ORDER OF BATTLE HANDBOOK CZECHOSLOVAK ARMY

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CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
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RIPPUB
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C
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202
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December 23, 2016
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January 16, 2014
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7
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Publication Date: 
August 1, 1958
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REPORT
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 ????? ?:?* L) : : ? ? ???? ??? ? ???:-..*:: ????? ...? :??? ::???? ? 4 ORBAT.CZECH ORDER OF BATTLE HANDBOOK ? anostolfAK ARMY (C) HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE OFFICE OF A /C OF S, G2 1 AUGUST 1958 CONFIDENTIAL 50X1 -HUM . ? . 50X1 -HUM ? ?.?..... ? ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 50X1 -HUM Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL .43FZe FOREWORD This Order of Battle Handbook is intended to serve as a complete reference for all those engaged in the collection and analysis of information concerning the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. With the exception of the Border Guard and the Air Force, all ele- ments of the Armed Forces are covered herein. The Czechoslovak Border Guard is covered in a separate publication issued by this Headquarters and the Czech Air Force in appropriate USAFE publi- cations; installations data is provided in the five volume set of handbooks entitled "Military Installations, Czechoslovak Ground Forces." It is believed that the utilization of all these books in combina- tion will provide as complete a picture as is now possible to present on the Czechoslovak Ground Forces. 50X1 -HUM Figure No. 1 COLONEL GENERAL BOHUMIR LOMSKY MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION Chapter I ORGANIZATION & EQUIPMENT Chapter II Chapter III Chapter IV Chapter V Chapter VI Top Control of the Czech Armed Forces Unit Organization Non-Divisional Units Weapons and Equipment Uniforms and Insignia ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS 13 19 52 62 75 Chapter VII Major Organizations Chapter VIII Minor Organizations Chapter IX Supply Installations and POL Facilities REFERENCE DATA Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter 104 144 153 X Index of Locations XI Personalities XII Personnel Actions XIII Training XIV Supply and Maintenance XV The Scho91 System XVI Mani)ower XVII Mobilization XVIII List of Known Field Manuals XIX Czechoslovak Permanent Fortifications XX The Interior Guard VS XXI Political and Athletic Organizations XXII Quasi and Para-Military Organizations XXIII The Soviet Military Mission XXIV Military Maps XXV List of Historical Names XXVI Czechoslovakia in Brief 161 177 189 200 248 253 262 272 281 290 299 303 307 310 312 319 321 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL t*. , ? - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Chapter XXVII Czechoslovak Calendar of Events ? 'Chapter XXVIII Key Industrial Cities Chapter XXIX Transportation and Communications Chapter XXX List of Czechoslovak Abbreviations 356 368 373 382 INTRODUCTION The Czechoslovak Armed Forces of today are not generally considered to be an effective fighting element of the Soviet Bloc military machine. Despite a reasonably high degree of military proficiency at all levels, the Czechoslovak Army rema5.ns largely untested, logistically dependent on the Soviet Union, and of question- able political reliability from the Soviet Bloc point of view. It must be looked on as an instrument of Soviet Military Power, which would undoubtedly be totally subordinate to the Soviet Army in case of a major East - West conflict. Beyond temporary diversionary maneuvers, independent action by the Czechoslovak Army is-judged to be highly improbable. The ability of the Czechs to soldier has been proven in both world wars, and twice during the short history of the Czechoslovak. Republic the Armed Forces have reached a very high degree of military proficiency only to disintegrate in the wake of political events. Fully mobilized and judged?one of Europe's finest forces, the Czechoslovak Army of .1938 was rendered impotent by the Munich. agreement. agreement. After World War II a reborn Army had reached 'a marked degree of military proficiency by 1948. It was one of the few European Armies capable of?conducting corps level maneuvers. But the Communist coup d'etat in February of that year again reduced the Army to a state of military ineffectiveness. In spite of these things', however, the Czech is basiCally-not a martial individual. The Czechoslovak Army, as such, has never been tested and consequently lacks a real military tradition. - With 7 the exception of Ziska, the men-who have made Czech history have/ not been men of letters. "The Czechs are frugal, industrious, ? extraordinarily Competent, home loving, possesbed of inordinate - personal integrity, above all reasonable in their dealings with' one another and with the outer world; they care little for the soldier, butenormously for the prophet and the :man of letter. - ? The Czech soldiers today only, as an. obligation, and not,' - because of a desire to 'further' the -aims of the?