PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS FOR SECRET TREATY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01036R000100100061-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 1999
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: January 18, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

FORM N0 5-NB
DEC 1g.. j
Approved For Release 1999/09/23 : CIA-RDP81-01036R000100100061-3
U.S. Officials Only
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY Iran/Turkey/pakistan
SUBJECT Preliminary Negotiations for Secret Treaty
25X1A
PLACE ACQUIRED
(BY SOURCE)
DATE ACQUIRED
(BY SOURCE)
DATE (OF INFO.) 18 NNov 53
OF THE UNITED STATES. WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793
AND 794. OF THE U.S. CODE. AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE-
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
25X1
DATE DISTR. / Jan 54
NO.'`'0F._PA-GES 2
NO. OF ENCLS.
SUPP. TO
1. Negotiations preliminary to a secret treaty between Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey
have now been; concluded. The central point of the proposed treaty will be a
mutual agreement of support in case of armed conflict.
2. Participation of other Middle Eastern states is by no means ruled out. The
most desired partner in the treaty is Afghanistan. However, Afghan participa-
tion will depend on the solution of the Afghan-Pakistani border problem. There
is a desire to take Iraq into the treaty, but not Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon..
3. The Pakistan Prime Minister, Mohammed All, encouraged the continuation of the
conversations with Dr. Sunarjo, which had begun in Dec 1952. Meantime, however,
Dr. Sunarjo was warned, by Mohammed Alits opponents, not to form a league with
Pakistan, on the ground that Mohammed Alirs position was shaky. Also, Dr.
Sunarjo knew that he had to pay attention to the susceptibilities of the Left-
oriented ministers in his own cabinet. This would make treaty obligations of
an anti-Communist nature difficult.
4. India is notoriously afraid of seeing Pakistan strengthened and equally afraid
of being herself isolated. Hence Pandit Nehru would be against the treaty and
any participation in it. (This idea may have been put forward, merely to test
the attitude of the partners in the league.) However, the participation of 1
India in any anti-Soviet bloc is in the last degree improbable.
>: LAST PACE rI re' ..
U.S. Officials only
DISTRIBUTION y STATEEv.
INAVY
FBI
25X1A
L I I
Approved For Release 1999/09/23 : CIA-RDP81-01036R000100100061-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/23 : CIA-RDP81-01036R000100100061-3 25X1A
SECRET
-2-
5. One reason why the proposed partners want to see merely a bloc that will form
a purely northern barrier to the Middle East (excluding Syria) is that the
Israeli problem has never been solved. Also, Syrian distrust of Turkish
policy forms another reason. Participation of Iraq, should it take place,
will hasten the dissolution of the -Arab league,.and make British Hashemite
plans doubtful. There have already, been signs of an Iracgian policy, in-
dependent of `England.
LIBRARY S` 3JECT & ARS,70. CODES
172.362 NU(5K)(1K)
172