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December 27, 2016
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June 6, 2013
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August 1, 1957
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 50X1-HUM Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 ei? SOVIET CONTROL OF MILITAR RAIL MOVEMENTS 50X1 -HUM /File Copy Must be forwarded to Document File Section 4G-2, U. S. Army within two weo4 BETWEEN THE USSR-GDR AND WITHIN THE GDR (5) -r r1one f e eat in whole az tel ?? PelaUeSaig34 Ot 3?64e.agj AUGUST 1957 50X1 -HUM M'S rrl ...ft' IR zr.o.h-1 w nie under etcmdbegi e- without - " of 219T1CU i^ t s,++: y c' led ? 4sisois Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 -5-EeRfr. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 -Esp, ?a; :?er mri3 cau,t=ff C ABMS DV? P mA1r110k1 AFFECTING ME ?NT NATIONAL DEMISE (OF ME Imam %YAM WIIMIN) laMINa CV YHE ESt? TOMS 7% MID To . Tim ONI ANY MMIEI2. 70 AN UNA EOM GM LAW. (17Z @ONT@NTS PER SN OS IONAGE LAM, IMRE W. U. GIME- ? OEM Cf3 REVELATOONI CV TRANSM PROH UTHOR RED MOS ONIHDRmATOCH 5 FURIASHED WITH ME UNDERSTMD., INS MAT O8Lt r BE LEASE REMAW OMER IMATOON WITH@UT SPECOPOC APPROVAL, `ME UNOTED RAM OP ANTROCA IMPARTMENT CP ME ARMS?; UT WEILL NDT DE OME2 THAN] AOLPTARV FURPas&s; AND THAW DNIV@RmATBON 'WILL BE AFFORDED THE s AmE 151WEE CV SEC(012111V 6 O1 UNITED STATES OP MEROCA DEPARTMERT ? irARAMP USED ? r- 41.0, CONGVENi 0411 50X1-HUM OL cot WPM? ?I CONEIDENPAL x. et.i. D4*, ? It - srqo Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005 8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 CONFIDENTIAL THE OVERALL SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SECRET. THOSE PORTIONS HAVING A LOWER CLASSIFICATION ARE INDICATED BY THE PRINTED CLASSIFICATION AT THE TOP AND BOTTOM OF THE PAGES ON WHICH THEY APPEAR. PAGES HAVING NO PRINTED CLASSIFICATION ARE UN- CLASSIFIED. REPRODUCTION OR DOWNGRADING OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, HEADQUARTERS, USAREUR. CONFIDENTIAL cip CONFIDENTIAL FOREWORD This study represents an analysis of information on Soviet control of military rail movements available to this Headquarters from 1945 to the present. It is designed to acquaint intelligence personnel and others with essential background information in the field of Soviet military rail supply procedures; to provide an up-to-date reference on the sub- ject; and to facilitate the interpretation of pertinent intelligence reports, as well as the preparation of estimates and plans on, or re- lating to, Soviet rail supply matters. Periodic revision of this document will be undertaken as required by future developments. Any intelligence or other recipient agency having valid information at variance with its contents is re- quested to notify this office promptly so that corrections can 1? --A- 50X1-HUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2: Chief Intelligence Production Branch iii CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 ii Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 ANWOPWW.1,111.4A SECRET CONTENTS Pate FRONTISPIECE CLASSIFICATION ii POREaCRD OECTION ? The Development of Post-,War International Rail Traffic Agreements A. The 1945 - 1948 Period B. The 1948 ? 1956 Period 1-25 1- 3 3-25 1. The 1950 Transit Traffic Agreement /0-11 2. The RIV Agreement 11 3. The SMGS?SMPS Agreement 12-16 4. The PPW 17-18 5. The 1954 Transit Freight Traffic Agreement 18-23 6. The 1954 Transit Passenger Traffic Agreement 23-25 acTicku - The Relationship Between Total Traffic Volume and Soviet Military Shipments 26-28 1. International Traffic 2. Intrazonal Traffic ggcluxuaL - Organization of the Soviet Military Rail Transport System (VOSO/SKU) 1. Chain of Command 26-27 27-28 29-32 29-30 2. The VOSO and SMAD?SCC?SHC?Embassy Transport Administrations: 1945 - 1956 30-32 ggsnop Iv - Procedure for Movement of Military Supplies) Troops) and Equipment 33-47 1. Relationship Between the Soviets and the East German Reichsbahn 2. The Transport Numbering System 3. The Train Numbering System Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 iv SECRET 33-35 36-39 , 39-42 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 SECRET CONTENTS (Contld) agmaCiv (Oontld) Page 4. Soviet Procedures at Frankfurt an der Oder 42-47 gEcTur y - Conclusion 48-51 1. Military Significance of the Present Routing System 48-49 2. Anticipated Changes in the Present System Prior to the Initiation of Hostilities 49-51 ANNEN1B ANNEX 1 - Main Rail Lines USSR - Polish Frontier to West German Frontier 52 ANNEX 2 - Shipping Documents and Transfer List (ubergabeliste)53-57 ANNEX 3 - Labels Used for Freight Requiring Special Handling 58-67 ANNEX 4 VOSO Personnel (Names, Duties and Location) 68-72 ANNEX 5 - Selected Military Transport Numbers 73-77 ANNEX 6 - Numerical Designation of Stations of Destination 78-83 ANNEX 7 - Photographs of Soviet Equipment Movements 84-110 ANNEX 8 - Glossary of Railroad Supply Terms 111-115 ANNEX.9 - Main Communication Lines of VOSO Organization 116 BIBLIOGRAPHY 117-118 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL SECTION I The Development of Post-War International Rail Traffic Agreements A. The 1945 - 1948 Period By the end of World War II, the Soviets had well estab- lished lines of communication for logistical support and movement of troops and equipment all the way from the frontiers of the Soviet Union to the Elbe. The principal transport medium for these troop, equipment and supply movements was the railroad. Indeed, at the close of hostilities the Soviets had even converted one track of the main Brest-Warsaw-Frankfurt/Oder-Berlin line to Soviet gauge in order to augment logistical support of Soviet forces in Germany by using the larger capacity Soviet rolling stock. Shortly after the close of the war, this track was reconverted to standard European gauge. Movement of troops and materiel by motor transport was nearly always localized, occurring primarily within the combat zone, i.e. from Corps to Division level, or Division to Regiment. These develop- ments were in accordance with Soviet doctrine of using rail trans- ports as close to the front lines as possible. After the armistice, the Soviets continued to use rail as their prime means of moving troops, equipment, and supplies not only between the Soviet Union and East Germany, but also within East Ger- many, especially when such movements were more than 25 miles (40 Kilo- meters). This emphasis on rail movement has not changed to any marked degree from World War II days up to the present. By the end of the war, the railroads of Poland and East Germany were completely controlled and primarily operated by Soviet personnel. As rapidly as possible the actual operation of these systems was relegated to the nationals of the countries involved. The Soviets, of course, retained overall control of these systems. Poland was the first of the two countries to regain basic control of her railroad system. This did not occur, however, until 1948. From mid-1945 up to this time she was forced to make available to the Soviets on a first priority basis her six main East-West lines for rather extensive Soviet traffic between-East Germany and the Soviet Union. The bulk of this traffic was not military, as will become evident from the following developments transpiring in East Germany during this period. Under the terms of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, each occu- pier of Germany agreed, inter alia,to restore economic life and 1 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 CONFIDENTIAL communications as rapidly as practicable. The Soviet Military Administration (SMA), as the Soviet Occupation Authority was then called, proceeded to do just the opposite. Throughout most of the four year period following the war, the SMA concentrated on a hither- to unprecedented scale of dismantling East German industrial plants and the East German railroad system, reducing the latter in effect to a single track system. To move this vast quantity of material back to the Soviet Union, and, to some extent, to the other war dam- aged satellite countries, the Soviets had the East German railroad authorities organize the best of the then available locomotive pool into some thirty pools or columns, as the Germans called them, each consisting of from 30 to 32 brigades, each brigade consisting of one locomotive and crew. These brigade trains, manned by East German crews and accompanied by Soviet guard personnel, regularly plied be- tween East Germany and the Soviet Union across Poland throughout this period. These trains came to be known also as reparations trains or "Soviet Interest" trains (Interessenzuege), since the cargo they carried was charged against the German reparations pay- ments owed to the Soviets. In addition to this traffic, and also hauled by the Brigade locomotives, were the Soviet troop trains and supply trains. The number of these, except for the relatively short period following the war, when the size of Soviet combat forces in East Germany was rapidly reduced, constituted only a small proportion of the total traffic between East Germany and the.Soviet Union. As long as the SMA had supreme power in East Germany and Soviet civil and military authorities controlled Poland, no rail traffic agreements relating to the movement of Soviet trains across or in these respective territories were necessary. In fact, had such agreementsexisted, they would, per se, have indicated a degree of sovereignty - and sovereign rights for East Germany, at least, were not even rumored at this time. Thus, by virtue of the power invested in an occupier, the Soviets dictated to East Germany and Poland how, when and where Soviet trains would be run, made the rail- road administrationeof the respective countries (principally East GerMany) responsible for providing themotive power and rolling stock for these trains and insuring their safe passage. In most cases, the Soviets sent their own guard and train command personnel along with each train as double insurance of its safe passage. Because of the volume of Soviet reparations traffic leaving East Germany, every available main east-west line was put into use. The East German lines joined the main Polish lines at the Oder-Neisse river, the new tentative post-war western frontier of Poland. By the end of the war the Soviets had constructed temporary bridges at all these main juncture points, or crossing points as they are more 2 CONFIDENTIAL (11 CONFIDENTIAL commonly referred to today, except at Goerlitz. This resulted in a total of 7 points, namely from north to south, Grambow, Tantow, Kietz/kuestrin, Frankfurt/Oder, Guben, Forst, and Horka (also fre- quently designated by another station closer by the Neisse River called Wehrkirch). These juncture points, together with the main East German and Polish lines they connect, are shown on the map in Annex 1. The best of these lines was the Berlin-Frankfurt/Oder- Warsaw-Brest line, since this was the only through double track line between the Soviet Union and East Germany during this period. Un- like today, however, it was not then quite as important a main Soviet supply line to East Germany; for during the 1945 - 1948 period, all the main East-West lines across Poland were regularly used both for military supply shipments and for the movement of Soviet troops and equipment, in addition to the extensive reparations traffic. B. The 1948 - 1956 Period The economic policy of the Soviets toward East Germany underwent a radical revision in 1948. It had apparently become clear to them that reparations in goods produced could be met only if the East German economy were given outside aid and allowed to re- build. The East German Economic Commission was formed under Soviet supervision and given the task over the next two years of coordinat- ing and planning all industrial and agricultural endeavors. This whole period was, then, a period of stabilization, a welcome respite after the severe wave of dismantling. It also had a marked effect on international traffic. The volume of traffic dropped, and the Soviets found that three main lines between East Germany and the Soviet Union were sufficient to handle both their military and com- mercial interest traffic. Rising Polish and East German economic requirements were necessitating an increasing use of the rails by the owner countries; and the Soviet policy of more closely integrat- ing the economies of the satellite bloc countries soon resulted in a preponderance of commercial traffic over those lines formerly hand- ling the heavy reparations traffic. Part of this commercial traffic was still reparations traffic, but a reduced volume of reparations in the form of products produced in East Germany and not dismantled items. k criterion for judging the fall-off in reparations and mili- tary traffic by the end of 1948 is the fact that the number of Brig- ade locomotives hauling these trains dropped from over 1,000 to 425, of which about half were in cold or standby reserve. By 1950 Poland was more or less regarded as a sovereign country, and East Germany had been given the sovereign-designate name of German Democratic Republic (GDR). The first concrete expres- sion of these new international political relationships, as they 3 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 CONFIDENTIAL affected Soviet international rail movements, was a formal transit traffic agreement concluded 1 July 1950 between the Governments of the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany. This agreement, with minor change, remains in effect to this day and seems to be reason- ably closely adhered to by the signatory countries. Because of its importance, the terms of this agreement are set forth in detail. 