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August 1, 1957
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 RESISTANCE FACTORS AND SPECIAL FORCES AREAS UKRAINE (U) INFORMATION CUT-OFF AUGUST 1957 50X1 -HUM 50X1 -HUM Pages marked 'NOT RELEASABLE are SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED, NOT RELEAS E TO sr-ITz.pirn.LNATIONA1,4-P-X-C-EPT: NONE, By Authority of OAC of S 6 May 1958 50X1-HUM ? THIS STUDY WAS PREPARED BY AN EXTERNAL RESEARCH AGENCY, (THE GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT), UNDER CONTRACT TO ACSI, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, AND DOES NOT NECESSARILY REPRE- SENT THE OFFICIAL VIEWS OF ACSI, DA. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET CONTENTS PART I RESISTANCE AND POPULATION FACTORS 1. Introduction. 0 0 ? ? 0 ? 0 OOOOOOOO 0 2. Traditional Resistance Background. ?0000?00???00?0 1 1! a. Separatist Traditions ? . . OOOOOOO 00000 OO b0 Resistance and Civil War, 1917-1921 0 OOOOOOOO 0 I S 0 c. Resistance to Soviet Rule, 1921-1941 . OOOOOOOOOOOO d. Resistance During World War II ? ? ? . . ? 0 OOOOOOO 3. Resistance Activity, 1945-1957 0000000?????00?00? 19 a. Participants in Resistance Activities ? 0 ? ? ? 0 ? ? ? 0 0 ? 19 (1) Ukrainian Nationalist Resistance Groups ? . . OO . 1 0 ? (a) The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists 0 0 20 (b) The Ukrainian Insurgent Army 23 _ (c) The Ukrainian Supreme Council of Idborition . . 9 W (2) The "Black uaL.i Organization. 0 26 ?000??00??0 b. Characteristics of Resistance Activities in the Ukraine . . . 26 (1) Types of Resistance Activities0.? 00.00?? 26 (2) Variations in Resistance Activities by Years ? . 0 : : 31 PART II GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS AFFECTING RESISTANCE AND SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS A. General Summary 0 . 0 . 0 O0000000* . 000?0?000 0 35 1. 7EUFEEFErarT-7-0 . . . 0 . 0 0 . 00 . . 0 a ? ? 0 05 . . a . 35 . 0 0 2. Terrain Fearures ? . 36 . . ??0000. ....?.. ..?... . . a. The Ukrainian Steppelands 0 ??..... . . . . 36 b. Ukrainian Poleslye . 40 ?00a? ? ? O 00000?00 O000 c. Carpathian Ukraine ? 0 .0 ? ?.? 00 ^ 000000?60 0 41 d. The Crimean Mountains. O00 00000000 0?00?0? ?43 3. Climatic Features? .?. 0.00 0,0000. ....?. . . . 47 a.HITTUM-KM-as 0 . ..... ....?.. .??... . . . 47 (1) Carpathian Mountains . 0 .. . .... ? 0?0? 0 ? a47 (2) Crimean Mountains . ? 0 a . 0 . 0 ? . . ? 0 . . . . . . 48 b. Polesgye . . . . . . . . ? . . . 0 . ? . . ? ? . ? . ? 0 . . 50 c. The Forest-Steppe and the Steppe 0 . . . ? . 0 . ? 0 ? . . : i 555i 4. Vegetation . . . . . . .... 0000 00000 00?SO? : 0 ? 54 a. The Zone of Mixed Forests . a 0 ... 0 . 000 ?... b? The Forest-Steppe Zone . . . ?0 . . ? e e r o ? o o o ? 0 c. The Steppe Zone . . . . . . . . 0 . 0000?0?0000? . 55 d. The Carpathians. . . . . 0 0 ? . . . . 0 0 0 0 ? ? 0 ? . . 0 56 e. The Crimean Mountains . . . ,0 0 06 0 0000000000 0 57 5. Cross-Country Movement 0000000?00?0000?000?0 . 59 6. Land Urnazation 0 . 0 .. 0 . ? 0 . .. ? .? 0 0 . . OOOOOOO 61 a. Cultivated Land .. 0.0?00.?0 . . . . 0 ? . . 0 0 0 ? 61 b. Pastureland 0 . .? . . . . ......00?.... 000 0 64 ... Forested Land 0 .. 0 .00.0..0000 OOO 000 ? 66 ? d. Non-Agricultural and Unused Land? ? .? ? . . ? . . . . 66 7. Patterns of Rural Settlement . .. . . . 0 0 . . ?00 OOO O 0 69 a. Types of Rural Settlement 0 00?? ??00?000?0?? 0 69 b. Density of Rural Population 0 . ? . . OOOOOOOOO 0 . .72 8, Rural Roads . 75 0 ?0.???0????0 a 00000000 ?0 R .E-rr-7.1clut on of Partisan Activities, World War II ?..... . . 77 C. Distribution of Resistance Incidents 1945-1957. . . ? ? ? . . . . 83 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: flf17 4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 PART III POPULATION FACTORS AFFECTING SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS 1. Total Population .. . . . ? * 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 2. Ethnic Composition a. Ukrainians ? ? 0 0 ? 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 b. Russians * 0 0 ? 0 ? 0 ? 0 0 0 0 c. Jews 0 ?? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 d. Poles * 00 0 ? 0 0 ?? 0 ? 0 3. Regional Variations in Population Attitudes a. The Crimean Peninsula . ? . b. oThe Donbass 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 ft 0 0 ? 0 0 0 c. The Northeastern Districts ......?. d. The Ode3skaye Obla-et 7 :CIfet e. The Black Sea Lowland . ......?.. f. The Dnieper Bend - Krivoy Rog Districts . g. The Left-Bank and Northern Steppe Districts h. The Right-Bank Districts ? ??...?. 1. Volynia , . . .,......?.??.. j. Transcarpathia 0000 0000000'?? k. Chernovitskaya Oblast . 8, 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 1. The East Galician Districts 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 PART IV SECRET . . 89 ? 0 ? ? ? 0 0 ?? 0i O : ?5 ?? 99941 . 1 ..... 0 ? 0 . ? ? ? . ? ? . 0 ? . 95 . . . .. . . . . 97 99 . . ? .0 0 0 0 O 0. 0 .. 0. .11:0:24 O 0 0 0 0 O 0 101 O 0 ?? 0 0 0 G -C! 0 ? 0 GO.8 G 101 0 ? 0 . 102 . . . . O 0 . 110035 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 O 106 O 0 O 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 107 .? 0 05005 . 108 SECURITY FACTORS AFFECTING SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS 1. Security Factors . . . . . ? 0 0 0 0 Go 0 0 0 0 0 ? a. Border IrroEps ......... 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 b. Interior Troops..........?.... c. Soviet Army . . . ? ?? 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 d. Other ? 0 0 0 041 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2. Frontier Security Zones 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a.Tlie-Targr----aFrontier .. a ?.....?... b. The Czechoslovakian Frontier ,....?.. c. The Hungarian Frontier 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d. The Rumanian Frontier . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 1. Introduction . 2. Transportation . Introduction a. b. Co PART V ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY O 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 O 0 ? 0 0 ? 0 Railroads 0 0 ? 0 0 Water Transportation (1) Inland Waterways . (2) Maritime Transportation . O 0 0 0 0 0 0,8 0 0 O 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 ? e o O0000 0 ? 0 00 0 d. Highways . 0 0 0 ? 0 0??? 0 0 0 0 3. Electric Power . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 4. Minerals 0 ? 0 0 C 0 0 0 0 ? 0 ?? 0 0 ? 0 a. Coal and Coke . ? 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b. Iron Ore . ........?...??0 ii SECRET 0 . . . . 109 c . 0 . 109 0 . . . . 0 . . . . 0 . . . 0 110 .0 0 0 0 . 0 . 110 . . 0 ? . . . ? 111 . 0 . 0 . 0 0 . 111 .0 0 O 0 0 0 ? 112 .? 0 ? . 0 112 O 0 O a 0 0 ? 0 0 0 113 0 O 0 ? 0 0 ? 0 113 . 117 . 0 , . . 0 . . . 3 0 9 O 0 0 0 . . 119 . . G . 119 ....?0?. 0 . . 0 . 0 . . . . 122 . 0 0 . 0 0 600 0.0: 111422993 O 0 0 006* 0 O0* 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 133 O 0 ? O 0 139 4, 8 0 0?0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 ??? 0 O0 ? 00 ? 0 ? 0 0 149 O 0 00 149 ? 0 ?? 0 0 ? 0 0? 0 0 0 0 0 ? 151 I=22N mita 1 SECRET c. Manganese d. Oil and Gas (1) Oil (2) Gas 153 155 155 158 e. Other Minerals 160 f. Conclusions 163 5. Telecommunications 165 6. Conclusions 169 PART VI SPECIAL FORCES ARIAS Introduction .?.?..?..?...?? a ............. 173 Special Fdrces Area 1 - 175 1. Cover Areas 175 2. Population and,Resistance Factors 181 3. Economic Vulnerabilities . ? 183 Special Forces Area 2 195 1. Cover Areas 195 2. Population and Resistance Factors 3. Economic Vulnerabilities ? ? ? ? ? 198 . 199 Special Forces Area 3 207 1. Cover Areas 207 2. Population and Resistance Factors ? ? . ? 210 3. Economic Vulnerabilities 211 Special Forces Area 4 215 ..... o ........ o 1. Cover Areas . . . . . . e . . . . . 5 0 . . . . 0 . 215 2. Population and Resistance Factors . 0 . . . . ....... 217 3. Economic Vulnerabilities 218 Special Forces Area 5, 0 ? . . 0 . ........ ....... 0 223 1. Cover Areas 223 2. Population and Resistance Factors 226 3. Economic Vulnerabilities 227 Excluded Areas . ? . 0 0 ???? 0 ?233 0 ........ 0 ? 0 0 0 ?? ? APPENDIX Resistance Activities?....??.. ........ ? 0 ?????? 269 FOOTNOTES Part I ................................269 Part II . 0 ? 0 ?? 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 ? 0 0 .............. 271 Part III ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 ......... 273 Part IV ? ???......??.???.?.?.. . . ...... . . 274 Part V . . . ? ? 0 0 ............. ?0??0?? 0 0 0 0 0 274 MAPS Following Page: A. Administrative Subdivisions (U) 6 B. Terrain Regions (U) 45 C. Temperature (U) 52 D. Precipitation (U) 52 iii SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/03/05 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET E. Snow Cover (U) 52 F. Vegetation Cover (U) 58 G. Density of Forest Cover (U) 58 H. Cross-Country Movement (C) 60 I. Land Utilization (U) 67 J. Variations in Land Use by Oblasts (U) 67 K. Total Population Density (C) 73 L. Distribution of Rural Population by Oblasts (C) 73 M. Partisan. Activity in World War II (C) 82 N. Resistance Activities, 1945-1956 (C) 88 O. Ethnic Composition ,(U) ............ 0 ????00?? 0? 98 P. Regional Variation in Populati=LAttitudes (c) 108 --- Q. Security Factors Affecting Special Frirces Operations (S) 115 R. Railways (U) .. ...................... 9 128 S. Waterways and Drainage Characteristics (U) ? ? a ? ? . 0 137 T. Highways (U) ....... C010 ....... 0 00 ?000? 0 0 141 U. Power Plants and Transmission Lines (U) . . . . . . 0 . 0 147 V. Minerals (U) . . . . . . ??0?0?0,0?0??0?00?0?0 ? 164 W. Telecommunications (C) . . . . ? ? 0 ......... . ? ? ? 0 0 . 167 X. Special Forces Areas Orientation Map (S) .????00??..0 0 a 175 Special Forces Area 1 (S) .?........?.? 0 0 ......... 193 2 (0.0.0.?....0............ 205 3 (S) . . . . . a a a a a a a a .......... 214 4 (S) . 00.0?.?0.0 ..... aa 222 5 (S) ...... 232 TABLES I: Types of Resistance Activities in the UkSSR--1945-1956 0 ? ? 0 . p. 29 II: Types of Resistance Activities in the UkSSR by Bands-1945-1956 0 33 III: Land Utilization: Ukrainian sSil? 1955 a ? a . ? 0 9 0 0 0 . 62 IV: Population of the Ukrainian SSR, April 1,,1956 ...... . a . a 89 V: Ethnic Composition of the Ukrainian SSR ........ 0 0 0 0 0 90 VI: Ethnic Composition of Principal Ukrainian Cities 93 iv SECRET ? ? ../.1.11111.1? PART I RESISTANCE AND POPULATION FACTORS SECRET SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release a 50-Yr 2014/03/05 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 nP I ? 1 ? SECRET ' 1. Introduction The largest of the minority nationalities in the Soviet Union is the Ukrainian which occupies an important area of 232,600 square miles in-the southwestern corner of European Russia, as well as smaller areas in southern Russia, Siberia, and Central Asia. The group totals 37 million people, or approximately 18 per cent of the population of the Soviet Union,* and con- sequently rivals in numbers countries such as France, Italy, and West nermany. Its importance for the Soviet Union lies not only in its size, but also in the area it occupies which is one of the richest of the USSR both in agricultural and industrial production and in raw materials. As a. result, the possibility of national resistance in the Ukraine has more serious implications for the Soviet Union than the possibility of resis- tance in other parts of the Soviet Union or in any of its satellites. Of the factors which have influenced Ukrainians in their attitudes /"ward Russian rule and the Soviet regime, the long history of union be- tween Russia and the Ukraine, extending from 1654 to the present in an aImost unbroken line, ranks first in importance. During this span of . more than 300 years Russian influence in the Ukraine penetrated deeply into the life of the country. Russian settlers moved into the pastern districts of the Ukraine and into its cities, and became the leaders in Reverment, industry, and intellectual life. Many of the Ukrainians living 1r the cities as well as those drawn there from the countryside adopted Russian ways, gradually accepting Russian rule and abandoning their - Ukrainian heritage. To a remarkable degree they identified themselves with Russians, and the urban areas of the Ukraine became Russian rather tnan Likrnian centers. Only in the villages and agricultural districts was the Ukrainian language preserved and a feeling of distinctiveness from Creat Russians kept alive. As a result, little open opposition to Russian authority developed, and the Ukrainian national movement remained unimportant. ???.????????????????????????? ???????.1.4a.m0.???????? .1?1?1?10?11?1111. * Population firires used throughout the study are estimates for May 1, 1557,, elceot where otherwise indicate']. SECRET ifid in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET Gradually, however, Ukrainian nationalism was stimultued by an awareness of the differences of language, customs, etc. Which separated the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, and especially by the feeling Which became prevalent among man/ Ukrainians in the 19th and 20th centuries that Russian rule was synonymous with Tsarist oppression. The predominant position held by Russians in Ukrain- ian industry, Commerce, and government and the corresponding discrimination against Ukrainians encouraged nationalists to oppose Russian rule and to re- emphasize the distinctive Character of the Ukraihian pea-pie-and their right to national autonomy or independence. It was this renewed interest in the Ukraine as a separate national region Which led to the growth after 1850 of a Ukrainian nationalist literature and the beginnings of Ukrainian political or- ganizations. By World War I the movement had grown to the point that organized resistance to Russian authority was possible, and during the civil war years from 1917 to 1921 Ukrainian nationalists organized a separate Ukrainian govern- ment and fought with some success against Russian forces. In the period after World War I Soviet rule was established in the Ukraine and, in accordance with Bolshevik national policy, the Ukraine was recognized for the first time as a distinct unit separate from Russia with the right to use its own language and to develop its own cultural institutions. Under these conditions numerous Ukrainian nationalists were drawn to support the Soviet regime, and for a short time it appeared that the wave of anti-Russian feeling Which had risen in the Ukraine might be absorbed and rendered harmless by the tolerant conditions of Soviet society. After 1927, however, Russian leaders embarked on an ambitious program calling for the collectivization of farms throughout the Soviet Union and a centralization of economic an govern- mental activities. Russian authority was consequently brought into direct orfliet with the Ukrainian peasant, as well as with Ukrainian leaders Who became increasingly aware of their secondary position within the Soviet Union. A new wave of Ukrainian opposition appeared, expressing itself first in open resistance to collectivization and secondly in the anti-Russian partisan move- 2SECRET SECRET ment which became a strong force in World War II. Although the resistance was directed against Soviet measures rather than against Russian rule, it assumed a strong nationalist form, demanding recognition of the right of the Ukraine to follow its own independent course. After World War II open re- sistance gradually disappeared, but Soviet sources as well as intelligence reports indicate that in many districts dissatisfaction with rule by Soviet Russia remains. The great influence which Russians have exercised in the Ukraine over a long period of time and the relative similarity of the Ukrainian and Rus- sian languages, customs, and backgrounds are distinguishing features which, in terms of resistance, set the Ukraine apart from the East European satel- lite countries. As a result, no resistance to Soviet rule on the scale to be found in the satellites is to be expected. Many influential positions in Ukrainian life are occupied by Russians or by Ukrainians sympathetic to Russian rule, and the points of conflict between Ukrainians and Russians are smaller than in other areas under Russian domination. Some Ukrainians are apparently only slightly aware of the differences which set them apart from Russians and feel little national antagonism. Nevertheless, important grievances exist, and among other Ukrainians there is opposition to Soviet authority which often has assumed a nationalist form. Under favorable con- ditions, these people might be expected to assist American Special Forces in fighting against the regime. 2. Traditional Resistance Background a. Separatist Traditions Underlying Ukrainian opposition to Russian rule are a number of deep roots which have stimulated separatist feeling. The first and most tangible is the Ukrainian language which, though a division of the East Slavic language group, differs substantially from its allied tongues, Russian and Belorussian. Before the 19th century it was unwritten, and large segments of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and city population used SERET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET it reluctantly if at all.' Nevertheless, it was the only language understood readily by the mass of the peasants, and after 1800 writings in Ukrainian began to appear despite the opposition of the Russian government.2 By 1900 the lang- uage had developed a grammar, vocabulary, and structure of its own, and was officially recognized by the Russian imperial Academy of Science.3 The distin- ctiveness of the Ukrainian language has been important to the nationalist move- ment: the inability of the Ukrainian peasant to read Russian publications and to converse with Russians?particularly government officials--has contributed to his feeling of separation; and the struggle for an official recognition of the right to use the Ukrainian language has served as a nationalist rallying point. A second basis for Ukrainian opposition to Russian rule grew out of the differences between Russian and Ukrainian customs and folk ways which set the Ukrainian people apart from the Great Russians. Their costumes were different as were their traditions and popular songs, their proverbs and folklore. As early as 1905 an English observer noted: The city 5ley7 and the surrounding country are, in fact, Little Russian rather than Great Russian, and between these two sections of the population there are profound differences--differences of language, costume, traditions, popular songs, proverbs, folk-lore, domestic arrangements, mode of life, and Communal organization. ? Indeed, if I did not fear to ruffle unnecessarily the pat- riotic susceptibilities of my Great Russian friends who have a pet theory on this subject, I should say that we have here two ? distinct nationalities, further apart from each other than the English and the Scotch.4 During the 19th century Ukrainian customs were abandoned by the upper classes-- government officials, army officers, the nobility, and the higher clergy.5 Many of the-it "Russifiedll families never regained a consciousness of their separate Ukrainian background. Yet the customs were preserved among the peas- antry, and after 1880 were gradually extended upward again through the work of Ukrainian intellectuals. The third root underlying Ukrainian separatism is the belief held by many Ukrainians that there was once an independent Ukrainian state which, however, became divided and enslaved by the Russians and Poles.6 The state, it is 4 SECRET 'Am ?Vr'. tt, SECRET argued) achieved its greatest glory under the Cossack leader, Bohdan Khmelnitsky, who ruled the Ukraine independently of Russia until 1654.7 The subsequent sub- ordination of the Ukraine to Russia was a clear violation, nationalists declare, of the area's historic right to independence--an independence that must be re- stored. This nationalist call for the re-establishment of an independent Ukrainian state has become one of the most forceful appeals of the separatist movement. The fourth root of Ukrainian nationalism grew out of the sharp cleavage which existed between the eastern, industrial and urban, parts of the Ukraine and the western, rural districts. Traditionally the Ukrainian peasant has regarded merchants and city-dwellers with suspicion, blaming them for his low income and high prices. Inasmuch as the urban population has been predomi- nantly Russian or Jewish?8 the Ukrainiants dislike of the city has been trans- formed into a hostility for Russians or Jews. A Ukrainian writer expressed the sentiment as follows: The city rules the village and the city is lalien.t The city draws to itself almost all the wealth and gives the vil- lage almost nothing in return. The city extracts taxes which never return to the Ukrainian village. In the city one must pay bribes to be freed from scorn and red tape. In the city are warm fires, schools, theaters and music, plays. The city is expensively dressed, as for a holiday; it eats and drinks well; many people promenade. In the village there is nothing besides hard work, impenetrable darkness, and misery. The city is aristocratic, it is alien. It is not ours, not Uk- rainian. It is Great Russian) Jewish, Polish, but not ours, not Ukra1n1an.9 After 1900 an agrarian movement developed in which the Ukrainian peasant identified his economic oppressors with his national en-ries. Ukrainian nationalism was thereby reinforced by the demand for land reform and by the argument that Ukrainian peasants could obtain land and expropriate alien landlords and capitalists, if the Ukraine became an autonomous political unit.10 The argument was equally effective under Tsarist rule with its semi- feudal system of land-holding and under Soviet rule with its collectivized and state farms. Finally, Uktainian nationalism developed out of the experience of 5 ? SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET Ukrainians living in the western districts of the Ukrainian SSR--in the dis- tricts incorporated into the Soviet Union during and after World War II.* Before World War I the most important of these areas--Galicia--was governed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire which adopted a relatively moderate policy to- ward its Ukrainian minority and permitted the development of Ukrainian poli- tical parties and the use of the Ukrainian language.11 After World War I the area was incorporated chiefly into Poland and2 although a less sympathetic policy was followed, Ukrainian political consciousness continued to grow; and political groups, particularly anti-Russian groups, to flourish.12 By 1939, when the area was acquired by the Soviet Union, its Ukrainian population had become the most active politically of Ukrainian groups and the most firmly anti-Russian in its attitudes. Both during and after World War II this wes- tern group provided the most intense and resolute opposition to the Soviet regime. * See Map A. 6 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 52? ubethnoye _ .rot ? :741 , ^ .) 51? 50? 49" .?Slayiansk-- Ksamionlr ? oKons ? R UM A N I A, UKRAINIAN S. S. R. MAP A ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS (U) Oblast boundaries Oblast center Acquired from Poland, September 1939 Acquired from Rumania, June 1940 Acquired from Czechoslovakia. June 1945 Transferred from the RSFSR, February 1954 Sumy r mmmmm mus gligeggi K,snizEv L. MOLDAVIA N' ? S. S R. Dam) ?Kameda: Sevastopol' tialaklaya 0 20 40 60 80 48? 100 Mi 0 HHH 4 60 81) 100 120 140 j0 Km. Comb*. 29' 30? 3.? 32? 330 34? 350 36? 370 38? 390 . 47? 46? 