PREPARATIONS FOR A SHOWDOWN AT DIEN BIEN PHU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01036R000100140053-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: March 15, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

DEC . 195 951 51-46
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COUNTRY Indochina
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
25X fUBJECT Preparations, for a Showdown at Dien Bien Phu
Or THE UNITED STATES. WITHIN TNEIEANINO OF TITLE IS. SECTIONS 7OS
AND 76A. OF THE U.S. CODE. AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVS.
CATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT OV AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON It
I PROHIMITFD_
THIS Is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
NO, OF PAGES
NO. OF ENCLS.
SUPP. TO
REPORT NO.
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lA Interest, both. military and civilian, is now centered at Dien Bien Phu, the great
French fortress in northern Laos, where a great battle is being prepared. The
French General Staff maintains two hypotheses concerning the purpose of the large
concentration of Vietminh forces in this sector;
a.
To isolate and par:alize this French fortress while the major part of the
Vietminh forces bypasses Dien ,Bien Phu in a rapid advance on Luang Prabang,
the capital of Laos; or
To launch. the entire Vietminh force against this fortress and to overrun it in
a decisive battle,
`lh.e Comm nnist Generra.l * :' Nguyen Giap4 has remade the most careful preparations in
building up his fighting forces to a maximum strength. The French General Staff
therefore expects this attack to become the most violent one in this war. The
French have Concentrated their best available troops and strongest arms in and
around the fortress. Their General Staff is apparently optimistic, yet the out-
come of the battle in the offing seems rather uncertain to the neutral experts.
Following his expensive experience at Nasam,, Vo Nguyen Giap is aware of the risks
.he is now taking and will probably provide all the factors needed for victory
before he decides to launch his offensive? He has the initiative and he may
choose his own time, sinee there is nothing to force him to seek an urgent solution.
He also may choose by bypass Dien Bien Phu, should an assault on that fortress
appear to him as too costly or inconclusive.
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3. The Vietminh has completed a., very large concentration of its forces against
5ien Bien ':Phu.' Several battalions, belonging to three different divisions,
some 20 thousand men, have been assembled in this area. They are supported
by three AA battalions, and one artillery regiment. For the first time in
eight years'of war, the Communist General Staff has accepted the calculated
risk of leaving its vital bases in the north Tonkin Delta unguarded. They
have.lef t behind only regional battalions protected by a dense intelligence
net, Most of their troops, including the best ones, are now at Dien Bien Phu,
A vast supply line has also been organized by requisitioning 40 thousand coolies
from,among the population and sending there some 300 trucks, which in the last
month have been piling up stocks of food and ammunition in the vicinity of
Dien Bien Phu, In spite of almost daily air raids, this traffic could not be
stopped. The food convoys have been coming directly from Yunnan in Communist
China, where large stocks of materiel have been ammassed. Finally, in the
entire region around Dien Bien Phu the ma uis which the French Corrurand had
organized,has been cleaned up by the Red troops. (They were ordered by the
French to disperse and then to join, in small groups, the forces in the Dien
Bien Phu fortress.)
4. In spite of the reconquest c `rhakek, all danger to central Laos has not been
eliminated by the French counteroffensive. The rebel battalions, although badly
mauled (one and one-half battalions have been lost) are still able to start an
offensive against Vientiane, particularly should the Vietminh forces bypass Dien
Bien Phu and march on Luang Prabang. At present the Vietminh forces, are being
regrouped in central Laos, and their depleted foodstocks have been replenished
with 300 tons of food, which they took at Thakek? These troops have also been
assigned the political task of disintegrating all resistance in central Laos by
propaganda work among the population. j t seems that this had been the main
purpose of the offensive against Thakek; the capture of that town may not even
have been planned at first?. The unexpected loss of Thakek proved extremely
costly for ,the French who lost a large amount of war. material there. The brand-
new American machine guns had to be destroyed by fire, since there was no
time for. shipping them away.. The Vietminh trou pshave also captured enough.
material to c;lotYig and feed themselves for many, months.
