and with
their aid to find loyal patriots willing to launch a struggle against the Ger-
man occupants. Where no people had been left by the organization,. the detach-
ment commanders were advised to contact the chairmen of the.kolkhoses or village
soviets, village communists, teachers, young agronomists graduated from Soviet
institutes, and kolkhos activists. However, they were to confine their contacts
only to party members. There were many such party members left in the villages,
and the Germane did not molest them up to the day of their retreat. It is true
that many communists began to ardently collaborate with the Germane, some to
save their skin, others for political considerations; the new arrivals there-
fore had to. be careful in approaching even these people, and to reveal them-
selves only after carefully checking their' trustworthiness. The checked and se-
lected people were to be added to the detachment and also utilized for espionage
and intelligence. As spies it was recommended to use young girls who studied in
the ten-year schools or worked in the district government bureaus. Only members
of the Coasomol were to be used in this work. Their task cams to maintain friend
ships'WithRussiaans who went into German service and with Germans themselves,
from whom they were to obtain information as to the plane of the local garrison
units; they were also charged with watching the roads over which passed the Ger-
man mobile units, to strike up friendships with German soldiers billeted nearby
and obtain all available information from then.
i6 After the detachment augmented its ranks from among the local population and
created a network of spies and scouts, it was ready to start action. But the
first requirement was the maintenance of liaison with the front and with the
center of diversioniet work in Moscow, which was later transformed into the
Staff of the partisan movement. The instructions were that the center was to
be informed of all actions, all successes and failures of the detachment and all
plans, and that no action was to be undertaken without previous approval from
the center. Moreover, all data obtained by the agents concerning troop movements
and armament were to be immediately relayed to the staff of the front sector
where it took place.
17. Moscow generally needed information on what was taking place behind the enemy
lines, for without such knowledge it was difficult to make any strategic plans.
The commanders were also ordered to report about all the groups and detachments
active in the rear, so that the center might be able to fill the numerous blank
spots on its maps. Such blank spots abounded up to 1943, and frequently people
sent from the center to these areas found whole armed detachments which they mis-
took for groups of German provocateurs and from which they fled. For instance,
the diversionist Zabelov, sent to the Bakhmach district in 1942, was told that
he would find there only armed enemies, and no friends; in reality, several par-
tisan detachments were operating there, frequently attacking the Germans.
lg~ The objectives of diversionist activity included railroad bridges, stations,
junctions, traffic bridges over rivers, arms and ammunition depots, troop bar-
racks,, officers: clubs, motion picture theatres, single automobiles, et-). In
actions endangering the life of the dynamiter himself, it was recommended that
a local person be used, so that the group sent from the center might be preserved
intact:
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19. Besides military strategic tasks, there were also political ones. It was neoese
cry to instil In the population faith that the Red Army would soon return to those
cusses, that the Soviet Government was still strong and capable. of winning the war.
Theses who had lost this faith and entered into collaboration with the eneaW were
to be ruthlessly punished, preferably hanged in the villages as an example to
others who bad not yet gone into German service,
20. The final paragraph of the instructions stated that it was impossible to foresee
all conditions under which the detachments would have to work; that new, unez
peeted objectives might be discovered on the spot, and that such situations
called for initiative, courage, decision and readiness to sacrifice all for the
fatherland. Incidentally, in order to make sure of such loyalty and sacrificial
seal, each detachment was assigned 3 or 4 agents who remained unknown even to the
commander; these agents were instructed to quietly eliminate all who deviated
from the required standards,
2L Finally, the diversioniets were landed. And here suddenly everything proved un-
expected and fraught with difficulty. For most of the detachments were dropped
within a radius of 150-200 kilometers from their objectives. Those who were to
be dropped over Bekhmaeh found themselves near Bryansk.,a The landing operations
were. conducted at night, when the pilots could not correct their course by the
lay of the land but had to make their computations blindly, by their instrsts,
As a result of the pilots error by 2 degrees, the detachment commander Lyn my
found himself 100 km. from his objective, utterly alone; it took him six months
to assemble a part of his-detachment and not to work.