1.. The 1950 Agreement on Transit Traffic between the German Democratic Republic and the USSR via-the Polish Railways a. Recipients: (1) Each Signatory Government. (2) The Ministries for Traffic and/or Railroads of Each Government. (3) The East German General Directorate of the Reichsbahn (Generaldirektion Reichsbahn). (4) Office of Certification and Record. (5) The East German Railroad Divisions (Reichsbahn- direktionen - RED'S). (6) The East German Railroad Sub-Divisions (Reichsbahnaemter - RBA's). (7) All Other Railroad Offices (stations) Having To Do With Transit Traffic. b. General Conditions: By agreement between the Ministry for Traffic of the German Democratic Republic and the Ministry for Traffic of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the following regulations govern the transport of passengers, baggage and freight from the German Democratic Republic to the USSR and in reverse direction, via the Polish railways; as well as the fiscal accounting of these services: (1) To perform the above mentioned serVices, tran- sit trains (Transitzuege) will be used. They will be made up of East German rolling stock and locomotives and manned by East German rail- way crews. (2) Passengers and baggage will be transported in 4 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL passenger trains. There will be one train daily each way between Brest and Berlin and two trains daily each direction between Brest and Frankfurt/Oder. These trains will be composed of East German cars and locomotives, but the locomotive and train crews will be Soviet railway personnel. (3) Passage of transit trains over the Polish railways will be in accordance with the rules laid dawn in a docu- ment on that subject. (4) The East German Reichsbahn will provide for, at no cost to the Soviet railways, the necessary space for the sale of tickets, acceptance and storage of baggage as well as waiting and transient rooms for the transit train crews at the following stations: Frankfurt/Oder Berlin-Schlesischer Bahnhof (now called Ostbahnhof) Wildpark (5) Passengers and baggage will be transferred at the Brest border station. Passengers going to the Soviet Union will get off trains of the 1435mm gauge (European Standard) and board trains of 1524mm gauge (Soviet broad gauge). Baggage will be trans- loaded in the same manner. The reverse procedure holds for passen- gers and baggage departing the Soviet Union for East Germany. (6) The transport of Soviet passengers and baggage is valid between any station in the USSR authorized to handle passen- gers and baggage, and the East German stations, Frankfurt/Oder, Berlin- Schlesischer Bahnhof, and Wildpark. Soviet Union railway and baggage tickets will be used and charged for in accordance with Soviet Union railway tariffs. Soviet railway personnel are in charge of the sale of tickets and handle the baggage at the Frankfurt/Oder, Berlin- Schlesischer and Wildpark stations. The following distances are used in computing ticket tariff in either direction between Brest and designated'points in East Germany: Brest - Frankfurt/Oder - 715 Kilometers (446.85 miles) Brest - Berlin Schlesischer Bahnhof - 804 Kilometers (502.5 miles) 5 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 CONFIDENTIAL Brest - Wildpark - 859 Kilometers (536.85 miles) c. Freight Movement: (1) Freight from the GDR to the USSR or vice-versa will be transloaded at the border transfer stations of the USSR or at its transloading stations. "or (2) Following are the designated border transfer stations of the countries concerned: Distances Via Polish USSR ,GDR Railways Kilometers Miles Mamonovo Kietz 453 (281.87) Bagrationovsk Kietz 524 (327.50) Zheleznodorozhnyy Kietz 546 (341.25) Lososna Kietz 736 (460.00) Berestovitsa Frankfurt/Oder 724 (452.50 Vysoko-Litovsk Frankfurt/Oder 690 (431.25) Brest Frankfurt/Oder 715 (446.87) Jagodin Guben 772 (482.50 'Rava Russkaya Guben 764 (477.50) Mos tiska Guben 728 (455.00) Nishankovitse "Guben 730 -(456.25) (3) The weight of cargo in either direction is nol to be more than 17.5 metric tons or 25 metric tons* per bill of lad- ing (Frachtbrief) per two-axle car. * Probably refers to Soviet type car. Fifteen metric tons is usual cargo capacity of Western European rolling stock. (4) The train manifest papers (Zugbegleitpapiere) will accompany the shipment from its point of origin in the USSR to the station of destination in East Germany. 6 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL (5) Bills of lading (Frachtbriefe) in German and Russian will accompany shipments originating in East Germany and des- tined for stations in the USSR. (6) Military freight originating in the USSR will be addressed to the border transfer (or transloading) station and new manifest papers will be made out there for further shipment to the East German station of destination. Military shipments originating in East Germany and destined for the USSR will be addressed only as far as border transfer or transloading stations. At these points they will be given new manifest papers and be sent on to their final des- tination in the USSR. (7) Freight charges will be calculated by the USSR station of origin or destination for freight moving over USSR and Polish lines; and by the East German station of origin or destination for freight moving over East German lines. These charges will be paid by the sender and/or receiver at the respective stations responsible for determining charges. d. The Transfer of Freight: (1) The East German Reichsbahn dispatches and accepts transit freight at designated border transfer stations on the East German-Polish frontier. Each transfer takes place on the basis of a transfer document (Ubergabeliste) presented by, or handed to, the train commander (conductor) at the border station. The train comman- der retains this document from the East German-Polish border to the USSR transfer station and vice-versa. The Soviet Union dispatches and accepts transit freight in the same manner at the designated bor- der transfer and transloading stations on the Soviet-Polish frontier. (2) Freight from the GDR to either by the seal of the railroad of origin, both. Military freight from the USSR and the the transloading station with the seal of the whereas all other freight will be sealed only railroad. the USSR may be sealed or of the sender, or GDR will be provided at railroad and the shipper, with the seal of the (3) The train commander will obtain three of the six copies of the transfer document (Ubergabeliste) at the border transfer station of the dispatching railroad for use at the border transfer station of the accepting railroad.- These documents must be signed by the train commander and a representative of the railroad dispatching and/or receiving. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 7 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 1-. CONFIDENTIAL (4) In case one railroad makes a damage claim against the other, this must be done no later than 30 days following the occurrence. Claims against the Reichsbahn are to be made at Traf- fic Control Office II, RBD Berlin, Berlin Unter der Linden 10. If railroads of the USSR are at fault, claims are to be made against the railroad division of the Soviet railroads through whose transfer sta- tion the goods passed. These divisional directorates are: Director- ate of the Lithuanian Railroads in Vilnius; the Brest-Litovsk Direc- torate in Baranovitschi; the Kovel Directorate in Rovno; and the Lvov Directorate in Lvov. e. Regulations Regarding Train Operation and Transfer of Rolling Stock: (1) Transit trains between the GDR and the USSR are to be regarded as sealed (geschlossen) trains. The number of such trains transiting Poland is laid down in paragraph 8 of a document en- titled "Regulations for the Passage of Soviet Trains over the Polish Railroad System".* These train schedules were agreed to by railroad representatives of the GDR, Poland, and the USSR. Polish train sched- ules must indicate which of their stations are coaling stations. Transit trains leaving the GDR for the USSR must carry at least six tons of coal in the tender to be able to reach the next designated coaling point in Poland, and enough grease and oil to last to the bor- der station of the USSR. A coal requisition form (Kohlenverlangs- zettel), signed by the locomotive engineer, will be used to obtain coal at Polish and Soviet coaling points. The East German Reichsbahn will submit monthly to the International Traffic Administration of the USSR Ministry for Traffic, copies of the coal requisition forms used. In the case of passenger trains, the train commander handles the forms, which are provided only at Brest, and indicates on the re- turn slip how many were used. * This document is not available to this Headquar- ters. (2) Locomotives and cars are transferred by the USSR railways or the Reichsbahn to the Polish railway system by means of locomotive and car manifests. These manifests must be made out in six copiet for each train. One copy goes to the dispatching and one to the receiving railroad. The other four are given to the-train com- mander. Locomotive and train manifests are not made out in the case of trains (passenger or freight) originating in Poland and going either to East Germany or to the USSR. The remaining four copies of the manifests, after being stamped and certified by officials of both the railroads concerned and the train commander, are distributed as follows: Three remain at the transfer station of the railroad dis- patching the train; the fourth at the transfer station of the 8 CONFIDENTIAL N CONFIDENTIAL railroad accepting the train. In case any cars have to be cut out in transit for any reason, a proper notation will be made on the car manifest and delivered by the train commander to the USSR or GDR bor- der station accepting the train from the Polish railroad. (3) The. conductor of the transit freight train has to prepare a trip log (Fahrtbericht) in duplicate. Forms for this re- port are obtained at the Polish entry station. One copy is retained for the Reichsbahn and one goes to the Polish exit station. (4) The Polish Ministry of Transport provides at no charge to locomotive and commander personnel of transit trains the necessary number of route maps, time tables, etc., in Polish, Russian and German. f. Determination of Railroad Responsibility in Case of Damage, Loss, Theft. Etc.: (1) The USSR railroad is completely responsible for the transport of baggage. (2) Each railroad is responsible for transit train safety and security from the moment of acceptance to the moment of dispatch, and in accordance with the tariffs governing its own lines. (3) Claims against the railroads of the USSR or Po- land may be directed to the Administration for International Traffic, Ministry of Transport, Moscow, Nova Bamannaja 2; against the Reichs- bahn to the Reichsbahn General Directorate (now the Ministry for Traf- fic), Berlin, Vossstrasse 33. 6. Accounting: (1) By the sixth of the following month, the trans- fer stations of the USSR and Poland, and Poland and the GDR determine the accounting of freight rolling stock used during the preceding month. This is done in accordance with a'special form on which is re- corded the movement of all cars concerned by type. Each railroad administration gets two copies of this accounting. (2) The financial accounting of passenger baggage and freight haulage between the GDR and the USSR will be done monthly (retroactive to 1 November 1949) between the International Traffic Administration of the USSR Ministry for Traffic (INO NTS) and the Reichsbahn General Directorate. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 9 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 r., costs: (a) Repair of its rolling stock by Poland and/ or the USSR, even if Poland and the USSR were responsible for damage. (b) Fnel and lubricants furnished by Poland and/or the USSR from 1 July 1950 at the rate of 30 DME per ton of coal and .25 DME per kilo of lubricant. - CONFIDENTIAL (3) The Reichsbahn is responsible for the following (4) The railroads of the USSR are responsible for the following costs, retroactive to 1 November 1949: (a) The use of East German locomotives and crew cars, and the use of East German rolling stock while T:in Polish or USSR railroad lines. These costs will be paid in accordance with the fees stipulated by the Reichsbahn, i.e.: 1 520 DME per day for the use of a loco- motive and crew cars, and the quartering of locomotive and-train crew personnel engaged in freight traffic, from 1 November 1949 to 1 July 1950; and from that time on at the rate of 32 DME per locomotive hour. 2 4.30 DME per freight car day. 1 8.60 DME per tank car day. - A 165 DME per locomotive day for locomo- tives used in passenger service Brest-Berlin and Brest-Frankfurt/Oder. 20 DME per two or three axle passenger car day. 6 55 DME per four axle passenger car day. 200 DME per heating car (Heizkessel- wagen) day. This includes cost of two tons of coal and provisioning of service personnel. 8 .06 DME per axle kilometer for transit passenger trains while on East German lines; or .10 DME per axle kilometer if these trains are manned with German locomotive-crews and are pulled by a Reichsbahn locomotive. (b) Any change in these costs must be settled unanimously. ? 10 CONFIDENTIAL ,4?S; CONFIDENTIAL It is evident from the above agreement that the origin, destina- tion and type of military traffic, while not recorded on railroad documents to the extent that commercial shipments are, nevertheless would appear on the bills of lading (Frachtbriefe), and therefore would be known to certain East German railroad employees. The im- portance of the Frachtbriefe to intelligence on the subject of mili- tary movements will be discussed in greater detail in Section IV. The procedures outlined in the 1950 agreement were reaffirmed again in 1951$ and underwent no basic change until 1 July 1954. At a conference held in Warsaw in May 1954, the signatories of the 1950 agreement agreed upon certain changes in procedure to become effec- tive 1 July 1954. The text of this agreement as it affects all freight traffic is not known to this Headquarters. However, certain procedural changes reportedly based on this agreement are known, as is that portion dealing with transports. These are discussed in Subsection 5. The major operational, changes that are known to have come about were: (1) The substitution of Polish locomotives and crews for East German in hauling Soviet freight trains across Poland, and (2) simplification of the train manifests (reduction of amount of information thereon) at border traffic stations. 2. ..M.a_l_g_y_AKIseemar_Lt. Somewhat prior to the time the Soviets were formalizing agreements with the satellites regarding Soviet traffic, post-war resumption of trade among Western European countries, and between Western and Eastern Europe led to the reinstitution and restatement of the pre-war international rail freight traffic agreement known as the Regelments des Vehicules Internationales (RIV), or Regulations on the International Movement of' Rail Cars, and a corresponding one for passenger traffic, the RIC (Regolamento di Carrozze Internationale). These agreements stipulate basically what types of cars are suitable for use in international traffic and outline procedures whereby one country can call upon another to meet its fluctuating car demands. All cars suitable for international traffic, in addition to the pres- cribed car markings of the country of ownership bear the white mark- ing RIV or RIC in a square frame. Although these agreements have no direct relation to the Soviet-satellite rail agreements, they are mentioned because they alone would be sufficient to govern all types of international traffic. Furthermore, the RIV/RIC traffic moving over satellite lines could reasonably be expected to be halted or sharply curtailed if the Soviets decided to make full use of the East- West lines between the Soviet Union and the eastern frontiers of Western Germany. 