-regime.- ? He.differs': from the conscripts of Western Armies in that although they serve-"' only because they are obligated to, they believe in the reasons for ? 1 We shall live again, Hindus CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL ? ,?v Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 CONFIDENT!i-k-L obligatory service. He differs from the average conscript of the Soviet Army in that he has the mental capacity to question it. He knows, however, that his 'service record follows him into civilian life, and that malfeasance on his part can permanently deprive him of the normal privileges of a citizen. Often today Czechoslovakia is misconstrued as a "reliable" Satellite.. -Her failure to revolt in 1956, at the same time as her Polish and Hungarian neighbors, has certainly countenanced this illusion. However, some of the very reasons why the Czechoslovaks did not revolt also tend to explain why this country is not considered to be a "reliable" Soviet Satellite. In an effort to provide an under- standing of the Czech soldier, as well as an appreciation of the current political and psychological climate as it exists within this nation, a brief examination of its history would be pertinent. Basically the Czech is considered to be a realist and now, perhaps, a more opportunistic type individual not inclined to rash action -- who for years has suffered as the face of Europe changed. The Magyars, ,the Hapsburgs, the Nazis and now the Communists have all contributed to this philosophy. The value of such rash an action as open revolt would have to be proven and obvious before the Czechs would consider it.. An analogy reflecting this situation and attitude is illustrated by a prevalent, if not entirely accurate comparison, that the "Czechs are like a clever old trout swimming in a stream fished by murderers." While the Ciechs must have before them the oftrepeated Komensky apostrophe: .... "after the tempest of God's wrath shall have passed, the rule of this country will again return unto thee, 01 Czech People;" -- the inclination to follow a cautious, almost apathetic approach is stronger than the prospect of revolution and freedom -from Soviet domination. Catholicism is not synonymous with nationalism as is-the case in Poland and Hungary: It would more accurately be synonymous with Hapsburg oppression. .The Czech Roman Catholic might well explain that he is a Catholic but also-a Hussite. By this he would'imiily that he believes in the-Hus.site traditions of democracy, freedom; and equality. Hus.is not considered an enemy-of the church, but rather a great liberator of-his people. Because of an already -established industry, Communist forced industrialization was not necessary in Czechoslovakia. (It is 2 CONFIDENTIAL 1 CONFIDENTIAL interesting to note a few percentages of pre-1918 Austro - Hungarian industries that remained in Czechoslovakia: Sugar 92%, glass 92%, cotton 75%, jute 90%, shoes 75%, china 100%, chemicals 75%, malt products 87%, brewing 57%, wool 80%, and leather 70%.) Skoda is today synonymous with armaments; but in addition it produces highly specialized iron and steel goods for shipping needs, agricultural implements, motor cars, rolling stock and all,sorts of manufacturing technical equipment. Between Skoda, Tatra, and Praga, Czecho- slovakia has supplied its own soft-skinned vehicle needs and Czech developed and produced armaments today are ample evidence of Czech self sufficiency in these fields. Much Czech military equipment is ' exported both to the Soviet Union and other Satellites. The Soviet Union at present appears to value Czech armament research, devel- opment and production above armament standardization. There is evidence to believe that the relatively new T-54 Soviet Tank had its inception in Czech tank plants in early 1949 (see Equipment). In his book, "We Shall Live Again," Hundus wrote in 1939: "In a practical sense the Czech overshadows all his Slav brethern and can hold his own with any of his neighbors. What an asset such a people would be to a Russia which is struggling frenziedly with the modern machine! If ever there is a union between these two Slair peoples -- which is not the most fantastic dream in the world -- the Czechs will astonish Russia and the world with the contribution they will make to the country's economic development." The irritant of Soviet occupation is not present, and the Czech enjoys a higher standard of living than any of his Satellite neighbors. In summary, the appearance of the Czech as a reliable Satellite is more mirage than actuality. He has tasted democracy, is a discern- ing individual, and again awaits