4 44? aiss, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET b. Resistance and Civil War, 1917-1921 The first strong indication of unrest in the Ukraine and of opposi- tion to Russian rule came in World War I after the revolution of March 1917 had destroyed the Tsarist government and opened the way for local uprisings throughout the Russian Empire. Almost at once a group of Ukrainian intell- ectuals and students meeting in Kiev formed a Ukrainian council--The Central Rada--which was gradually broadened in membership until it became a sort of regional government for the Ukraine.13 Although it refused to declare its independence of Russia, it displayed its national coloring by demanding regional autonomy, the right to use the Ukrainian language in the schools, and in government and public life, and the formation of separate Ukrainian military nn1ts.14 The government was not widely supported by the mass of Ukrainians outside of Kiev, but it controlled a number of military regiments, and with the consent of the Provisional Government, jointly administered the Ukraine under a rather loose, temporary arrangement.15 The Rada failed, however, to extend its influence below a relatively thin layer of intellec- tuals and nationalists, and when Russian Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government and sent troops into the Ukraine, the Rada was quickly defeated and forced, early in 1918, to flee from Kiev. Happily for the Ukrainian nationalists, the German government favored Ukrainian independence from Bolshevik control, and, adopting the Central Rada as its puppet, cleared the Ukraine of Russian troops and returned the Rada to Kiev.16 Ukrainian nationalists consequently were given once again the opportunity to govern the Ukraine. Their freedom of action was limited by the German occupation and by the tendency of German officials to inter- fere both in the political life of the country and in its economic affairs, but much work was done in stimulating the growth of Ukrainian national con- sciousness. The Ukraine was recognized as an independent country by both Germany and Russia, and many Ukrainian peasants Who had previously disliked aspects of Russian rule but had seen no other alternative began now under SECIZET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 , SECRET [the influence of the Ukrainian flag and the Ukrainian language to accept the possibility of Ukrainian independence. As a result, when the German occupation and its puppet regime collapsed late in 1918, a new Ukrainian government, the Directory, was formed, and for a time established in the capital city, Kiev.17 More than any previous govern- ment the Directory was supported by Ukrainian peasants. It was defendeda., small military units and by peasant bands which were intensely nationalist and in some cases large and well-organized. At times it claimed the support of a broad section of the Ukrainian people, and the movement it guided grew in certain districts Into a mass national uprising. At other times, however, the Directory was almost alone, as its supporting forces deserted to the enemy or returned to their homes or engaged in independent, petty raids. In any case the Directory was opposed by powerful armies it could not cope with, in- cluding Denikints "White" troops, Polish and Rumanian forces, and the Llshevik Red Army. By November 1920 it was finally defeated and forced into exile. Russian Bolshevik troops again occupied the Ukraine and again established a Soviet government there. During the same years in which Ukrainian nationalists were working un- successfully to win control of the Ukraine, Ukrainian Bolsheviks also were failing to form a stable government. The first Ukrainian Soviet government was established in December 1917 in the eastern part of the Ukraine at Kharkov. It received only modest support in the Ukraine, but was aided by Russian Bol- shevik troops and managed to occupy the area until forced out by the Germans.18 It remained in exile in Russia until the end of 1918 when Germanyls collapse enabled it once again to enter the Ukraine. With Russian help it seized much of the area and began to govern it in a centralizing way, refusing to recog- nize the Ukrainian language or the importance of Ukrainian nationalism)-9 It antagonized peasants and natione.:cts and lost all local support except in the eastern, Russian districts. By the end of 1919 it had again lost control, and was severely criticized by Russian Bolsheviks for its failure to accommo- 8 SECRET "^ ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ,nktrILS, SECRET date to local Ukrainian sentiment.20 When it was re-established in the Ukraine, again with Russian help, it was ordered to adopt a more flexible policy, to encourage Ukrainian nationalists, and to accept the use of the Ukrainian language.21 The period of civil war in the Ukraine demonstrated that Ukrainian nationalism had become an important force in certain districts and that there was much opposition to Russian and Bolshevik rule. The opposition -centered in the western and central parts of the Ukraine, while in the eastern, industrial districts, loyalty to Russia and to the aew Soviet government remained uppermost. The opposition was poorly organized and was weakened because its greatest strength lay in the countryside where peasants were generally indifferent to politics and where equipment and supplies were not available to match the resources of the city. In ad- dition, the opposition could command supPort only from the small parts of the Ukraine it held, while its enemies--the Bolsheviks, Poles, and forces of Denikin--could draw assistance from Russia, Poland, and other states. Nevertheless there was considerable sympathy within the Ukraine for its nationalist leaders, and the period has subsequently been glori- fied as a time in which the Ukrainian people struggled against numerous enemies ia the face of overwhelming odds for their independence. c. Resistance tc ?:viet Rue, 1921-1941 With the establishment of a stable Soviet government in the Ukraine in November 120, resistance by nationalist bands quickly disap- Y Tfle last p.r.tisan raid tD17..e. place in October 1921 when a band of afeu hundred men headed by General Tiutilinnyk was defeated after 22 driving some distance Into the western Ukraine from the Polish border. Subsequently, resistance disepoeared except for minor, local incidents. Thrcugh,-;ut the twenties little national opposition to Soviet rule was expressed. Russian Bolshevik leaders, anxious to win support in the Ukraine, adopted a surprisingly moderate policy) insisting that the Uk- rainian language and culture be fostered) that native Ukrainians be drawn 50-Yr 2014/03/05 : CIA-RDP81-01043R0023on79nnn7_1 9 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET into leadership posts, and that local independence in economic affairs be granted.23 As a result, Ukrainians lost much of their basis for opposition to Russian rule, and many nationalist leaders, non-Communists as well as Communists, took posts in government and public organizations and gave their support to the new regime. Gradually, however, conflicts developed between Ukrainian nationalists and Soviet leaders. The earliest appeared in cultural fields where a group of Ukrainians including members of the Communist Party began to demand that the Ukraine turn away from Russia in its literature and art, and toward Western EUrope.25 The leader of the group was a Bolshevik, Mykola Khvyltovyi, and the group included the Ukrainian Commissar of Education, Oleksandr Shumslkyi. Under pressure from Stalin26 and other Russian leaders the group finally withdrew from its demands, and no open conflict resulted. Neverthe- less, many Ukrainian writers continued to oppose closer ties between Russian and Ukrainian literature, and the restrictions imposed by Bolshevik officials served to increase Ukrainian dissatisfaction with Soviet rule. In 1927 new limitations on Ukrainian national development were adopted. In an April resolution of the Ukrainian Communist Party it was emphasized that the policy of fostering Ukrainian national institutions had led to a disregard of the rights of the non-Ukrainian minorities and to the development of re- strictions on the right to use languages other than Ukrainian.27 It ordered that minority languages be granted an equal status with Ukrainian, and that Russian specifically be established as a second language in the schools. The campaign was pushed further in 1929 when a subversive organization, the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine was uncovered and accused of "pushing its own people into social, economic and cultural life, into the Party, into the Komsomol, and into the schools in order to utilize them for grafting national- ist ideas. 28 Over forty-five Ukrainian scholars including members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science were tried and convicted and exiled or sentenced to long prison terms. In 1931 and 1933, two additional organizations, the 10 ,SECRET 4.1! SECRET Ukrainian National Center and the Ukrainian Military Organization, were un- covered and additional arrests made. In all the organizations members of the Communist Party were discovered, some of them holders of important lead- ership posts. As a result, a complete Party purge was ordered for 1933. Over a fifth of the members of the Ukrainian Communist Party were expelled, the top leadership was replaced, and nearly a third of the regional (oblast) secretaries were removed. In addition, most of the officials of the Commis- sariat of Education and many university professors lost their posts.29 An even more serious opposition to Soviet rule appeared among Ukrain- ian peasants, who were brought after 1927 under steadily increasing pressure to surrender their land and join the new collective and state farms. In 1928, discriminatory taxes and forced grain levies were imposed on the wealthy peasants, restrictions were placed on individual peasant households, and measures were adopted for the encouragement of state and collective farms. In 1929, it was decided to eliminate the kulaks (the wealthy peas- ants) completely as a class: their land was made subject to confiscation; they were denied the right to join collective or state farms; and the gov- ernment was empowered to deport them from their districts.30 After 1930, most vigorous efforts were made to force all peasants to leave their indiv- idual farms. Peasants throughout the Soviet Union disliked the new measures, and the period from 1929 to 1933 was a period of sharp conflict in all agri- cultural regions. In the Ukraine the greatest peasant resistance to the new farm policy was encountered--not at first because of any national hostility, but because the Ukrainian peasant was more seriously affected by collectivization than the Russian. Ukrainian peasants included traditionally a higher percentage of kulaks and middle peasants, for the milder climate and richer soil of the Ukraine made possible a higher farm income. Since the farm changes were directed primarily at the wealthier peasants, a larger percentage of Ukrain- ians were harshly affected. Secondly, the traditions of the Ukrainian peasant made it more difficult for him to accept the communalism of the collective Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 11 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET farm: he had traditionally glorified the Cossack for his freedom and indepen- dence; he had idealized the institution of private, individual homesteads, with land passed from father to son; he had not become accustomed, as had the Russian peasant, to the system of "rppartition" in which the village com- munity periodically redistributed the land among the peasant families.31 As a result, he found it even more difficult than did the Russian peasant to adjust to the new farm system with its reArictions on private ownership of land and on individual farm management. Ukrainian opposition to collectivization was largely unorganized. Groups of peasants occasionally combined to resist grain collection forcibly; small bands of peasants raided collection points and wealthy farmers alike; but there was no large-scale, coordinated opposition. The resistance was important, however, because it involved many more Ukrainians than any previous uprising or nationalist movement. Few Ukrainian landowners did not make some attempt to retain their farms, or to hide grain or cattle from the collection team, or to resist deportation; and almost every Ukrainian was harshly affected by the famine of 1932-1933.32 As a result, the severity of Bolshevik farm policy left a sharp impression on a wide section of the Ukrainian people, and that impression formed a basis for hostility to the regime. The opposition to collectivization never became a large-scale national uprising. Ukrainian national sentiment existed, and Bolshevik leaders exag- gerated its danger, claiming at one point that nine out of ten instances of "counter-revolutionary" activity were carried out under nationalist slogans.33 The predominant element, however, was econanic? and the Ukrainian peasant who attacked the grain collector did so to protect his property, not to uphold Ukrainian autonomy or independence. Yet the struggle did assume an ethnic character when Soviet leaders discovered they were forced to rely largely on urban dwellers and on loyal Communists imported into the Ukraine from Russian cities to enforce the new policy. Over 15,000 such workers were sent to the rural areas of the Ukraine.34 Since they were almost without exception Rus- 12 SECRET SECRET sians or Jews, a measure of national hostility appeared, and the basis was laid for a distinctly Ukrainian national rebellion directed against economic and social oppression by alien rulers. Such a rebellion did not materialize because of the Ukrainian peasant's lack of political consciousness and be- cause the potential leaders of such a movement--the intellectuals and the nationalists within the Communist Party--had been removed by 1933 from in- fluential positions. Yet the harshness of collectivization left the Ukrain- ian peasant with feelings of bitterness and opposition, and the heavy res- trictions on private farms aroused his antagonism. His hostility was apparently directed chiefly against Bolshevik policy; but to a limited but increasing degree he identified the Russians with Bolshevism and with city oppression, and thereby became susceptible to anti-Russian, Ukrainian nationalist and separatist views. d. Resistance During World War II* The outbreak of World War II and the subsequent invasion of the USSR by Germany provided Ukrainian nationalists with a new opportunity to oppose Soviet Russian rule. As the Red Army was forced back out of the Ukraine, Soviet controls were removed, and the Ukrainians were enabled, within the framework of German policy, to express their national feelings. At the same time the occupation permitted.Gernari observers to assess the strength and extent of Ukrainian nationalism. As a result, the wartime period with its lessons about resistance provided a number of concrete indications of the possibilities for conducting Special Forces operations in the Ukraine. Ukrainian resistance during the war period was influenced by two factors. The first was the attitude of German authorities toward the Ukraine and specifically toward Ukrainian nationalism. On the whole, the German government, in keeping with Hitler's policy of maintaining absolute control over the conquered territories, gave only limited encouragement and support * See also Part II, Section 2 and Part 111, Section 3. SECIIIET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co .y Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET to Ukrainian nationalists. Before the outbreak of the war the Germans had encouraged Ukrainian emigre groups,35 and the German Army had recruited Ukrainian translators and police units, and had organized a small Ukrainian military force; but among the highest German circles there was much opposi- tion to Ukrainian nationalism, and following the invasion of the USSR many Ukrainian leaders were imprisoned and a stern policy adopted toward the national movement. Although the Army in its eagerness to develop Ukrainian miliLary support continued to tolerate Ukrainian nationalists, allowing them to carry on political activities in occupied areas and to hold administrative posts in local government, German policy in general was one of restricting national enthusiasm. The second factor influencing Ukrainian resistance was the important role played by Ukrainian emigres and by Ukrainians in the western, formerly Polish districts. Among these groups there had developed a nunber of politi- cal organizations which were extremely nationalist and anti-Soviet in their views and looked toward Germany for assistance in their fight against the Soviet Union. The chief emigre group was the Organization of Ukrainian Nation- alists (OUN) which consisted principally of Ukrainians who had fled from the USSR following World War I and was now directed by a western Ukrainian, Andrew Melt nyk. Following the German invasion of Poland in 1939 the OUN had been given administrative posts in the General government and had developed some anti-Soviet weakened by the Ukraine enthusiasm in the areas outside the Soviet Union. The group was the fact that its supporters were primarily emigres who had left after World War I and hence were conservative and without connec- tions with Ukrainian nationalists inside the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the OUN had aroused some hostility by its willingness to cooperate with the Germais. As a result, on February 10, 19409 a splinter group headed by Stephan Bandera broke with the parent body and established a separate organization which was also called the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) and which quickly became as important as the first. Its membership was considerably younger than SECRET - SECRET the Melnyk group (OUN-M) and it adopted a more radical position. It insisted on the most active, forceful measures for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state, and it viewed cooperation with Germany with some misgivings. It was in a stronger position than the OUN-M, for many of its members had left the Soviet Ukraine only after Russian occupation of Eastern Galicia and hence had close connections with nationalists in the newly-acquired areas. Rivalry between the two occasionally became intense, and throughout the war period the organizations refused to coordinate their nationalist activities.36 As soon as German forces invaded the Soviet Union, the emigre national- ists attempted to spread their influence into Soviet Ukraine. In the western zones, especially in the areas acquired by the Soviet Union in 1939) hostility to the Russians was more intense and better organized than in the eastern sections. Underground uprisings were ordered, and at Sambor and in several regions of Eastern Galicia (Podhaitsi and Monastiriska) Ukrainian militia took over police functions and dissolved the collective farms before the ar- rival of German troops.37 On June 30, 1941, with the German occupation of Lvov, a group of Bandera supporters, with the tacit consent of the German Army, proclaimed the "re-establishment" of the Ukrainian state.38 At the same time, both the OUN-B and the OUN-M dispatched "task forces" into the East Ukraine to establish nationalist cells in the principal cities, to proclaim the independence of the Ukraine, to organize an administrative ser- vice, and to build a Ukrainian army from former soldiers of the Soviet Red Army. The groups were tiny and ill-equipped and were successful only in forming small organizations in Zhitomir, Vinnitsa, Dnepropetrovsk, and Kiev.39 Meanwhile, the Melnyk organization, by providing translators and advisors for the German Army, had been permitted to move with it through the Ukraine. On September 19, 1941, the group reached Kiev, where it established the administrative apparatus for the city. The ability of the emigre nationalists to develop their authority in the eastern parts of the Ukraine was dependent on German military success in the Ukraine and on the willingness of the Germans to tolerate their ac- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co.y Ap?roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA RDP81 01043R00230027non7_1 15 SECRET _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET tivities. In contrast to the situation in the west Ukraine, there was in the east no organized nationalist underground, and the emigre leaders had few contacts on Which to build such a movement.? Almost immediately after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, did not intend to support the activities the Ukraine. Three days after the Ltvov it was made clear that the Germans of the emigre nationalists inside proclamation of an independent Uk- rainian state, SS forces arrived in the city, dissolved the embryo government, and arrested Bandera and his supporters, sending them to Berlin. The OUN-B "task forces" were disrupted and adherents of Bandera in Zhitomir and the western Ukraine were executed or forced underground.41 Supporters of Melnyk? more acceptable to the Germans, were given a longer period of relative free- dom, but they too, after November 1941, were met by increasing restrictions. Some of their leaders were shot. Others were forced underground. In December 1941 authority over the Right Bank of the Ukraine was transferred from the German Army to the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Under the harsh rule of Erich Koch the role of the emigre groups diminished until only the lower level posts in local government were left in their hands. In addition to the work carried on by Ukrainian emigres, underground and partisan activity developed among groups living inside the Ukraine at the time of the German invasion. The largest groups appeared near Nikopolt, in the Dnieper River bend, and in the Poles tyeswamps in the northwestern Ukraine.42 Early in the war, when Ukrainian nationalists still hoped for German coopera- tion, the bands consisted primarily of Communists afraid of the harsh treat- ment they might receive at German hands, and of Red Army soldiers who had been separated from their units and who were fearful of German prison camps. By spring 1942, all the largest bands had been destroyed except one in the sheltered forest belt of Polestye northeast of Chermigov. This group, headed by Sidor Kovpak, was dominated by Communists, and most of its military sup- plies were provided by the Russian Army by air. Nevertheless it claimed to be a Ukrainian liberation movement; it published a Ukrainian language 16 SECRET 0.????????? 0??????0-. (0 SECRET newspaper; and it received some support and food supplies from the non- Communist population. In late October 1942, Kovpak embarked upon a con- siderable raid throughout the northwestern quarter of the Ukraine. Cross- ing the Dnieper River he moved westward into Galicia, then south to the Carpathian Mountains, and then back again to the northern swamps.* Apparently he received little support in the Carpathian Mountains where the population was strongly nationalist. Throughout most of his raid, however, he was hampered only slightly by the Ukrainian population or by Ukrainian partisan bands. At the end of the raid the group dwindled away except for a small troop in the forest regions.43 The second of the partisan bands was anti-Communist and distinctly Ukrainian. It was organized by Taras Borovets (Taras Bulba) who, with the initial permission of German Army officials, gathered together a group of several thousand Ukrainian partisans and stragglers from the Soviet Red Army. Its center of operations was the triangle-shaped area from Pinsk to Olevsk to Mozyrt. Until the end of 1941 it acted principally against Red partisan bands; but in November, when the Germans ordered the group disbanded, it withdrew into the woods and carried on activities against Germans and Communists alike. In July 1942 emissaries of the Soviet government requested it to join with the Kovpak band in its action against the Germans; but the demand was rejected.44 The third partisan band, also established in Polestye, consisted almost exclusively of Ukrainian nationalists. It appeared in the fall of 1942 when the Germans by their repressive measures had made plain their hostility to the Ukrainian national movement. It drew its support from Ukrainians fearful of the Germans and particularly from remnants of the Bandera group which had been dispersed by the Germans. From October 1942 until February 1944 it carried on open activities against the occupation. Its strength lay in its isolated location in the forest area north and * See Map M. ?0. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007 1 17 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET west of Rovno, and in its proximity to Galicia where it could easily draw support from the emigre groups. Toward the end of 1942, the group adopted the title Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UP), and in the next year forced the Borovets partisans and a number of Melnyk supporters to join with it. It grew in size as repressive German measures affected more and more Ukrainians until it controlled a large part of Volynia southwest of Rovno and the square from Kovel' to Vladimerets to Kostopolt to Lutsk. The group remained in con- trol of the area until the Soviet advance in February 1944 forced it undeJ7- ground.45 Several conclusions may be drawn from the ekrp:9rience of Ukrainian par- tisans in World War II. First, it is significant that the only partisan movements of any size east of the Dnieper River were pro-Russian. Apparently whatever Ukrainian nationalist sentiment existed in the eastern Ukraine was ? unorganized and passive, and was unable, without external stimulus, to grow into an active force. Secondly, it is important to note that the pro-Russian Kovpak band which was partially dependent on local support was able to con- duct a successful raid through the center of nationalist activity in north- western Ukraine. It is true that the band was forced to detour to avoid the headquarters of the Bandera partisans, and apparently it was greeted with some hostility in the Carpathian area. Nevertheles;le the Ukrainian partisans did not challenge it nor did the population oppose it as resolutely as they did the Germans. Perhaps its use of the Ukrainian language concealed its pro-Russian bias, or perhaps anti-German feeling had grown so strong that any group opposing the occupation was supported. Thirdly, it is noteworthy that the partisan bands developed their greatest strength as a reaction to the harsh German occupation and not primarily in opposition to the Soviet Union. Because of the speed of the German invasion it is perhaps natural that anti-Russian bands did not have an opportunity to organize themselves. At the same time there is no question that the Borovets and Bandera groups were consistently anti-Communist as well as anti-German. In general, however, 18 SECRET a_ SECRET greatest support for the nationalist partisans came from Ukrainians harmed by the German occupation, and the principal activities directed against the Germans. 3. Resistance Activity, 1945-1957 of the bands were a. Participants in Resistance Activities With the re-occupation of the Ukraine by Russian troops at the close of World War II, the nationalist partisans who during the war had fought both against the German Army and against Soviet forces were incorporated within the Soviet Union. Many of the partisans wereunwilling to accept Soviet rifle- and consequently did not return to their homes, but remained in the sheltered areas they had controlled during the German occupation and continued to op- pose Russian forces. At the same time, as the Red Army again marched into ? the former Polish districts of Volynia and Galicia and as the Soviet govern- ment made clear its intention to incorporate these areas into the Soviet Union, large numbers of the inhabitants, disturbed by the prospect of Russian rule, began to support the partisans actively, providing them with food and supplies and offering them shelter. As a result, a solid base for opposition to the Soviet Union was established. An active resistance movement appeared, centered primarily in the Ukraine's western, newly acquired districts, and dominated by Ukrainian nationalists. It is this movement which has been responsible for most post-mar resistance activity. Resistance in other parts of the Ukraine has appeared only sporadically and in a limited way, and apart from the nationalists, only small and unimportant bands or indiv- iduals have been involved. (1) Ukrainian Nationalist Resistance Groups: The opposition movement established by Ukrainian nationalist resistance groups has been marked as a highly organized, centrally directed movement, mc.ivated by long-range objectives which have been outlined care- fully. The movement has established as its primary aim the defeat of the * See also Part II, Section 3. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81 01043R002300220007-1 19 rt- C Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET Soviet forces controlling the Ukraine and the formation of an independent Ukrainian state. The movement has included in its activities not only open measures against the regime, such as the destruction of bridges and the burn- ing of police headquarters, but also a program of economic and social resistance and an educational campaign of nationalist and anti-Bolshevik propaganda. Three organizations have composed the resistance movement: the Organiza- tion of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN); the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA); and the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (UHVR). The three groups have been closely associated with one another and in fact their leadership has taken the form of an interlocking directorate with the same individuals occupying the top posts in each organization. For example, until his death in 1950 Roman Shukevich (General Tares Chuprinka) was the top leader of edch of the three bodies: head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists; commander-in- chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army; chief of the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation.46 Similarly, Petro Poltava (pseud.), who was until his death in 1952 the leading ideologist of the Or- ganization of Ukrainian Nationalists inside the Ukraine, was also .a major in the Insurgent Army and chief of its propaganda division, as well as deputy chief of the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Libera- tion.47 The three organizations have been merely separate divisions of the underground movement: the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation has been visualized as the official government of the Ukrainian underground; the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists has been the political group dominating the underground movement; and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army has been the mili- tary force responsible for active measures of resistance. In recent years the distinctions between them have become of small importance except in emi- grant circles, as Soviet counter-measures have almost completely destroyed the movement inside the Ukraine, transforming the three bodies into paper organizations. (a) The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists?This is the oldest and most firmly established of the three nationalist units. Its 20 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A e ease SECRET membership has consisted since World War II almost exclusively of western Ukrainians and particularly of Ukrainians from the areas ceded to the Soviet Union by Poland. The organization is directed by a Provid or Executive Committee whose members are apparently self-perpetuating and self-selecting. The last Congress of the Organization (the third Extraordinary Great Con- gress) was held in 1943 inside the Ukraine, and that Congress selected a bureau of three men to serve as the guiding body of the Executive Committee. The three men were Stephan Bandera, former chairman of the Executive Commit- tee; Roman Shukevich, commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Pnly and long- time associate of Stephan Bandera; and Yaroslav Stetsko, founder in 1940 together with Bandera of the radical wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.? In 1950 Shukevich was killed by Soviet forces, and his place taken by Turi Lemish (Colonel Vasil Koval).49 In November 1952, Stephan Bandera, who had been living outside the Ukraine after 1941, re- signed from the Executive Bureau with the explanation that only Ukrainians living inside the Ukraine should direct the work of the Organization.50 Undisputed leadership of the Organization inside the Ukraine then was centered in the hands of Yuri Lemish, who remained as head of the Organi- zation at least until March 1954. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists has emphasized three points which explain its importance as the most active resistance group inside the Ukraine. First, it has adopted an extreme nationalist position, glorifying the nation as an independent entity in terms reminiscent of German National Socialism. The nation is regarded as "the highest and strongest type of organic human community," and as a "natural and eternal phenomenon in human- ity."51 In particular, the Organization has adopted as its motto the phrase, "The good of the Ukrainian nation is our supreme goal"; and the phrase has been interpreted to require the unconditional independence of the Ukraine.52 The Organization has consequently become the most uncompromising of the Ukrainian groups in its demand for Ukrainian independence, and the most ac- tive in its opposition to Russian Soviet rule. 5 - r 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-1)1n2V1 Prul9qnnoonnn74 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET Secondly, the Organization has insisted that Ukrainian independence can be achieved solely through revolutionary methods, and that consequently the Organization must remain an illegal, revolutionary group. Attempts to com- promise with Russian leaders and to accept a gradual evolution of Ukrainian autonomy have been denounced) and Ukrainians who have cooperated with the Soviet government have been attacked as-traitors to the Ukrainian nation. Only a militant and uncompromising battle waged by insurrectionary forces can, it has been argued, produce Ukrainian independence.? Finally, the Organization has taken-the position that only resistance groups actually operating inside the Ukraine can further the Ukrainets nation- al aims. Although the Organization maintains an emigre division and although it seeks support from countries hostile to the Soviet Union, emphasis has been placed most strongly on the internal years immediately following World War II, with their policy of internal resistance, resistance movement.54 In the Organization leaders, in keeping committed their partisan units to open battle with the Soviet Army. The policy was almost ruinous, and nearly half the bands were destroyed. After 1946 the Organization gradually shifted to a program of occasional partisan raids and general underground activities. It has retained, however, its emphasis on the importance of active resistance groups operating inside the Ukraine rather than abroad among emigre groups. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists has been an important resis- tance factor in the Ukraine because it has been an extreme nationalist group insisting it will not compromise with the Soviet government until Ukrainian independence is achieved, because it has called for active opposition rather than passive submission, and because it has been the only political group maintaining underground forces inside the Ukraine. However, there have been important limitations on its effectiveness. Since it was organized initially by western Ukrainians living in Galicia, and since it has been dominated by western Ukrainians, the Organization has had few ties in the eastern Ukraine, and some of its representatives have been received by the population there with apathy or even hostility. In addition, because of its extreme philoso- 22 SECRET Declassified in Part aril ized Copy Approved for Release ? 110 SECRET phy, other Ukrainian groups in the emigration have refused to cooperate with it. Their supporters inside the Ukraine would probably oppose any resistance movement dominated by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Finally, it seems likely that most Ukrainians are unwilling to take as radical a stand as that adopted by the Organization, or to adopt its extreme national- ist views. Hence, more moderate Ukrainian groups might find it easier to develop wide mass support. (b) The Ukrainian Insurgent Army--The military arm of the Ukrainian underground movement has been the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The Army was formed initially during World War II from the merging of a number of partisan bands which had been operating in the western areas of the Ukraine against both the German occupation forces and also against pro-Soviet partisan bands. During the early years of the war the most important of the Ukrainian partisan bands were controlled by Ukrainian groups hostile to Stephan Bandera and his Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. However, in 1943 the Bandera organization began to expand its area of control in the Ukraine, until by force or persuasion it had absorbed under its authority virtually all the anti-Russian partisans. The name, Ukrainian Insurgent Army, was adopted and a Bandera supporter, Roman Shukevich, was appointed head of the Army under the pseudonym General Taras Chuprinka. By the end of 1943 a central head- quarters for the underground partisans had been set up, and the Army had es- tablished itself as a para-military armed force with regular formations operating in some areas and with a carefully defined organization.55 Through- out 1944 and the first part of 1945 the Insurgent Army continued to grow in importance: it operated openly against Soviet forces; it made no attempt to conceal its major centers; it controlled important areas of the Western Ukraine. However, in the spring of 1945 the Soviet Army inaugurated ,a major military offensive against the insurgents, and by the end of 1945 most units of the Insurgent Army had been defeated and perhaps fifty per cent of its troops captured. The remainder of the Army broke up into small units which operated only in inaccessible forested areas, or went completely underground 23 50-Yr2014/03/05:CIA-RnPRi_ninA-Drywn,-- ..... Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET and ceased all open activities against the' Soviet regime.56 After 1950 the Insurgent Army apparently disappeared as an effective and active organization. Although Colonel Koval was appointed to replace General Chuprinka as commander-in-chief, it appears that his command was only a nominal one and that there were few units coming even indirectly under his control. Until 1954 reports continued to indicate that he was in the Ukraine and still nominally Army- chief, but the reports have said nothing about the scope of his authority. After 1954 even indirect references to Colonel Koval-disappeared; and it seems likely that the organization is no longer of importance. There are perhaps a few isolated bands which remain in bunkers in remote forested regions, and their numbers may be replenished occasionally by a small stream of Ukrainians avoiding military service or fearful of Soviet reprisals for actions they have taken against the regime. Also there are undoubtedly many western Ukrainians who remain sympathetic to the Insurgent Army and who now and then render support. Perhaps leaders of the Insurgent Army retain some contacts with resistance groups and continue to prepare propaganda materials. In general, however, the Army has virtually disappeared, and it would seem unlikely that it could increase its activities under present conditions with- out outside assistance. (c) The Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation--The impetus for the formation of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation came in the late fall of 1943 when the Bandera nationalists fighting inside the Ukraine decided that the nationalist movement would be strengthened by the establish- ment of a semi-governmental body which could easily be broadened into a full- fledged government in case Ukrainian independence were achieved. In addition, the Bandera group was anxious to have under its control a political body which could match the numerous exile governments and "Ukrainian National Councils" which other Ukrainian groups had formed.57 In November 1943 an Initiating Commission was established and during the following seven months the Commission negotiated with various Ukrainian groups in an effort to build broad support 24SECRET 11V Declassified in Part SanitizedC py Approved for ease ? SECRET for the new Ukrainian "government." The attempt was not completely success- ful, for the Hetmanite and Melnyk groups refused to cooperate. Nonetheless, a Congress of Ukrainian representatives was called to meet in the Carpathian area of the Ukraine in July 1944, and when twenty delegates arrived, the Congress declared itself to be a Constituent Assembly. On July 12 a con- stitution for the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation was adopted and its principal officers chosen.58 The Supreme Council of Liberation was intended to serve as an under- ground parliament and government of the Ukraine, and to work for the es- 14 tablishment of an independent Ukrainian state. In theory its principal organ was to be a Grand Assembly, but the Assembly has not met since its 1944 session. Its only important body has been a General Secretariat or Cabinet headed by its Chairman, Yuri Lemish. In order to maintain contacts with Ukrainian emigre groups and to develop support abroad, the Supreme Council has maintained a foreign mission, the Foreign Representation, which has established offices in Munich. In recent years the Foreign Representation has remained as the only active part of the Ukrainian Supreme COuncil of Liberation. The Council itself was never more than an adjunct to the other nationalist organizations in the Ukraine, and after 1950 it became almost completely inactive. It has played an important role in the resistance movement, however, in two respects. First, it has devoted much of its energy to the preparation and distribution of propaganda materials explaining the purposes of the nationalist movement and the aims of its leaders. It has thereby provided a more general framework for the nationalists and has helped to give their resistance activities a more organized form than that of simple bandit operations. Secondly, by maintaining contact with its emigre division it ? has provided connections between the resistance groups at home and nation- alists abroad. Since the Supreme Council has been supported by a wider group of Ukrainians than has the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, 25 SECRET 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDPRi_ninaqpnnoQrmoonn,,, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET its contacts with emigres have given the resistance movement a broader basis of support. (2) The "Black Cat" Organization: Apart from the Ukrainian nationalist organizations the only active resistance group in the Ukraine has been the "Black Cat" movement. It has never been of any great importance and there have been no indications of any activity by the group since the end of 1950. As far as is known, there has been no central organization for the movement, and it has been accused of being merely a number of separate bands which have adopted the name as a mat- ter of convenience.59 The group has been active throughout the Soviet Union, and incidents have been reported in Siberia, Smolensk, and especially in Minsk and other parts of Belorussia. Inside the Ukraine incidents have been reported only in Kiev and Odessa. The movement has been distinguished from the Ukrain- ian nationalist groups because it has been most active in the cities rather than in the rural and isolated areas. Undoubtedly some of its activities have been mere bandit operations of no political consequence. However, some reports have indicated that it has been distinctly anti-Communist and that one of its missions has been the assassination of Communist Party leaders.60 b. Characteristics of Resistance Activities in the Ukraine (1) Types of Resistance Activities: Resistance activities in the Ukraine during the period from 1945 to 1956 are described in Appendix I. Altogether there are listed in the table 231 incidents varying in intensity from the distribution of anti-Soviet pamphlets to actual armed engagements between as many as several hundred Soviet and Ukrainian troops. The incidents fall into three general categories (see Table I): (1) acts of opposition to specific Soviet measures of control and regulation; (2) acts of resistance which do not involve violence, but which are directed against the Soviet regime as a whole rather than against a single, specific Soviet decree; and (3) violent measures of resistance to Soviet rule. The first category includes all types of opposition directed not generally against the regime but specifically against a single measure 26 SECRET SECRET such as collectivization, work-norms and food-delivery quotas, deportation, or military service. In some cases resistance incidents in this category do not indicate general hostility to the regime, but reflect merely the strong opposition of the Ukrainian peasant to a specific measure of collectivization or military service. A Ukrainian who generally supports Soviet rule may feel that his grain-delivery quota has been set too high, and may consequently try to avoid meeting the assigned figure. Such opposition does not indicate gen- eral resistance. In other cases, however, the opposition is an expression of an underlying, general hostility and may then be classified as a resistance activity. The incidents listed in Appendix I are considered to be of this type. The second category of resistance activities includes incidents directed clearly against the regime as a whole, but not involving violence. Three types of incidents are included: (1) carrying on propaganda activities a- gainst the regime by distributing anti-regime pamphlets and leaflets, flying Ukrainian nationalist flags, and painting anti-Soviet slogans; (2) assisting insurgents or partisans by providing them with supplies, them, or by giving them information about Soviet police; ing underground bunkers. Although these activities have or by concealing and (3) construct- been directed against Soviet rule, they represent underground rather than partisan resistance. The third category of activities includes incidents in which violent opposition to the regime is expressed. Four types of incidents are included: (1) plundering stores and supply depots; (2) destroying railroad installations, kolkhoz property, or government buildings; (3) assassinating supporters of the regime such as Communist Party members, leaders of local government, or kolkhoz chairmen; and (4) attacking Soviet police, security forces, or units of the Red Army. All four types of incidents represent the most active and forceful measures of resistance. The incidents have been carried out openly, and the resistance groups responsible for them have depended either upon their superior strength in a region which could easily be defended or upon Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50 -Yr 2014/03/05 : IA- 0 27 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET the proximity of forested areas in which underground shelters could be built to escape destruction by Soviet forces. In the years immediately following World Mar II the resistance groups were strong enough to defend themselves openly in some areas against the Soviet army and MVD troops, After 1948 they were no longer able to do so and were forced to rely on shelter provided by the local inhabitants or on bunkers built in the remote forested areas. The individuals who have participated in the incidents have committed themselves irrevocably to opposition to the regime. They would undoubtedly provide ac- tive assistance for Special Forces, if modest guarantees against immediate reprisals could be provided. As indicated in Table I, the most important single form of resistance in the Ukraine has been armed attack by insurgent groups against Soviet military forces (column 10). More than a quarter of the resistance activities listed have involved such open fighting. Almost all the encounters have been fought by units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and the number of attacks has de- creased as the size and importance of the Army has declined. In the years immediately following World War II as many as several hundred men were involved in each operation, and the Ukrainian units in some oases deliberately attacked Soviet military groups. After 1948 the number of participants fell to less than ten or fifteen men, and most encounters were fought to defend the insur- gents against Soviet troops sent to destroy them rather than to achieve any particular objective. The second important form of resistance has been the destruction by par- tisans of specific military or economic targets (column 8). Nearly a fifth of the incidents listed in Table I are included in this category. In the earl period--from 1945 to 1948--military targets such as NVD headquarters and important railroad installations were most often attacked. Subsequently the targets most often destroyed were economic or political targets such as kolkhoz buildings and installations, or government offices and meeting halls of local Scviets. The shift in targets indicates the general shift in the 28 SECRET Declassified in Part San iti " opy Approvedor Release Violent Resistance .4m 0 0 00,44.30 ri M .8-1 p -POHO -Pww.T4 -c4 crim0Hmt.--mm.41.r\r-NIA0\ ?C11\0?0---cococlo000 HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHNNcv ch-t'OHN-1.?0c-c\ImOHWOm....1.c- CO HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH Ir\C-INMO?OC.--MNO\M-N HHC\INMIAIJNIA1AM ? 1 11:14 00(0 n-IM;400 W (PA 0\mt040-PA d c g $4 tn ?ri OC. 0 M ??P cl? 0 F4 .4al NMNIAOHONHCN.-.10NM ChCNC)C)HOJIANCI\C) HHHHHHHHHHcv CM CO CO ON CD ?0 ON r-co r-I CV 1.C\ MO r4 HHM-71.11-MMON ) Ci 8 Attacking Communicationsl Lines & Farm & Government, Property 1 H C*1 .40 CM C-- c0 OH c0 crl IA t`- o'.0 0\ L'-* ON Nmm....10mcocro000 HHHHHHHHHHHHHHNNcvN IAMHNOGNM-l'Oel?OONIAMO\OMH HHNNMM----C-C-C-C7 a 0 0 00 .ri t?,ca $4m1-143 0004o C---liPtP4P4 0 4288 HW P-4 H0OHO\MIAOCNO ?0?0coo\0\cm- HHHH ? Non-Violent Resistance 'd WOm ZoP .1-1;40 TitokA C ?OH$4 M'S 04?0M111.-) HHNNIs?....1'.-1?00 HHHCO bd ga30 .c-1 4-,m4m 0-Ptiog poom In.rtrigto Prq10 43 p.od H to E 43 V) ! 4 r-cooNNm\-N-zruNNIs\ 000HHNNN HHHHHHHHHHHHHH cr"\\O CO ON 0 C\1 CO MIS\ 0 r-i VW\ r"- HHm.0.1Doc,mmc.o. CO cv mw 1,04,0 , gOtr-IPP .1-101d00 -)3W.1-I -P .4M;-IP.IdH .r10000 WW;40 WgP4WW 4H----0 Mr`-.MCNMHIACNIAM00000111 HHN-1-0OHNMM-.1Art HHHHHH Opposition to Soviet Control and. Regulation 2 3 Refusing Resisting to Meet Deportation Work Norms & Evading or Food- Military Delivery Service Quotas MMON-?0 MoON r-1 ?_ ---- - C-- CO Cf? --* --I' t?-? HMM 1 Opposing Collectiv- ization Is-caONCI\MH111 04.--MHM1A1-11 HHHH i ToqmAs dvx 50-Yr 2014/03/05 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET resistance movement from a movement Which was primarily military before 1948 to a movement Which was chiefly economic and political. Most recently, the targets have been transportation and communications lines, probably because the lines are relatively poorly guarded as they pass through remote areas most suitable for partisan activities. The third important category of resistance has been propaganda activities, (column 5), including. the printing or distribution of anti-Soviet pamphlets or the display in some form of anti-regime sentiments. Ukrainian nationalist holidays have been celebrated and nationalist songs sung; the graves of insur- gents killed by Soviet forces have been decorated and Ukrainian flags flown openly; slogans attacking the remime have been posted. Unlike other forms of resistance, nationalist propaganda increased steadily after World War II, becoming most important in 1949 and 1950. Ukrainian nationalist groups de- liberately shifted their emphasis from. open resistance to propaganda work after 1948. After 1950 the number of incidents in this category decreased sharply as did all other forms of resistance in the Ukraine. However, some propaganda work continued though on a small scale, and apparently most re- sistance after 1953 was in this category. The fourth important form of resistance has been the assassination of supporters of the regime (column 9). The targets most frequently chosen have been agents employed by the MVD as informers to observe the movements of the insurgents or their suspected sympathizers and to report to the security police. In some cases MND leaders themselves have been ambushed and shot or killed in raids carried out against MND headquarters. Leaders of collec- tive farms have also been attacked when considered too conscientious in their management of the farms or too eager to deliver food-quotas. Other targets have been collaborators in the church, police, or government, or occasionally leaders of the army. Other forms of resistance activity have been reported only on a smaller ,scale. Their importance, however, should not be minimized for in some cases they indicate an underlying hostility of the population to Soviet rule which 3:tECRET t' SECRET is more significant than the number of reported incidents would suggest. Open opposition to collectivization, for example, accounts for only a small part of the resistance activities listed in Table I (column 1). However, there is much evidence to indicate that in the areas where such opposition has been noted the population has been almost completely hostile to collec- tivization although the hostility may not have been openly expressed. Special Forces units, by supporting a return to a system of independent farm holdings; could expect a measure of support from many of these people. (2) Variations in Resistance Activities by Years: Resistance activities in the Ukraine in the period after World War II developed in three different phases. In the immediate post- war period--1945 to 1947--resistance activities were carried out on a large scale following the pattern of opposition developed by Ukrainian nationalists during the war. Armed military units including as many as several hundred men were active in the Carpathian Mountains region and in the northwestern Ukraine; and parts of these areas were controlled by the insurgents. The opposition was carried out openly, and a number of large-scale battles were fought between insurgents and Soviet troops. The second phase of resistance--1948 to 1951--developed on a much smaller scale. The largest resistance bands numbered less than fifty men and were no longer able to maintain control over any areas of the Ukraine. Most of the bands were nomadic--wandering from one remote wooded region to another and devoting most of their energy to obtaining supplies and avoiding Soviet forces. The bands continued to carry out raids on Soviet installations, but activity was much reduced; large parts of the year were spent in hiding in underground bunkers. Empha- sis in the resistance movement was shifted from open measures against the regime to underground organization and propaganda activities. The third phase of resistance--1952 to 1956--saw the elimination of almost all resistance groups. In the early part of the period reports indicated that active partisan bands were still to be found near Chernovtsy, 31 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET UZhgorod, Kadiyevka, and near other towns, especially in the Carpathian Moun- tains and in Foleslye. The bands were apparently small--consisting of less than a dozen men--and carried out few raids, occupying themselves chiefly with avoiding Soviet forces. By the end of the period reports indicated that resistance was further diminished, being limited almost exclusively to propaganda work and underground activities. That a few partisan bands re- mained, however, was suggested by reports in 1956 and 1957 that trains cross- ing the CarpathianMountains were still subject to attack, and that on occasion--most notably during the Hungarian uprising--railroad bridges were destroyed and trains derailed. Table II campares the types of resistance activities which took place in the Ukraine after World War II in eaCh of the three periods--1945 to 1947, 1948 to 1951, and 1952 to 1956. The most striking change indicated by the table is the steady decrease in the number of open attacks by insurgent groups against Soviet military forces (column 10). In the first period, thirty-five such attacks were reported; in the second, the number was cut approximately in half; in the third, only three open attacks were reported. The drop in the number of incidents reflects the change in the character o4, the Ukrainian resistance movement. In the years immediately after World War II the movement attempted to maintain its character as a military force by retaining under a regular military organization the partisan units which had developed during the war. During 1945 and 1946 and into 1947 the mili- tary units carried on organized operations in which as many as several hun- dred men were involved. However, in 1945 and 1946 the Soviet Army conducted a major campaign against the insurgents, and in 1947 the MVD security police continued the drive.61 As a result, the insurgents were forced to limit their activity. During 1948 and 1949 the size of the partisan bands fell to less than twenty to thirty men, and apart from defensive action only occasional raids were carried out to impress the local population.62 In December 1949, the Soviet government proclaimed an amnesty for all insur- 32 SECRET ? 