11 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 CONFIDENTIAL 3. The SMGS-SMPS Agreement All European countries with the exception of the USSR are signatory to the RIV/RIC convention. Because of the shift in post-war trade patterns and the concomitant increase in rail traffic between nations of the Soviet Bloc, a separate international railroad convention, sponsored by the Soviet Union, was adopted on 1 November 1951 by the following countries: The Soviet Union Albania Bulgaria Hungary North Korea Mongolia Poland Rumania Czechoslovakia This convention was known as the SMGS and SPS, standing for the Russian words SOGLASCHENIJE MEZHDUNARODNOJE GRUZOVOJE SSOBSCHTSCHENIJE or Agreement on International Freight Traffic. SMPS, wherein the P stands for PASSAJEROVOJE, means Agreement on International Passenger Traffic. The German version of this agreement/is known as Abkommen ueber den Internationalen Eisenbahn-Gueter-und Personen-Verkehr. In effect, the SMGS/SYYS was a type of RIV solely applicable to the Soviet Bloc, and enforceable within this Bloc under 'the aegis of the Soviet Union. ? The SMGS/SEPS Convention was reaffirmed 1 January 1954 and again on 1 January 1956. The 1956 edition of this agreement was issued be- cause of the entry of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam into the Con- vention. The 1956 edition contains no important changes to the 1951 edition. The most important sections of this agreement are indicated in the following extracts: a. Purpose: This agreement governs international railway traf- fic in freight and passengers between the Peoples' Republics-of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, China, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the German Democratic Republic, the Korean Peoples' Democratic Republic, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the Republic of Czechoslovakia. 12 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL b. Modus Operandi: The bill of lading (Frachtbrief) will serve as the basic document in international freight movements. Every member country is obligated to handle all freight except explosives, ammunition (hunting ammunition excluded), and cer- tain other highly inflammable materials, received from another member country. All freight will be forwarded from origin to destination without transloading when the railroads concerned are of the same guage; when the gauges of the countries concerned are different, freight will either be transloaded at the appropriate border station or transferred to the new gauge by placin the car on wheel sets (trucks) of the new gauge. Ordinarily the dispatching railroad is obligated to provide the reserve wheel sets for those cars which will travel over a different gauge system. If, however, the country having the different gauge is only a transit country, then it, upon agree- ment, may provide the necessary wheel sets for its lines. The following types of freight may be shipped only after prior agreement has been reached between the participating railroads: (1) Heavy piece freight, the weight of which is than 60 metric tons and which cannot be transloaded. more (2) Heavy piece freight, the weight of which is more than 30 metric tons, but which can be transloaded. (3) Freight longer than 18 meters (except rails up to 30 meters in length). (4) Freight which exceeds normal load limit regulations. (5) Acids and other chemicals, transported in special tank cars and which require transloading. In order to determine the movement requirements of the above listed types of freight, the station of origin must notify the railroads concerned at least a month in advance of the weight and dimensions of the freight to be dispatched. Freight excertding normal load limitations will be so marked in red letters in German and Russian, except that such freight to China, Korea, Ncmgolia or Vietnam will be so marked only in Russian. The shipper vehicles is obligated to wheel and boxes of spare of motor vehicles, tractors or other power lead-seal the cabin, hood, batteries, spare parts and send along an inventory list of 13 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 CONFIDENTIAL the sealed items. These inventories will be written in the language of the shipperla country as well as in Russian or Germane Every freight shipment of any type must be accompanied by a bill of lading (Frachtbrief) from station of origin to station of destination. This document is made out by the shipper at the sta- tion. In addition, a bill of lading duplicate (Frachtbriefdoppel) is prepared and retained by the shipping station until the shipment contract has been completed, whereupon the shipping station returns the duplicate to the shipper. The ordinary Frachtbrief and Fracht- briefdoppel are printed on white paper. Should the shipment be an express shipment, the Frachtbrief will have a 1 cm. wide red stripe across the top and bottom margins, both in front and on the back. In addition to the Frachtbrief, which must accompany the shipment, there is another comparable document that has to be made out by the shipping station. This is called a loading card or Frachtkarte. It is actually an abbreviated form of the Frachtbrief. It is intended to facilitate the movement of any given shipment from one railroad to another. As such, it is a rail movement document (as opposed to the Frachtbrief, which is a shipper's document) and is prepared by the shipping station in as many copies as there are rail- roads participating in the movement. The station of origin also keeps a permanent copy of each Frachtbrief made out. A copy of the Fracht- brief and the Frachtkarte are reproduced in Annex 2. The shipper will indicate on the Frachtbrief the border stations through which the freight is to pass. These stations should be those permitting the most rapid (shortest distance) shipment be- tween station of origin and destination. The shipper should choose those stations listed in the Unified Transit Tariff(Einheitlicher Transittarif) Agreement, which was evolved for this purpose. In shipments to and from China and Korea, the number of the Chinese or Korean station concerned must be given in addition to its name. c. Limitations: The following transit freight, forwarded over USSR lines to China, Korea, Mongolia, or Vietnam may be shipped under one bill of lading up to the following amounts: (1) Bulk freight (grain, oil seeds, sugar) in box cars up to 50 metric tons or a cubic measurement of 75-85 inches. (2) Bulk freight in open cars up to 60 metric tons for gondolas and up to the maximum load limit of a flat. 14 CONFIDENTIAL {-4 CONFIDENTIAL (3) Tankcar shipments of 25 to 50 metric tons. (4) An axle pressure of 17 tons may not be exceeded, except by agreement between the Administration of the railroads con- cerned, on lines having a gauge of 1435mm (Standard European). If, for any reason, the permissible axle pressure of a given line falls below 17 tons, then the railroad concerned is obligated to inform all member railroads immediately. Cars may normally not be loaded beyond their maximum load limit (Tragfaehigkeit). In case only one load limit designated is printed on a car (this is the normal capacity of the car or Ladege- wicht), the maximum load limit will be considered 5% higher. EXcep- tions to this are two-axle cars of the USSR and Mongolian railways, where maximum load limit is .5 tons higher than normal load; and two tons higher than normal load for the four or more axle cars. If only one load limit designator is printed on a Chinese or Korean car, this limit will be considered the maximum load limit. Cars loaded with explosive or inflammable materials must so be positioned in a train that at least 12 axles come between the first car loaded with such materials and the locomotive, and at least six axles between the last cars so loaded and the end car of the train. These buffer oars may be empty or loaded with non-oombustible materials. Cars loaded with explosive or inflammable materials may not be switched at a speed faster than 10 kilometers per hour. Jerky switching and sudden jars are to be avoided. Locomotives hauling or switching these cars must be provided with spark catchers. As a.further safety precaution in the rail movement of explosives and inflammable materials, a series of special labels has been devised. These labels will be affixed to the sides of the oar concerned in a prominent and easily visible position. The various labels that will be used are shown in Annex 3. If desired by the shipper or receiver, and if the persons concerned have the necessary travel doouments and authorizations, the shipper's representative or representatives may accompany the ship- ment from origin to destination, or to a designated border station where the receiver's representative(s) will accompany it the rest of the way. Transfer of cars and/or entire trains will be effected at the border crossing stations every day of the year and any time of day or night. A record of such transfers will be kept at the border transfer stations for fiscal reimbursement purposes. Transfers willbe 15 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005 8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 ? CONFIDENTIAL recorded and effected by means of a transfer list (Ubergabeliste) giving the date of transfer, the number and type of cars, gross load, cargo, etc. A reproduction of the Ubergabeliste is shown-in Annex 2. d. Administration: The remainder of the agreement treats of railroad and shipper liability, computation of tariffs and other fees, handling of complaint and claims, damage or loss payments, future changes to the SMGS, how to make out the Frachtbrief, and calling of conferences on the subject. Of special interest is the fact that the present SKIGS/SIPS agreement is valid for an indefinite period. The Russian text of the agreement is the legal text. Changes can be made re- garding various articles of the agreement by mutual consent. SMGS/ SM-PS conferences will regularly be held every two years, but may be called oftener if the situation warrants. The official languages of the SMGS/SMTS agreements will be Russian, German and Chinese. Trans- lations into other languages may be made if felt necessary by a mem- ber nation. The following government administrations are the offi- cial representatives and/or juridicial.persons with respect to the agreements and commitments contained in the SMGS/SMYS convention: The Ministry for Traffic, Main Directorate of Railroads, Tirana, Albania The Ministry for Transport, Sofia, Bulgaria The Ministry for Traffic and Postal Affairs, Budapest VI, Hungary -The Ministry for Traffic and Public Works, Railroad Department, Nambo St., Hanoi, Vietnam The Ministry for Traffic, 33 Voss St., Berlin _W 8, Soviet Sector East Germany The Ministry She Ministry The Ministry The Ministry The Ministry The Ministry The Ministry for for for for for for for Railroads, Peking, China Traffic, Phoengjang, North. KOliea Transport, Wan-Bator, Mongolia Railroads, Warsaw, Poland Railroads, Bucharest, Rumania Traffic, Moscow 66, USSR Traffic, Prague, Czechoslovakia 16 CONFIDENTIAL LW (.; CONFIDENTIAL 4. The PPW The SMGS/SMPS Convention does not elaborate on the types and technical specifications of the cars which can be used in Soviet Bloc international traffic. The use and specifications of these cars are contained in an agreement supplemental to the SMGS/ SMPS known as the PPW. The German version of these letters is trans- lated "The Use of Cars in International Passenger and Freight Traffic." The first issue of this agreement was 1 November 1951. It was reaf- firmed 1 January 1954; and that edition is still valid. The follow- ing points of the agreement are considered noteworthy: a. General: Cars, both freight and passenger, can be transferred from one railroad to another, even if the gauge varies. This can be done by sending the car to the border transfer station on a track of the same gauge; or by transferring the car onto trucks or wheel-sets of the new gauge. The latter procedure is limited to those stations having the necessary facilities to effect such a trans- fer. All railroad syatems signatory to the SMGS/8M1S are signatory to the PPW convention. b. Passenger Cars: Passenger cars must be equipped with hand and air brakes, electric lighting, and through steam heat- ing. Cars which must be forwarded over USSR stretches must have a screw coupler of the type permitting double coupling. Before cars are transferred from one railroad to another, the transferring rail- road must certify that the cars are in good operating condition and conform to all the regulations governing international movement. The following time interval is allocated for the transfer of passenger car trains (irrespective of the number of cars): (1) Not more than 30 minutes when no change of axles is involved. (trucks) is involved. All passenger cars used in international traffic will, in addition to their normal markings, bear the additional mark- ing "MC" in white letters. These are the cyrillic letters for "MS" (cf. SMTS). A car manifest will be maintained. Copies will be stamped at the transfer points certifying to proper inspection of the cars by the transferring and receiving railroads. Copies of this manifest will also be made available to the railroad administrations concerned for accounting and cost purposes. (2) Not more than 60 minutes when a change of axles 17 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 CONFIDENTIAL c. Freight Cars: Freight cars must also bear the marking 'WC" (cf. SMGS) in addition to their regular markings. They must have automatic brakes or air hoses permitting complete air- brake operation of the train as a whole. Cars with brakes, which are to be transferred to trucks (axles) of a different gauge, must have adjustable brake shoes. Cars to be forwarded on USSR lines must have a screw coupler of the type permitting double coupling. A car mani- fest (Wagennachweis) will be maintained for each transfer and made available to the railroad administrations concerned for cost and accounting purposes. One minute is allowed per car for inspection purposes at the transfer points. Returning loaded cars may be trans- ferred at any transfer point. Returning empty cars, unless otherwise specifically agreed upon, must be transferred at the sage transfer point through which they entered. Cars, upon reaching their station of destination, may be transferred for further use to another rail- road if the demand for cars is great enough. All such transfers are recorded on a special transfer list (Sonder-Uebergabeliste), copies of which go to the railroad administration concerned. In addition, the station of dispatch, to indicate that a given car can be used for such a purpose, makes out a certificate known as a Begleitschein, which accompanies the car from the time of dispatch until its return to its home railroad. The using railroad has to pay the owning rail- road a rental of 1.1 rubles per day for the first seven days, 1.3 rubles for 8-10 days, 4 rubles for 11-15 days and 8 rubles for 15 or more days. 5. The 1954 Transit Freight Traffic Agreement The regulation governing military transports for Soviet forces in transit traffic between East Germany and the Soviet Union over the Polish railroad system, as previously mentioned, is part of the agreements reached at the Warsaw Conference in May of 1954. The main difference between this regulation and the 1950 regulation which It replaced is, apart from the use of Polish locomotives on Polish lines, the greater specific detail given regarding the movement and security of Soviet trains and the use of transport numbers. The fol- lowing abstracts, taken from the second edition of this regulation published in July 1955 (first edition published 1 July 1954), there- fore represent the most current specific information on the subject. a. General: Military transports between-the USSR and the GDR will operate in transit over the Polish railway system in accordance with the stipulations contained in this Regulation. Mili- tary transports fall into two categories: (1) Military trains for troop units and headquarters of the Soviet Army. Each of these trains must be numbered. 