22, In addition to this initial difficulty the entire occupied territory proved?.full
of surprises, There was probably no other country under German occupation which
had such chaos, treason, collaboration with the enemy, so many different trends
and groupings as existed in Russia and especially in the Ukraine, There were the
followers of Benderov and of Vlanaov, nationalists, Ukrainian separatists, cossack
patriots, plain bandits, and no on. It would require a separate report to analyse
all the movements and trends among the Russian population in occupied areas during
the war years in order to see how absurd are the assertions of the Soviet leaders
that the country is a monolithic union of all nationalities. As a result of the
war, 5 republics have been liquidated (only 3 were mentioned in the official press),
over.35% of the population of the other republics which bad been under occupation
had been deported to Siberia, and numberless traitors have been shot in made ex.-
cutions, The present author, vha moved westward with the army, saw with his own
eyes the punishment mated out to the Ukrainian population by NKVD troops. NKVD
units followed the advancing front and, breaking into each populated point, hanged
the leaders and carried out mass arrests of 'all who were in any measure involved
In collaborationist activity, In the winter of 1944 1945 the jails of the Ukraine
were bursting with. prisoners, who had to be sent to Siberia on foot, without shoes,,
goaded by the constant blows of rifle-butts.
239 It was necessary to mention these facts in Order to make clear the actual situa.
t$on in which the diversionists found themselves upon being dropped from the
planesa Wandering in the forest in search of his comrades, division com mar
Lynkov had. several times stumbled upon forest partisans who took him either for
a German provocateur or for an agent of the NKVD. Once he net two members of $
detachment of "okrrushentzi" (soldiers of armies which had been surrounded by
German troops and had scattered in the forest to escape capture). Learning that
t
they were former Rod :Army soldiers? he was overjoyed and asked their help in
xy'ing out his mission. But the soldiers-nearly killed him when they hoard t~
that be had just arrived from Moscow, declaring that they occupied themselves
with brigandage and had no intention to defend the bank
-
4-24s In the one forest there was another detachment "hose -4--
V were closer to WOOD-
of Lynkov. When he met them
they did not belive th
t h
h
,
a
e
ad been sent by J~osOow
which, in their opinion
had n
ti
t
,
o
me jus
thew to think of such distant places; fn
the rear. to test his identity, they asked him what was Stali
'
bi
h
n
,
rt
place. Be
named a'city in the Caucasus, but one of the soldiers declared that Stalin was born
in Gorky, near Moscow, Again he was about to be shot,. but was able to escape once
more. And only when he be
gan a search in the villages for former activists fro*
the party cells
did he fi
d
,
n
people who believed his documents and oaths,
people helped him to find his comrades, and~Lynkov began to carry out his diiver-
forest, where no GGerrmans had as yet not foot, announced the mobilization of IGne
all
men of military age
divid
d th
,
e
em into sections and squads, and declared that
henceforth they would be regarded as partisan-miliatiamen called up to fight the
Germans. Soon afterwards, when the detachment increased-to 200 men, they not to
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work. They attacked the district center, blew up small bridges, broke into
stations and dynamited entire ammunition trains, attacked village police ate-
tions and killed the police "traitors" (during the occupation all police units
consisted of Russians ti.
25.. Abrst of the detachments underwent similar experiences, and they were all or--
nixed in the rear in the same manner. easy of the groups, failing to a ftsem-
ble their own members, joined other detachments. The largest partisan unit,
under Kovpek, who was twice decorated with the Order of Hero of the Soviet
anion and later raised to the rank of Major General, absorbed the greatest num-
bar of such groups. Kovpak himself, who had organized his detachment on his
own Initiative during the very first months of the war, evinced great abilities
in organisation and leadership of men and shored himself to be a cunning and
courageous. guerrilla. His fame soon reached Moscow, which began to send him.
may people trained in special schools, as well as ammunition and other supplies
needed in his work.
26. These largo detachments were anon given more important assignments. In 1942
Stalin himself received some commanders of partisan detachments and set them
various tasks. Kovpak was ordered to bake a raid on the right bank of the
Dnieper and there try to disorganize the whole German rear. Others were in-
structed to remain'near the front and directly aid the fighting Red Army by
weans of diversions hampering the transport of ammunition and men for the Ger-
man Army. However, this took place in 1942, when the partisan movements was
brought under the jurisdiction of a special central staff which directed all
the schools and the men behind the German lines, But more of this later.