the day KOMENSKY promised. The difference in Czech and Slovak temperament is also worthy of mention. The independence loving Slovak favors the Magyar or Pole more than the Czech. He is not to be trusted by the regime in either Prague or the Kremlin,. During the Hungarian rebellion there were reports of attempted Slovak sabotage of the Vah Valley rail lines. Following the rebellion in Hungary a new Interior Guard Brigade was organized with headquarters in Spisska Nova Yes. Its only apparent mission is the security of this rail line. In addition, Prague reportedly signed an "agreement" with Moscow to allow Soviet troops to use these lines whenever necessary - thus, of course, furnishing a legal basis on which Soviet troops could be moved into Slovakia. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5. CONFIDENTIAL 3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 CONFIDENTIAL The most important reasons for "keeping an eye" on Czecho- slovakia today appear to be its location and the probability of its provid- ing information concerning Soviet intentions. Geographically, Czecho- slovakia provides the Kremlin with a salient in Western Europe. Its. western borders, heavily wooded and mountainous, are natural defensive positions. Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor, once stated that he who controls the borders of Bohemia also controls central Europe. To the east of these borders lies the Bohemian Plateau with its egress the . traditional invasion route of the Moravian Gate. To the west lies the almost indefensible Danubian Valley. Through the Vali Valley of Slovakia runs the only land line of communication with Eastern Germany if the "unreliable" Pole were to again revolt and cut the most used rail lines between USSR and East Germany. Evidence of Czechoslovakia furnishing information concerning Soviet intentions is best exemplified by recent changes in Soviet TOE in East Germany. Many of the changes effected had been already estab- lished in the Czech Army for several years. Truck mounted rocket launchers in rifle divisions, 152mm Howitzers in line division artillery, etc., were reported in Czech units as far back as 1954. This is believed to be because the Czech Army is used by the Soviets as a TOE laboratory with the Soviet Military Mission playing the part of the researcher. If attacked, the Czech soldier of today can be expected to fight well in his own defense. In an offensive operation against the West, his performance would be half-hearted, and once the tide turned so might he. The military leaders in Czechoslovakia, like those in other Satellite countries, have limited direct influence on the developments of Bloc strategic plans. The Unified Military Command, established by the Warsaw Pact in May 1955, is organized on a representative basis, but the real headquarters is in Moscow. Details of the role 0 - assigned to the Czechoslovak Armed Forces in a future war might be worked out on Czechoslovak initiative, but it is believed that general .44 supervision and control over all Czechoslovak military actions, including mobilization, rests ultimately with the Soviet Union. ts. In conclusion, it is interesting to compare the motto from the - seal of Duke Vladislav (1147), "Duke Vladislav is ;the Custodian of the Peace of this Land assured us by Saint Vaclav, " with that of the Czech Army today, "We Must Conquer for Peace." 4 CONFIDENTIAL fr. ? Sr Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? et, 50-Yr 2014/03/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R0n7R0n1annn7_c f .f,?:1P?47.3,2 e Az? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 . _ ? r- .1 ti1311.45'1.(13;;:r.'''?' ? t ; .t? ''`? ? " o 1,, ?-'6.-of.Lta Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 , N. ? ` ?; rrf The names of aministrative diaishans an tin same as thoir capitals. 40 SO - 7 ? ?re Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 r ? .64 - ?? - ? 4.4 4 I. if fi z??17 oflif? UNCLASSIFIED 41, CHAPTER I - HISTORY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK ARMY The Beginning In reading the histories of individual Czech units one will note the frequent appearance of the names of Jan Hus and Jan Ziska. They also appear frequently as names of military installations, and it might be said that Czech military tradition has its roots in the lives of these twb men. The blind Ziska, an ardent follower of the religious reformer Hus, is one of history's most brilliant generals. As the leadei-of.the Taborites (after the city of Tabor, stronghold of the radical Hus sites), Ziska time and again routed the far superior forces of Emperor Sigismund. He never lost a single military engagement, and today his name and the city of Tabor are symbols of the bravest war of liberation in Czech history. With the defeat of the Hus sites at the battle of the White Mountain near Prague in 1620, Czechoslovakia became a part of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and the Czech Army as such ceased to exist. World War I Perhaps the most