18 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL (2) Transports with military goods, the senders or receivers of which are troop units or headquarters of the Soviet Army. Each transport with military goods must be numbered. Military trains or transports moving over the Polish railroad system are classed as Polish trains. In case cars in these trains have to be cut out of the train because of technical faults, the commander of the Soviet military guard accompanying the train will decide how the cargo and/or car will be subsequently forwarded (e.g. trans-load, side the train until the car can be repaired, forward with a later train, eta.). All such cars will be repaired on a priority basis. b. Security: The security and guarding of military transports operating between the USSR and the GDR will be performed by Soviet Army guard personnel throughout the entire journey. The German Reichsbahn will rent the necessary guard cars to the Soviet Army. These cars will be marked in German and Russian as Guard (Es- cort) Cars (Begleitwagen). These cars bear the numbers 795001 through 795040 (regularly operating guard cars have the numbers 795001 through 795030, reserve guard cars 795031 through 795040). c. Dzere.on: The transfer of military trains and transports from one railroad system to the other will be effected in accordance with the rule of the SMGS agreement. Cars are transferred from one railroad system to the other in accordance with the PPW agreement. Lademittel (see Glossary) cars will not be used. Commanders and guards of military trains are to be provided with fuel, light, and boiled drinking water. A record of services rendered will be kept and one copy will go to the MTV, Main Administration for Rolling Stock, International Freight Car Service Department (HVW, Abt. Int. GWD). Upon request by the transport Headquarters of Soviet troop units in Germany, the Deutsche Reichsbahn will make available at the border stations of the USSR clean, disinfected cars equipped for troop transports. Such cars will operate under Soviet Army guards. Car equipment for the transport of troops (lose Militgreinrichtungen) will be listed by car conversion shops (Wagenmeistereien) or stations supplying such equipment on a special form in quintuplicate. The MFV, HVW, Abt. Int. GWD gets one copy together with a cost statement of the equipment used. Troop car equipment, when no longer needed, will be returned by the military train commander to the shop which provided it, or to the station master at the unloading station. The Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 19 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 CONFIDENTIAL materials returned will be listed in duplicate and one copy of the list sent to the HVW, Abt. Int. GWD in Berlin. A special note will be made on these lists of all equipment lost or rendered unusable. The movement of explosive or inflamable-freight for Soviet troops will be carried out in accordance with the regulations laid down by the railroads involved in such movement (cf. the SMGS). d. Documentation and Transport Numberinpj Military trains and transports moving to and from the GDR over the Polish rail- road will be dispatched to and from the border stations of the rail- roads of the USSR. Shipments to the USSR will be addressed to the transloading points under the control of the Soviet Ministry of De- fense. Shipments originating in the USSR and destined for the GDR will be sent to the USSR border stations under USSR domestic way bills. From the border stations to the station of destination in the GDR way bills provided for in tile SMGS agreement will be used. The reverse procedure will be used for shipments originating in the GDR destined for the USSR. The dispatch of equipped empty troop trains, as well as freight cars used as guard cars from the GDR to the USSR and return, will be effected with the Frachtkarte (cf. SMGS). A Frachtbrief and a Frachtkarte, each in quadruplicate, will be made out-for every mili- tary train. When these documents are made out, on the upper right hand corner a notation will be made of the transit military train and/ or transport number in red ink or with a stamp. The number of cars and the number of axles will likewise be listed on the Frachtbrief/ Frachtkarte either in the column marked "Determination of movement costs on the railroads of transit countries" (Abrechnung der Befoer- derungskosten auf den Bahnen der Transitlaender), or on a separate sheet attached to the Frachtbrief/Frachtkarte. Cars of a military transport will be sealed by the loader at the loading station. e. Liability: Damages to, or loss of military freight through any fault of the railroads will be settled in docordance with SMGS regulations. The railroads will not be held responsible for any damages or loss traceable to the military guards. f. Determination of Movement Costs: Fees for the move- ment of military trains and transports for the Soviet Army on USSR railroads and on the Deutsche Reichsbahn will be calculated in accord- ance with the appropriate tariffs of these railroads. All fees will be paid by Soviet Military authorities. The MT will determine the fees to be collected for the use of its cars. 20 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL g. Miscellaneous: For those costs not covered by this regulation, reference will be made to: The SMGS Agreement The PPM Agreement The Soviet-Polish Railroad Border Agreement The GDR-Polish Railroad Agreement * * NOTE: The terms of these agreements are not known to this Headquarters. h. Troop Car &aliment: The following equipment is considered loose equipment (lose Militaer-Einrichtungen) which may be used in equipping trcop cars, guard cars, and/or kitchen cars. Opposite each item is the price in East German Marks (DME). ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DME PRICE FOR Guard Car Troop Car Kitchen Car 1. Boards for plank beds 220 cm long; 18.5 cm wide 2. Grooved boards for plank beds 3. Special boards for plank beds 4. Top boards for plank beds 278 cm long; 15 cm wide 5. Support boards for plank beds 6. Support joints for plank beds 7. Bench 8. Stove 9. 1 meter stove pipe 10. Stove pipe elbow 11. Chimney deflector 12. Reducing pipe 21 59.60 70.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 CONFIDENTIAL 1.76 1.86 2.24 1.08 5.90 59.60 65.00 0.90 0.90 2.45 0.90 0.90 2.45 2.85 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 CONFIDENTIAL ITEM OF EQUIPMENT 13. Fire screen 14. Stove griddle 15. Coal box 16. Coal shovel 17. Poker 18. Broom 19. Water pail 20. Lanterns 21. Candles 22. Window 23. Door guard rail 24. Door insert board 25. Wash basin 26. Drain pipe for wash basin 27. Wash basin stand 28. Dining compartment with air vent 29. Weapons stand 30. Records box 31. Installation costs, in- cluding nails and wood ' screws 32. Cost of dismantling equipment DME PRICE FOR Guard Car Troop Car Kitsben Gar 20.00 0.85 0.85 0.85 8.00 2.15 2.15 1.25 1.25 1.25 0.83 0.63 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.90 14.00 14.00 14.00 1.40 1.40 1.40 0.14 0.14 0.14 7.15 7.15 7.15 1.25 1.25 _ _ 10.90 10.90 10.90 40.00 40.00 40.00 4.50 4.50 4.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 250.00 40.00 5.80 5.80 5.80 43.00 TCTAL COST PER CAR 589.47 29.20 4.20 8.90 2.50 277.87 118.67 Since 1 January 1956 the Reichsbahn has been en- gaged in converting about 5,000 box cars into semi-permanent troop cars. These cars are of the 06 and 07 series. The bunk boards can be folded against the walls so that the car can be used in ordinary commercial traffic when not needed for military purposes. This meas- ure will reduce some of the annual cost of equipping.a troop car and will facilitate getting the car completely ready to have troops. The 22 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Reichsbahn has a total of about 6,000 series 06/07 cars which can be converted. It is not yet known whether the entire series will be converted. 6. .11T2_19.54_TransitPassqYAL5112E112._AgEttagat In the case of passenger traffic, a new schedule of trains was published which in effect established schedules for four passenger trains daily in each direction between East Germany and Brest. These passenger train routings are as follows: Brest - Brest - Brest - Brest - Frankfurt/Oder - Berlin and Wuensdorf Frankfurt/Oder Frankfurt/Oder - Magdeburg and Schwerin Frankfurt/Oder - Cottbus, Dresden and Erfurt These four daily trains are known as transit military passenger trains (Ttansit-Militaer-Reisemege). The Wuensdorf/Berlin - Brest train is the so-called "Blue Express". This year this train was painted green and is now beginning to be called the "Green Express". Several of its coaches (principally the pullmans) go through to Moscow, their trucks being changed at Brest. As far as is known, the remaining scheduled trains originate and terminate at Brest. Various special regulations govern the use of these trains. Among the more important of these are: a. These trains may not be used to carry passengers, baggage or express goods to or from Polish stations. b. Soviet personnel have charge of tickets,.and baggage will be handled at Berlin/Ostbahnhof, Wuensdorf, Frankfurt/Oder, Magdeburg Hauptbahnhof, Erfurt Hauptbahnhof and Dresden Hauptbahnhof. c. These trains consist of coaches rented by the Deutsche Reichsbahn and/or coaches of the Soviet railroads. d. Train supervisory personnel (conductor, porters, loader, coach inspector, coach fireman, electrician and radio opera- tor) are provided by the railroads of the Soviet Union for the entire trip. e. Reichsbahn locomotives rented to the Soviets and/or Polish locomotives and crews haul these trains between Brest and Frankfurt/Oder; Reichsbahn locomotives and crews haul these trains within East Germany. 23 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 CONFIDENTIAL f. The Deutsche Reichsbahn provides waiting-rooms for Soviet passengers as well as quarters for Soviet train supervisory personnel at the Frankfurt/oder, Berlin-Ostbahnhof, Wuensdorf, Magdeburg, Dresden, and Erfurt main stations. g. The Deutsche Reichsbahn places at the disposal of the Soviet train supervisory personnel free use of railroad telephone and teletype facilities for communication with rail offices of the Polish and Soviet railroad systems, as well as with the Transport Administration personnel of the Soviet Army in East Germany., h. All Reichsbahn locomotives rented to the Soviets for their transit passenger trains coal up at Frankfurt/Oder. A serial record of locomotives coaled is kept at Frankfurt/Oder. i. The Brest station makes necessary repairs on the rented Reichsbahn locomotives. The Reichsbahn delivers the necessary spare parts for these repairs to the chief of Locomotive Column #42. In East Germany RAW Delitzsch handles the repairs on the coaches, and RAW Meiningen on the locomotives. Soviet railroad personnel accompany the locomotives to and from the Meiningen RAW. In the case of coaches to be repaired, Frankfurt/Oder serves as the point of delivery and acceptance. j. A repair schedule for the locomotives and coaches of these trains, similar to that in effect for all other East German equipment, is laid down as follows: Locomotives Duration Coaches Duration (RAW Meiningen) of Repair (RAW Delitzsch) of Repel,* LO - Once in 9 months 14 days Annual Check RJU-Twice in L 2 - Once in 18 months 20 days 1 year 15 days L 3 - Once in 3 years 30 days Main Check RRU - Twice in L 4 - Once in 6 years 36 days 5 years 25 days k. On East German territory German authorities are responsible for the safe passage of these trains; on Polish territory Polish authorities. In addition an external guard, under the juris- diction of the train commander, may accompany the train. 1. The Soviet railroads pay the Deutsche Reichsbahn for the use of coaches and locomotives, use of Reichsbahn lines, use of auxiliary trains, fuel and lubricants, and the use of baggage and waiting rooms. 24 CONFIDENTIAL ; CONFIDENTIAL m. The following Reichsbahn rolling stock and locomotives are rented by the Soviet railroads for these transit military passenger trains: 20 Locomotives, Type 01 (Locomotive Column #42 in Brest) 20 Guard escort (Brigade) cars 66 Sleepers, of which: 11 are 1st 25 are 3rd 30 are 3rd 8 Day coaches, 2nd Class 3 Day coaches, 2nd and 3rd Class 46 Day coaches, 3rd Class 18 Baggage Coaches 4 Mail Coaches 12 Hot water cars and 2nd Class Class for 28 passengers Class for 32 passengers It is evident from the forgoing documents that rail traf- fic between countries of the Soviet Bloc is precisely regulated, docu- mented in great detail, and hampered to a certain extent by technical limitations of the car parks of the participating countries. The precise number of cars of each signatory country suitable for interna- tional traffic is not known to this Headquarters. It is known, how- ever, that the East German Reichsbahn frequently has difficulty in furnishing enough transit-worthy cars for the comparatively low volume of traffic it has with the USSR and other satellites. Thua technical limitations alone may well be a very important factor in ]ogistic9.1 suprort by rail in any Soviet military move against the West. 25 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 CONFIDENTIAL SECTION II The Re 1 tiortw en _rot 1 Traff ic Shirments 1. I nt,ernp.t ictral Traffic: For the past seven years rarely has the total volume of rail traffic through the six major crossing points across the Odcr/Ncisse line exceeded 50 trains a day in each direction. Military supplies and equipment and troops regularly use only three of these crossing points; namely, Kietz/Kuestrin, Frankfurt/oder and Guben. Except dur? ing the periods of troop rotation between the GDR and the USSR, the bulk of all Soviet supply and equipment shipments are routed through Frankfurt/oder. A comparative analysis of the number of cars reported as carrying military goods and of those carrying commercial products indicates that the flow of military goods averages only about 18% of the total traffic through the three main crossing points. It may rise to double this amount, particularly during rotation periods coinciding with an expanded equipment import program, such as the vehicle import program of the Fall of 1954, or the vehicle and ammunition import pro? gram of the Fall of 1955. The following table illustrates the relation between cars re? ported carrying military cargo and total traffic by month through the two major import points, Frankfurt/Oder and Kietz/Nuestrin, for the year 1955, which is regarded as a good representative year and one for which data are most complete. So little military freight traffic has been reported via Guben that this point has been excluded from the calculations given in the table. 