27. The NKVD retained its own spy system and its own diversionists, who formed ne.d.-
tachments, but acted with especial secrecy and by themselves, reporting only to
Moscow. It also retained jurisdiction over the series of schools which trained
these diversioniste, One of these schools, which is of special Interest, was the
eachool for women scouts.
IV. T SC2M.
28. In the winter of 1942 the author took part in transporting by air a'large group
of young women, rho were being sent to the enemy's rear for espionage and intelli-
gence work. A large shipment of automatic parachutes arrived at the airfield
where our unit was stationed, and soon afterwards the girls arrived by train.
After one or two training jumps from low heights, they were taken to the German
:'ear. They were divided into small groups of 5 or 6, under the leadership of
experienced NKVD workers. From talk* with these girls we learnt that they were
recruited in July or August, 1943., from schools and war factories. They were all
members of the Gomsomol, came from working-class families, and distinguished them.
elves by their discipline and loyalty to the Soviet Government, All those se-
lected had excellent recommendations from their party or Oomwomol cells, and were
admitted to; the school for scouts after careful screening by. the NM and the aedi-
commission. There were several such schools in Moscow, and, they were housed
iu the buildings of the regular high-schools, a number of which were closed to
their fOziner students and placed at the disposal of the V;dr. Sinistry end - the NKVDi.
In the conversation, the girls mentioned the 73rd and the 141st Schools in Moscow,
29. In the reconnaissance schools the. girls were put through a 3-monthm$ course of
study; the curriculum included German,.radio and communicationp codes, weapons,
(revolver and grenade) and their use, military documents and their significance,
current events and athletic exercises. They were taught by professors from the
special NXVD schools and some specialists In radio-communisation from the ailitaty
Academy and the Intelligence Division of the General Staff.
30. On graduating, all students gave their solemn oath and signature to reveal nothing
of what they had been taught at the school and to faithfully perform all tasks set
before them. To further guarantee their loyalty, hostages remained an f joscow in
the persons of their parents and relatives. These scouts were dropped over the
districts of Rehev, 1lelikiye Luki, Smolensk, Kursk,, Belgorod, Kharkov, etc. They
were to work in the German officers' clubs and restaurants, and some of tin were
to enter the German brothels; the latter were distinguished by-beauty and gay tem-
peraments. They showed little gaiety, however, after they were landed, on
meeting one of them in Moscow in 1944.. the author learnt that more than half of
them were caught by the Germans and perished. Some of then lost their courage and
were eliminated (shot) by their own agents, and'only 25-30% managed to establish
contacts with Germans and obtain some information. An a rule, they became the
mistresses of commandants, rear officers, club managers, eta., and acted throes
then. Of the six girls dropped by our plane onl7 one turned vs killed in
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the fall- ono was captured by . the Germans, one was shot by the representative of
the NKVD (she had been raped by the Germans, became insane and began to "talk");
one was killed by the Germans during the retreat, then the head of the group was
caught, and only one lived to return.
31. On. of the girls from the same school,,. nicknamed "Helm a", killed the cost
over the entire Byelorussia; she out off his head and brought it in a sack to the
partisans. To avenge this act, the Germans shot 15,000 inhabitants of the city
of Minsk, and therefore "Balina".received no rewards or honors for a long time.
.'Afterwards, the Germane raised a noisy campaign concerning the Soviet policy of
sending young girls as spies into Brothels, and the policy was apparently diseon-
tinued.
V.
32. In the beginning of 1942, the gaps in the map of the German rear rapidly began to
fill up. The parachutists sent to these areas radioed the results of their re-
connaissance which indicated that approximately 1200 guerrilla detachments were
active behind the enemy lines (this figure is taken from the reminiscences of one
of the scouts). This convinced the government of the necessity to seriously uti-
lize these detachments by sending these experienced and reliable people who would
assume leadership and direct their activities in the required channels. By this
time, Stalin signed an order creating a Central Staff of the Partisan movement.