43 V I V ti 0 il I2 4 : H 4 bi)M E 1 155 t 4 ?1 k 4 0 0 I4-1 1 0. 2 U3 0 ..4 0 F?4?4 K5:5 \ \ 8 Destroying RR Instal: lations,Koik- hoz Property, & Government 10117-9W Its. ...474I I i ...._ -.. \ l's kelli) ri I I C 04 1*- U3S RA M E gs c H ?13Via 111 0 to P-1 4)-v 1 44 ..s?L. . MC21 A 11N N1 I 1 ?131 n :9113 A C14 4 V) . ? ? ? \ \ gt.' g k T. 1 0 ii o q r 4) bio-t-1 ???i -* 474) Tiii 1 al Ilk U3 .4.4 ..... ; 1 _ I E 1 IA I I 4 1147i1P Ii m5484 'E I i A 7143 NI? 0 ct I i t111 I : 4 +.3 01 tbio 0J3Mzp4R4 e-,140-4;4g, .93gorl i V aj.4r4 SI so o *4-I Ha Is 484 0 *1 CO N I I I I I I I 11\ 0 g .g squepToui Jo sequin 33 SECRET SECRET El 0 4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET gents Who left their units,63 and in the spring of 1950 MUD security police carried out a further intensive campaign against the bands. By 1952 open military activities were no longer feasible for the partisans. In the other types of resistance indicated in Table II the pattern was somewhat different. The number of activities reported in the immediate post- war period was small; it grew rapidly in the years from 1948 to 1951; it fell back again sharply after 1952. These changes can best be explained by the fact that in the period immediately after the war Ukrainians who were resol- utely opposed to Soviet rule were active in insurgent military units and did not take part in milder forms of resistance. Also, since the inhabitants of the western Ukraine had not yet been confronted seriously with the hard- ships of collectivization and work-norms, many accepted Soviet rule with little opposition. After 1948, however, most of the active resistance groups were forced to resort to more indirect and sheltered work such as assassina- tions and propaganda; the increasing severity of collectivization and deporta- tions led many of those who had previously accepted the Soviet regime to oppose the new, objectionable measures. Consequently, the number of resistance incidents reported in the period from 1948 to 1951 increased. After 1952, however, the number of incidents dropped again as the same Soviet measures which had virtiunly eliminated open insurgent attacks also limited the pos- sibility of other forms of resistance. In the period from 1952 to 1956 only those most bitterly hostile to the regime were willing to continue their opposition. 34 SECRET ? PART II SECRET GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS AFFECTING RESISTANCE AND SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET A. General Summaryl 1. Introduction The Ukrainian SSR occupies 222,600 square miles in the southwesternmost corner of the USSR. It extends approximately 850 miles from west to east and 550 miles from north to south, including the Crimea. In the west and southwest, where the Republic borders on the four satellite states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania, significant territorial gains were realized at the expense of these states as a result of World War II. The Moldavian SSR, in the southwest, represents a lengthy interposition between the Ukraine and much of the Rumanian frontier. The Belorussian SSR defines about half of the northern limits of the Ukraine; the remaining portion and all of the east is enclosed by the'RSFSR. A limited section of the south- ern frontier is shared with Rumania and the remainder extends along the Black Sea, the KerchtStrait, and the Sea of Azov. It is impossible to depict the Ukrainian SSR as a natural geographic unit, submitting to easy definition. The broad and sweeping steppes of the uplands and lowlands are not uniquely Ukrainian, but actually are part of the greater East European Plain, or Great Russian Plain, spreading in many directions beyond Ukrainian borders. In the north, a wide band of marshland, typically a Belorussian terrain feature, covers thousands of square miles, while widely separated highland areas rise steeply over a limited part of the periphery in the west and south. Again in the south, an extensive coastline borders on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Vegetation likewise fails to provide a basis for describing the Ukraine as a natural unit inasmuch as there are three broad landscape zones which spread latitudinally across the Republic. Climatically the greater part of the Ukraine partakes of the continentality characteristic of most of European Russia, although manifested less severely than in many areas. However, even though the Ukraine is not 4 distinct natural unit based on physiography or vegetation, it is clearly a distinct political unit, the limits of which have been justified on the basis of community of language and history. SECVET De I ied in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/03/05 C:IA_Pnoszi Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET 2. Terrain Features (See Map B) a. The Ukrainian Steppelands The dominant terrain feature of the Ukrainian SSR is the wide, level to gently rolling, fertile steppeland which stretches from the Carpathian Mountains on the western frontier into the RSFSR on the east, and in the north from the inhospitable swamplands of Poleslye southward to the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and into the Crimea. Throughout this vast area, ac- counting for about seventy-five per cent of the Ukraine, he basic pattern of land formation is one to discourage the operations of Special Forces. Like the Great Plains of the United States the Ukrainian steppes gently rise and fall with monotonous regularity, seldom varying in elevation by more than 500 feet; in most areas the limit of visibility is the horizon. Regional variations exist within the limits of the Ukrainian steppe- land, but in most cases these differences do not involve significant areas suited to refuge and evasion. On the periphery of the steppelands, however, there are several areas in which the terrain differs radically from that of the plains, offering excellent opportunities for long-term refuge and eva- sion. These areas are: Ukrainian Poleslye? the Carpathian Ukraine, and the Crimean Mountains. They will be considered in more detail following a briefer description of the regional elements of the generally unsuited steppelands. From the standpoint of Special Forces operations the most promising part of the steppeland is found in the upland areas west of the Dnieper River. This extensive upland, generally over 100 miles in width, trends northwest-southeast for about 500 miles from the Carpathian foreland and the Polish frontier to the great eastward bend of the Dnieper River. In the north and northeast it is defined by an escarpment facing the lowland of Poles 'ye, and in the south and southeast it follows the line of the Dnestr River, finally merging with the Black Sea Lowland roughly along a line connecting the cities of Ealta and Zaporozhtye. The uplands region, 36 SECRET SECRET or plateau as it is sometimes called, is composed of loess, underlain by various sediments on a crystalline base; there are places where river val- leys are incised deeply enough to expose this base. The Yuzhnyy Bug divides the area into two parts: the Volyno-Podollskaya Upland, which occupies all of the north, and the area between the Dnestr River and the Yuzhnyy Bug; and the smaller and lower Pre-Dnieper Upland which is largely confined to the area between the Yuzhnyy Bug and the Dnieper River. The Volyno-Podoltskaya Upland ranges from about 600 to 1300 feet above sea level. Elevations are highest in the northwest, the upland sloping- gradually toward the east and southeast. The erosive action of water has had a considerable effect on the upland surfaces. The valleys of the larger streams draining southward to the Dnestr are deeply cut, frequently having the appearance of canyons 300 feet or more in depth; the western valley slopes are steeper than the eastern. There is also drainage northward to the Bug and Pripet Rivers. Removal of forest cover and other agricultural abuses have led to gullying elsewhere on the upland; steep-sided, branching ravines are common and sometimes attain a length of several miles and a depth of 100 feet. The broad interstream areas are plateau-shaped and con- tain a great number of round, various-sized, shallow depressions sometimes occupied by bogs or temporary ponds. The winding valley of the Dnestr, which strikes between the Volyno-Podoltskaya Upland and the Bessarabian Upland of the Moldavian SSR, is deeply incised, much of the valley floor being 300 to 450 feet below the surrounding heights. The valley ranges from under one mile up to five miles in width and has many marshy sectors. The other upland area west of the Dnieper, the Pre-Dnieper Upland, has lower elevations than the Volyno-Podoltskaya Upland. The highest elevations, about 1,000 feet, are in the northwestern part; the average elevation is about 700 feet above sea level. Occupying the area between the Yuzhnyy Bug and the Dnieper River, the upland slopes gently toward the northeast, where it merges with the Dnieper Lowland, and toward the southeast, terminating in an escarpment along the right bank of the Dnieper. 37 SECRET Declassified in Part Sanitized op Ap.roved for Release 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RnPfkl_ni Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET Its southernmost extension merges gradually with the Black Sea Lowland. The upland surface is cut by streams and gullies, but not as deeply as on the Volyno-Podoliskaya Upland. Many river valleys are broad and troughlike, with occasional small areas of poor drainage. Upland areas are not as extensive to the east beyond the Dnieper. Only the southernmost part of the highly dissected, although nearly level, Central Russian Upland penetrates the Ukraine in the vicinity of Kharkov, rapidly losing its character as an upland north of the Donets River valley. Another upland area, the Donets Ridge, rises steeply to the south of the Donets valley, in many places being as much as 300 to 500 feet above the surface of the river, and occupies much of the area between the river and the Sea of Azov. In general the ridge has the characteristics of a gently rolling plateau with steppelike interstream areas. Orientation is WNW-ESE, for a distance of over 200 miles, and in places the upland is about 100 miles in width. The maximum elevations, attained south of Voroshilovgrad, are about 1,200 feet; most of the upland is in the 328 to 656 foot range (100 - 200 meters), but there are significant sections which fall in the 656 to 984 foot range (200 to 300 meters). As in other upland areas of the Ukraine the surface is penetrated by steep-sloped stream valleys and marked by gullying. A southweStm extension of the ridge, called the Pre-Azov Up- land, closely approaches the shores of the Sea of Azov before merging with the Black Sea Lowland. TWO large lowland areas occupying the central and southern sectors of the Ukraine constitute thepremainder of the steppelands. The northernmost of these, the Dnieper Lowland, adjoins the left bank of the Dnieper River and gradually merges into the Central Russian Upland on the east. In ex- tension it is about 250 miles from northwest to southeast and 150 miles in width; this lowland continues northward beyond the Ukrainian border. Eleva- tions rise from about 300 feet above sea level at the Dnieper River to over 500 feet upon merging with the uplands in the east. The terrain throughout 38SECRET S SECRET is predominantly level with average slopes less than 2 per cent. Numerous left-bank tributaries of the Dnieper cross the region. Their right banks are generally higher than the left, and in spring floods inundations spread far and wide over the left bank areas contributing to the development of ex- tensive meadowlands. These tributary streams generally have a slow current and become shallow in the summer. Part of the Dnieper Lowland immediately adjoining the left bank of the Dnieper is described as the zone of the Dnieper Terraces, a band of terrain stretching from Chernigov in the north to Dnepropetrovsk in the south; in places this zone reaches a width of over 75 miles. Subdivision of this terrace zone are largely defined in, terms of altitude, soil, and vegetation. Thus they pass from the flood plain meadows, through dunes overgrown with pine groves, to the relatively higher elevations of the fertile steppe. A very small part of the Dnieper Lowland lies on the right bank of the river in an area west of Kiev. It merges in the north with the swamplands of Poles 'ye, and in the south and west gradually ascends to the Pre-Dnieper Upland. The other extensive lowland area in the Ukraine is the Black Sea Low- land. It extends for almost 500 miles from the western to the eastern limits of the Ukraine along the northern shores of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and then continues eastward to the rolling plain of the Don. River. Its extension inland ranges from 20 miles, in the eastern part, to over 100 miles in the area north of the Crimea. The Crimean Lowland steppe, constituting three-fourths of the entire peninsula, is a part of the Black Sea Lowland. The outstanding relief characteristic of the Black Sea Lowland is the vast expanse of nearly level to gently rolling terrain. Elevations range between 100 and 300 feet above sea level and the monotony of the flat, treeless horizons is broken only by the shallow valleys of streams, local gullies, and occasional low hills. Granite outcrops of the underlying crystalline base and numerous ancient burial mounds provide relatively prominent breaks in the prevailingly level plains. The lower courses of the SEdET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50 -Yr 2014/03 05 : - - 1 4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET Dnieper, Yuzhnyy Bug, and Dnestr, and many smaller, partly intermittent streams provide the drainage of the area. The steep right banks of the streams are commonly marked by gullies and ravines. Where the larger streams empty along the coast, long and narrow bays and estuaries (called limans) have been formed. These estuaries are the drowned valleys of lower river courses; some of them have become completely separated from the sea by spits. Through- out a great part of the coastal are including the Crimea, short beaches are backed by low cliffs. The Crimean Peninsula is connected to the continental lowland by a five-mile wide isthmus. The greater part of the peninsula is level to gently rolling, ascending in the south, however, to the ridges of the Crimean Mountains. The Kercht Peninsula, an eastward elongation of the Crimea between the Tea of Azov and the Black Sea, is also predominantly flat, but rises into a series of low ridges and hills around and about Kerchtat the eastern tip. b. Ukrainian Polestye Of the areas in the Ukraine which show marked differences from the upland or lowland steppes, Polestye is the most extensive and inaccessible. Polestye is the name given to the vast, level, poorly drained lowland area that is roughly defined as occupying the basin of the Pripet River. The area is more commonly known as the Pripet Marshes and is famous as a major mili- tary obstacle, having served many times to divert invasions and counter- invasions to the easier ground lying to the north and south. The southern third of this marshland lies within the borders of the Ukraine and extends about 300 miles from the Polish frontier eastward to beyond the Dnieper River. It extend southward from the Ukrainian-Belorussian border to the Volyno-Podoltskaya Upland, a distance of about 80 miles in some places. Differences in elevation over the broad reaches of Polestye are not at all significant, there being only a difference of 180 to 262 feet between the center and the edges of the marshland. There are many sandy areas, often with westward-facing parabolic dunes, the whole characteristically bearing 4?SECRET MUM SECRET a growth of pine. On the Whole, however, Polestye is one great flood plain with a few, predominantly sandy, dry valleys. Absolute elevation is in the 328- to 656-foot range (100 to 200 meters); there are a few small "islands" of terrain foreign to the area, the most remarkable being the Ovruch Ridge which attains an elevation of about 1,050 feet. The typical landscape is cheerless, being monotonously flat, wooded, and wet. Marshes and swamps cover most of there a Which abounds in small sluggish streams and drainage ditches and canals. Interstream areas are low and almost completely given over to marshes and swamps. Soils are dominantly peat and muck with some sand and gravel on the low ridges. Spring thaws render any movement through- out the area almost impossible because of widespread flooding. Winter is the season most favorable to movement, depending on the depth to which the ground freezes. Late summer also offers somewhat better opportunities for travel. Despite its generally forbidding aspect, Polestye supports a mod- erate population and, in addition, has proved its worth as an excellent refuge and evasion area by supporting large-scale guerilla activities in the past. c. Carpathian Ukraine The Carpathian Ukraine is a second area differing radically from the level plains and gently rolling uplands which cause po much of the Uk- raine to be held unsuitable for the operations of Special Forces, In the Ukraine the Carpathians form a slight arc, trending northwest-southeast for about 150 miles. During their course from the Polish frontier across the westernmost sector of the Ukraine to the Rumanian frontier, the Car- pathians reach the lowest and narrowest points of any section of the whole system. The total width of the parallel component ridges varies from about 60 miles in the northwest and central portions to over 80 miles in the southeast. Elevations increase gradually from northwest to southeast with most of the summits rising to between 3,000 and 6,700 feet; a maximum ele- vation of 6,752 feet is attained on the peak of Gore Goverla in the south- east. Longitudinal and transverse valleys provide an easy means of access SECRET : ( , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop A d for R e ease 5 - r 03/05 . CIA-RDP81-0104f1Pnn0qnn00(1(1(17 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET and penetration over wide areas of the Carpathian Ukraine. A number of relatively low passes are availabe. Three parallel ridges are distinguishable throughout much of the length of the mountains, although in the higher southeastern section longitudinal valleys are not as clearly defined. The central ridge, the highest and most extensive, has summits ranging from 3,000 to 6,000 feet and over, and varies in width from 12 to 24 miles; most of the summits of this range are dame- __ shaped although sharply defined peaks are encountered in the southeast. Large, nearly level alpine meadows are a common feature of the broad crests and are used as summer pastures as well as avenues of relatively unhindered movement. The northeastern slopes are short and frequently precipitous, whereas the southwestern slopes are longer. A longitudinal depression av- eraging 15 to 18 miles in width separates the central from the eastern ridge. In its southern part this eastern ridge becomes increasingly rugged and dis- organized, local relief* often exceeding 1,000 feet. The northern part is also ill-defined and resolves itself into a group of separate mountains. The westernmost ridge, divided from the central by a narrow depression, averages about seven miles in width. It is the lowest of the three ridges, varying between 2,500 and 3,300 feet above sea level. Summits are fairly level and the southwestern slopes decline gradually to merge with the foot- hills facing the Trans-Carpathian plain; the northeastern slopes are short and steep. On the whole, the southeastern section of the Ukrainian Carpathians is the area best suited for refuge and evasion, although sections which are almost as rugged are found in the central portion. Even though elevations are not particularly high in the northwest, this section is still a signif- icant barrier area. Gorge-like valley approaches, forests, and broken ter- rain greatly hinder traversability. The southeastern section, however, is * Local relief is defined as the difference between highest and lowest elevations within a horizontal distance of one mile. 42SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Rel ? 50-Yr 2 SECRET the highest, most isolated and inaccessible of all. Traversability, and therefore organized pursuit, would be most difficult here. The lack of natural approaches has resulted in sparse settlement. Relative relief is considerable in the western part of this section; differences of 1,000 feet per mile are not unusual. The valleys are narrow and steep, frequently having gradients of over 50 per cent. The foreland areas to the northeast and southwest are occupied by foothills.- On the northea5t-the fOriaa-rid Vries- -inth?fr-c.:_tl- a- few_roile.s _ to a maximum of about 30 miles. The slopes generally have gradients of less than 10 per cent, except Where there are steep valley wells. The general elevation ranges from 760 to 1,000 feet, but there are places where eleva- tions are greater, the maximum being 2,500 feet. The belt of foothills in the southwest is not as wide, ranging from six to nine miles, and there are places where the transition is abrupt and striking, the -elevation between plains and mountains differing by as much as about 3,000 feet in ten miles. Southwest of the Carpathian Mountains, the Soviet Union has acquired a strategic western gateway in the form of the Trans-Carpathian Plain. This narrow rectangular plain, about 20 miles in width, is oriented north- west-southeast along the strike of the mountains. It is a monotonously flat area, gradually sloping toward the frontier Where it opens onto the Great Hungarian Plain, of Which it is actually a part. The area is crossed by numerous braided streams bordered by swamps and marshes; drainage ditches, canals, and dikes present further restrictions on movement. The largest river, the Tisza, is a considerable barrier and is subject to . widespread flooding. Vegetation on the plain offers few opportunities for concealment. A line of Soviet cities and towns marks the abrupt break between the Carpathian ridges and the plain. d. The Crimean Mountains The mountains aligned southwest-northeast along the southern coast of the Crimea provide one of the most striking departures from the monotonous 3/0 5. ClA-RDP81Q1Q43p7rn79nnn7 43 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET terrain of the upland and lowland steppes of the Ukraine. The Crimean Mountains are strung out for about 100 miles along the Black Sea coast and extend inland approximately 30 miles. A narrow coastal strip, only a few miles wide, divides the mountains from the sea, except where occasional high, steep cliffs plunge directly into the water. In the north the boundary be- tween mountains and steppe is somewhat north of a line defined by the cities of Sevastopol-BakhchisaryrSimferopol-Karasubazar-Feodosiya. ---The mountain system -consists of three parallel ridges in the e tern sector, contracting to two in the eastern. Valley depressions of varying width divide the ridges latitudinally and steep transverse valleys and gorges, carrying most of the mountain drainage, tend to cut the individual ridges into a number of mountain blocks. Elevations are greatest on the southern ridge, decreasing on the central and northern ridges until the mountains merge with the steppe on the north. The southernmost and highest ridge is called the Yaila. Elevations reach their highest point, 5,062 feet, on the Roman-Kosh? northeast of Yalta. The summit of the range is not a crest, but a rolling plain only a few miles in width, partly covered by meadows, and partly rocky. These "flats" are generally at elevations of between 3,000 and 4,500 feet above sea level and are strongly marked NT ntlaler9Ue depressions, furrows, caves, and deep cavelike abysses. The southern, sea-facing slopes are extremely steep. On the western and eastern ends of the range they descend into the sea in the form of nearly vertical precipices which in places are a thousand feet high. In the central section the range recedes somewhat from the coastline, but remains noteworthy for its high precipices. Terraces and gullies are common, and deep divides, which resolve the Yaila into a series of individual plateaus and blocks, are also met with on the southern slopes. The extensive fissuring of the Yaila leads to damaging landslides and the entire mountain Crimea is subject to earthquakes. Northern slopes are much more gradual, descending to a depres- sion about ten miles in width separating the Yaila from the foothill ranges 104SECRET SECRET to the north. A few low, rounded hills are found in this valley. The second or central range is not nearly as impressive as the Yaila, either in terms of height or ruggedne3s. Actually this ridge is not a true mountain form, being rather the product of six miles in width and ranges in elevation its summits. As in the case of the Yana, erosion. It varies from two to from 1,300 to 2,400 feet along southern slopes are steep and craggy While those on the north are much more gradual. Zn its-eastern---- part, toward Feodosiya, this range is broken up into detached hills and basins. Water action has led to considerable erosion, cutting narrow gorges and dissecting the range into a number of separate plateau blocks. The northernmost range is the lowest and least extensive, spreading eastward only as far as.Stary Krym. Elevations range from about 400 feet above sea level at the northern base to a maximum of 1,000 to 1,200 feet on summits. South slopes are steep and in places terminate in cliffs; nor- thern slopes descending to the Crimean steppe are gradual. Considerable erosion has taken place. A narrow depression, about two miles in width, divides this range from the central range to the south. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SEAET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 eChuguyev ?Sleviinsk ? Kramitorsk? s- -0Artemork-z, \-1-111ova .2 Min *Oita 6?Cr s - Go lo ka- -Deba ???6.7.. effikre evka. oChistyakovo r." ??. ' vAl-? .74 tiVra,r, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 52 48 22 L.t 24 26 26 30 32 BELORUSSIAN SSR \? ,N\\ \X ? N\NN Ns? . ? \\ \\.? ? I c \ ? \ ? \kNx \ 34 36 38 40 UKRAINIAN S.S.R. MAP D PRECIPITATION (U) Annual precipitation (inches) under 12 12-16 16-20 20-24 24-28 28-32 32-36 over 36 Dibrova, 0. T. Geografiya Ukrains'koi RSR Kiev, 1954 (U) Dobrynin, B. F. Fizicheskaya geografiya SSSR Moscow, 1948 (U) 0 30 60 90 120 MI. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT a=f1=1=32G Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Number of days per year with snow cover Dibrova, 0. T Geografiya Ukrains'koi RSR, Kiev, 1954 (U). Dobrynin, B. F. Fizicheskaya geografiya SSSR, Moscow, 1948 (U). 30 60 90 120M1. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co. Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET 4. Vegetation (Vela F and G) Within the borders of the Ukrainian SSR there are three broad latitu- dinal landscape zones which can be defined largely on the basis of their vegetation. From north to south they are: (1) the zone of nixed forests, (2) the forest-steppe zone, and (3) the steppe zone. In addition, there are two well-forested highland areas, (4) the Carpathians and (5) the Crinean Muntains, which are but little influenced by the latitudinal zones in which they lie. a. The Zone of Mixed Forests The zone of mixed forests (actually a subzone of the vast forest zone of the USSR) is one in 'which broad-leaved species appear in company with conifers. In the Ukraine this zone closely approximates the southern- most extension of Poles lye. Oak is the characteristic tree of this zone, intermixed with spruce and pine. However, the sane deciduous species which grow in the taiga, such as birch, aspen, alder, and linden, are found in company with elm, maple, ash, and hornbeam. North of the Ukraine, and par- ticularly north of the Pripet River, the distribution of spruce is continuous. In the Ukraine, however, the nixed forest is a much more general feature and spruce is generally found in isolated islands on the outskirts of bogs, or on valley slopes. In terse of cover, the zone of nixed forests far exceeds in suitability for Special Forces operations the forest-steppe and steppe zones. It covers a wide area in the northern Ukraine, spreading eastward for about 300 miles from the Polish frontier to beyond the Dnieper River, and extending south- ward from the border with the Belorussian SSR for over 80 miles in nallY places. Over a quarter of the total surface is covered with forest, and there are broad sectors where the density of the forest cover ranges from 25 to 40 per cent and more (see yap F). In sone places there are patches of open, grass-covered land that provide fodder for cattle. On the whole, however, the region is covered. by heavy forests of deciduous and evergreen trees with a dense undercover of tall grass reeds and underbrush. The 53 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET thick growth provides excellent cover for unconventional warfare operations and the extensive swamps form a major obstacle to military activities directed against such units. The ability of partisan bands in this region during World War II to survive and the effectiveness of their operations underscore this evaluation. - The sparse road and rail networks have had little effect on the natural isolation of the region. b. The Forest-Steppe Zone The forest-steppe zone is one of transition between the forest zone of the north and the steppe zone on the south. The typical forest-steppe landscape is one in which forest complexes alternate with vast stretches of steppeland, or in which coppices are scattered in patches over a background of steppe. In areal extensions this zone proceeds southward from poles 'ye over most of the Volyno-PodarskaYa Upland.. East of the Dnieper the south- ward extension follows a varied course roughly between the parallels of 49? and 50? North latitude. South of this line the relief on the Donets Ridge has led to tae establishnent of a large island of forest-steppe. Oak is the characteristic species of this zone, but ash, linden, aspen, elm, naple, and hornbeam are common. Beech groves are found in the western part where the climate is mild and noist; pine, practicFoly the only conifer . growing on the forest-steppe, is encountered in sandy areas on the Dnieper terraces. The steppe areas of this zone are much greater than the forest areas. The entire area was once steppeland, but gradual climatic changes have led to the encroachment of forests which would in tine be dordmInt but for the inter- ference of man. As it is, the demand for agricultural land. has nore than kept pace with the slow advance of the forest, and the fact that the region is termed a "forest-steppe" is mare for purposes of geographical classification than to indicate that forests at present vie with the open steppes for the dominance of the landscape. There are a few areas of limited size within the forest-steppe zone of the Okraine where small resistance bands or Special Forces units night find shelter for short periods of tine. Along many of the river valleys wooded 514 SECRET ? SECRET areas are found extending from the river banks for distances of as mach as eight miles on each side. In many cases the banks are lined with villages so that even the presence of woods would not guarantee that unconventional warfare units would escape detection. However, in certain areas around the Dnieper and Donets Rivers and in the San Dnestr River 'Valley there are larger wooded sections whidh are sparsely populated. Southwest of aterkassy on the west bank of the Dnieper River there is a wooded marsh- land of approximately 180 square miles which is covered with oaks and birch thickets and which has only a scattered population. Along the bsrikg of the Donets River west of Izyum, and in the western Ukraine northwest of L'vov other wooded areas are found. None of them are larger than 200 square miles and in sone cases the woods are not thick. However, all provide limited possibilities for concea2nent. Forest density in the forest-steppe zone is generally less than 10 per cent, but in sone of the areas nentioned above it rises well above this figure. Conditions are best in the westernnost part of the Volyno-Podoll- skaya 'Upland near the polish frontier where the density of cover ranges between 15 and 25 per cent although there are wooded expanses near D'vov where forest density goes as high as 40 per cent (see Nap G). This region sustained considerable partisan activity during World War U. c. The Steppe Zone The final and southernnost landscape zone is that of the steppe, Characterized by an almost total lack of forest cover. The southern boun- dary of the zone neets the shores of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and, In the Crimea, the southern mountains. The typical landscape consists of grassy steppes and broad cultivated fields. The little forest cover that is available is confined to floodplains of rivers, slopes of river valleys, or narrow sandy terraces which lie above the river floodplains. Although trees are scarce, their variety is great. Elm, oak, ash, poplar, willow, maple, alder, aspen, birch, and sone pine are found here and there. 55 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET The steppe zone is the least favorable of any part of the Ukraine for the operations of Special Forces. The greater part of the zone is classified as having less than two per cent of its area under forest. The remainder is hardly more favorable, ranging only from two to five per cent under forest. The only sizeable area of forest cover in the entire region lies east of Dnepropetrovsk in a bend of the Samara River where a sandy terrace encourages forest growth in a 150 squate mile section. ' A.. The Carpathians The mountainous regions of the Ukraine are confined to a compara- tively small section of the Western Ukraine--Carpathian Ukraine?and to the southern edge of the Crinean Peninsula. These two areas, although limited in extent, possess sone of the most suitable vegetation cover in the Ukraine. That part of the Carpathian Mountain chain which lies within the borders of the USSR stands out as the most thoroughly forested section of the Ukraine. The mountains lie at the western end of the forest-steppe zone, but are not a part of it, more accurately constituting an island of true forest. In the lower- lying parts the forests have been considerably cut over to make way for agricul- ture, but in the more rugged and inaccessible sections (central and southeastern), mountain slopes are still covered with excellent forest stands. The lowest altitudinal zone--that of the foothills--has suffered most from clearing; where forests still remain, they are composed of oak, hornbeam, and beech. Higher-- at about 1,000 to 2,000 fe4tlerthe broaaleaf forests of oak; hornbeam, beech, linden, maple, and elm begin to receive an admixture of the conifers--fir and spruce. At higher elevat4.ens the admixture tends to be limited to conifers and beech until at about 4l000 feet spruce forests prevail. The upper limit of the forest zone is reached at a little over 5,250 feet. Subalpine meadows and scrub thickets dominate the summits above the timberline. Possibilities for concealment in the forest belt of the Ukrainian Car- pathians are excellent. Many individual forests offer continuous cover over hundreds of square miles. Although the deciduous forests on the lower reaches of the mountains have largely a seasonal value as cover, the thick evergreen 56SECRET SECRET stands on the upper slopes provide excellent year-14ound coneealweint, and forest density here frequently exceeds Ito per cent. Forest density, in general, decreases with altitude. The forests of the Carpathian Ukraine were the site of uudh partisan activity during World War II and have continued to be the chief focal point of post-war resistance to the regine. e. The Crimean Mountains The Crimean NOunteies and the southern littoral constitute a narrow geographical band lying between the Crinean steppe to the north and the Black Sea to the south. The most characteristic feature of the littoral strip is its subtropical vegetation, supported by a Mediterranean climate which also encourages orchards, vineyards, and tobacco plantations. The rich Yediterranean vegetation, however, does not extend very far up the mountains and soon gives way to juniper and oak forests, which, in turn, are dominated at higher levels by beech forests admixed with Scotch pine, maple, and hornbeam. Juniper thickets form an upper fringe to the beech forests and extend up to the Yaila summits. The sunnit itself is largely unforested, but there are sone thickets and even occa- sional small beech forests. Descending the northern slopes of the yaila, beech and hornbeam forests with stands of Scotch and Crinean pine are encountered, graaing into oak and hornbeam at lover elevations. Below, the characteristics of the forest-steppe zone re-assert themselves, with oak, pear, and hornbeam predominating, continuing northward to the lowest and northernmost ridge of the Crimean Mountains Where the treeless steppes are net. Concealnent possibilities on the sumnit of the Yaila are limited, but the thick forests of the Crinean ranges The two northern, and forest cover and less on the northern and southern slopes of this highest offer nany opportunities for refuge and evasion. lower ridges of the Crimean Mountains have a thinner rugged topography than the Yaila. In fact, both ridges have large areas 'which are unforested or 'which have been cut over 57 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 - SECRET and cleared. There are, however, many stretches, particularly in the valleys, where good forest cover is available in company with thick underbrush. On the whole, the undergrowth throughout the forests of the Crimean Muntains is not heavy, reducing somewhat the value of these forests for concealment from ground observation. However, the unbroken extension of forests over many square miles of difficult terrain compensates in a large measure for the lack of undergrowth. -441111. 58SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 --. _ ? -7-62:0:. - Z? +. .77-1-- - - ........1:k4. 'et'?"1/, -. ,S,'"S''':?,. . ':: 10..40A44 . . Ak, itelio? cl'Ax_ 40 T( );v1 Atr* A AV ???>,....,,,,, .('--.. 0 .... --.?-?,71 X V 49? bezhnoye -Slayyansk? Kramliord- ?radials,? Druzhkov Mins Cinerria ? Dnepropetrovsk\ 46? .? ?mmIe ? Porvomaysk R UM A N I A, UKRAINIAN S. S. R. MAP F 470 VEGETATION COVER (U) AREAS WHERE VEGETATION HAS LITTLE OR NO CONCEALMENT VALUE--DOES NOT RESTRICT MOVEMENT Uncultivated steppe dry grasses, desert shurbs and salt plants Cultivated steppe crops provide limited concealment for short periods, trees found only in occasional, narrow shelter-belts. AREAS WHERE VEGETATION HAS SOME CONCEALMENT VALUE FOR SMALL GROUPS--DOES NOT RESTRICT MOVEMENT Forest-steppe area cleared for cultivation except for scattered trees and occasional small groves River-valley and mountain meadows with grasses, reeds shrubs and scattered trees. - I AREAS WHERE VEGETATION HAS CONCEALMENT VALUE?RESTRICTS MOVEMENT LOCALLY ????ei Y. ,ese-14f.r,t,p;, rtZfiv-. kt5r4ti ? rI. : ? 4. ? Deciduous forests, chiefly oak, hornbeam, and beech Mixed forests chiefly pine, oak, and beech SOURCES: Akademiya nauk soyuza SSR. Karta Rastitel'nosti Evropeyskoy Chasti SSSR (1:2, 500,000). Moscow, 1948. J. Kleopow and E. Lavrenko. Vegetationskarte Der Ukraine (1-1,000,000). Kiev, 1942. "Die Naturlichen Vegetationszonen Der Ukraine" (1:3,000,000), in Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen, 90 Jahrg., 1944, Tafel 8, Gotha. 4tzr MOLDAVIAL. t?-11 S. S. R. ? 46? IN/ Belgrod.DnestrovSkiy ? ; 11 6L. ?Krasnodar Dan 51 A 20 40 60 Baiaklay& 4 60 80 ' 100 .120 140 160 Km Ii 44' ? 4t?Iffy 14, tte,12% ':1,1?Zt% VVV' .44 i% Constanta? 30? 32' 330 34? 35? 36' 37? 380 39? ??? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 717.. 0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 ? ? ' 22? 23? 24? 25? 26? 270 280 29? 300 31? 32? 33? 340 35' 36? 37' 38? 33? `.7??????: iI 51? 50? 48? LAND r.........---#!-? .... '"--Z,...1.F fflagg''"igi""' r'tlIPAra-,Ijr0 ? -0,Aiia hi, ifit 9,1, ' .'"4.iiir' ./L?1 elynt .,0,..- . TriA ;Rt. ; '3 ii, -rat-A:Iumitti ?=., ... .. 4 ?,,V, - w A .. , ..?,..?,- ....ill--'4?4*,T.c - -.. .,. gio...;.,tx.,- - ...-T.- =a _-.. .:.:?,. .1?-?, ?-?-?-????et _ . " 52? - Ct .??? , ej . to. i .A.....r....t . / ???? / ? ---,--- %:-...--=:'-- _ ?? .. ' ??^21 ' .7-k? - - ?:1 -.---....... ? ? '51? Slivisnsk? Kramilorsi RUMANIA, UKRAINIAN S. S. R. MAP G DENSITY OF FOREST COVER (U) Percent of total area under forests Less than 2 - 5 5 - 10 10 - 15 15 - 25 25 40 Over 40 SOURCE. PLOSHCHA LISIV URSR (1 7, 500,000) in 01 T Dibrava, GEOGRAFIYA UKRALNIS'KOI RSR, (Kiev, 1954), p 31 1.4" --r4 7? 50? 49^ 48? ??? MOL DAV IAN S. S. R. " %ft.. ? _ ? rBel#rod?Dnestrovskiy r? .J A Constintao 29 30? 3110 32? BaiodiT, Sevast000r A 0 20 40 - 60 80 100 Mi 0 4 1414 100 120 140 160 Km 33? 34? 330 36? 37? 38? 390 46? 4??V .? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 ; Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 ? SECRET 5. Cross-Country MOvenent (Alps H and S) Conditions of terrain and climate are generally favorable to cross- country movement on foot throughout the Ukraine. Aside from the larger streams Which are everywhere a barrier to movement except When frozen, the major areas in which novenent would be sharply restricted, and at times prohibited, are Poles'ye, Carpathian Ukraine, and the Crimean MOun- tains. The vast marshes of Poles'ye are pereniRlly wet. Movement in any direction encounters very difficult conditions, although sone local move- ment is more easily accomplished in a north-south direction on long, narrow strips of dry land along the slightly higher left banks of the major streams. Spring is the least favorable season in Poles'ye; at that time, thaws lead to widespread flooding. Winter is the most favorable season after the moist ground and open water has had sufficient oppor- tunity to freeze. low water level is reached in August and its arrival expands to a limited degree the possibilities for movenent. A second 6 high-water period cones in autumn but does not usually create conditions as severe as those in spring. Despite its forbidding aspect the marshes, swamps, and forests of Poles'ye have demonstrated their value as refuge and evasion areas in the past. During World War II large bands of guerillas were able to sustain themselves for long periods of time in this area. The highland areas of the Carpathian Ukraine and Crimean MOuntains also present marked obstacles to movement on foot. Steep or precipitous slopes, rough surfaces, and deep, narrow gorges would severely hamper or dhannelize movement. The summit regions, however, are frequently broad and rather level and would Provide avenues of relatively easy movement. 1110 The most difficult season 14 the highland areas occurs in winter When ; deep snows and strong winds result in the formation of high drifts. Mountaineering experience and special equipment would be particularly useful in this season but would also prove valuable throughout the year. 59 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 ? SECRET 5. Cross-Country Movement (!41psH and S) Conditions of terrain and climate are generally favorable to cross- country novement on foot throughout the Ukraine. Aside from the larger streams which are everywhere a barrier to novement except when frozen, the major areas in which novement would be sharply restricted, and at ? times prohibited, are Poles 'ye, Carpathian Ukraine, and the Crimean MOun- tains. The vast marshes of Poles ye are perenially wet. TOvement in any direction encounters very difficult conditions, although sone local move- ment is more easily accomplished in a north-south direction on long, narrow strips of dry land along the slightly higher left banks of the major streams. Spring is the least favorable season in Poles'ye; at that time, thaws lead to widespread flooding. Winter is the most favorable season after the moist ground and open water has had sufficient oppor- tunity to freeze. Low water level is reached in August and its arrival expands to a limited degree the possibilities for movement. A second high-water period cones in autumn but does not usually create conditions as severe as those in spring. Despite its forbidding aspect the marshes, swamps, and forests of Poles'ye have demonstrated their value as refuge and evasion areas in the past. During World War II large bands of guerillas were able to sustain thenselves for long periods of tine in this area. The highland areas of the Carpathian Ukraine and Crimean MOuntains also present marked obstacles to movenent on foot. Steep or precipitous slopes, rough surfaces, and deep, narrow gorges would severely hamper or channelize novenent. The sunnit regions, however, are frequently broad and rather level and would Provide avenues of relatively easy novement. The most difficult season in the highland areas occurs in winter when 1110 deep snows and strong winds result in the formation of high drifts. Muntaineering experience and special equipnent would be particularly useful in this season but would also prove valuable throughout the year. 59 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2 RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET AA in the case of Poles 'ye, these two highland areas were the refuge of large guerilla bands in the past. The remaining areas of the Ukraine are xaade up of upland or lowland steppes. In these areas are found. broad, unfordable streams, frequently margined by swamps and ne.rshes. primary dissection in the plains areas is due to the sometimes deeply incised valleys along which the streams flow. High banks would hinder movement locally. For details on some of the 1319?jor Ukrainian rivers see Idtp S. Elsewhere on -the plains erosion has led to the formation of long, deep ravines and gullies. Spring thaws have a far-reaching effect on the traversability of the plains, creating serious mud conditions and flooding vide areas adjacent to streams. Winter snows are not deep and next to the dry, dusty summers this season is the one most favorable to movement. Autumn witnesses a second mud period, not as serious as that of spring. 60 SECRET ? ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2 RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 52? ?oesai.100 7Z7Por = 510 ? 51? LAND S. / ..?..../.../ .. ,,,,,, ? Ot.'"' 50? A__?-:-.? -.72... . T= ? - -s, ..., ';;"''':: ? '-iz47-4'.-,?-2:S, : :: ? -.CI-- ,..,;,,,,,,43,4,:le ,,,,, era.e0,4?::::?:4,,, .....,_77.4k:!..j'' ,fe24.';rt I 0314 eeeif_ .1% L. .s-*\ 15 al` ?-\ c 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 22. 23.. 24. 25. 26. Odess aya Polta skaya Rove skaya Stali kaya Stanis avskaya Sumska a Ternopo skaya Vinnits Volynskaya Voroshilovgra Zakarpatskaya Zaporozhskaya Zhitomirskaya aya UKRAINIAN S.S.R. MAP J VARIATIONS IN LAND USE BY OBLASTS (U) Type of land use (Percentage of total area) Other and unused Hayfields and pasture land Forested land 10 Identifies Oblasts Grain Technical crops Potatoes and vegetables Fodder crops SOURCE: Data on cultivated land taken from Statystychne Upravlinnya Ukrainskoi RSR, Narodne Gospodarstvo Ukrains'koi RSR (Kiev, 1957), pp. 110, 123-125. Other figures are estimates. 0 30 60 90 120M1. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT C"?- ? I- ? Dneprodzerzhinsk Dnepropetrovsk VotosHovitad 7 c. 4., ?Mahn? 45e River 28 BLACK EA CONFIDENTIAL 34 36 38 .c.e) 48 46 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET 7. Patterns of Rural Settlement (See Maps K and L) a. Types of Rural Settlement The types of population settlement in different sections of the Ukraine vary widely from one another. In the fiat steppes in the southern Ukraine there are large villages extending for many miles along river valleys. In the mouhtains there are small settlehents or clu6ters of several households dotted here and there on the sheltered slopes of mountain basins or along mountain streerla- In Poles 'ye the villages are small and crude and are stretched along the relatively dry banks of the area's sluggish streams or on islands of dry ground surrounded by swamps, and marshes:, The most prevalent form of settlement is found in the steppe and forest-steppe districts, and especially in the broad, middle belt of the Ukraine which extends from the eastern to the western borders between Poles'ye in the north and the Black Sea Lowland to the south. To a greater degree than in other areas of the Ukraine, settlement is concentrated in moderately large rural villages varying in size from 500 to 3,000 inhabitants. Villages are found most often along rivers, where they extend in thin lines for distances of several miles along one or both river banks. where settlezent is heaviest as in the Volyno- Podol'skaya Upland and the northeast Ukraine, the villages form almost continuous ribbons of settlement along the valleys. Away from the rivers, villages have grown lip also wherever natural or artificial ponds are found. /h contrast to the Ti,ver settlements, the pond villages are nucleated. In both types of villages houses and farm buildings are constructed usually of sun,dried brick or clay mixed with straw, and are frequently white- washed. Traditionally roofs have been thatched and steeply pitched. Newly,-built homes are sometimPs of frame construction with tile roofs. A large part of the farming in this area is intensive, and principal crops are sugar beets, potatoes, and fodder-crops. As a result, villages are relatively closeiy-spaced, and farmers travel only short distances to their fields. SEeRET Darf qnniti7Pd Coov Aooroved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET In the southern steppes, especially in the Black Sea Lowland and the northern sections of the Crimea, the pattern of population settlement is somewhat different. The principal crops here are wheat, barley, and corn, and cultivation is extensive rather than intensive. The climate is dry, and there are few rivers or streams; as a result the problem of later supply is a difficult one and villages are consequently concentrated almost exclusively along the bigger rivers and streams. The water divide stretches are covered with fertile loess soils 65 to 100 feet deep, and water is avail- able only at considerable distances below the surface. Only in those few places where artesian wells can be dug have suitable sites for villages been found. In general, the water divide areas are without settlement. Agriculture in the southern steppes is nore heavily mechanized than in any other part of the Soviet Union. It was here that the first machine tractor station was formed and there is now almost no farming which is unmeehanized. In parts of the steppes the machinery is electrified, drawing its power from the great hydroelectric projects on the Dnieper River. Because villages are concentrated along river valleys they frequently adjoin one another closely and contain as many as 3,000 to 5,000 inhabitants. Houses are typically of brick or clay with tile roofs. A third type of settlement is found to the north in Toles'ye, where the land is distinguished by its nunerous swamps and forests. Population in Poles 'ye is generally sparse and is settled principally in farm villages located on the higher lands surrounding the swamps. In some cases the villages are built along river banks -which are raised above the swampland and hence are relatively dry. In most cases the villages consist of 20 to 100 farmhouses strung along both sides of a single street. In centrast to the steppe villages, houses and farm buildings are principally of wood mounted by thatched roofs. Frequently the houses together with their stables and outlying btildings are grouped to form a courtyard. The land cultivated from the villages consists of small separate plots which are seldom far away. The plots are intensively farmed, with vegetables and cereal grains predomina- ting. The villages are the most backward in the Ukraine, and sanitary and 7?SECRET ? ? ? ip SECRET water-supply facilities are primitive. In the deepest parts of the swamps, occasional separate dwellings are found, used by trappers and fishermen or by farmers grazing livestock or cultivating tiny patches of dry land. In the mountain districts of the Ukraine?the Crimean and Carpathian NOuntains?the settlement patterns are diverse. In the foothills and in the lover reaches of stream valleys communities similar to those of the tenpe are to be found. A typical community consists of 800 to 1,000 inhatan-cs engaged in agriculture and lumbering. In addition to crops suel. az: ..hear and potatoes, orchards, gardens and, in the Crimea, vine- yards ctri7 cultivated, and Livestock are grazed on the steeper slopes. Houses art- ce-lefly of brick with tile roofs. In the Carpathian NOuntains above the foothills, settlements are generally found only in valley basins, along gentle mountain slopes, or along the larger river valleys. Settlements consist usually of a few houses widely separated from one another. The houses are made of wood with high thatched roofs. In the Eastern Carpathians the number of such small villages is very great: in one district in the Zakarpatskaya oblast there are over 5,CO3 indicat:ae, can average density of nearly six villages per square mile. cr [)/' 01,31,tiC was brought to bear to indu.:c the farmers to join coJittyes, and in the following years a number of the smaller villages wcn7 Alibined into larger towns with schools, hofspitals, libraries, etc. Hoaevcr, many older villages remain, particularly in the higher mountain reg2ons where lumbering is the principal activity. In the Crimean KounLains the settlement pattern is marked by the numerous resort and he7,Ith facilities which dot the hills above the Black Sea. In the vaiter7. and mountain basins gardens, vineyards, and tobacco plantations are found, adjoining closely to small villages con- structed along mountain st-2eams. At higher elevations there are virtually no permanently inhabited points, although shelters used in the summer months by herdsmen, huntrs and lumbermen are to be found. 