important phase of Czech military history was the participation of Czech units in the fight against the Central Powers in World War I. This is so because it was the action of these units which was primarily responsible for the recognition of Czechoslovak independence by the West. As part of the Austro - Hungarian Empire at the outbreak of hostilities, Czechs were called upon to fight and die for German Imperialism which they associated with oppression in its most exact ? sense. When mobilization was ordered on 26 July 1914 some Czechs refused to obey - others departed from Prague stations with anti-German cries and singing Slav songs. "Maria Theresa lost Silesia, Francis Joseph is going to lose everything" was often heard. On the other hand, Sudeten Germans formed some of the Austrian Army's crack regiments. In the early days of the war the average Czech expected the Russian Army to be with them any day, but when initial German successes became known Czech soldiers began to desert to the Russians by the - thousands and even by units. The most notorious of these was the 28th Prague Regiment which went to the Russians on 23 April 1915. Within UNCLASSIFIED 6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50 -Yr 2014/03/04: - - 1 4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 ? UNCLASSIFIED 30 minutes after entering combat the 35th Pilzen Regiment also deserted in a body. A total of 300, 000 Czech and Slovak soldiers deserted, and of these Masaryk estimated 182, 000 ultimately fought beside the Russian and Western Armies. Approximately 25, 000 deserted on the southwest front to the Serbians. Of these about 11, 000 survived a death march to Albania and 4, 000 of them were taken to France as a nucleus of a Czech Army in that country. The Czech unit formed in Russia in August of 1914 was comprised mostly of Czech residents of Russia. It took the name of Czech Legion (Ceska Druzina) and was officered mostly by Russians. It was initially commanded by Lt Col Lotocky and later by Lt Col Sozentovich with headquarters in Kiev. The unit was actually a regiment in size and its colors consisted of the Russian Tricolor on which the crown of St Vaclav was superimposed. Members took an oath of allegiance to the - Russian Czar on 28 September 1914 and the Legion was then attached to the Russian Third Army. Members of the Legion were dispatched indi- vidually to Austro-Hungarian lines to induce Czechs to desert, and by the Spring of 1915, the strength of the Legion totaled 3, 000. When the Central Powers forced the retreat of the demoralized Russian forces from Galicia the Legion distinguished itself in several rearguard actions. Following this campaign it was transferred to the Army of Gen Brusilov on the Volhynian frontier. In March of 1915, the "Federation of Czechoslovak Associations in Russia" was formed with the principle aim of the formation of a large Czechoslovak Army from the thousands of Czech and Slovak prisoners. The Russian government, however, refused to allow formation of a Czech Army which had any semblance of independence from Russian control. Masaryk, in the belief that one must prove ones value to those from om one asked help, went to Russia in May 191/ and was succes.s- ful ir ganizing the-Legion into a.Czech Army which received its baptism of fire at the battle of ZBOROV in Galicia on July 1 - 2, 1917. Its size at this time was actually a brigade of four regiments formed on June 13, 1917. During the battle Czec}. personnel conducted themselves with cool courage and had eminent success in capturing 4, 200 prisoners and much materiel., The battle of ZBOROV was the last real flare of Russian military activity and foreseeing little future Russian participation, Masaryk won permission,to move the Czech Army to France. By the end of 1917 it - had a strength of 32, 000 organized into two divisions. However, under UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED the chaotic conditions in Bolshevik Russia in 1918, only about 2, 500 members of the Legion reached France. The remainder of the Legion ultimately fought its way through Siberia - courageously and with 'perfect discipline - to return to Czechoslovakia via the United States. In 1914 many Czechs and Slovaks living in France joined the French Foreign Legion. They were later joined by Czechs' from Britain and formed a unit known as the Nazdar Company. They received their baptism of fire near Rheims on October 23, 1914. , Their standard bore the historic emblem of Bohemian freedom - the Lion of the House of Luxemburg. To this unit was added the 4, 000 from Albania and about 2, 500 more from the United States. In 1917 Benes went to Rome and was initially rejected in his request to form Czech military units. However, a treaty was finally concluded on 21 April 1918 which allowed the formation of an independent Czech Army in Italy to be commanded by General Andrea Graziani. It was officered by Italians, Czechs and Slovaks. Under the control of the Czechoslovak National Council in ?Pa-ris, it had a