19,25 Total Incoming Traffic Total Number of Cars -donth In Terms of Cars Carry in Militr_g (Totals Rounded) (Totals Rounded) January 13,960.(450 per day) 2,790 (90 per day) 20% February 14,220 (507 per day) 2,800 (90 per day) 17.7% March 20,660 (666 per day) 3,200 (103 per day) 15.4% April 23,530 (786 per day) 2,000 (66 per day) 3.3% nay 24,550 (792 per day) 2,020 (65 per day) 8.9% Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 26 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 CONFIDENTIAL 1955 ( Conti d.) Total Number of Cars Total Incoming Traffic Month In Terms of Cars Carryinj Military Cargo (Totals Rounded) Totals Rounded) June 24,560 (818 per day) 2,800 (93 per day) 11.3% July 24,270 (782 per day) 2,500 (80 per day)- 10.2% August 23,246 (750 per day) 2,750 (88 per day) 11.7% September 19,702 (656 per day) 3,200 (106 per day) 16.1% October 22,863 (737 per day) *5,250 (145 per day) 22.9% November 23,405 (780 per day) 4(8,250 (275 per day) 35.2% December 21,842 (704 per day) *4,000 (129 per day) 19.3% *includes troop rotation Although the Soviets have consistently adhered to interna- tional rail agreements with regard to the use of designated lines and import points since they became signatory thereto in 1951, the train density, composition and cargo through all Oder/Neisse frontier points are carefully studied to detect any use of non-designated crossing points or the additional use of designated points for the movement of military cargo and/or troops. This is done in the belief that the Soviets would make much greater military use than at present of all existing rail entry lines into East Germany prior to the initiation of all-out hostilities against Western Europe. 2. Intra-zonal Traffic: There is good evidence also that the Soviets during most months of the year use only a small proportion of available-Reichs- bahn cars for their troop/equipment supplies and equipment moves. As a rule, their daily planned loadings throughout the GDR total between 450 and 650 cars, all types. Actual utilization is often considerably less. The only exceptions to this are the marked increases in rolling stock utilization when the Soviets move to spring and fall training areas and return to home stations in the fall, or when a shuttle train program is established to rotate troops to and from the USSR, import or export equipment, e.g. import of soft skinned vehicles, or import POL supplies. To obtain the ratio between Soviet rolling stock utilization and total Reichsbahn use, one must relate the daily Soviet loading figures to the daily Reichsbahn loading figure. On the average this 27 CONFIDENTIAL 4)' CONFIDENTIAL latter figure amounts to between 31,000 - 33,000 cars, all types. Thus the Soviets normally use only between 1% and VI of the total num- ber of cars loaded daily in East Germany. During the heaviest utiliza- tion periods connected with GSFG moves to the field, as many as 4,000 or more cars a day may be used for short periods of time. The utiliza- tion letio then rises to from 10% to 13% of daily total Reichsbahn loadings. Although the above figure is a relatively low utilization compared to total Reichsbahn loadings, it nevertheless represents an abnormal interference with Reichsbahn economic commitments, and the fulfillmeat of the annual East German economic plan is to some extant jeopardized by the Reichsbahnis inability to meet both its heavier military and regular economic commitments simultaneously. Military movements in East Germany, if carried out by rail in the volume noted over the past four years, may cause marked interference with the ful- fillment of the 1956 - 1960 Five Year Plan, which calls for even greater economic effort on the part of the Reichsbahn without provid- ing for any important additions to the Reichsbahn car and locomotive pools. In this connection, it should be noted that additional mili- tary movement by rail can be expected from 1956 on as the East German Peoples' Army (formerly KVP, now NVA) increases in size and enlarges the scope of its training. Up to the present time, their rail move- ments have been extremely light (less than one quarter of Soviet utilization), and until recently were included in the Soviet utiliza- tion figure. This appears to have changed and Reichsbahn rolling stock for the EVA is being ordered by their own transportation officers in- dependent of the Soviets. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 28 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 SECRET SECTION III Organization of the Soviet Military Rail Transport System (VOSOISKU) 1. Chain of Command On the basis of available information it appears that the movement of military transports by rail from within the Soviet Union to the USSR - Polish frontier is a joint function of both the Soviet Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport. Between the bor- ders of the Soviet Union and East Germany, and within East Germany, the movement of military transports of all types appears to be the function of the Military Communications Service (VOS0), which is a Division of Headquarters, GSFG, located at Wuensdorf, East Germany, and of Headquarters, Northern Group of Forces, located in Poland. The VOSO organization in East Germany, in addition to its ? headquarters at Wuensdorf, is sub-divided into Transport Command Directorates called SKUts (Sovjetskoe Kommandaturnoe Upravlenoe), located at the headquarters of each of the eight RBD1s. In addition, members of these SKUts may be stationed at important RBA's. A small SKU staff is permanently stationed at Frankfurt/Oder (RBA 7 of RBD Berlin) to handle transit Soviet military traffic. It is not defin- itely known whether similar staffs are stationed at Kietz/kuestrin and Guben; but it is believed more likely, in view of the proximity of both to Frankfurt/Oder, that a member of the Frankfurt/Oder SKU would be dispatched to these relatively lightly used border points to handle Soviet transit traffic on an ad hoc basis. It also appears that VOSO personnel are stationed at key supply depots in East Germany, and at certain other main stations, e.g? along the Helmstedt-Berlin rail line used by Western Allied Military trains. There are also numerous Soviet military personalities appearing in connection with ordering rolling stock for various pur- poses. These persons, however, appear to be transport officers of troop units. Whether they are considered part of the VOSO organiza- tion even though assigned to definite units, or whether they are merely unit officers made responsible for handling the rail transport requirements of their particular unit is not clear. The latter cir- cumstance seems more probable, however. The same uncertainty applies to GSFG moves to the field. There has been some evidence indicating that SKUIs send their personnel as needed to stations at which mili- tary loading or unloading is going to be heavy. Whether these SKU staffs are augmented for this purpose by additional officers from the unit concerned, or whether the regular members of the SKU staff are 29 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 SECRET merely dispatched as supervisors of the overall loading and unloading operations, is not clear. Apart from the VOSO (SKU) RBD Operational Staff and the Headquarters Staff at Wuensdorf, is a small VOSO staff, usually headed by a general officer, attached directly to the East German MFV Headquarters as advisors to Minister Erwin Kramer and staff. A simi- lar staff is believed attached to the PKP Headquarters in Warsaw, Poland, and a similar VOSO - SKU organization is believed to exist at Polish RBD1s, as well as at main Polish border check points, e.g., Rzepin and Terespol on the Frankfurt/Oder - Warsaw - Brest line. In addition to the VOSO organization operating as a part of GSFG, there also appears to be a small, separate VOSO staff operating under the control of the Soviet Embassy in East Germany (East Berlin). This staff, until 1 March 1954, when the Soviet High Commission (SHC) was dissolved and replaced by a Soviet ambassador and staff, was lo- cated at Karlshorst. It was both a policy-making and monitoring staff, the main function of which appears to have been insuring that both Soviet military and commercial shipments were handled promptly by the Reichsbahn, new trackage and loading/unloading facilities constructed when needed, trackage adequately maintained, and neces- sary Reichsbahn status data provided by German railroad officials. This office also appears to have had a decisive voice in all matters affecting Western Allied rail access to Berlin as well as the control of Berlin railroad (including S-Bahn) facilities proper. There is evidence that this staff was not dissolved, but was taken over directly by the Soviet Embassy, and that it still functions at Karlshorst. It would also appear that its functions are the same as under the SHC. Thus the chain of command controlling military shipments ex- tends all the way from Moscow to key railroad offices in Poland and East Germany through a military channel and, if the KarlshOtst staff is what it appears to be, through an independent diplomatic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Embassy) channel. In its present form, it is considered completely adequate to insure that Soviet rail Movement interests are fully realized. 2. The VOSO and SMAD-SCC-SHC-Embassy Transport Administrations: 1945 - 1956. Between the years 1945 and 1953, the functions of the VOSO and the transport group of the Soviet Military Administration for Germany (SMAD) (from 1949 to 1954 known as the Soviet Control Commis- sion), had separate functions. The VOSO was primarily concerned with troop and supply and equipment movements both within the GDR and be- tween the GDR and the USSR. The transport group of the SMAD was 30 SECRET 0 SECRET concerned with the movement of the reparations trains and other Soviet interest trains such as food and industrial imports/exports to and from East Germany. The number of personnel of both organiza- tions was very large until about 1949, the year which generally marked the end of the dismantling period. VOSO personnel, for exam- ple, were stationed at every RBA, at RAWIs and BWIs, and at many main stations. The SMAD-SCC transport personnel, in addition to their duties at the Karlshorst level, were located at the many stations where reparations goods were loaded. Both organizations worked dir- ectly with the East German railroad personnel, gradually depending on them more and more for the actual operations of the railroads and the loading-unloading process as the Reichsbahn recovered from the rav- ages of war and the wave of dismantling. During this period, too, the size of both organizations gradually diminished as Soviet econ- omic and political occupation policies changed and the size of Soviet military forces in East Germany was reduced. On 1 January 1954 the Soviets announced there would be no more reparations taken from East Germany, and that the economic situ- ation was such that normal international trade could be started? East German trade agencies were made responsible for handling most of "the Soviet interest" export-import shipments. This change in policy obviated the need for SHC transport personnel at any level below Karlshorst, with the possible exception of the stations handling uranium ore exports. It is not definitely known whether or not non- VOSO transport personnel are still supervising the dispatch of these shipments locally. At any rate, by mid-1954 the majority of SHC transport personnel had been withdrawn from local levels and presum- ably returned to the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, on 24 March 1954 the SHC was dissolved and replaced by a Soviet ambassador and 6 consulates, the latter located in accordance with the East German geographical administrative areas. The operational supervision of most, if not all (see above), Soviet interest trains, which is a term still applidd to trains transporting commercial goods to and from the Soviet Union, appears to have been turned over to the VOSO. When the Soviets announced the dissolution of the Soviet High Commission in March 1954, the implication was that all its func- tions had ceased. As previously indicated, however, it is believed that the transport staff of the SHC, and probably other SHC staffs, was incorporated into the Soviet Embassy, which replaced the SHC as the highest Soviet advisory and policy making agency dealing with the East Germans. Through the latter period (1953 - 1956) the VOSO organiza- tion is not known to have undergone any noteworthy changes. Its 31 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 ? CIA RDP81 01043R00 00 on. -R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 SECRET relationships with the Reichsbahn are discussed in greater detail in Section IV. Suffice it to say at this point that their major func- tions are as follows: a. Notifying the Reichsbahn in advance of rolling stock needed, and when and where it is to be spotted. b. Notifying the Reichsbahn of anticipated import/export movements, both military and commercial. c. Control and security of Soviet military and "Soviet interest" trains passing over Polish and Reichsbahn lines. d. Control of, and actual supervision (especiallY-when such activity is heavy), of Soviet troop and equipment loading and unloading. e. Maintenance of records of all Soviet military shipments, both intra-East German, and into or out of East Germany. A schematic representation of the Soviet Military Rail Transport System is contained in Annex 9. 