71 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET b. Density of Rural Population Total population density in the Ukraine is indicated on Map K, and rural population density by oblate on Nap L. The most densely popu- lated sections are those in the forest-steppe belt, including the Volyno- . PodolTskaya Upland, the Dnieper River districts between Kiev and Krenenchug, and the Poltavskaya and Sumakaya oblasts in the northeastern Ukraine. This is the belt which'enconpasses the traditionally Ukrainian lands and in which cultivation is of an intensive type= Consequently rural 'Population is dense, varying from 112 to 181 per square mile., Within the belt the most densely settled points are found in the Ternapollskaya and Vinnitskaya ?blasts, where the land is fertile and heavily cultivated. A second densely populated section is the chernovitskaya oblast, which occupies a part of the southern valley of the Dniester River, the upper valley of the Prut River, and the eastern section of the Ukrainian Car- pathian Mountains. Rural population density is 188 per square mile. Settlements are found not only along the principal rivers, but also in mountain valleys and on mountain slopes extending upward to elevations of 2,000 feet. The dense rural population is engaged in the cultivation of grains, potatoes, and sugar beets, and in the grazing of livestock. At elevations above 2,000 feet settlements gradually disappear, although herds- nen and woodsmen are to be found at heights of 5,000 feet and more. A third densely populated region is the Trans-Carpathian Plain. The most densely settled places are l'ound in the foothills above the plain, especially in the Tisa valJey near.Tyachev and near the towns of nikaohevol Vinogradov, Beregovo, and Uthgorod. Rural population densities in excess of 500 per square mile are recorded at some points. Further into the moun- tains the population becomes sparse, and settlement is confined almost exclusively to the basins of a few larger rivers. In the mountain meadows and in the forest districts only occasional herdsmen and woodsmen are found. 72SECRET ? ? ? SECRET The sections of the Ukraine with lowest rural population densities are found in the Black Sea Lowland, the Crimean Steppe, and the Donbass. Densities vary from 46 per square mile in the Crimea to 88 per square mile in the Odesskgya oblast. Farming in these sections is extensive, farm madhinery is heavily used, and there is a consequent low ratio of farm workers per square mile of cultivated land. In the Donbass the popu- lation is predominantly urban, and rural inhabitants are found only in clusters of farm villages producing chiefly vegetables and dairy products for the industrial centers. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 73 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SOURCE: MVD SSSR, Plotnost' naseleniya SSSR Asmussmasziwa GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 o 0? o o o 0 00 0 -0 0 060 00?0: :6-4 0:: ? 0 O ? 0 - ? 0 0 0 ? ? ? 0 ?0 O a a 0 0 0 O 0? 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 4:0 4 10 0 6?0 :0 1.1 io Vt? 6 .0 ? 0 ? 0 :0?0? 0'3 : o ? 0 0 ? 0 0 o : A -000o0 0 0 0 ' ? 0 "Oo 00o 0 ? s: 0 0 0 o o o * o ?? 0 42000 _o00 ?of ?: 20 0 ..0" :0Ce? 0 000? ? e 0 0 00?00.'00?0 0 ? e ? A 0 %coo 0 0 o o o ? O ? 0 0o00. 0 0",0 A 0Ao0000 o 00 e 0 0 0* o 0 ? 0 0 0 e ? ? 0 0 * 0 ? O ? 0 00 0 A 0 o ? o o 00000 00 0* ?O? ? ? 00000, 0 ? 0 0 e eo0 0 .0 ? 0 0 o? 0 ? 0 0 0? 00 ooe 0 0 A o 0 o ? _ 0 0_0 0 0? ,. ea 0 ? o. 0 00. ? o ? '2? .0 ??0I 12 .0. .0......? O 0 a . a . ? . . - . . ? 0 ? . ........e.o_ 0 ? a 0 0 a oe ? : :..... ?00 ,0,:, ? ,... 00 . 0 . t, ? . a . ? . ? ? 6. ? ? e 0_ 0 . 0 ? 0 0 ? o 0 o 0 o 0 ? ? 0 ? 00 000 ? ? 00 o? o 0 0 000, 0 0 0 O 0 ? 0 0 DISTRIBUTION OF RURAL POPULATION BY OBLASTS (C) 156--Average density of rural population in each oblast Note: Figures are Soviet estimates for April 1, 1956 SOURCE: Statystychne upravlirmya Ukrains'koi RSR. Narodne gospodarstvo Ukrains 'koi RSR. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT / Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co .y Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET 8. Rural Roads Current information on the density of rural roads in the Ukraine is not available. Rural roads known to have been in use in recent years are plotted on the AY6 N501 1141) Series. The naps covering the Special Forces suitability areas included in this study present a general picture of the rural road ne'Pwork in these areas. The most dense:network of roads is found in the forest-steppe belt where rural populaqOn density is also greatest. Roads are most nunerous in the western and eastern sections of the belt and somewhat more sparse in the central distActs. Equily numerous roads are to be found in some sections of Poles'Ye 'to the north, and in certain districts of both the Carpathian and Crimean Mountains. Rural roads are relatively Sparse in the broad steppe regions in the Black Sea lowland, in sone parts of the Donbass, and in the dry steppes of northern Crimea. Rural roads everywhere are poor by U.S. standards. In nost cases) they do not have a consolidated roadbed and are simply natural roadways connecting one village with another. In the steppe regions where the terrain is level and unbroken the roads are very wide, and during dry weather in the summer and when frozen in the winter are capable of bearing heavy traffic. In wet seasons and particularly during spring thaws the roads become so muddy that they are impassable even for moderate traffic. Light carts and trucks which must travel during these seasons avoid the roads, traieling across the dryer and nore passable fields on ther side. In the area of'Foles'ye roads are narrow, commonly following thin belts of dry ground between swampy' depressions on either side. Possi- bilities for movement along the swam roads are excellent only in mid- winter When the ground is frozen. 'At other seasons the roads are at tines locally impassable and in the spring are everywhere closed to all but foot traffic. 75 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co .y Ap ? roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R00230027non7_1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET In the mountain regions the standards of rural roads are generally higher and although they are often winding and narrow are open to traffic for larger parts of the year. Both the Carpathian and Crimean Mountains are crossed by numerous trails and tourist routes suitable for light vehicles. In mid-winter roads by snow at elevations of 5,000 feet and above. as well as by roads are frequently closed 76 SECRET SECRET B. Distribution of Partisan Activities, World War II (See Map M) An important criterion in the selection of suitability areas for Special Forces operations in the Ukraine must be seen in the locational factors de- fining the operations of the partisan bands which controlled sections of the Ukraine for varying periods in World War II. These factors are of in- terest to Special Forces planning first because they point to those areas where geographic conditions--terrain, vegetation cover, settlement patterns, etc.--are most favorable for operations by opposition bands, and secondly because they throw light on certain problems Special -Forces units operating in the same areas would encounter. Two principal groups conducted partisan operations in the Ukraine during World War II. The larger group was composed of pro-Soviet partisans organ- ized in most oases by Russian military leaders, led by dedicated members of the Communist Party or by Army or MND leaders parachuted into the Ukraine, and supplied in part at least by stores of equipment left hidden by the re- treating Soviet Army or by material parachuted from Soviet planes.2 Members of the pro-Soviet partisan groups were recruited in some instances from the local population generally; but apparently the majority of the partisans were Communist Party members, membefi-of partisan battalions specially trained in the rear of the Red Army and sent to favorable areas as the Germans advanced into them, or soldiers of the Red Army who had been sur- rounded by German forces and had joined partisan bands rather than surren- der. Undoubtedly the harshness of the German occupation encouraged some Ukrainians to resist, but it would be misleading to assume that large numbers of the partisans were local inhabitants who had fled to the woods to escape repressive measures. The second important group of partisans consisted of anti-Soviet bands. These partisans were Ukrainian nationalists who initially viewed the Germans as liberators from the Soviet yoke and were given tacit permission by the German Army to occupy parts of the northwestern Ukraine. During the early months of the war much of their energy was devoted to fighting the Poles in Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 77 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co .y Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET the area who were their bitterest enemy.3 Later the groups were alienated by the harshness of the German occupation, and when ordered by German Army leaders to disband in 1943, they refused, continuing their operations against Soviet and German forces alike. Initially, many members of these bands were emigres who had come into the Ukraine on the heels of the German Army from the eastern districts of Poland. During the later years of the occupation, however, as German repressive measures increased, many local inhabitants fled to the wooded areas of Polestye? joining the nationalist groups there. In contrast to the Soviet partisans, the nationalists could rely on no out- side group to provide them with supplies. In numerous instances, however, the local population provided them with food and shelter; for equipment and weapons they were forced to depend on whatever they could seize from the Germans or occasionnlly from pro-Soviet partisan groups. There were five regions of the Ukraine in which the partisans were strong enough to disrupt German control for long periods of time in at least the outlying areas. In addition, there were seven smaller centers in which partisan groups operated for short periods although they were eventually destroyed by German forces. These general centers of partisan activity have been plotted on Map M. Throughout the rest of the Ukraine there were occasional acts of sabotage which the Germans sometimes labeled as partisan activity, as well as occasional raids by partisan bands. None of these in- cidents were important in comparison with the activity of the partisan- infested areas. Polestye: -- The largest and most important area of partisan activity was Polestye--the wide swamp-forest belt stretching along the northern bound- ary of the Ukraine (area A on Map M). The area was the most favorable section of the Ukraine for partisan operations. It offered excellent sanctuary for partisan groups because of its moderately heavy forest cover and extensive swamps and marshes, and because its sparse communications network limited Tossibilities for German counter-measures. The bands operating in the area 78 SECRET 4 SECRET were pro-Soviet bands and were consequently strengthened by their proximity to the marshland in Belorussia to the north where the largest and most im- portant of the partisan groups in the Soviet Union were to be found. In the parts of Polestye east of the Dnieper River the people were apparently sympathetic to the Soviet partisans or at least benevolently neutral, and consequently provided them with supplies. In the districts west of the river the people were less sympathetic and provided less support; but be- cause population density was moderately low, the partisans could carry on operations with little fear of detection. Because of the favorable conditions in Poles:ye partisan groups were both more numerous and more strongly entrenched than in any other region of the Ukraine. Altogether there were perhaps 20,000 men included in the bands, contrblling not only the areas outside the cities, but occasion- ally raiding German centers such as Chernigov and Glukhov.4 Initially, the partisans were strongest in the region east of the Dnieper River, but early in 1943 a large group commanded by Sidor Kovpak crossed into western Polestye;5 in the following months many other bands developed until almost the entire northern border of the Ukraine came under partisan control. German forces were never able to challenge seriously these forces. Southern Volynia: -- A second area in which partisans were entrenched during an important part of the war was the area immediately to the south and west of Polestye (area B on Map M). Included in the area were parts of the Poles tyeLowland with its forests and marshlands and also the northwestern sections of the Volyno-Podoltskaya Upland. Before World War II the area had belonged to Poland, and anti-Soviet, Ukrainian nation- alist organizations had developed within it. With the German occupation of the region, these organizations had established active, military units which fought at first against the Soviet partisans to the northeast and later also against the German Army. The partisans were strongly supported Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co.y Ap.roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA RDP81 01043R00230027onn7_1 SEeliET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET by the sparse population of the area, and remained in control until 1944 and 1945 when the Soviet Army forced them to disband or withdraw further west,6 Although the geography of the area is not as favorable for Special Forces as are the more northern parts of Poles lye, there is sufficient cover to provide concealment for large groups, to anti-Soviet forces than in Carpathian Mountains: -- and the population is apparently more sympathetic Polestye itself. The third important partisan area was the Car- pathian Mountain region and especially its western, formerly Polish sections (area C on Map M). Since this area was the furthest west of the partisan areas and had not been a part of the Ukraine before World War II, it was the last area in which partisan groups were organized.7 Like the partisan area immediately to the northeast, it had been a center of anti-Russian, Ukrainian nationalists before World War II, and consequently the bands which appeared were anti-Soviet. In some cases they were composed of Ukrainian partisans who had been forced out of Polestye by Soviet partisans and Soviet troops and had taken shelter in the more protected and remote regions of the Carpathians. Toward the end of 1943 Sidor Kovpak led his band of Soviet partisans into the area, but the population was apparently strongly anti-Soviet and the band could not obtain supplies and equipment. The group quickly disintegrated and although other Soviet groups occasionally raided the area, they too were un- able to establish bases there, and the area remained into the post-war period a center of Ukrainian nationalist partisans. Possibilities for concealment in the mountains are good, although there are places which are not heavily forested and which are moderately densely settled with numerous access roads and communications lines. On the basis of World War II experience it would be expected that Special Forces would be more strongly supported in the Carpath- ian Mountains than in any other section of the Ukraine. Crimean Mountains: -- The fourth partisan center was the Crimean Moun- tain region on the southern coast of the Crimean Peninsula (area D on Map N). Numerous pro-Russian, anti-German encampments were established in the forested soSECRET ? `oda, ? Ora SECRET parts of the mountains and perhaps as many as 10,000 partisans were active at various times,8 The partisans were under the same form of organization as were those in Poles tye, and came under the close control and guidance of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement of the Red Army. The groups were strongest at the end of 1942, and although the Germans were later able to make extensive raids against them, they were never completely eliminated ?ss before German troops were forced to withdraw in 1944. The area is less iso- lated than the Carpathian Mountains or Polestye, being crossed by a number of paved roads and dotted with tourist centers and trails. Its population would probably be unsympathetic to American Special Forces, for the only group which opposed the Russian partisans in World War II--the Crimean Tatars--were subsequently deported to Central Asia, Dnieper River between Cherkassy and Kiev: -- The last important cen- ter-of partisan activity was the area between Cherkassy and Kiev along the Dnieper River (area E on Map M). The partisans operating in the area were pro-Russian partisans numbering approximately 2,000 at their greatest strength.9 Except for the Black Forest, southwest of Cherkassy? tree cover is limited, being confined to the shores of the Dnieper River and its tributaries. Apparently the ability of the World War II partisans to maintain themselves rested more on their proximity to the stronger partisan groups in the northern Ukraine and on German reluctance to cam- mit the troops necessary to destroy them rather than on the geographic features of the area. Only small Special Forces groups could find shel- ter in the Black Forest, and the area as a whole does not compare in suitability for unconventional warfare operations with the other four areas of heavy partisan activity. The seven smaller centers in which partisan groups operated for short periods of time were of less importance. None were controlled by partisans for more than four months, and the bands were able to remain as long as they did only because German forces were not immediately available and organized to operate against themc The band of 350 men in Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007 1 81 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET the swamps near Nikopolt was dispersed within a month of the time it was organized;-0 the groups located along the Donets River and east of Sumy were quickly destroyed; many of the Kharkov partisans were dispersed by local in- habitants hostile to the Soviet regime even before the German Army took steps against them. The only area in which the partisans were not easily uprooted was the forested section lying in the bend of the Samara River between Novo - moskovsk and Favlograd. Here approximately 350 partisans were able to main- tain themselves from October 1941 to January 1942. As in the case of the partisans around Cherkassy? however, they were not immediately destroyed chiefly because the situation on the front lines prevented the Germans from assigning the necessary troops to the area to oppose them. In January, a German Infantry Regiment arrived in Novomoskovsk and in a brief engagement completely wiped them out.11 On the basis of the experience of the partisans in the seven smaller areas of activity in the Ukraine, it is apparent that the areas provide suitable shelter only for small Special Forces operations and only for short periods before Soviet forces are directed against them. The forest zones are small in area--less than 200 square miles--and are separated from one another and from the larger wooded regions by broad stretches of coverless steppe. Communications facilities near the areas are good, and Soviet troops could be moved quickly to surround the woods. Unconventional warfare opera- tions, limited in size and scope and particularly in the time needed to accomplish their missions, could be carried out in the areas; but no large- scale operations as in the north and west Ukraine and the Crimean Mountains are feasible. 1 82 SECRET ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 30? 310 SECRET ? ? 32? 330 34? 35? 51? 51 ? 50? LAND - U _ . r ? ? 1: ? .7.1 _7e ? a- 50? - of ? II- ?- - ? 111 - ? ? ? ? ? ,? a /1 ? ? 4:11 :) 0 ? 1U .1 Khaf tar ?Chuguyev Kupyansk? L,1/4 - 49? - \ , - 4 ti 1, 1: t e? Oarnenla, Pori?I'skl s: a j1 e ? , ??e -6=7 y If. ? , ? 491 ? Kblienyya ?????, / 480 (t- ? ? f ? !.? %,(%?? ? ecoromr--, , I ? ?b?1?. *Av. era ? ?Z' 0? -?1?:;?;? or. ? ? "I? ? Kirovograd 48? ??? R U ,AA vi A N IA UKRAINIAN S. S. R. MAP M PARTISAN ACTIVITY --WORLD WAR II(C) 0 IN ? ? II ? ? ? -- Areas in which Red partisan activity was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German control. A Poles'ye and the northeastern Ukraine D . . . . Crimean Mountains Dnieper River between Cherkassy and Kiev Areas in which Ukrainian nationalist partisan activity was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German control. Southwestern Poles'ye Carpathian Mountains Points at which Red partisan groups were noted. Points at which Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups were noted. Route followed by the Red partisan band commanded by Sidor Kovpak. 47? MOLDAV IAN S.S R. ?^. 6^. 46? iL 45? Dana e ?Krasnodar . Sevastopol' KBalaklava Canton/a0 0 20 ao - 60 90 9OMi 80 100 120 140 160 Km OF444 ,4 a-IL...L(41 60 ? .. ? 290 30? 3' ? SECRET 32? 33? 34? 35? 36 ) 3 7 0 38? 390 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET C. Distribution of Resistance Incidents, 1945-1957 (See Map N) The resistance incidents reported Appendix I have been plotted on Map N bution of the incidents is their heavy formerly Polish parts of the Ukraine. since World War II and described in The striking feature of the distri- concentration in the westernmost, Of the 212 recorded incidents, 163-- nearly 77 per cent--have taken place in the six oblasts (Rovenskaya, Volyn, skaya, Livovskaya, Ternopolskaya, Stanislavskaya, and Drogobychskaya) transferred from Poland to the Soviet Union during World War II. Twenty- one of the remaining 49 incidents have occurred also in the westernmost parts of the Ukraine, but in the areas ceded to the Soviet Union by Czechoslovakia and Rumania (the Zakarpatskaya and Chernovitskaya oblasts). In the other sections of the Ukraine--tho districts belonging to the Soviet Union before World War II--only 28 incidents, approximately 13 per cent of the total, have been reported in the post-war years. The predaninance of the formerly Polish areas as centers of resistance has not been quite as prominent as the tabulation in Appendix I indicates because the insurgents operating in these sections have had close con- nections with emigre nationalists in the Western world and hence have reported more completely and directly on their activities than have re- sistance groups in other sections of the Ukraine. Undoubtedly many acts of resistance carried out in the eastern Ukraine have never been reported outside the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, with due allowance for the more complete reporting of resistance in the western Ukraine, there is little question that a preponderant part of opposition to the regime has been expressed here, and that it has been expressed in a more active form than elsewhere. The concentration of resistance may be explained in two ways. First, the Ukrainian population in the six western oblasts has been consistently the most strongly opposed of Ukrainian groups to Soviet rule. In the period between the first and second world wars the area, 83 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05. 81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET as a part of Poland, became a center for anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists. Many Ukrainians inside the Soviet Union unwilling to accept the Soviet re- gime fled to the area, joining there in the organization of strongly anti- Russian, Ukrainian groups. The Polish government provided some encouragement for their efforts. As a result, when the Soviet Union seized the area at the beginning of World Nar II, it incorporated within the Ukraine an organized and strongly anti-Russian group. Following the war, the hostility of the local population was intensified because the process of Sovietization of the new districts was carried out at a pace which far exceeded that by which the Soviet Union itself had been initially socialized as well as the pace being followed by the satellites in their program of socialization. Industries were immediately taken over by the. state; farm collectivization was deedily pressed; severe quotas for food deliveries and work-norms were established and enforced. As a result, Ukrainian opposition to Soviet rule in the wes- tern districts, and especially among the farmers, increased rapidly. The second explanation for the concentration of resistance lies in the geography of the western parts of the Ukraine. Included within the area are parts of three physiographic regions, all of which provide at least mod- erately favorable conditions for the survival of resistance groups. In the north, the Volynskaya and Rovenskaya oblasts are covered by the Poles tye swamps where evasion possibilities are excellent: forests in the oblasts are relatively dense, providing suitable concealment for resistance bands; population density is not high, enabling bands to escape detection; the ground is marshy in most places, providing an important obstacle to Soviet security forces moving against the insurgents. In the center of the wes- tern sections of the Ukraine, the Volyno-Podoltskaya Upland extends into the two oblasts of Ltvovskaya and Ternopolskaya: the upland offers less favorable conditions for evasion, but wooded sections and numerous deep valleys with wooded slopes provide possibilities for concealment in places. In the south, the Carpathian Mountains and the Carpathian Hills cover large 84 SECRET SECRET parts of the Stanislavskaya and Drogobychskaya oblasts: the heavy forests and mountainous terrain found at many points interfere with movement and assist evasion and concealment. These physical factors conspire to render conditions for resistance more favorable than is the case in any other re- gion of the Ukraine. Within the newly acquired western districts of the Ukraine are seven points at which resistance has been concentrated. The most important has been the triangle identified by the three towns of Stanislav, Slavsko, and Stryy. Within the triangle 61 incidents have been reported- -29 per cent of all incidents in the Ukraine. The triangle is centered on the northeast foothills of the central section of the Ukrainian Carpathian Mountains on the border between the Drogobych and Stanislav oblasts. Its terrain is dissected, although not as sharply as in the more mountainous regions fur- ther to the south. Forest cover is not continuous throughout the triangle, but heavy woods are found especially east of Slavsko and in a line west of Stanislay. The triangle lies on the edge of the line of settlement of the two oblasts; to the south only a few, small and scattered communities are to be found. Access to the triangle is difficult inasmuch as only one highway and rail line are to be found--between Stryy and Stanislav--plus a few secondary roads. The people living in and near the triangle have been strongly anti-Soviet, and although many have been deported to the east and replaced by Ukrainians from more settled and pro-Soviet districts, some anti-Russian nationalists apparently remain. The second important center of resistance has been the heavily eroded sector of the Volyno-Podoltskaya Upland extending southeastward from Lvov to the Dnestr River. Twenty-nine incidents or 14 per cent of the total for the Ukraine have taken place in the area. Although maximum elevations in the upland are less than 1,400 feet, numerous rivers and streams have cut sharply into its surface forming deep valleys with steep slopes. The valleys themselves are flat and swampy, and the woods which once covered Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SEC El Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET them have been cut-over and the land planted to crops. Population density in the valleys is high. On the hills and ridges separating the valleys for- ests are to be found and there is little settlement. It is here that possi- bilities for evasion and concealment are good. According to numerous reports the people living in the sector have been strongly opposed to Soviet rule and especially to collectivization. They have provided considerable assist- ance to the insurgents in the Area,. A third important center of resistance has been the western section of the Drogobychskaya oblast between the town of Drogobych and the western frontier of the Ukraine south of the Dnestr River. Seventeen incidents or eight per cent of the total in the Ukraine have been reported here. The terrain is mountainous with elevations of 3,000 feet or more in some places. Southeast of Turka is a heavily forested area, unpopulated except for scat- tered woodsmen and herdsmen; possibilities for concealment are excellent. Elsewhere heavy woods are found here and there, although they are not con- tinuous. The only communications link is a single-track rail line and a paved highway running from Sambor to Turka and beyond. Two other important centers of resistance have been reported in the general area of the Carpathian Mountains. In the Eastern Carpathians along the upper reaches of the Prut River ten Incidents have been noted. The in- cidents have been concentrated near the towns of Delyatin and Nadvornaya and along the rail line leading to Kolomyya and southward across the Car- pathians toward Rumania. The mountains are rugged and high in this sector and there are no settlements or communications facilities away from the valleys. The second area is centered on the southwestern slopes of the mountains above Uzhgorod in the Zakarpatskaya oblast. Partisans have appar- ently operated from the Ungdarok Forest--a heavily wooded section to the northeast of Uzhgorod. The partisans have attacked kolkhozes in the vicin- ity, as well as the highway and rail line between Perechin and Uzhgorod and between Uzhgorod and the Hungarian border. 