Marshal Voroshilov was appointed Commander in Chief, and Ponomarenko (leader of
the Byelorussian Communists) was named Chief of Staff. They were placed in charge
of the partisan detachments and the schools which were training now contingents'
of reinforcements. All detachments which had radios and maintained communication
with Moscow were given new ciphers and codes,, which were henceforth'to be used in
orders from the center and in reports that the partisans were to sand daily to the
staff headquarters regarding their work. The staff also began to assign the dew
tachments various operational tasks coordinated with the needs of the fronts. To
assist in the execution of these missions the staff sent the partisans ammunitiion#
explosives, arms, men, clothing and food. Different detachments pooled their
energies to building landing. strips in the fields for the heavily loaded "Dom laees"
which brought supplies from Ltoscow and took back the wounded and the various dvcu-
meats captured from the Germans.
33. The work of the detachments was becoming more or ed and effective. Their chief
objectives were railroad lines, junctions and bridges. The Bryanek railroad june-
tion alone was the scene of a concentration of 80 detachments organised into a
single partisan center. Each detachment, however, had a strictly defined "sphere
of influence "p in which it blew up entire transports of supplies and German troops.
The Germans perfected the technique of rebuilding blasted lines, bringing the re.
pair time down to 8 or 10 hours, but they never succeeded in organizing any effec-
tive method of fighting the diyeraionists. .The latter were scattered and Oamou-
fl.ued in the impenetrable depths of the Bryensk forests, whence they dispatched
at night small groups of. men to different sections of the railroad, acid oe .thcy
could not be driven out by any "combing" of the forest. And the larger-deticbments,
such as Lynkot 1, which then counted more than, 250 persona, acted in squads of five;
which were sent far from their base for long periods, and with which infrequent con-
ta*t was maintained, mainly for the purpoab of supplying then with. explosives.
34. In addition to these detachments, there appeared new groups of diversiohietc, or-
gised by the commands of the various fronts on their own initiative. These were
either left behind in the retreat or carried across the front lines by goat of the members, of these groups were scouts who had undergone a ton-day t~-in-
3ng sent to the rear, This course dealt, with only one subjects
military intelligence and diversion in the rear. Thum, in June 191,2, in the region
of the Bryanek forests, on the "small land", 130x170 km. in area and belonging to
partisans, there landed the group of Major Virshigora, who subsequently took over
command of Kovpak's legendary division. The group was sent by the Bryansk front
for purposes of reconnaissance and diversion. The instructions read to them before
they were sent off to the enevq a rear warned them to refrain from all contacts
with the population and not to reveal themselves,. since the area swarmed with
traitors. This group had its own agents, who.kept watch 24 hours a day at the ap-
proaches to reilroaad stations and reported to the front intelligence on all passing
transports, Not having sufficient strength for an attack upon the stations they
demolished all the approaches to it, creating a tie-up, then radioed back for.p1 nes,
Virshigora's group consisted of a company of scouts and two women radio operators;
in August, 1942, they all joined Kovpak'e detachment.
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35. This a erience was shared by other groups dropped behind the German lines by the
Russian fronts.. Only a small percentage made their way back to their units across
the fit lines, and the rest joined various guerrilla detachments.
36. ra the mitldls of the summer of 1942 Moscow decided to send a large detachment far
into the rear to the right bank of the Dnieper, where there was relatively little
resistance to the Germans and where mazy had begun to accept the occupation and
collaborate with the enemy,
37. The Commanders of the large detachments were called to a conference in Moscow. In
addition to the legendary Kovpak, there came Saburov - the hero of the Bryensk
forests, Smelyutin - commander of a 650-man detachment, Duka, Pokrovsky and others.
They were generously rewarded, showered with gifts and received by Stalin h elf,
He encouraged them, thanked them for their valuable help, and then began to Us-
cuss new tasks. The large detachments were advised to continue their work In the
same spirit, expanding into districts further west. But Kovpskts detachment was
ordored to make a large-scale raid on the right boundary of the Ukraine, to cap-
ture a part of Western Ukraine and reach the Carpathians, By this time Kovpak's
detachment, 5000 strong, consisted of 4 subdivisions of 8 companies each, with
ee,:out squads, miners' sections, and a quartermaster corps. The first battalion
ahao had a sapper platoon and a radio-junction.