32 SECRET '4 SECRET SECTION IV Procedure for Movement oSJILIAtipsy_ILIpplies, Troops, and Equipment 1. Relationship Between the Soviets and the East German Reichsbahn: As indicated in Section III, the present relationship between the Soviet and the East German railroads with regard to movement of military goods, troops, and Soviet-interest commodities is both a supervisory and advisory one. In this capacity the Soviet Forces in East Germany (GSFG), and, presumably, the Soviet Embassy, also insure the movement by rail of troops, equipment and other supplies, both within and to/from East Germany through transport control groups whose headquarters are at Wuensdorf and Karlshorst. The Tranaport Group at Karlshorst until 20 September 1955 was part of the office of the Soviet High Commission. With East German sovereignty effective on that date, it is now believed part of the Soviet Embassy Staff. It appears to have over-all control of both Soviet military rail movements and all commercial shipments carried on in the interests of the Soviets, e.g. uranium exports from East Germany, grain imports for the GDR, etc. In addition, it carries out Moscow's instructions on policy matters affecting the Reichsbahn, e.g. introduction of the Dispatcher System, allocations of train paths to the Western Allies between West Berlin and West Germany, and reduction of or increase in rail communications facilities available to the West. This Karlshorst group formerly had supervisory personnel at all levels of the East German Reichsbahn system. They were then known as the SCC (in German, SKK)(Soviet Control Commission, later the SEC (in German, OK) Soviet High Commission) transport personnel and were a group completely independent of the military transport supervisory group. The SCC group was greatly reduced in the spring of 19549 shortly after the Soviet declaration that no more reparations payments would be requested of East Germany (the bulk of which consisted of finished industrial products shipped out by rail). Remnants of this . group, however, may continue to exist at Ministerial and Division (RBD) level under the new name of "Advisors to the Reichsbahn on Transport matters". Operationally they appear to be occupied solely with Soviet interest commercial shipments to and from East Germany. From the policy standpoint they undoubtedly continue to see to it that Moscow's policy directives affecting the Reichsbahn are carried out, e.g., in- troduction of the Dispatcher System, international traffic agreements relating to both Western Allied and Soviet traffic, restrictions on 33 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 - CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005 8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 SECRET Soviet traffic through Western Berlin, restrictions on use of the tele- communications facilities, and insuring that GSFG transportation needs will be fulfilled by East German transport facilities, notably the Reichsbahn. Since the end of World War II, Soviet military movement has been controlled by an Army Headquarters group now located in Wuensdorf. This group, commonly known as the VOSO (Voennoe Sooboschennoe), has al- ways been responsible for physically controlling the actual troop and supply movements within East Germany as well as the annual troop rota- tion movements. In addition, the VOSO group has charge of the routing, loading and unloading of the Soviet supply shipments within the GDR and between the GDR and the USSR. VOSO personnel are regularly sta- tioned at Ministerial level, RBD levels, at some RBA's, at permanent supply installations, at main GDR frontier rail crossing points, at regularly used passenger railroad stations servicing Soviet leave personnel, and, as the situation dictates, i.e., annual moves to train- ing areas, at local station level, all depending on where the main direction of movement and unloading is concentrated. The strength of the VOSO group of GSFG Headquarters is not accurately known. The usual strength of each VOSO group at Reichsbahn Ministerial level and at each RBD is from 10-14 ogicers. In addition, there are from 1 to 5 Soviet interpreters and widely varying numbers of enlisted personnel to assist each of these officer groups. Names and ranks of persondg known to have been or still be connected with the VOSO are given in Annex 4. The method of moving Soviet supplies by rail (probably at least 90% are moved by this means) is briefly as follows: During the last 10 days of each month a plan is prepared on the estimated daily average utilization of rolling stock by type car for each RBD in East Germany. This plan is based on what the various GSFG troop unit and supply services estimate they will need during the ensuing month. Both intra-zonal and international rolling stock needs are included in the plan. It is presumed that this plan is approved in final form by the Transport Group of the Soviet Embassy at Karlshorst, and then made known to the East German Minister of Traffic and the State Secretary for Railroads. The details of the plan as they affect each RBD are thereafter made known to the VOSO group at GSFG Headquarters Wuensdorf and at RBD level. The VOSO groups in turn acquaint the proper East German railway officials, the RBD President, the Operations and Traf- fic Department, and the Car Distribution offices, with their planned needs. The above mentioned utilization plan serves as a long-range 34 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 CIA RD SECRET guide. When it is translated into actual daily movements, a special procedure is followed. Whenever a Soviet unit wants to make a move by rail (either troops, equipment, or supplies) its transportation offi- cer must put in his request about three days in advance of the loading to the VOSO group of his respective RBD. This group in turn must, in most cases, make the request known to Wuensdorf and must receive approval for the actual movement. The only exception is the movement of extra supplies within an RBD. Once the request is approved (usually a matter of a very few minutes only), the RBD VOSO and requesting unit are notified, and, at the same time or shortly thereafter, the proper East German railroad officials are notified as to how many cars by type will be needed, as well as the station to which they are to be sent and the time at which they are to arrive. In addition to these regular daily requisitions, it frequently happens that unforeseen supplemental requests must be made, or that a previous request must be cancelled. The chain-of-command procedure for accomplishing either of the above is the same as with a regular requisition, except that, if the supplemental requisition is small, two days advance notice is usually sufficient to insure spotting the necessary rolling stock. Cancellations are often given the same day the cars were requested. This is usually too late for the Reichsbahn to change its movement orders and hence the result is a very uneconomi- cal utilization of rolling stock. The Soviets, to keep track of their own rail movements, assign transport numbers to each specific shipment. A different series of numbers is assigned to intra-zonal shipments from that assigned to in- ternational shipments. All transport numbers run serially. In some cases one type of transport number seems to be used regularly for just one type of cargo. But more frequently than not, the transport number simply indicates to the Reichsbahn that the shipment is a Soviet ship- ment; the transport number per se cannot normally be used by non-Soviet personnel to identify cargo. Examples of these numbers and their significance, where known, are given in Annex 5. The Soviets keep careful track of the movement of all their supply shipments by requiring their VOSO personnel to inform higher headquarters at least twice a day of what shipments are in process of being loaded or unloaded, of those actually loaded and unloaded, and of the whereabouts of those shipments enroute. This appears to be true both for intra-zonal as well as international shipments. It is particularly important that the Soviets know what shipments are en- route to and from the Soviet Union so as to be able to insure the smooth transfer of such freight at the East German/Polish and Polish/ USSR border crossing points, since it takes very little "above normal" traffic to congest these stations. 0 35 SEC_RET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 SECRET 2. The Transport Numbering System: The Soviet system of numbering military transports consist- ing of entire trains, or one or more cars, has been in effect in East Germany since the end of World War II. This procedure of moving and tracking military rail shipments by transport numbers is a Soviet rail practice and was unknown to the Germans. The numbering system, the full details of which are apparently known only to the Soviets, appears to have a definite relation to type of cargo carried and to the origin of the shipment, i.e. whether it is an intra-GDR shipment or whether it is being imported or exported from the GDR. Each military shipment has a transport number, which is recorded not only by the Soviet VOSO personnel, but also by East German railroad personnel at freight dis- patch points (Gueterabfertigung) in the Versandbuch (Station Dispatch Log), and is frequently cited in railroad teletype messages sent out either from the Ministry (MFV) or Division (RBD) to notify stations along the way of the trains movement schedule. An example of such a message is shown below: 7.12.56 _ From: Berlin To: Dransee Dgs 19714 (65.5) Transport Nr 86119 will operate Saturday/Sunday 8/9 Dec. 1956 from Dallgow to Dransee. On or about 1 January every year to date, the Soviets have changed their transport numbers. The change lies not in a change in system, but rather in the assignment of a new numbering series to the various cargoes. The numbering system pattern consists basically of: (1) a five digit group of numbers, or (2) a prefix group of one to three numbers preceding a slash (/) followed by a group of from four to five numbers. The simple five digit group is regularly used to designate intra-zonal troop/equipment moves of the type observed in the GSFG movements to and from training and maneuver areas, or to designate troop trains of the type noted in a troop rotation program. The Five Digit Transport Number There have been many attempts to relate this type of trans- port number to the movements of specific GSFG units. There probably is a definite relation between the number and a specific unit move, but it is believed this relationship is known only to the Soviet mili- tary transport command at GSFG level, to the VOSO personnel concerned, 36 SECRET SECRET at RBD level (RBA level also in the case of troop rotation trains) and to the transportation section of the unit making the move. As an example, the number 78368 may be chosen from a group of transport num- bers used for troop/equipment moves in the GDR during 1955. The first two numbers appear to be designations, i.e., they identify the trans- port simply as an intra-zonal troop/equipment move. The last three numbers are probably the specific indicator, i.e., the movement of specific elements of a specific unit during a given month are probably' assigned a block of numbers; in this case let it be assumed 78360 - 78375. The last two digits, in addition to making up part of the three digit bloc, are serial. In no confirmed instance has any number been observed used twice. It has occasionally been noted that one troop/equipment train may contain two or more distinct transport num- bers, thus suggesting either the movement of three separate elements of a unit, three elements of three separate units, or possibly three special groupings of the same element of a unit. With respect to the troop rotation programs between the GDR and the USSR, a shuttle number (Pendelnummer) series is used. This is an East German railroad numbering convenience, however, although there is some evidence to indicate that the Soviets have used it too to keep track of their troop trains. The Pendel series regularly consists of trains numbered 100-125. Not all of these numbers have to be used, however, as that is dependent on the number of troops to be rotated and the length of time in which it has to be done. Thus, for example, in 1954 only 19 of the 25 were used, and in 1955 only 17. There is sufficient evidence, however, to indicate that each of these Pendels also have a Soviet five digit transport number. Those noted have been in the 22xxx, 23xxx and 24xxx series. Just what the different designa- tor digits indicate is not clear. It may be that they differentiate between Air Force, technical service, and line troops. In the case of troop transports, it appears that once a transport number is assigned to a troop Pendel train, that number remains assigned to that train no matter how many trips it makes, or whether it is loaded or empty. There are times when the three digit shuttle numbers and other five digit numbers are used in designating intra-zonal military shipments, intra-zonal commercial shipments, international Soviet interest shipments, and international commercial shipments. Since the commercial transport (shipment) numbers are sometimes reported as mili- tary transport numbers, and the three digit military shuttle number is disbelieved by intelligence analysts because it does not fit in with the usual five digit number or the prefix numbers, a few words of clarification may prove helpful. Within East Germany about 20 Reichs- bahn heavy-duty flat car trains are rented by the Soviets and treated as a Soviet flat car reserve. Each of these trains has been assigned 37 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 - CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005 8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 SECRET a three digit number called a Panzerpendelnummer, since these trains are usually used to haul armor. Their movements, particularly dur- ing GSFG moves to and from spring and fall training areas, may be reported under their Panzerpendelnummer, usually a 3xx series number. Such movements also have the regular five digit military transport number, but this number is not always obtained. In addition, during troop rotation, groups of cars operating between low and high echelon collection points within East Germany may bear three digit pendel numbers and apparently do not receive a troop transport number in less-than-full-train-lots. These may be in the 5xx or 8xx series. In the commercial field witnin East Germany, regularly operating sugar beet trains during the sugar beet harvest, or regularly oper- ating coal trains are usually assigned a three digit pendel number, apparently for Reichsbahn use in calculating what it hauled by com- modity in relation to economic plans and fulfillment of these plans. In international traffic three digit pendel numbers are regularly assigned to grain and ore imports into the GDR from the Soviet union. These shuttle numbers are usually in the 5xx, 6xx, 7xx and 8xx series. Soviet interest shipments, such as uranium trains, so far in 1956 have been given a straight five digit transport number. Prior to 1956 they were designated by a prefix number. It is likely also that other commercial commodities destined in 1956 for the Soviet Union from the GDR, such as potash, machinery, etc., will also have a five digit transport number. Such transport numbers have not yet been positively identified, however. The a. b. C. d. e. The Prefix Transport Numbers prefix transport numbers fall into the following patterns: x/xxxx 1 x/xxxxx xx/xxxx xx/xxxxx xxx/xxxxx The prefix digits are regarded as designators, i.e., they in- dicate whether it is an export from the GDR or import into it. The initial determination of this fact cannot, so far as presently known, be derived solely from the transport number, but only after comparing the number with documentation such as the Frachtbrief, the Frachtkarte, the Versandbuch, the Vormeldempfangsbuch, or in some cases, a railroad operational message or some reliable observation. The digits following the slash are often called shipment re- cording numbers, since they run serially, but in certain instances the 38 SECRET 141 SECRET first two and possibly three (in the case of a five digit number) digits appear also to be further designators of the type of supply or equipment. Again this fact is not initially evident from the num- ber per se, but only after correlation with documentary evidence of the type mentioned above or with reliable observation. Precise data on the numbers used for military shipments dur- ing the period 1945-1953 are no longer available at this Headquarters with the exception of the year 1949. To illustrate how the main num- bering systems work, selected examples have been appended in Annex 5. In summary, it can be said that the great value of the trans- port number lies in its use as a reliable means of identifying the shipment as a military shipment, and, in many cases, the type and probable cargo of that shipment in the absence of any additional des- criptive information about that shipment. 