strength of approxi, mately 22, 000. The Czech Army in Italy was cited for conspicuous gallantry by General Diaz on September 22, 1918. Its last engagement of importance was in the battle of the Piave in late October. The importance of the Czech Army's participation in World War I can best be illustrated by the following statements: August 9, 1918 from the British Foreign Office: "Since the beginning of the war the Czecho-Slovak nation has resisted the common enemy by every means in its power. The Czecho- Slovaks have constituted a considerable Army, fighting on three different battlefields and attempting, in Russia and Siberia, to arrest the German invasion. "In consideration of their efforts to achieve independence, Great Britain regards. the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied Nation and recognizes the unity of the three:Czecho-Slovak,Armies as an allied and belligerent Army waging a regular warfare against Austria-Hungary and.Ger many. " "Great Britain also recognized the right of the C.zecho-Slovak National Council as the supreme organ of the Czecho-slovak national,, interests, and as the present trustee of the future Cecho-Slovak- Government to exercise supreme authority over this'allied and ? ? ?. ? belligerent army. " ? UNCLASSIFIED 8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 eg!ft-A - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 , -, ? - ? . ? UNCLASSIFIED September 2, from the U.S. State Department: "The Czecho-Slovak Peoples having taken up. arms against the Ger- man and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and having placed in the field organ- ized armies which were waging war against those empires under officers of their own nationality and in accordance with the rules and practices of civilized nations, and the Czecho-Slovaks having in the prosecution of their independence in the present war confided the supreme political authority to the Czecho-Slovak National Council, the Government of the United States recognizes that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks thus organized and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires." "It also recognizes the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a de facto belligerent government, clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks." "The Government of the United States further declares that it is prepared to enter formally into relations with the de facto government thus recognized for the purpose of prosecuting the war against the common enemy, the empires of Germany and Austria-Hungary. " 1918 - 1938 Compulsory service was introduced in 1920 which was universal for all male citizens. Service liability began at age 17, although inductions were usually effected at age 20 for a two-year period of active service. All male citizens remained members of the reserve until age 60. In 1919, a French Military Mission was established to remain 10 years. This mission was primarily, responsible for the high state of efficiency ultimate- ly achieved by the Czech Army. Under the provisions of the new constitution the President was the supreme head of the Army. The country was divided into four military - districts and comprised 12 divisions and a number of separate brigades. The Army of .1920 - 1938 was considered to be a very efficient force, well disciplined, and true to the principles of the Republic. No min could enter an officers" school until he had finished his service in the ranks, - and no class was-favored for officers.- Drills were strenuous, ,and obedience imperative. Sudetan Germans- also served and were in no way -discriminated against. Later Hitler's Sudeten followers were surprised ? by the flood-of Sudeten Germans to the Czech colors in the critical days . . ? before Munich. ' With the election of Benes in 1935 rearmament was pushed- and, for the first time in Czech history, the Czech Army became popular. By 1937 the strength of the Czech Army totaled 10, 059 officers and 9 ? UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 153, 356 enlisted men. It was by this time regarded as one of the finest in Europe, both in equipment and training. The Air Force had a total of six regiments with 566 combat planes. A reserve of 2, 000, 000 existed in 1938 and mobilization was ordered on 21 May 1938. The mobilization was effected so quietly and efficiently that it took Hitler by surprise. In late September all men up to age 40 were called to the colors. At this time the Army placed its faith in General Sirovy whom they likened to Ziska with a patch over one eye. On September 22 Sirovy told the people of Prague: "I guarantee that the Army is standing and will continue to do so on our frontiers, and will defend our liberties to the very end Do not allow any internal enemies to sway you into the belief that the Army could possibly change its attitude." But the attitude did change, Benes accepted the Munich Decision, and the Czech fortifica- tions were handed over to the Germans. Not only the German Army stood