38. In September this large military unit started out, and in November it made a forced
March across the Dnieper. The appearance of this division was so sudden and effee-
tive that the population began to talk about a break-through of the front by the
Red Army, and some people broke into panic flight. Vherever the detachment passed,
it looted German depots and distributed the food to the population, hanged all police
and all Ukrainian traitors, and did everything possible to win over the people
such was Stalin's order. It also destroyed numerous communications and junctions.
The most brilliant operation was its smashing of the Same Cross (a junction of
many railroads-and highways connecting with Kiev, Rovno, Barauovichi, etc,); around
the city of Sarno itself, the detachment blew up all the bridges and large sections
of the roads. Small, groups detailed by the detachment put on police armbands, broke
into villages and killed all traitors. Many of the Russian mayors appointed by the
Germans came of their own will, pleading their guilt and offering their services;
some of then were hanged and some, thoroughly intimidated, were left in their places.,
But by this time, at the beginning of 1943, the Germans had developed the policy of
using Russians for fighting in the rear, They assembled volunteers from the prisoner-
of-war camps for cossack detachments to do garrison duty in the rear. There proved
to be a great number of volunteers (most of them bitter eneades of the Soviet Govern-
wnt), and they distinguished themselves by unbelievable cruelty to the partisans
who disturbed their current prosperous and free existence. The volunteers included
middle-rink officers who had graduated from - Soviet schools, Iioscow workers, cossacks,
ark. manyof the various nationals who had served in the Red' Army and vQ7.untarily
doserted to the German side.
39. Kovpek+s;detachment launched a fight to the death against these. volunteer divisions,
but the ]ratter were too numerous and fought so stubbornly that the partisans did
not succeed in destroying them and had to circle around them in order to proceed.
In addition to open fights, the guerrillas sent to these cossacks girl-shies en-
listed among the local population. These girls lured them to drinking parties,
where they were caught by the partisans. The partisans also-used other tried
methods; they stole into the enemy's offices and headquarters, planted delayed-
action mines, and soon both the building and the people in it were blown to bits.
Zr, one instance, they blow up a "Labor Bureau" which was recruiting the local work-
irg population for deportation to Germany and which was guarded by cossack uralts.
44a In other districts the detachment encountered new Gestapo tricks. On learning of
the advent of the partisans, the local Gestapo and police officers dismissed all
Russian employees who had become known for especial cruelty in dealing with the
recalcitrant population, announcing the dismissals as an act aimed to benefit the
population. However, the dismissed men, armed by the police, organized gangs and
began to hang and massacre all who fell into their hands..tJjhen the population be,
gan to comllain against these atrocities, the German authorities said that they
'Would gladly help, but they had no troops for the purpose. If the population,
they added, would take up arms against these various bandits and partisans, then
there might be some peace in their district. And the population took up arms and
opened a war on the partisans and the bandits. Kovpak's detachment lost many
people in these battles until he succeeded in convincing the population of the
difference between his men and the bandits.
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41. Qeneerally, the detachment encountered a great number of surprises, traps and pro-
vocations on the part of the Gestapo. But despite these, the raid was successful.
The partisans blew up many bridges, destroyed many communication junctions, killed
hundreds of Germane, and disrupted numerous telephone and telegraph lines. They
also obtained such valuable information which was immediately transmitted, over
the radio or through liaison planes, to Moscow and the various front-line staff
headquarters. Thus, lovpak'e partisans downed the plane which carried all the
operational resumes and the plans of the headquarters of !deist's ar*y. These
documents were relayed to Hoseow, which found them very valuable. and generously
rewarded the partisans for this feat.
42. Kovpak's raid was important in other respects as well. In almost all the districts
passed by the detachment there sprang up new partisan units which began to fight
the Germans. The raid also restored faith-in the return of the Soviet Governxt.
43. The detachment subsequently proceo4ed to-the t/astern Ukraine and Poland, reaching
as far as Warsaw. It was reconstituted into a large military division, equipped
with artillery and several tanks, and maintaining a permanent contact with Moscow,
which continually supplied it with ammunition. In addition to ammunition and sup-
pl.ca, k.ovpak's army was given a special representative from the Central Committee
of the Party, Syromolotov, whose position was equivalent to that of a member of
the Military Soviet of the Front - the highest-ranking party commissar.