3. The Train Numbering System: The Reichsbahn operates all of its trains, as do most European railroads, in accordance with a train path schedule system known as the Buchfahrplan. This is a booklet published twice a year toward the end of May and the beginning of October, listing the number of scheduled freight trains that can be run over a given line. In addi- tion, based on the time gaps between scheduled trains, a certain num- ber of non-scheduled, or special trains as they are often called, can be run. The status of any given freight train is readily discernible from its number. Scheduled train numbers consist of from one (in the case of passenger trains) to five digit numbers, with the majority of scheduled freight trains consisting of the four digit series. One of the five digit groups is reserved for the special or non-scheduled trains. This is the 19xxx series (19000 - 19999) given tc special freight trains (Sonderzuege (Sdz)). These numbers were formerly allo- cated only by the train management (Zugleitung) of the RBD's usually with the approval of the Chief Train Management (Oberzugleitung) at MTV level. The Chief Dispatcher Management (HDL - Hauptdispatcher- leitung) and RBD Dispatcher Managements (OM - Oberdispatcherleitung) have replaced the train managements, so they now determine the move- ments of the special trains. Currently (1956-57 winter schedule) the allocation of these numbers is known for two RBD's only, Berlin and Halle. This allocation is as follows: 19001 - 19099: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 RBD Berlin used for special purposes only, probably by the train schedule group for emergencies, i.e. wrecks, and unexpected military trains. 39 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 19100 - 19199: 19200 - 19299: 19300 - 19399: 19400 - 19499% 19500 - 19599: 19600 - 19699: SECRET RBD Berlin (Contld) RBA 1 (Dispatcherleitung 1) Berlin RBA 2/3 (Dispatcherleitung 2/3) Berlin RBA 4 (Dispatcherleitung 4) Berlin RBA 5/6 (Dispatcherleitung 5/6) Berlin RBA 7 (Dispatcherleitung 7) Berlin ODL (Oberdispatcherleitung) RBD Berlin For the first time in the post-war period, the 1956-57 winter schedule shows no allocation of the 19700 - 19999 series. It is known that trains in this series originate in Berlin. It therefore seems likely that these numbers are controlled and allocated by the Hauptdispatcherleitung at Ilinr level, although there is no positive proof of this. Each Dispatcherleitung must clear its special train number with the ODL. 19001 - 19299 19300 - 19499 19500 - 19699 19700 - 19799 19800 - 19999 RBD Halle Train Schedule Group at RBD level RBA 1 (Dispatcherleitung Halle) RBA 2 (Dispatcherleitung Leipzig) RBA 3 (Dispatcherleitung Wittenberg) Unassigned paths, probably allocated directly by the Oberdispatcherleitung (ODL) of the RBD. According to RBD Hallets instructions, a 19xxx series train originating in RBD Hane and traveling into another RBD is supposed to have prefixed to the number the standard telegram abbreviation for the RBD, i.e., H1 19806. This rule, however, is not always followed in practice, nor does it apply in the other RBD's. It is possible, but not usual, for two RBD' s to operate simultaneously two special trains having the same 19xxx series number. As long as such trains operate within the confines of their own RBDis, there is no difficulty; nor would there be any confusion if such trains operated into an adja- cent RBD as'long as the areas were widely separated. The use of the prefix abbreviation may have been introduced to identify two separate trains with the same number operating in the same area. That this practice evidently has not been successful is borne out by the fact that there is now an operating rule stating no trains having the same 19xxx series number may operate on the same line at the same time or arrive at the same station at the same time, and that it is preferable 40 SECRET SECRET such trains be kept to a minimum. Invariably intra-GDR Soviet troop/equipment trains, troop rotaticn trains, and full trains of supplies and/or equipment enter- ing the GDR are regarded by the Reichsbahn as special trains and as .such usually have priority movement. These trains, therefore, are always of the 19xxx series. Conversely, however, it is most important to note that all 19xxx series trains are not Soviet military trains. In fact, in RBD Berlin as many as 43 different types of trains, only one of which is Soviet military, may have a 19xxx series number. The 19xxx series simply means a special, non-scheduled, and usually prior- ity movement train. Thus, as numerous train records show, many coal and coke trains entering East Germany from Poland are moved over Reichsbahn lines as 19xxx series trains if their movement warrants such priority. The same holds true for commercial export trains, uranium trains, and/or any other commercial freight train if it is decided by the Reichsbahn that priority movement is necessary. Some- times both a 19xxx and a four digit scheduled train number will be re- ported for an entire special military train, or in rare cases only a four digit scheduled train number. This simply indicates that the non-scheduled train was moved in an open, scheduled train path instead of a non-scheduled path, and that where only the four digit number was given, the special train number was missed by, or was not known to, whoever reported it. The 19xxx train number is assigned by the East German Reichs- bahn. It does not give special origin of the train beyond an RBA level, nor does it offer per se any guarantee that a military train is involved. The last digit, as in the case of nearly all train numbers indicates a general direction of movement to the extent that even num- bers indicate from East to West Or North to South and odd numbers West to East or South to North. Occasionally a 19xxx series train number will be followed by a number in parenthesis; this parenthetical number is a train classi- fication number (Zuggattungsnummer) and is of definite value in deter- mining whether that particular 19xxx series train is or is not a mili- tary train. All evidence to date shows that, if the number in paren- thesis is (65.5), the 19xxx series train in question is definitely a Soviet military train. Thus, in the absence of any other information on a particular train, this criterion alone can establish its military identity. The use of this Zuggattungsnummer, however, appears to be limited to written railroad movement messages, and even here it is often omitted. When Soviet supply shipments consist of less than full train lots, i.e., only one or a small group of cars, they are usual]y Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005 8 41 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 SECRET dispatched in a regularly scheduled freight train. The train con- sequently has the usual four digit number taken from the Buchfahr- plan. Under such circumstances there is no indication in the train number whether there is a military supply shipment on the train or not. Such information would normally be recorded, if it were an intra-GDR movement, at the freight dispatch office of the station of the station of origin, and on the car way bill (Hauptwagenzettel), although in both cases there would be no guarantee of specific des- cription of cargo; the cargo designation would most likely be simply "Military Goods" (Militaergut). In the case of an import shipment from the USSR the Frachtbrief, or Frachtkarte, would normally be the only certain record of specific cargo, unless, of course, such sup- plies and equipment were on open cars and could be identified by ob- servation. In summation, it can be said that Reichsbahn train numbers per se cannot be used to identify military supply and equipment or troop shipments, and in no known case do they offer any asSistance in the specific identification of military cargo. They can be of some value in determining an area of origin (RBA), if one knows to which RBAls the series is assigned and the RBD of origin. Unfortunately, only for ABD Berlin and Halle is such information known to this Head- quarters. 4. Soviet Procedures at Frankfurt an der Oder: Frankfurt/Oder is by far the most important rail entry/exit point to the Soviets. This rail center is the closest in point of rail distance to the USSR and lies astride the main double-track Berlin-Warsaw-Brest line, the only double-track line extending from Poland into the interior of East Germany. By virtue of its location it has long been the main operations center for incoming and outgoing Soviet military and commercial rail movements. Two groups-of Soviet transport personnel, both members of the VOSO organization, have charge of these operations. Their activities are described in the following paragraphs. The main VOSO group at Frankfurt/Oder is located in RBA-7 Headquarters. It is designated as an SKU (Sovietskoe Kommandaturnoe' Upravleniyre) or Soviet Directorate, as are all VOSO staffs at least at RBD level. Its main functions are: a. Operational coordination with Brest (not infrequently also with Moscow) and Wuensdorf of the movement of Soviet passenger trains, and Soviet supply, troop and commercial shipments between the USSR and East Germany via Frankfurt/Oder, Kietz and Guben. 42 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Rel SECRET b. Ordering rolling stock for troop/equipment and supply movements for Soviet units stationed at and in the vicinity of Frank- furt/Oder. c. Supervising the work of the Soviet transport group work- ing in the Frankfurt/Oder marshalling yards and at the Oder Bridge frontier point. d. Control of the Soviet escort personnel (guard personnel) for the transit trains. e. Participating in those rail traffic conferences between the Soviets, the Poles and the East Germans that are held in Frankfurt/ Oder. From the intelligence collection standpoint perhaps the most important fact about this group is that it notifies the East German . dispatcher personnel at Frankfurt/Oder about six hours in advance of the arrival of Soviet trains entering East Germany, whether via Frank- furt/Oder, Kietz or Cuben. Notification of military trains originating in East Germany and departing via these crossing points is given in the same manner one to two days in advance. The arrival, composition, Pen- del number, and in many cases, transport number, of these trains are regularly recorded in the following East German railroad documents: Belegblatt des Bahnhofdispatchers; Vormeldebogen des Vormelders; Zugmeldemgsbuch des Fahrdienstleiters; and in the case of outgoing trains only, the Merkkalender of the Bahnhofdispatcher. Operationally the SKU at RBA-7 is assisted by a group of five Soviet officers working directly in the marshalling yard. They are physically located on the Betriebsgebaoude (Operations Building) of the yard. This group gets daily instructions from RBD Berlin on what transports are expected to arrive from various places in East Germany, and how they are to be forwarded to the USSR (usually Brest). Not only do the yard dispatcher personnel receive a written copy of these instructions, which must be returned to the Soviets, but also the East German manager of the transport office, an office having to do with the clearance of all freight trains leaving for the USSR, including customs clearances. The International German-Soviet Shipping Agency Deutrans (formerly Derutra) is believed to be connected with this office, so in all probability commercial Soviet-interest shipments are handled here as well. According to the latest information, the Soviets do not require the transport office to return its copy. It is presumed also that the transport office receives similar information on incoming transports, as well as the dispatcher personnel. From all accounts, there appears to be a duplication of effort on the part of the Soviet 43 SECRET 2013/06 - 43Roo2nnn inn Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 SECRET Yard personnel and those at RBA-7 Headquarters, since not only does RBD Berlin inform the Yard of outgoing Soviet trains, but also the same information is passed to them almost at the same time by the Soviets at RBA-7 Headquarters. At any rate, this procedure affords the Soviets a double check. Apart from seeing that Soviet trains operate through the three scheduled crossing points as directed by higher Soviet Head- quarters, the Soviet Yard group has the operational responsibility for assigning the necessary guard escort cars to the trains. A Soviet officer independent of the Yard SKU is in charge of some 40 guard escort cars (Kommandantenwagen) and the personnel riding them. The 15xxx number which has been observed as a train number on Soviet trains exiting East Germany, in addition to a regular border cross- ing number of from three to five digits, is, according to two sources, a Pendel number used to identify guard escort crews. That is, the guard crew is assigned one number for the round trip, and apparently a given crew keeps a given number. Thus, in 1955 the only-numbers used in this connection ranged from 15001 to 15070. There is insuf- ficient information available to establish whether the 15xxx series number usually associated with transit trains of all types via Kietz and Frankfurt/Oder bears a direct relationship to the guard escort series or not, or is a pure Reichsbahn train number. TO. determine this one would have to have current issues of the pertinent East Ger- man train schedule books for RBD Berlin (Buchfahrplaene), the special train schedule for transit trains through Guben, Kietz and Frankfurt/ Oder, and a fairly wide sampling of transit train manifests (Wagen- listen). The following examples of SKU orders to Frankfurt/Oder dis- patcher personnel are given to show the considerable amount of in- formation that is available at Frankfurt/Oder: Instructions Given by the SKU to the Dispatcher Section and the Transportleitung, respectively, for Soviet Transports to Brest: Plan nach Brest vom 10/6 - 11/6 55. 