COMMUNIST TACTICS IN THE BALKANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01035R000100030011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: December 30, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/09/21 CIA-RDP81-01035R000100030011-7
SEC~~. 1
iEC:cET
A special Yugoslav envoy and an expert an the Hungarian Pates Treaty were sent
to Hungary on a asaret mission with a letter of introduction from Ka,rdelJ to
Rakost, The letter informed Rakosi of the Yugoslav plan andreq ted the
support of the Hungarian Communist Party in persuading its Government to
apparavp such a transfer, by either incorporating it in the peace treaty or
drafting a special agreement between the two countries. An'agreenent was
negotiated in Paris by an exchange of notes between 8ardelj and Nagy. This
agreement vas moderated in several respects. Instead of removing the whole
minority, an exchange of minorities was agreed upon, but the date of exchange
was delayed considerably. The moderation of terms case as the result of the
op flion, expressed by Rakori and Professor Varga, that the support of the
Original plan would be detrimental to the Hungarian party a -d to the final aims
of the Gc rausist Party on the whole. At that time the co-ordination and
collaboration of the different part-lee was not, fully established. The Hungarian
party declared that the Yugoslav plan rail not approved by 'rcpt', thus clearly
showing where the final decision lay.
4., On matters of less political importance such as border crossing and control;
exchange of goods, restitution of property,. visas, etc., there is no need of
Moscow's approval, but no decisions made between two or more governments to
further party aims can be made by the mere concurrence of agents of the
respective governments. Prior approval crust be obtained from Moscow.
S. In Albania the Communist party was short of Voscoe-trained members and needed
a oompetent intermediary so that officials in Moscow would not be bothered with
trivial, matters. They also needed engineers, doctors, etc, Although the
Albanian Government, in 1946, seriously considered importing Italian advisors,
Moscow chose Yugoslavia to fill the gap.
The repatriation program in Canada and the US, and the propaganda asking
imrdgrants'to return to Yugoslavia are designed to:
(a) Relieve Yugoslavia's acute shortage of skilled workers for her Five fear
Plana
(b) Induce the people to brine with them their holdings of foreign exchange
(dollars) or agricultural and other machinery. The immigrants are oncour3ged
to invest In such holdings prior to returning.
(a) To obtain intelligence information from the more "progressive elementsQ"
This last consideration however is of eras importance than the other two, as the
Yugoslavs can obtain the aarae information from other sources and from official
statistics published by foreign countries.
5EC1a
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/09/21 : CIA-RDP81-01035R000100030011-7