8ECRET SECRET Outside Outside the Carpathian Mountain region there have been two additional centers of resistance in the western Ukraine. The first lies in the Polestye swamp district east of Rovno where six incidents of resistance have been re- ported. During and after World War II the area was a center for the Ukrain- ian Insurgent Army, and throughout the post-war period the local population opposed collectivization and supported groups unfriendly to the regime. The combination of swamps and forests in the vicinity was favorable for insur- gents; and numerous underground bunkers were built. After 1950 many of the original inhabitants were deported and replaced by eastern Ukrainians whose loyalty to the regime was more certain. Hence Special Forces could no longer anticipate local support with as great assurance. The second center of resistance has been the area near Ternopolt where five incidents have been reported. Although the terrain is moderately dissected, conditions are generally unfavorable for resistance groups. No incidents have been reported after 1950, suggesting that opposition elements in the local population have been largely eliminated. Outside the western districts of the Ukraine the only reported resis- tance activities have been located in the cities. In Kiev nine incidents have been reported, the only important number anywhere in the eastern Ukraine. In Stalin?, Kadiyevka, Kharkov, Zaporozhtye, and Odessa other incidents have been noted, but they have been isolated and have indicated little basic, underlying hostility to the regime. The lack of resistance activities in the populated areas of the Ukraine confirms the suggestion that the cities have been Russified. It is only in the rural western regions where terrain conditions are favorable and the population dissatisfied that resistance has been important. In most recent years resistance has been much less widely distributed than in the immediate post-war period. Incidents have been reported in the cities of Kiev, Stalin?, and Kadiyevka, and in the western Ukraine in Ltvov, Stanislav, Chernovtsy, and Uzhgorod. Many of the reports have referred to student unrest which was not subversive in itself or to isolated raids which 87 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50 -Yr 2014/03/05: - - 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET may have been carriei out by bandits rather than resistance groups. The only areas in which distinctly partisan attacks have been located are in the mountainous areas near Drogobych, south of Stanislav, immediately west of Chernowtsy, and north of Uzhgorod; in the Polesiye swamps north of Lutsk and east of Kovell; in the woods near LI vov and Magerov; and in the cities of Kadiyevka and Stalino. Only in the Carpathian Mountains have partisan activities been reported after 1955. 88 SECRET 41P10 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R007?Ann99nnn7_1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 220 23? 24? 25? 26? 27? 28? 29^ 30? 31` SECRET 32? 33? 34? 35? .36? 37? 38? 31)0 40? .., a _ _ - _ onr.zh 51? 51? LAND - ?Sumy - 141 5 44 _T5-5.13-?::-.10-";77-1!.:?6.1761*::?9 115 ? 27208 201-202 rTI1T VIII4-9.1154 1 80 IIITI101111 14216-1211:1-13 10 !I?2,82 32 - S. ? 49? 1 1 1 6-5k 110 t1 1 C183t185 b 111 II 148 -43'7111: 41111111r t, 13....- "-- ?1;-1 4 ., r -----12tr,, i ) l',-431-133::::: 7-.1._,,,__L22z-4,24 ? ? '''.-...--?-?.,---7.0. ''.77' ---7,' ? ? "-;--?- V%--C?....).....?...y. 19 ) ...? ...'.... _or ,..." \ II ? N .......,,, , .. ,..._ ... ,.?7..... N-7''".;1"7''',.y.,,-? ,7----,t, ss??:'__. --1--- Tr %? . .. 102 Ly- r'?( _ f? j oChuguyev KhEneln11.1kly ? 40 ,1!111 Kupyansk0 so 49" ubezhnoye ".? emenchug Lozpaya ih_stelhuovg 4.!? ? . p. , Novomoskovsk?/// Pinto rad? ? ??44N 6 'A ? ? S. RUMANIA ' ' entomaysk Dnep ortzerzhInsk-?--??? Dnepropetrovsk oKrasn oChistyaltovo _ _ i:oo, ? 48? 0Kryoy Rog UKRAINIAN S. S. R. MAP N RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES, 1945 1956 (U) (See Appendix I) 1945 - 1947 1948 - 1951 1952 - 1956 47? Zhdanov KISHI EV 1111111111111111111111 MOL DAV IAN SS R ? n e- ?.) ( 1.0 \\ti flt - ? ? ? - timber Mehtepor 79 'than; dessa 34-135 46? BeVotod.Dnestrovskiy?, 1 ii ,S k Dzhankoi t". FLF. 4:1'v Oanu ? patonya r,M1,84, r ???? I I ? ? 140ft 2903 ;4,4 ......... .. - . 4.2?307.4.? 2 _ P??"P" Mcol,, ............ ? ?;'? \_ 1)???"?'&' ? v.: L.11. o Podd. p44,07. 000 *.*:"P??? ? e_ ..vd? rod co ' ..-..e.... - ,. mow,. Few)", erj 4-"i-."7.14"G.,,,ijd I."- t.o.,.....:.????;::*? . ? ;$,.),..tch; 2,_., , ''"*".??Y?thi'4th''''""?:" ''. 'Boa' '17yor????31?37. 9.:. :15'6:c..,,:???'.?'.. Nficryo:0?40," : 0 b ? .kotT.'14 A' * lor01.7.1.1..Alue? ___s_____tonion..TM.'..141.--:-.--1 . - - ... ?C ..--? ? :IA,: _ ???? ,I Poo:world* I . .;????_, raio loth; S;;;-/ ? C---./s.`-se.`-'2* ?:i? 447-1 Apr Miarkff;*?' - ? ?? ' ? 'VT-. j". hclO - otliyo p t3P9/4" ?-? ???-^ Kohin ? ? .--???;.1171,4733oito rr;ft,r,e-' Spenalkoya Toprodo ? 4 .-- Zor P'?.? 1. ..? _ Sot orlto 0. ?War* - 00. r:* ..-7-?? 930' `???? g5 65 66,6 '7 '7 30' ,4*rr-"Yro, go; , liT"*0 ?ver. 4-4 114' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 ? ? SECRET Special Forces Area 5 The importance of the Crimea to the Soviet Union is based on its mineral resources?particularly iron ore--and on its location on the Black Sea and the consequent development of the port of Sevastopolt?located in the area-- as the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet and the main naval ship-repair center on the Black Sea. While nearly all the main mineral resources now being exploited in the Crimea lie outside the Special Forces Area proper, the railroads connecting these resources to the manufacturing centers of the Ukraine and of central Russia do pass through the area and constitute there- fore the most significant target system. The Crimean Mountains, extending along the southern coast of the penin- sula, offer excellent possibilities for concealment and evasion. In places the mountains are alpine in character with escarpments, steep slopes, and many deep ravines. Troops operating in these sectors could do so only if specially trained and equipped. Forest cover is nat continuous, but there are extensive dense woods especially in the southwest. The population in the area is predominantly Russian with important Ukrainian elements in the northern half of the mountains and continuing into the Crimean steppes. Neither the Russians nor the Ukrainians have shown themselves in the past to be particularly hostile to the Soviet regime. Rem- nants of the Tatar population which so vigorously opposed the Russians during World War II may be found in remote mountain regions and would probably be willing to assist Special Forces. l. Cover Areas Area 52 which includes the southern portion of the Crimean Peninsula, possesses some of the most striking landforms to be found in the Ukrainian SSR. Along the southern coast steep mountain walls rise from a narrow coastal plain or directly from the Black Sea; in some places the mountains attain elevations of over 52000 feet within a distance of only a few miles from the shoreline. Northward, these mountains decline more gently to a 225 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Cop Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET lower series of ranges which in turn aeon give way to the sharply contrasting flat and featureless prospects of the Black Sea steppe which constitutes the remainder of the Crimea. In many places the slopes of the Crimean Mountains are covered with forests that wouldafford good opportunities for concealment. Forest cover is not available elsewhere in the Crimeae The mountains of the southern coast are orientated southwest-northeast from ,Sevastopolq443511-3334E) to a little beyond Feodosiya (4502Ne3,524E), a distance of about 100 miles. They are most prominently developed in the southwest, where three parallel ranges reach a maximum width of about 30 miles; toward the north- east the mountains grow narrower and lower and finally disappear altogether be- yond Feodosiya. Throughout the greater part of the mountains the terrain is . typified by steep valley slopes, deeply dissected terraces, large plateau sur- facesa and other stretches of relatively level terrain eeparated by deer transverse valleys and narrow gorges. The southern slopeso particularly on the main ridge, form high cliffs andabrupt escarpments in many plume. Elsewhere there are terraces, gullies and narrow coastal strips. Although the northern slopes are more gentle, they are also extensively dissected in places. Opportunities for concealment are best in the youthweetem sector of the mountains. Here there is a rectangular-shaped area ?approximately 40 miles long by 20 miles wide in which the density of forest cover frequently exceeds 40 per cent. The area is roughly defined by the highway from Sesaetopolt to Simferopol' (4458N-3405E) on the north on the east by the highway from Simferopo17 to Alushta Oddilne3425E), and on the south and west by the Black Sea. Contained in the area are the highest elevations of the Crimean Mountains and consequently some of the Itost rugged terrain. The Yaila Mats" assume 30M8 of their most characteristic features here at a distance of only about five miles from the Black Sea shoreline in the vicinity of Yalta. The forests do not offer contin- uous and unbroken concealment throughout this south stern areaa, but are inter- rupted here and there, as on the summit of the !alias, by patches of open terrain which are sometimes quite broad. The possibility of moving undetected from one 2L SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release 50-Yr SECRET point to another in this areas however, is good. Slopes are thickly wooded and mountain defiles as well as broader valleys have a screen of trees. Broadleafs predominate, but year-around concealment is available in ever- green stands at higher elevations, particularly on the southern slopes of the Yaila. Undergrowth is not particularly dense, but scrubby growth is common near the summits. The area is completely encircled by all-weather roads and several of this type make their way across the mountain ranges to the southern coast. Approaches to passes are frequently steep and winding. Other roads of an inferior type will also be encountered in this travel on them in subject to the vagaries of .clii..eate end season0 towns- and small fishing settlements are numerous on the southern area, but Resort coast and a number of small settlements are scattered at the lower elevations along mountain valleys) particularly in the western part of the area. Tourist trails will be encountered throughout the area. Forest extensive, However, a northeast, cover throughout the remainder of the Crimean Mountains is less and the mountains are lower and narrower than in the southwest. forested area of about 600 square miles is to be found in the and there is much rugged and precipitous terrain. Forest cover does not approach closely to the coast and is more fragmented in the moun- tains. It is possible, however, to move from one part of the area to another with benefit of forest cover, and contact is easily made with the forests of the southwest. Coastal and mountain valley settlements are less numerous, but the network of seasonal roads is quite dense. Thera are fewer alleweather roads. The nature of the terrain in the Crimean Mountains poses great dif- ficulties to movement on foot. The seaefacing slopes of the southernmost range present the most serious and extensive obstacle because of the many precipices and high escarpments occurring there. The southern slopes of the lesser ranges are also frequently precipitous. Movement is much more easily accomplished along the line of the summits and on the northern slopes, Local dostacles? in the form of gorges, deep and narrow valleys, 225 SECRET 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET and rough surfaces, are encountered everywhere, but can generally be circum- vented. In the winter, deep snows sometime block passes and greatly restrict or even prevent movement on foot. Mountain streams can be hazardous in spring when swollen by melting snows? As in the Carpathian Mountains, mountaineering experience would be invaluable in the Crimean Mountains* Settlement patterns vary in the area from place to place. Densest popu- lations are to be found along the southern coast where numerous rest hares and recreation areas are scattered on the wooded slopes. Along the valleys extend.. ing into the mountains are gardens, vineyards, and tobacco plantations. The villages whose inhabitants cultivate the fields are closely spaced and thickly settled. At higher elevations, population becomes sparse except in mountain basins and on the most gentle slopes whore orchards and gardens are cultivated. Villages are small and generally isolated from one another. Near the summits of the mountains only occasional shepherds cottages are to be found, many of which were formerly used by Tatar herdsmen and may now be deserted. On the northern slopes of the mountains a second belt of relatively dense settlement occupies lower elevations. In addition to gardens* vineyards, and tobacco plantations, there are grain fields which extend northward into the steppes. These are relatively sparsely populated. Nowhere are the Crimean Mountains as isolated as other mountainous dis- tricts of the Soviet Union. Many paved, allsweather roads cross the mountains and are supplemented by secondary roads and by numeroue tourist trails and livestock tracks. Security forces and ground fonces of the Soviet Amy also are present in the area, particularly at Simferopol1 and at Feodosiya. 2. Populations and Resistance Factors. The predominant populations in Area 5 are Russian and Ukrainian. The Russian are concentrated most heavily along the southern coast, on the southern elopes of the Crimean Mountains, and in the cities of Sevastopol? and Simferopol's including their outlying areas. In these sections Russians comprise more than 80 percent of.. the population. The Russians are largely an urban group, although a number of Russian farmers have been brought to collectives in the mountain 226 SECRET 4-6 SECRET valleys and in the steppes to the north. Largely due to the fact that the southern slopes of the Crimean Mountains overlooking the Black Sea are one of the principal tourist centers of the Soviet Union, their populations are undoubtedly loyal to the regime. Ukrainians nowhere form a majority of the population, although they occupy numerous settlements in the steppes to the north of the Crimean Moun- tains. Most of them have exhibited no opposition in the past to Soviet rule, although some of the recent settlers are repatriates from Poland and may hold some nationalist convictions. A few Tatars may have escaped deportation after World War II and may be found in the remote, more densely wooded parts of the mountains and could be useful to Special Forces. During World War II partisan groups were active in the area. The pre- dominant group consisted of 'Russian partisans who controlled the more remote mountain districts of the Crimea during the entire German occupation. The partisans were not necessarily recruited locally, but were apparently sup- plied at least in part by the local population. In opposition to the 'Rus- sians were the Tatars, who also inhabited the mountain districts as well as the plains to the north, and who strongly supported the Germans. Although they destroyed numerous Russian troops and settlers, the Tatars were never able to challenge Russian control of the mountains. 3. Economic Vulnerabilities The only important urban center in the Area is Sevastopol% It is the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, with extensive supply depots and the largest naval facilities in the Black Sea area. The Sevastopol' shipyards are also capable of constructing naval vessels including sub- marines, torpedo boats, and destroyers. Some fishing vessels and other small commercial boats are also constructed here. The small port of Balaklava also has some shipbuilding facilities and serves as an auxiliary naval base. Sevastopolt also has a small electro-technical industry, manuis facturing switchboards and munition plants. The other towns in this SEdfiT Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA RDP81 01043 02 n9 n7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET Special Forces Area excepting Simferopol! are all fairly small and most of them are located around the coastline. They are either resort centers or small agricultural centers, Their only industries are food processing and production of consumer goods for local consumption. There are two railroads in the Crimea which cross each other at Dzhankoy (454214.,3424E) north of Special Forces Area 5. One of these railroads, terminat- ing at Sevastopol!, goes northward to the Dnieper Bend Area, Kharkov and Moscow. It is by far the most important of the two in terms of providing the Crimea with the naval supplies for the Vieet.ind 14.1th-the-wide range-e-manufaetured_ goods not locally available, and also for shipping the fish and sub-tropical agricultural products of the Crimea to the main urban centers. The second rail line originates at Kerch! (4523N-3626E) and proceeds along the southern and western shores of the Sea of Azov through Perekop Strait to Kherson (4640N-3235E), where it connects with rail lines servicing the central and western portions of the Ukraine. This rail line could be used for land shipments of Kerch2 iron ore to the East European satellites (if land shipments. are currently being made) and may also be used for obtaining some supplies, particularly lumber, from the wooded areas of Belorussia and the Carpathian Mountains. Most of the rail traf- fic between Kerchl and the rest of Russia follows this line only as far as the junction at Dzhankoy and then goes north via the Sevastopol!-Kharkov-Moscow _ . route, Both of these rail lines are single-tracked and steam-operated. Fuel is mainly coal from the Donbass although some diesel locomotives are used. The physical vulnerabilities of the sector of the Kerch2 line is law inasmuch as it passes -through. al dry and level coastal plain. The rail line to Sevastopol!, on the other hand, cuts through the northwestern portion of the Crimean Mountains, ? encountering numerous fairly steep grades and passing through a number of cuts at which the right-of.may is vulnerable to interdiction. There are quite a few bridges on this mountain sector, including two long ones, and reportedly six tunnels on the approaches to Sevastopol!, four of which have been located on the accompanying map. 22%ECRET SECRET The peninsular nature of this Special Forces Area greatly reduces the vulnerability of rail transportation. Most of the mineral products of the Kerchl Peninsula go north by way of the Azov Sea to Zhdanov (4705N .-3736E). Much of the agricultural produce of this area and also most of the fish catch go by water to various ports along the Black Sea and along the northern shores of the Sea of Azov. The bulk of the freight received by the Crimea is also believed to come by sea, including coal from the Donbass-and oil from the Caucasus. Because of the limited industrial importance of the Crimea the volume of freight required! for the proper functioning of its economy can readily De moved by seats." circumstances warrant. The Crimea has awell -developed highway network, largely geared to the needs of thesesort centers. In addition to the principal paved highway which runs from Yalta (4430N-3410E) to Moscow in this area largely paralleling the railroad north of Simferopol!, good highways skirt the coast from Sevastopol! through Yalta past Feodosiyaa and connect Simferopol! to 7evpatoriya (4512N- 3324E) and the northwestern coast of the Crimean Peninsula. A second high- way link between Sevastopol! and Feodosiya runs to the north of the main mountain mass through Simferopol!. These highways and the fairly well- developed network of secondary roads serve mainly to collect the limited agricultural products of this region. Highways cannot be considered to be strategic targets-from a economic standpoint partly because of the limited economic contribution which the areas served by these roads make to the Soviet economy and partly because the agricultural produce of this r egion is raised so close to thesea that it could be loaded aboard ships without reliance on the highway network. The only value which highways in this Special Forces Area might have would be militaryand therolonl'y in case of Military operations in the Crimea proper. The maincenter of power generation in this area is Sevastopol!. The Inkerman power plant which is located at the eastern end of North Bay pro- vides power for Sevastopolt and an extensive area in the southern part of SECT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET the Crimea. Its capacity is reported my most sources to be about 24,000 kw., although one source states that it is at least 50,000 kw. The plant burns coal which is presumably shipped by water from the Donbass. An oilf4ourning plant of 9,000-10,000 kw principal sources these two plants; capacity which is Sevastopoll.i . capacity is located on the south shore of North Bay. (All are inagreement on the identity and approximate size of however, one source mentions a third power plant of 12,000 kw. a hydroelectric plant located somewhere in the vicinity of Another source, which does not list power plants, reports a 1Z4000-1.- Seriestepolt,2_ Cnumber of other power plants are undoubtedly in operation in various industrial concerns in Sevastopolt including one at the main naval shipyard. They are all believed to be small and their joint capacity is certainly not sufficient to explain the large gap in estimates of total capacity between the 33,000 kw, given by most sources and 1060000 kw.) The only other power plant in this area known to be larger than 5,000 kw. is located at Yevpatoriya. The old Simferopol! power plant has only 3,000 kw. capacity0 but another power plant0 reportedly much larger, is under corutruction. A reservoir covering an area estimated at 1 km. by 2 km. and backed up by a dam 400 meters long is located two kilometers south of Simferopol, on the road to Alushta. Its functions are unknawn. Also under construction is a reservoir near Yalta which will contain the waters of a small river flowing into the Black Sea. It is probable that a hydroelectric power plant is being constructed at the reservoir but its capacity cannot be very large because of the limited water flaw and its highly seasonal nature. The oi/i-burning power plant at Feodosiya may possibly be as large as 5,000 kw. It consists of diesel generators and a power train located just vest of the rail,. road station. Other planta are in operation at the torpedo test station and in the harbor area. k 110.4cv. network is centered on the two power plants of Sevastopol?, with one line going north to Yevpatoriya? the second northeast to Simferopol?, and a third around the coast to Yalta. A 110-kv0 line runs be,- tween Simferopol? and Yalta, but no information on construction is available. 230 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? t. 50-Yr SECRET Other power transmission lines in this area are 35.