44. The other detachments, most of which remained in their native districts, also ex-
panded every year. Their functions multiplied as their membership grew, and some-
times they took part in. regular front operations; they prepared air fields for the
landing of large divisions of the Red Armyy,blockaded whole districts, and gave
direct aid to the fronts. The smaller detachments continued their work of diversion,
blowing up trains, and so forth.
TI. POSSIBL Q T .QF PST- Nt1 E I
45. The war has yielded: a vast 'store of experience with regard to various foams of par-
tisan struggles methods of organizing partisan units, and system 'of preparation
and training. This experiencd was carefully and constantly studied by the SoTL*t
Contend, and the question of possible utilization of partisan warfare in a future
war Will be decided - has probably been decided already - on the basis of this, study.
The principal question here is the relative value of the two basic types of par-
tian organization and the possible use of both or the preference of one over the
other. One of these types is the partisan unit which sprang up more or less
spontaneously as an expression of popular resistance and was later gradually brought
under the direction of the Red Army Commend. The other type is represented b' the
detachatinto which were thoroughly trained beforehand and which operated from the
very first under instructions from the center. The problem involves not only the
relative usefulness of these types of partisan detachments, but also'the accoa any-
ina conditions and results of their activity. In this respect, the partisan wits
of the former type have not proven desirable in every respect, for they created
mush friction and even disorders, particularly during the Winding-up of their
operations.
46. To the partisans themselves the and of the war and generally the and of their ac-
tivities brought many disappointments and aroused much discontent. As soon as"the
Red Army ente*ed a new district, where the partisans had hitherto been active, the
latter were immediately required to surrender their arms and either enter theregu-
lar'army or go to work in the kolkhoxes. But more than 3 years of life in the
forests; where they had been entirely on their own and done practically whatever
they pleased, bred in the partisans a certain independence and unruliness. 'fire
Soviet Government, which had always fought these qualities, began to combat them
in the partisans as w'ell.-
4?. Thus, in the spring of 194.4, after the liberation of the Leningrad region, all par-
tieans who operated in the area behind the enemy lines were called to a conference
in Leningrad. The resulting spectacle was rather curious and quite unpleasant both
to the government and the population. The city was invaded by armed tramps who had
acquired a taste for looting,. murder, and all sorts of lawlessness. They were
dressed in the motley uniforms and costumes of assorted European and Soviet armies.
Having listened to the high-flown speeches of the regional leaders, they asked 'what
rewards they would receive for their deeds and how they would now live. They were
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told that it was still necessary to finish off the enemy on his own territory and
than begin to rebuild their homeland.
48. Neither answer was very satisfactory to the partisans. Emerging into the street,
they broke into the newly opened commercial stores in which the best wares were
gathered and began to loot. First of all they made for the alcoholic.drinks.
After a day of drinking, they turned in the evening to robbing the civilian popu-
lation. They held up passers-by and took their coats and watches, raped women,
transformed smell restaurants Into places of riotous orgy. Fbr two days the entire
city was in a state of total chaos. The residents were afraid to set foot in the
streets, the police hid in the barracks, the stores that escaped looting remained
closed. It was not until the morning of the third day that an UKVD division,
called up from its garrison, managed to curb the partisans and drive them out of
the city after carefully disarming them. Theringleaderss paid for the riot i>,_trh
their lives,
49. Even greater and longer-lasting anarchytwas created by the partisans in the taino.
Learning what the returned government intended to do with then, they Preferred to
r.r 1n in the forests and continue their lawless existence. Up to the and of 1945,
the forests of the Ukraine swarmed with partisans, and the NKVD was forced to carry
on almost the same struggle against them as had been waged by the Germans.
50. After this experience, it is hardly likely that in a future war Moscow would again.
be willing to set up an extensive network of partisan detachments out of the local
popu?ation. But there is no doubt that even in peace-time the government will ex-
pand its system of partisan schools for the youth of the urban centers and increase
the number of specially trained diversionists, who remained throughout fully sub-
ordinate to their leaders and showed irreproachable discipline, .
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