5. While the French lines of communication between northern and southern L~:-ao are
being restored, General Navarre has starte), an unexpected offensive against
the etminh in the central zone of Vietnam, extending from Nhatrang to Tourane.
Military experts generally disapprove of this decision since this operation,
even if completely successful, will only at Gain gains. in a sector of seconda.rry
importance. It is an offensive which needs a long period of time and is directed
against an area where the Vietminh has no important bases to lose. The French
forces sent into this area will have to stay there for at least six months,
while the Vietminh may withdraw into the mountains bordering the coastline
from where they may continue their harassing attacks for almost any length of
tia:g a
6. Urxbias ? oa F,>?, ?vets note th!r.t 3~ecent military moves or. both sides indicate an
in.t;ent, of assuring t`.aem.a elves; favorable positions in case negotiations for an
arm since are torte Chi i~;inh is trying, to. establish himself firmly xio y a
of the 16 parallel, including northern Laos, while the French-Vietnarrm forces are
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improving thei-r -security in the - south -by occupying ad,-enemyenclave?, easy -to
take, in their own-au eas Thti'.'ts- .,,.political intent could 'expiai.n the recent tactic::,
of bath-sides which m.ilitari :'y do not seem reasonable. The French' General.
Staff denies such intent and emphasizes that they. 'are seeking rapid succe'ses,
even -if. they be only temporary, in order to prevent the- idea of negotiations with
the enemy gaining support{
Whatever the French military plans are, the idea of -armistice negotiations to
start soon, has spreadain Vietnamese 6olitical circles and has caused the Caotaists
to react strongly against it This-sect has published -a letter which. it sent.-to
the French Minister, ~aeguet, who It at present: in Tncochina, to warn the F.rerich
authorities-that the taodaists were definitely opposed to any negotiatiohs.with
the Communists, and that in case of such negotiations, tGhey would Join the _maqu.is
ahd'also establish-themselves in, the Philippl..nesj where, faith American-aid,. they
would-establish an,anti-Comatmunist?government for liberation.
$. It seems that. a French emissary, ---]has made contact with a -Vietminh 25X1
emissary ,to explore the chances or eventual armistice negotiations, but nothing
is known about the result of these contacts. To judge by the optimism of the
Frdnbh' General Staff, the ..ld'e of egotiating an -armi.staice has: been'-put off t%ithout,
however, having been abandoned. On the other hand,, Ho Chi Minh is certainly not..
forced to negotiate an armistice. His military potential -is intact. Quite recently
lie, started to use more powerful .and dangerous arms in. the guerrilla= inf"e sted Tonkin
:delta: land mines more powerful than any heretofore known, -and. almost impossible
to-detect,F Those mines-have been supplied by the Chinese Communists, and they
are : eapable oaf pulverizing even a, tank. Mines are being used now in. the Tonkin
Delta to a..far greater extent than heretofore, Military and civilii.an.:t.ruoks- and
cars are being,. destroyed in large numbers, and serious losses in.huiaan];iVee have
also been suffered.' In - central and southern Vietnam, guerrilla .fighting has
also,beaen increased,, , Several trains have been blown. up ,recently on the lines fu4._
Tourane and Hu4-cuang.Tr1. In the- south, a byclist contest, .Called the Tour. of ` ,
Southern Vietnam, had to-be cancelled since, immediately after the. start, terrorist
a4tions interfered with the tour. There is a- constant C.ommun.ist - effort to. increase
the fighting quality of the paetisans -in .centra.l Vietnam, while in the south, they
are also able to organize minor operations against outposts and smaller fortified
areas
9. Chinese -material aid has been considerably increased in recent weeks. It irieiitdLis
some heavy material.* 105. caliber. guns, AA batteries, and special -fuel for
Molotpv,trucks. Intelligence agents have also-been-recruited recently in large.
numbers x some Communist agents had become - too well known and had to be replaced
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