-kv. At present current flows from Sevastopol, to the various other cities in the high-tension net- work and the interdiction of the three 110-kv. lines would deprive much of this area of its power. The consequences, however, would not be serious because of the lack of significant production or of large urban populations outside of Sevastopol!. Although there are reports that with the completion of the Kakhovkal power plant on the Lower Dnieper the Crimean power network will be connected with the Dnieper-Donbass network by a 110-kv. line, there re. no _reports of .aufficiently_large_ industrial __expansion. ontside Kerch t Peninsula which would require considerable increments in power sup- ply. Nearly all the small power plants in the Crimeas with the exception of the sizeable plant at Sevastopol!, use oil as fuel and probably depend mainly on water transportation for their fuel supplies. Since the oilfields of the Kercht Peninsula have no local refining facilities it seems likely that fuel comes from the Caucasus or from the Odessa refining plants. The only significant mineral production in this areat are the salts of the Lake Sakstkoyd (45?7N-3336E). In pre-war years 75,000 tons of sodium chloride were obtained yearly by solar evaporation. Lake Sakstkoye also provides magnesium salts, its pre-war capacity being 1,250 tons of magnesium chloride and 66 tons of magnesia. It was the main source of raw materials for the production of metallic magnesium at Zaporozh!ye, which had an output of 400 tons. in 1937. Its present importance as a source of magnesium salts is unknown. The salt works near the lake are also reported to extract bro- rine and possibly iodine from Saksikoye brines. Lake Sasyk (4512-3331) and other nearby lakes also contain large supplies but are not known to be ex- ploited. There are ample supplies both of sodium chloride and magnesium salts in the parts of the Crimea lying outside this Special Forces Area. The USSR has many other larger deposits of salt, so that deprivation of the Sakstkoye supply, which although railroad-connected is mainly shipped out by sea, would have little effect on the economy of the Ukraine or of the USSR. 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 231 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET Because of the peripheral location of Area 5 and its limited economic importances the telecommunications network is not a particularly valuable tar- get. The main line from Moscow follows the railroad-and terminates at Sevas- topol'. The main center for wire communications is the capitals, Simferopoll. The most powerful radio communications stations are at Simferopol' and Sevas- topol', with other stations at Feodosiya, Yevpatoriyal, Yalta, and Sevastopol' Turgovyi Port (4436N-3333E). A powerful broadcasting station is located at Simferopol'. Maritime communications include Yevpatoriya? Yalta, Feodosiya, Arabat (4518N-35321,. and SevAstopolt. 1).erhaps of greater interest to Siaecial Forces than the radio or telegraph network is the chaim of radar stations skirting the coast of the Crimea. Presumably these radar stations stretch all the way from the eastern tip of the Kerchl Peninsula to the western tip of the Crimea and include early-warning radar stations as well as aerial navigation and maritime navigational control stations. Nearly all the significant targets in this area, with the exception of the rail lines, are along the seacoast or very close to it. The feasibility of seaborne attack should be considered. 232SECRET ? ? SECRET SPECIAL FORCES AREAS (S) LEGEND r-% Rail bridges )( Highway bridges Tunnel Steep grade Electric Power Plants Hydroelectric 5,000 - 10,000 11 10,000 - 50,000 over 50,000 o under construction Thermal ? 5,000 - 10,000 41 10,000 - 50,000 111 over 50,000 C) under construction ? Transformer station Power Transmission Lines 60 KV Existing 60KV _ Under construction Pipelines Existing --?-- ??? --0- Under construction /t* Mines Oil and/or gas field Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET ? ? 15 5: OweMWCk a3L . A' YEVPATOP., Boyuk Ak.act. ?? 54 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 ? , ? ? . . ? sp ?J ? ; k s? 56 hdt: .SECRET_T ? ? Nawyp? 1?1??00.1 Th chell? p? - ? . -.Ads/bk.).* ? :Kaftan/4.4k/ 59 *. ? ea. e.tAnd ?yevka ? ,:"..C?oroposSnk 7 11.4.6t0. 0101i. ' Kt . i L 1.147,- f( ? X? P ? i .0'., hobe..ior ? Allugan Tatartki:1, ? 65 V ^ ? S. L.. P ) 412 - :: I ??*'l reit ziSoS tia .T. '44 ? ',s-Y ?;?'./ \ ? 5 "-??'' 1 C I 14J ?4"1Pro104:4 ? ??? ? ' U4.41,- // , K.ALAMITSAIY (4,ro S44 54550 va Kama.* 10554.1 - Rad, Key.*** And . ',al, St. ? --bek29 151,1 Ia. 47 c,7 : , .? 6,..o... X f k. * .'r??..... ,Kodovitc;?.. lir .?....0 .0.. 1 ..;', : ....f. .I., ?k, It .... - 93 2.4551y.B.nondwk ? . .? mak / kaY $d .Z,. Kee& b.141sid?444d. 67 h..- I. r? ,e$ 44:. Kiaro..basy E ? ?? L.:1......:5.,6:7:7?:.:N ?? ata.:\ ? I.- " ? . 4...faus," L. 1, ? ? , 'TT ? 5cio Ad Katny... 5.Ory90 1.2055134 7 shpts.,. ?{JO, -et Na.1 Swab.. :at . /Slang UiWys,.. 141":1 ? Ah?no,kok g /ft' r.a,.,or ? 091571 lie( 084 ? F E FEODOSIYA ? ? ? ',11:"Te ?:4fiS.--"s:?-? I -4 ,?ba ? !..421IK_uk Ada.. Kkoiasevio * 4 ? 44,4 ??????.... , SEVASTOPOL' ?Ss cals ono la 50.50 kvandrytd, ? r ...nue EL . forniaitg 111 "Ad. ? ?Z.. "e-N ?-? ,./.2L24.C/.6 ? J laSenad?or 5. ? Tv% Lembo/ Kaeobakh 54 dylto?\* 010.1.3 Mustorn'yo, ?44 55 \ Gt4rsvf .411( foti ir?70-44er VI/ a doya A?reanda 4405-ArTccf5r AJOpbO Mys Ir enn-Bumu ???? Sa?reA 56 .hotio vs ?er, 57 MOSKVA mINSK PYATIGORSK Khyalynsk ? ????? ./. 4 ? ? ? * 15- 55 45 56 57 NArton My, AyviDeg - r ? --1- '11 - _ xi': 9 II Mys 4-- _ 4.. My s 11'4 a Mot dids '411118.6.?.? Th 1_ x.? A -- 45 ? IS 5 4. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 4.10 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET Excluded Areas Several marginal areas have been excluded as unsuitable for extended Special Forces operations, although they have some concealment which might be adequate for short periods. Some of these areas have features other than concealment possibilities which are favorable to Special Forces operations. One of the areas excluded) although in some respects it is favorable, is an area with Kharkov at its northwestern corner and extending south almost to the Donbass and east to the Upper Donets River. It offers extremely impor- tant. target -cysteras, TartieUlaA7 the rail Ines from the Donbass through - - Kharkov to Moscow which carry a substantial proportion of the freight from the Donbass north and are essential in supplying raw materials for the very important engineering industry of Kharkov. Also in this area are the newly developed Shobelinka natural gas deposits and the large-diameter pipe- line conveying gas to Kharkov. Eventually this pipe line will be extended, possibly as far as Moscow, and its value will be accordingly enhanced. Another areat extremely important from an economic standpoint extends east and north from Dnepropetrovsk. In this area are the main railroad connections between the Donbass and its sources of iron ore and manganese, between the metallurgical industry of the Dnieper Bend and its sources of coal and pig iron and steel in the Donbass, and also the main connections between the eastern and western Ukraine. The Dnieper River itself, of con- siderable importance for navigation, power generation and irrigation, is a significant target at vulnerable structures. Finally, some of the high- tension lines passing through the Dnepropetrovsk area and supplying it at present with current from the south at Zaporozhtye and eventually from the northwest at Kremenchug are vital to the heavy industry in this region. Three other areas in the Ukraine also offer some opportunity for con- cealment but not of sufficient density to justify their selection as Special Forces Areas. These remaining three regions, although not entirely lacking in target systems of interest to Special Forces, do not have any- where near the economic significance of the Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk 233 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 ??? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET regions. One of these lies east of Cherrrtgov and e xtends from the Desna Myer north to the border of the Ukraine. This area has no large cities or important industries. The railroads passing through are important for connecting Kiev and Moscow: but of only secondary purpose to other inter- regional trade. A water connection between the Dnieper and the Volga Rivers follows the Desna River in this area but the present level of its utiliza- tion is low. A second region of marginal cover and only moderate interest from the target standpoint is located on the Middle Dnieper around Cherkassy. The most significant target system here is the rail line from Kiev to the Dnieper Bend and the Donbass. This rail line, however, can be by-passed both to the south and to the north. The third area is located north of the Dnestr Myer and is bordered on the west by Areas 1 and 2. It is an ex- clusively agricultural region with only local industry and no significant mineral production. The main rail lines between the Ukraine and the East European satellites pass further north, although some rail connections with the Moldavian SSR and Rumania lie within this region. 234 SECRET ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr APPENDIX RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET SECRET -4501r Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 R 50X1 -HUM Next 16 Page(s) In Document Denied Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release . 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 E Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release . 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 1 0 SECRET PART I 1. Ralph Butler, The New Eastern Europe (London, 1919), p. 132 (U). 2. Michael Hrushevsky, The Historical Evolution of the Ukrainian Problem (London, 1915), pp. 40-41 (U). 3. john S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917:1920 (Princeton, 1952), PP- 33-34 (U). 4. Donald Wallace, Russia New York, 1905), p. 347 (U). 5. Reshetar, op. cit., pp. 11?. 12; Butler, 2p.l_sa.? p. 132 (U). 6. Michael Hrushevsky, AJILII2asiLa52ILTI (New Haven, 1941), pp. 39- 123 (U). 7. George Vernedsky, Bohdan.:Betman of Ukraine New Raver, pp. 131 if (U), 8. The Russian census of 1897 noted that 94.4 per cent of the Ukrainians lived in the country, while the cities were composed of 32.4 per cent Ukrainians, 32.5 per.centyussiahel and 28.4 per cent Jews. (H.H. Weinstein, "Land Hunger in' the Ukraine, 1905-1917," Journal of Economic History, May 194) p. 25 (U).) 9. Peter Skorevetanski?.Revoliuteiia ha Ukraine (Saratov, 1919), pp. 7-8, quoted in.yeinstein? op. cit., p. 26 (U). 10. Weinstein, p. 34 Ca. 0 11. Henri Grappin, Thlonais et Ruthenes la uestioh de Galicii (Paris, 1919) (U). 12. john A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism 19391911.5 (New 1955), pp. 18-25, 30-32 (U). . 13. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine, pp. 521-22, 524-25 (U). 14. Paul Khristiuk, Zand:tki:i,materiali do istorii ukrainskoi revoliutsii 1917-1920 15. Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, 1954) (U). 16. Reshetar, op. cit., pp. 117=20 (U). 17. Ibid., p. 216 (U). 18. Pipes, 222_211., pp. 123-26 (U). 19. Ivan Majstrenko, Borot'bism a Chaster in the 1134/92.121.21291 p pp. 119- Nationalism (New York, 19 20. Vsesoyuzlaa a kommunistiches a arti a u rezo (5th ed.; Moscow, 1935 Vol. I pp. 32 -2 U). ir' 21. Ibid., pp. 325=26 (U). 22. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 14, 106-107 (U). 269 SECRET akh I reshen akh Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET 23. J. V. Stalin, Sochineniia (13 vols.; Moscow, 1946-1952), Vol. V, pp. 181-94, 2364d0, 291-341 (U). 24. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 15-16; Walter Kblarz, Russia dad Her Colonies (New York, 1952), p. 129 (U). 25. George S. N. Iuckyj, Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-1934 (New York, 1956), pp. 65.66, 92.102 (U). 26. Stalin, op. cit., Vol. VIII, pp. 149-54 (U). 27. Visti vseukrains'kogo tsentralinogo vykonavdhogo komitetu, April 19, 1927 /U). 28. MYkola Sciborsky, "The De-Ukrainianization of Ukraine by Soviet Russia," Trident/ Vol. IV, p. 15 (U). 29. (U).- - 30. Alexander Baykov, The Development of the Soviet Economic System (New York, 1947), pp. 192, 194 (U). 31. W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine, a Submerged Nation (New York, 1944), p. 57 (U). 32. Ibid., pp. 57-62 (U). 33. P. P. Pbstyshev and pp. 71..73 (U). S. V. Kosior, Soviet Ukraine Today (Moscow, 1934), 34. Ibid., pp. 11-12 (U). 35. Joachim joesten, "Hitler's Fiasco in the Ukraine," Foreign Affairs, Vol. MCI, No. 2 (January 1943), p. 334; German Foreign Office, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1 '-i 'i (Washington, 1948), pp. 145-98; Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 23-29, 3 35) 43 (U). 36. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 53.63 (U). 37. Ibid., pp. 76.77 (U). 38 Peter Mirchuk, Akt violnovlennia ukrainskoi derzhavnosti (New York, 1952) (U). 39. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 84.86, 90.92 (U). 40. There are sone indications that the emigre nationalists were distrusted by the natives for their excessive Ukrainization, their superior attitude, and their emPhasis on the western Ukraine and on cooperation with the Germans. 41. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 97.98 (U). 42. Ibid., pp. 131-38 (U). 43. Ibid., pp. 133-421 146-47, 151-53 (U). 44. Ibid., pp. 145-46 (u). 1 45. 46. 47. 270 SECRET 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. She New York Tires, November 3, 1953 (U). SECRET 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM 55. Oleg Martovych, Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Tires (Edin- burgh, 1951), p. 107; Ukrainian Congress Committee of Anerica, Ukrainian Resistance (New York, 1949), pp. 72.73; CIA/SODB (S); _50X1-HUM 56. 57. 53. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. Ukrainian Resistance, op. cit., p. 107 (U). Martovych, op. cit., pp. 116-18 (U). 50X1-HUM Anerican Legation, Vienna, Desp. No. 407, September 14, 1951 (U). 50X1-HUM PART II 1. Principal sources used in preparation of "General Sunnary": AFOIN-1 Al., IR-1114-55 (DOI 1957), Uneval., AF 698011 (u). Anuchin, V. A. Geografiya sovetsko o z at' a (Geography of Soviet Transcarpathia). Mbscow, 1956. U Axtenenko, A. K. "Lesnyye po1osy--nade7hrmya zashchita pole" (Forest Belts--Reliable Defense of the Fields), Iesnoye khozyaistvo, Vol. 7, No. 12 (December 1954), pp. 59-61 (U). Baranskiy, N. N. Ekonomicheskaya geografiya SSSR (Economic Geography of the USSR). Nbscow, 1952. (U) Berg. L. S. Natural Regions of the USSR. (O. A. Titelbaum, transl.) New York, 1950. (U) Bubnovskiy, N. "Sellskoye khozyaystvo Ukrainy na podlleme" (Expansion of Agriculture in the Ukraine), Sotsialisticheskoye dx -HUM khozyzysvto, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1956), pp. 18-30 (U). Camnbell Prolect, Terrain Study, Poland (ID 674500) (U)., -% De Nhrtonne, Emmanual, The Carpathians: kflysLograpZfl_C .ie u-u kAdu trolling Human Geography," The Geographical Review, June 1917 (U). 50X1 -HUM Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 271 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET Dept. of the Any Pamphlet No. 30-50-1, Handbook on the Soviet and Satellite Arnie March 1953 (R). Dibrova, O. T. Georafiya Ukrains'koi RSR (Geography of the Ukrainian SSR). Kiev, 1954. (U) Debrynin, B. F. Fizichesksya geografiy. SSSR (Physical Geography of the USSR). scow, 1948. G-2 Project #6550, Ukraine, Country U-1 thru U-7 (ID 950050) (S/SpH/NOFORN). Gavrilav, A. M. and Popov, I. V. Dnepr idet v step' (The Dnieper is Brought into the Steppe). Ieningrad? 1951. cffy Germany. Generalstab des Heeres? Abteilung ffir Kriegskarten mid. Verressungswesen (IV. Mil.-Geo.). Militargeographische Angaben fiber das Euro gische Russland, Ukraine (Military-Geographic Data on European Russia, Ukraine). Berlin, 1941. (U) Kutaflyev, S. A. EUkalall_WILISE (Ukrainian SSR). scow, 1951. (U) Library of Congress, Studies of Migration and Settlerent, "Pripet Marshes: Ponulation and land Settlemmtr NO. R-108, January 1945 (ID 113405)(C). Iubyaw? I. Ya. nowt ogyoxegiya kolkhoaaml osushennyth zeger vpoynakh r. Supoya i Dritokav r. Trubezha--Karani i Ne&y71"RalagEtior-Vort of the Kolkhozes on the Drained Lands in the Floodplain of the River Supay and the Tributaries of the TrUbesh River?the Karani and Nedry"), Gidzotekbnikai nelioratsi Vol. 7, NO. 7 (July 1955), pp. 38-41 (U). Maslov, S. P. Krym Crinea Moscow, 1954 (u) Rinisterstvo prosveshcheniya RSFSR. Ekononiches o SSSR ("Economic Geography of the USSR). "scow, 1 Mirav, N. T. 222Enkl*.y_9f Russia. New York, 1951. (U) Vbscow. Vsesayuznaya sellskokhosysystvennaya yystavka. Pavil'yon .114rg4POP.Ya SSR. Kiev, 1955. (u) NIS 26TUX717.777-Chap. VI, Sec. 61, "Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry" (s). NIS 260 Supplement I, U.S.S.R.-I, European U.S.S.R., Chap. II, Sec. 20, "Introduction" (S). NIS 26, Supplenent I. European U.S.S.R. Chap. II, Sec. 21, "gIlitary Geograph cRegions' NIS 26, Supplement I, U.S.S.R.-IL Euroan U.S.S.R., Chap. II, Sec. 23, "Weather and ClimaTe" (SiSpH/NOFORN). NIS 26, Supplenent I, U.S.S.R.-I, European U.S.S.R., Chap. II, Sec. 24, "Topography" (C). --------- Ozhevskiy? P. G. 0 razvit narodnogo khosy stva Ukrainskay SSR (On the Lvelopment of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR scow, 1954. (U) Seletskaya, N. A. "Konkretnyi plan poyysheniya produktivnosti lesov Gnivanskogo lesnidhestva" (Concrete Plan for Raising the Productivity of Forests of the Gnivanskiy Forestry District), Lesnoye khozyaistvo, Vol. 8, No. 9 (September 1955), pp. 23-28 (U). Shabad, T. Geography of the USSR: A Regional Survey. New York, 1954. (U) Shackleton, M. R. Europe: A Regional Geography. Iondon, 1951. (U) Shdherbina, A. A. "Parki zapadnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi SSR" (Parks of the West Oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR), Biulleten' glavnogo botanidheskogo sada, Vol. 18 (1954), pp. 32-41. (U) Sada:toy, A. G. "Kurtury dUba v Chernom lesu, sozdannyye shpigovkoi" (She Culture of Oak in the Black Forest), Iesnoye khozyaistvo, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1955), pp. 33-36. (U) Statystychne upravlingya Ukrainstkoi RSF. Narodne gospodarstvo Ukrainekoi RSR (National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR). Kiev, 1957. (U) Tyulaffir? M. O. "Perspektyvy ta stan osvoyengya zaplavnykh zerel' v kolgospakh URSR" (Perspectives and Status of Utilization of the Reclaimed Lands in the Kolkhozes of the Ukrainian SSR), Visgyk akadegii nauk UkRSR, Vol. 27, No. 6 (June 1956), pp. 30-38 (U). USAF, Eq., DI. Political and Demo ra ic Co osition of the Sino-Soviet B1siThaa.951Avaufaj.a4taiL. 1 May 1957. S . 272 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ???????I?? ???????? SECRET 2. Dept. of the Army, Office Chief of Military History, Supply of Partisan' Units during the War, 1941-1945, MS 0-125 (ID 1144619) (U); Dept. of the Army, G-2, Det. 5562nd AAU, Partisan Warfare in the Soviet Union, 20 June 1953 (S); Air Research and Developnent Connand, BRRI Project, The Role of the Partisans in Soviet Intelligence, .January 1954 (C); G. A. Dixon and O. Helibrunn, Communist Guerilla Warfare (New York, 1954) (U). 3. Vladimir Studnicki, Das ostliche Fblen (Kitzingen-Main, 1953), pp4, 101-109 (U). 4, 213 Sich. Div., "Tatigkeitsberichte der Abt. Ic worn 1.4.42.-31.12.42" (GEES 35307/4); Div., "Feindlagekarten vom 16.5.43-3.7-43" (GME6 uncatalogued); "Bandenlage Oat" 15.12.43 (GME G H3/1439) (C)., Sloloy_XOvnak, Vld-netivlia do karnat (Kiev?.1940 (U). "Bandentatigkeit in den Ost-Wahrkreisen" 15.12.43-15.7.44 (GNDS uncatalogued) (C). 7. Ibid. ?5. 6. 8. A.O.K. 17, "Anlage 12 zwr&T.B. Ni'. 8 Bandenneldungen worn 10.10. bis 31.12.43" (GMDS 40935/14) (C); A.O.K. 17, "Anlage 12 zum &Tab Ni'. 8 Bandenneldungen worn 1.1. his 31.3.44" (GVE0 52947/18) (C); A.O.K. 11/Abw. Offs. "Banden 16.8,.1941-20.11.1942" (GMDS 35774/16) (C) 9. Ibid.; 213. Sich. Div., "Feindlageharten worn 16.5.1943-3.7.1943" TUR56 35307/4). 10. Air Research and Development Command, HRRI Project, Partisan Warfare in the Dnepr Bend. Area of the Ukraine, January 1954 (C). 11. Ibid., pp. 4-8. PART III 1. Joseph B. Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945 (New York, 1943), pp. 150, 184, 208-210 (u). 2. According to the most recent account (me.y 1957) the Tatars are not to be returned to their homeland, as. are most of the deported minorities. (New York Times, Illy 5, 1957.) 3. The last complete record of regional variations in ethnic composition of the pre-war Ukraine vas the census of 1926. elsentrarnoye statis- ticheskoye upravleniye SSSR, Otdel perepis, Vsesoyuznaya perepie naseleniya 1926 goda (Moscow, 1927), Vol. XI, pp. 8-26 (U).) The last record for the territories acquired from Poland was the 1931 , census. (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,' Th:e Pisod'Po.u.12.tiozoldan (Washington, 1954), pp. 147-55 (U).) For the Trans carpathian oblast infornation dated. April 1, 1956 is available in V. A. Anuchin, Geceratiya aovetskogo zakarpat'ya (Moscol./0 1956), pp. 130-34 (u). The following account of regional differences ethnic composition is based on projections' of this information, with allowance made for major population dislocations Where known. 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 2;t3 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET 4. After World War II about 483,000 Ukrainians were repatriated from Poland to the Black Sea area around Eherson, Nikolayev and Zhdanov. (Joseph B. Schechtman, "The Polish-Soviet Exchange of Population," Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. IX, NO. 3 (October 1949), p. 306 Cu).) The Ukrainian percentages mgy therefore be somewhat higher than the figures given. 5. Tsentral'noye statisticheskoye upravleniye SSSR, op. cit., pp. 8-26. 6. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 7. Solomon M. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Union (Syracuse, 1951), p. 15. (U) 8. Ibid., pp. 229-30. - ? ?_ 9. Ibid., p. 16. 10. Gregor Aronson, Soviet Russia and the Jews (New York, 1949), p. 26 (U). U. Schechtman, Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. IX, No. 3, op. cit., p. 306 (U). 12. Eugene M. Kulischer? Europe on the Move (New York, 1948), pp. 291-92 (U). The balance were apparently killed during the war. 13. New York Tines, March 28, 1957 (u). 14. Ibid., April 1, 1957. PART IV' 1. Center for International Studies, NKVD Labor Carps, Final Report on Project Mango, Cl/B/55-3 (Carbridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1955) (S). 2. 3, 5. Dept. of the Army Pamphlet No. 30-50-1, Handbook on the Soviet and Satellite Armies, March 1953 (R). 6. G-2 Project #65501 Ukraine, Country Books, U-1 thru U-7 (ID 950050) (S/SpH/NOFORN). 7. USAREUR, 580-qq-13891 55-0496 (ID 2281741) (C). PART V 1. Principal sources on railroad transportation are: NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Sec. 31, "Railroad," November 1950 (ID 935103) (C); Germany, Generalstab des Heeres, Ukraine: Schema der Eisenbahnen, Map 1:1,500,000, April 1941, CIA 20630-G-220-25 (U); Statystychne upravlinAya Ukrains'koi RSF, Narodne gospodarstvo Ukrains'koi RSF (National Econory of the Ukrainian SSR) (Kiev, 1957) (U). 274 SECRET 2. 3. 5. 6. 7. NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Part DI Supplerent I, "Ports and Naval Facilities," March 1951 (ID 935103)(C). 50X1-HUM al cce-DcT '-'50X1-HUM ? 8. ? 50X1-HUM 9. On shipbuilding facilities and their recent activities, see: CD 0 10. Main sources on highways are: NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Sec. 32, "Highways" (ID 935103) (C); 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM U. Main sources on electric power plants and transmission networks are: U.S. Federal Power Commission, .Btameau of Power, Electric Power Require- ments in the USSR, 1950; "Sixteen Cities in Economic Region III," 1950 (D); Ibid., "Electric Power Requirements Dnepr-Donets Grid" (D); NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Sec. 621 'Fuels and Power," March 1951 (ID 935103)(C); USAF Project Rand R-194, Electric Enerr Resources of the USSR, 26 April 1950 (ID 1095353(5);) ( Ibid., R-4311 The Electric Power Systems of the USSR--AMendum to R-194, 15 May 1950 (ID 1095353) (S); Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 ' 27 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 SECRET JIB (London), 3/149, Electric Power in the USSR, Vols. I, II, June 1952 (ID 1093875) (S); SALOPIBI Bet. "Q", London, The Distribution of Electric Power in South Russia, Parts I, II, III, 12 February 1954 (ID 1224681) (S). 12. NIS 26-I, U.S.S.R.-I, Sec. 251 "Urban Areas," June 1954 (ID 935103) (S). 13. Ibid. 14. Principal sources follow. Additional sources of mare limited scope be nentioned in the appropriate subsections. D. B. Shimktn, Minerals: A Key to Soviet Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953) (U); NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Sec. 62, "Fuels and Power," March 1951 (ID 935103) (C); Theodore Shabad, Geography of the USSR: A Regional Survey (Net" York: Columbia Univeroity Press, 1951) (U); Statystychne upravlinnya Ukrainsikoi RSF, op. cit. (U). 15. NIS 26, Sec. 62, op. cit. (C); Mykheylo Pavlyak, "The Sixth Soviet Five- Year Plan and the Eloitatjon of Ukrainian Iron and Fuel," The Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. XII, No. 2, June 1957 (u). 16. 17. 18. On oil and gas, see: NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Supplerent V, "Petroleum," (ID 935103) (TpH/NOFORN); NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Sec. 34, "Pipelines,: May 1951 (ID 935103 (C); N/A Moscaur, R-151-56, 31 Eby 1956 (DOI: Eby 1956), A-1 (ID 2019457 (u); AIIR IR-1387-55 (DOI: August 1955), AF 692194, 25 August 1955 (c); 7050 AISW, AF 749141, 7 May 1956 (C); AIIR IR-416-56, AF 732245, 7 Februali 1956 (q); 19. NIS 14, Poland, Sec. 62, "Fuels and POwer," Septenber 1952 (ID 935103) (S); 20. Principal sources on teleconnunications are: NIS 261 U.S.S.R. Sec. 38, "Teleconnunications" (ID 935103) (S); Ibid., Supplenent III, "Teleconnunications" (S); Signal Corps Intelligence Agency, S-117-57, Selected Soviet Radio Network Facilities, Septerber 1956 (ID 2041228) (S); Ibid., S-62-551 Soviet Radio Network Facilities, January 1955 (ID 1282407)(S). 21. NIS 26-I, U.S.S.R.-, Sec. 25, "Urban Areas," June 1954 (ID 935103) (S). 276 SECRET PART VI Special Forces Area 1 SECRET 1. NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Sec. 34, "Pipelines," }&y 1951 (ID 935l0) 56X1-HUM ibid., Supplenent V1 "Petroleum" (ID 935103) (S/SpH/NOFORN 2. 3. Special Forces Area 2 1. 50X1-HUM 2. NIS 14,,Ita.and-, Seq.-6Z "Fuels rand Power," September 1952 (ID 935103) (S); CIA/00-14-826) 12 Odtolier 1955 (D0I: 1955) (MO). 3. G-2. Project #6550,Akrainef:Countr7 Book (ID 950050) (S/SpH/NOFORN). . . 50X1-HUM Special Forces Area 3 1. "d-2 Pro.ject #6550, op:-cit;i1 Book U-1 (S/SpH/NOFORN). 2. Akadetiyalleuk fiRkl, Kiev.- Rada po vyvehennyu produktyvnykh syl. a .roz tk?.pd.ukty'cmkhsyl za.khidnrkh oblastei Ukrainalkoi RSR. .( uest ons.o . Yelopme.n...:_of the Produc ive Forces of the West Miasts of the Ukrainian SSR). Kiev, 1954. (U) Special Forces Area.:4* 1. 2. Special Forces Area 5.. 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM 1. NIS 26, U.S.S.R!., Part DI Supplement I, "Porto and Naval Fac 11., 4, Narch 1951 0:-JD 955103) (C). 2. U.S. Federal Power Commission, Bureau of Power, Electric Power Revire- mentos in the USSR, 1950, "Sixteen Cities in Economic Region III," 1950 (U). Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007 1 277 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1 50X1 -HUM Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1