97/41028 90/41048 90/40062 90/41040 90/40060 90/43074 46G ohne Kdtwg. 140 von Ffo 20 P1 von Fuew 6G von Ffo. 80 von Muellrose 200 von Cs 44 795023 795005 795017 795004 10/6/mill SECRET 'e SECRET Translation Transport program to Brest on 10 June to 11 June 55 Transport Number 97/41028 90/41048 90/40062 90/41040 90/40060 90/43074 46 Box Cars without Guard Escort Car 14 Box Cars from Frankfurt/Oder with Guard Escort Car 20 Flat Cars from Fuerstenwalde with Guard Escort Car 6 Box Cars from Frankfurt/Oder with Guard Escort Car 8 Box Cars from Muellrose with Guard Escort Car 20 Box Cars from Cottbus without Guard Escort Car 10/6/55 Date of Issue of this Order Mill represents the signature of the interpreter of the SKU. 795023 795005 795017 795004 The instructions of the SKU to the Transportleitung read the same except that the Pendelnummer is put in front of the number of the Kommandantenwagen; for example: 15011 - 795023. Instructions the SKU to the Dispatcher Section (possibly the Transportleitung also) for Soviet Transports from Brest: Auftrap Bl, 371-15761 795023 & 001 135/41010 10 P1 610020 nach Fuerstenwalde mit dem Kdtwg - vereinigen u. abfahren. 135/40004 6 G 050033 nach Koenigsborn. 135/41012 1 G 0135012 nach Ffo DSU 34198 ohne Kdtwg. abfahren. 135/43017 12 P1 601028 nach Ffo Lange Rampe mit Kdtwg. 023 abfahren. 135/41061 12 Kess. - 517023 nach Aken 135/41064 1 Kess. - 517054 nach Velten 135/41067 2 Kess. - 511021 nach Biesenthal ohne Kdtwg. abfahren 45 SECRET 10/6.55 Mill 795001 795023 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005 8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 SECRET Translations and Explanations Auftrag Bl. means Order to Betriebsleitung which means the dispatcher section (Dispatcher-Leitung) which this section has been called since the introduction of the dispatcher system. The number 371 represents the Polish train number which a train has as far as Frankfurt/Oder frontier railroad freight yard. It is not known whether this number stays all the way from Brest or only from the last Polish customs station. The number 15761 stands for the transfer number of a train (Ueberfuehrungsnummer) from the Frankfurt frontier railroad freight yard to the Frankfurt/Oder mar- shalling yard. The numbers 795023 and 795001 stand for the numbers of the Kommandantenwagen. 135/41010 (transport number) 10 P1 means 10 Plattenwagen (flat cars); the number 610020 is the number of one railroad car as a check. This transport number is to go to Fuerstenwalde, and the Kommandantenwagen 795001 is to be included in this transport. 135/40004 (transport number) 6 G (six box cars), the number 050033 is again the number of one railroad car as a check. This transport is to go to Koenigsborn. 135/41012 (transport number), 1 box car number 0135012 to go to Ffo. DSU 34198 without a Kommandantenwagen. Ffo DSU 34198 means Frankfurt/Oder Deutsche Schiffahrt mid Umschlagbahnhof, APO 34198, at F/b Harbor Station. 135/43017 (transport number), 12 flat cars (131 - Platten- wagen). The number 601028 represents again the number of one car as a check, and this transport is to go to Frankfurt/Oder to the Lange Rampe (long ramp) together with Kommandantenwagen 795023 (023 is an abbreviation of that number). 135/41061 (transport number), 12 Kesselwagen (12 railroad tank cars) to go to Aken. Number 517023 represents again the number of one car as a check. 135/41064 (transport number), 1 Kesselwagen (1 railroad tank car), number 517054, is to go to Velten. 135/41067 (transport number), 2 Kesselwagen (2 railroad tank cars) to go to Biesenthal without a Kommandantenwagen. The number 511021 represents again the number of one tank car as a check. 10/6.55 is the date of issue of this order. Mill represents the signature of the interpreter of the SKU. 46 SECRET ? SECRET Ingimagions given by the SKU to the dispatcher section for the SoviAtAtIalpgrig within GDR: Auftrag Bl. 8121 51/4120 10 G 054123 von Fuew - Muellrose ohne Kdtwg. abfahren 10/6.55 Mill Translation and Explanation Auftrag Bl. means order to the Dispatcher Service-. The number 8121 represents the number of a scheduled train (Zugnummer). 51/4120 is the transport number. 10 G (10 box cars) arriving from Fuerstenwalde have to go to Muellrose, without a Kommandantenwagen. The number 054123 is the number of one car as a check. 10/6.55 is the date of issue of this order. Mill represents the signature of the interpreter of the SKU. I 47 SECRET WWI Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 SECRET SECTION V CONCLUSION 1. Military Significance of th Present Routing System a. It appears, on the basis of foregoing evidence, that the rather extensive documentation procedures, border inspections and customs controls, advance notification of rolling stock needed, use of only three transit lines across Poland, extensive Soviet-interest traffic along with the purely military, and comparatively low, overall Soviet use of rail transit facilities in comparison with total avail- able, present a picture of: (1) Routine operations so far as Soviet logistical sup- port is concerned. (2) Commitment to a long range economic assistance pro- gram (Five Year Plan) to the GDR. (3) Extensive railroad traffic for economic purposes between countries of the Soviet Bloc. (4) Continued, and in some respects, increased depend- ence on the railroad systems and operating personnel of the railroads handling Soviet military traffic. b. It is also apparent that the documentation and accounting procedures for Soviet military shipments are sufficiently numerous as to preclude very much secrecy regarding them. Although in many cases specific cargo information may not always be easy to obtain, it is evident that much information concerning cargo can be obtained from German records at various levels and, of course, by direct observation. c. From the military standpoint it appears that the use of the transport number for Soviet military shipments is of particular importance. Some have termed the use of the transport number merely an administrative convenience. While it is administrative in nature, it appears, however, to be a very easy and feasible method of keeping an accurate account of the number of troops and types of supplies and 48 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 It Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 SECRET equipment sent and the volume of such goods. By virtue of the pos- sible combinations of transport numbers, particularly the prefix type, the system could be readily expanded prior to, or in time of, war to meet increased logistical needs. It would appear, then, in view of its use for Soviet troops in Germany and, until recently, in Austria, since the end of World War II and probably also during that War, that the transport numbering system is an integral part of Soviet logisti- cal support doctrine at least for supply by rail. Whether this doc- trine applies likewise to logistical support by water and highway is not known to this Headquarters, but it would appear likely. 2. kntiirpted Changes int1iePr.sent Sysem_Pior to the_ _ a. It appears that numerous changes would occur in inter- national rail traffic as a whole, and in the logistical support system in particular, both prior to and in the event of hostilities. Just how sharply defined these changes would be, would of course de- pend on Soviet strategic concepts and preparations. b. The following appear to be likely courses of action either singly or in combination: (1) Increase in dispatch of supplies and equipment (and thus marked increase in blocs of transport numbers) from the interior of the USSR to Soviet transloading stations or to selected Eastern Polish stations. (2) Marked increase in movement of supplies and equip- ment, and service and line troops (therefore marked increase in trans- port numbers) into the GDR well in advance of D-day on the basis of the consideration that Allied retaliation might render logistical sup- port too tenuous during the initial period of hostilities. (3) Marked increase in placement of VOSO personnel in Reichsbahn offices at MFV,-RBD, RBA levels, at border crossing points on the Oder-Neisse, and at key railroad stations in the GDR at least two weeks prior to D-day because of the need for familiarization with Reichsbahn operations either in a close supervisory or actual opera- tional capacity. (4) Forward movement of supplies by rail to dumps close to West German border are with attendant increase in the use of trans- port numbers, about two weeks in advance of hostilities. 49 SECRET ? SECRET (5) Marked change in the pattern of international com- mercial traffic four to five days prior to D-day on the basis of con- sideration that Allied retaliation may not be fully effective during the initial period of hostilities. With respect to a change of traf- fic pattern, it would be expected that a preponderence of flat cars and probably box, troop and PCL cars would be sent eastward through the Oder-Neisse crossing points to be ready to move on or just before D-day. (6) Marked change in GDR domestic traffic four to five days prior to D-day caused by the inroads made in the GDR box, flat and POL car pools. (7) Establishment at least four days prior to D-day of an Alarmbereitschaft (Reichsbahn-wide alert) for key Reichsbahn per- sonnel, together with the issuance of special operational orders re- garding train priorities, measures to be taken if certain difficulties arise, special reporting procedures, and the handling of border traf- fic. (8) Marked cancellation of GDR passenger and non-essen- tial freight trains at least two days in advance of hostilities to clear lines for probable military regrouping-within the GDR and to ready the main East-West lines for any movement from Poland. c. It is very doubtful that this Headquak-ters would be in a position to determine an increase in military shipments from the inter- ior of the Soviet Union to the transloading points along the USSR- Polish border or just across the border into eastern Poland. d. With respect to the changes envisaged in GDR traffic pat- terns, however, various indices can be expected to provide a good in- sight into these changes in a timely manner. First of all, an increase in VOSO personnel in Reichsbahn offices would come as a surprise to German personnel and could be expected to cause considerable comment. It is believed that such a measure could scarcely be kept secret. Secondly, any marked increase in utilization of rolling stock and motive power for Soviet purposes requires advance notice to the Reichsbahn. Past movements show that the greater the utilizationithe greater must be the prior notification. For both intra-GDR and inter- national movements of the type envisaged above, it is believed that at least four days and probably longer would'be required for the Reichs- bahn to assemble and dispatch its rolling stock. Since much of this movement would probably be of the shuttle _type, a system of shuttle Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005 8 50 SECRET _ !! It Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 SECRET numbers would normally be instituted and made known to numerous rail- road operational personnel. In addition, an increase in supply move- ments within the GDR would be evident to East German railroad person- nel at several levels and would be reflected as well in a like in- crease in transport numbers. The same would hold true for any marked increase in imports of supplies and equipment, and/or troops. If, how- ever, such imports were carried out over an extended period of time well in advance of hostilities, the accumulation could be determined again on the basis of transport numbers. The accumulation would then have to be weighed against a predetermined figure of what would con- stitute an "imminence-of-hostilities" amount. Lastly, cancellations of trains, the dissemination of the many special instructions believed necessary for the operating personnel of the railroads, and the calling of an'Alarmbereitschaft would again evoke much comment from railroad personnel and probably cause a marked increase in defections. It is likewise believed that such measures could not be effected in complete secrecy. e. From an over-all railroad standpoint, there are of course other changes that could reasonably be expected to occur prior to the initiation of hostilities, but since these lie outside the scope of logistical rail movement, they have not been introduced here. f. Finally, it should be noted that the rail indices con- sidered here do not purport to exclude logistical movements by highway and waterway. Although the Soviets have increased their capability in highway movement, they have shown little evidence in East Germany of supplying themselves above division level by highway or water, or of using either form of transport in their logistical chain between the Soviet Union and East Germany. Until there is stronger evidence that they are becoming less dependent on rail for logistical support, it is felt that the logistical rail indices considered in this study will remain valid. 51 SECRET 41`) ,? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP81-01043R002000110005-8 ? ? ? ? florpyaxa Pa3Pergella Pia ..... Asry.dTa... ...... 195 5. Beladung genelmilgt far Hy I .1 MINE mamma (noinnvesl. StAlonsvorsteher (UnterschrIM 195.___r. 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Gerat, Wagendecken oder Verpackung, die an den Absender zurOckzusenden sind 3HaxH, stapxn II ttomepa mecr Zeichen. Marken und Nummern der StOcke LI1C/10 mecr Sitickzahl POD yrtaxonfat Art der Verpackung NAHMEHOBAHHE rPY3A BEZEICHNUNG DES GUTES Bee rpy3a (s;fcr). onpeaeammtit Gewlcht des (1.44:s (in Kg) festgestelit Oco6bte aastenemtst ornpawenst Begondere Erklarungen des Absenders TpnficnopT N?135/44512 Pponycx N? 197.oT.12.08.55r. FlPHY1001-1 IC Or ?,B, ? 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