poised for attack, but so did the Polish and Hungarian Armies on the North and South. The Czech Army's spirit had been contingent on Western support, but now their strength was sapped and General Sirovy announced: "I have lived through the most difficult moment of my life because I have had to fulfill the most painful duty that could ever have befallen, me, a duty which is worse than death. And because I have fought in war and know the conditions under which a war may be won, I must tell you frankly, even as the conscience of a responsible Army demands, that the force which in this hour would rise up against us compels us to recognize superiority and to act accordingly We are a fortress that is surrounded by forces stronger than ours We, shall fulfill the conditions which have been imposed on us by force it World War II As was the case in World War I, Czech and Slovak soldiers began defecting to Poland, Russia, Yugoslavia and other-Eastern European countries and eventually to France. On October 2, 1939, an agreement was signed between the French Government and the Czech Minister in France to reconstitute the Czech Army in that country. A French Military Mission was assigned to it and General Ingr became CINC. Thousands of these Czechs later escaped to England during and rafter Dunkirk. Czech flyers participated in the Battle of Britain, and the Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 UNCLASSIFIED 10 ? -?,..Z?netS '.4??????::, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 UNCLASSIFIED ? Czechs continued' to serve with British Forces as a welcome addition to'-. . the Allied military effort. Meanwhile in' Slovakia a different picture-Was evolving. Slovalcia had declared its independence of the Czech lands and became a Nazi' puppet state. The Hlinka Guards and their affiliated Hlinka 'Youth were formed. They?were created according to the pattern of Italian Black Shirts and the German SS and SA Corps, including black uniforms and the Fascist salute. They were armed with light weapons and were organized along m3litary lines. The Hlinka Guard was the organization primarily responsible for the remcival of Czechs from Slovakia, and - the deportation- of thousands of Jews. In addition, a Slovak Army con- tinued to exist and on September 1, 1939, the Slovak Army participated in the German attack on Poland; Its operations were confined to Polish territory along the Slovak border and it occupiedcommunities that had been ceded-to Poland in early 1939. - In June of 1941, a Slovak Army of 50, 000 participated in the attack on Russia. The size of this force soon dwindled to 16; 000 because of the defection of Slovaks to the Russian forces. In 1943, this Slovak' "Security Division" under the ,command of Jan Vesely was moved from the Soviet front to Italy. There it built bridges and fortifications as part of the Axis war machine. Those who' deserted tot-the Russians joined the Czech Corps which fought with the' Russian 'Army against'the Germans. In the summer of 1943, the Slovak Government offered to Send 10,-?500 Slovak troops to Germany to form' labor units. Soldiers in Trnava,and Senica revolted and refused to move. On August 29, 1944, over the Banska Bystrica radio the insurgent Slovak National Council called Slovakia to rise ? against the German forces called into Slovakia by Tiso.. Lt Col Jan Golian.ordered the Slovak Army to start combat operations. From the outset they were at a definite disadvantage. The Germans entered Slovakia simultaneously .from several, directions, with superior forces supported by the Hlinka Guards and German Ordne.7.-s. The Slovaks lacked heavy arms, air support and adequate small arms, ammunition. The Western Allies attempted to, assist the Slovak insurgents with scime arms ammunition and American and British Military. Advisory Groups. The. Russian contribution was' half hearted at best. Although in the.best position to render assistance, they time and time again' failed to fulfill' promises of Material help such as to fly in a Czech Brigade from Russia, and to launch an attack under Marshal Koniev in the Carpathians.' Instead of troops they flew in Soviet partisan officers, .,political 11" UNCLASSIFIED Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for ? UNCLASSIFIED commissars, and Czech and Slovak Communist agitators and politicians. The Czech Brigade under Col Vladimir Prikryl was flown in but much later than promised. The Soviets also launched a half hearted attack toward the Carpathian ranges in the region of Dukla Pass, but when stiff German opposition was encountered, they abandoned the project. Thus the situation deteriorated rapidly. On October 28, 1944, General R. Viest, who had succeeded Golian as Commander of the 1st Czecho- slovak Army in Slovakia, issued an order to continue the fight "until the victorious end." As a result, the partisan type fighting went on until the liberation of Slovakia in April 1945. An interesting note was President Roosevelt's reference to the Slovak insurgents on October 28, 1944: "The People and Armed Forces inside Czechoslovakia have joined actively and gloriously with their countrymen abroad in the ranks of the nations against tyranny We Americans salute our Czecho- slovak Comrades-in-Arms who are today so bravely contributing to the liberation of their homeland and the rest of Europe." Post-World War II Following World War II the Czechoslovak Army was again re- organized and by 1948 had reached a marked degree of military pro- ficiency. It was one of the few European Armies capable of conducting corps level maneuvers. With the Communist coup of 1948 and the sub- sequent extensive purges of "unreliable elements" the army was once again reduced to a state of military ineffectiveness. Officers who had fought with western armies were weeded out because of pro-Western tendencies: Many of those who had fought with the Russian Army were also purged. The theme was now "like the glorious Red Army", and many of those _who had fought with Russian units were eye witnesses to the contrary, rendering their retention undesirable. In 1950, the reorganization of the Czech Army along Soviet lines commenced. The Soviet Military Mission members were assigned to all units down to regiment and to all schools. Some Soviet equipment was furnished, and initially much old German and Czech equipment was in use. Higher level exercises did not achieve any degree of proficiency. until 1956. ease ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-n1n4vIPnnosznni c ,UNCLASSIFIED 12 , Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 CONFIDENTIAL ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT CHAPTER. II - TOP CONTROL OF THE CZECH ARMED FORCES Administrative Organization The Army high command coincides with that of the Armed Forces; the "Air Force" is, in effect, part of the Army and there is no Navy. The President of the Republic is designated. Supreme Commander by The Constitution of .190. The President can, upon recommendation by the National Assembly, declare war on other state of emergency and institute mobilization. He is advised on military matters by a small Military Office of the President. The determination of ordinary military policies .and the making of routine decisions affecting the military are delegated to the Council of Ministers. and, specifically, to the Minister of National Defense. The Minister exercises direct control over all major tactical units, staff agencies, and other head- quarters. He is assisted by a number of Deputy Ministers, each of whom heads a major element,of the Armed Forces high command. The high command includes several agencies that serve all components of the?Armed Forces and are represented at lower levels of command: The .General Staff, the Main Political Directorate, the Main Directorate of Personnel,. the Main Directorate of the Rear, and a Military Counterintelligence (Vojenska Kontrarozvedka) agency. There is also a Military Schools Directorate that supervises all military schooling. There is a separate Air-Defense Command that coordinates all matters pertaining to the detection and interdiction of air attacks against the national territory of Czechoslov4-rin.. there are separate commands for the air force and all the ground arms and services: artillery, armor, transportation, chemical, engineers, and signal. The -commanders of these agencies exercise administrative and technical control. over the troops of :their respective branches. The militarized security.forces of the. Interior Ministry are administered by a 'siugle Main Directorate of Frontier and Interior Guards. These troops, are train'ed and equipped. in much the same way as infantry troops. In wartime, militarized security force units would serve with the Army ground forces. The functions of the various components of the as follows: ? , (1) General Staff -- The Chief of General Staff possibly a First Deputy, Minister of National Defense. 13 CONFIDENTIAL high command are is a Deputy, and He does not Declassified in Part - Sanitized C A e ease 0 ? ? CONFIDENTIAL exercise operational control over military headquarters or units except as expressly delegated by the National Defense Minister. The various staff sections of the General Staff include Operations, Intel- ligence, Mobilization and Organization, Communications, Cryptography, and Registry and Archives. The General Staff, is charged with the preparation of plans and studies concerning the operational employment, administration, and general functioning of the Army. These include strategic operational plans, intelligence on foreign armies, the classification and assignment of conscripts in peacetime and the mobilization of reserves in wartime, and the conduct and security of military communications. (2) Main Political Directorate -- This agency heads an apparatus that extends to every part of the Army. It is charged with the political "education" or indoctrination of all members of the Army. Political officers serve at every command level down to company. They regularly lecture the troops on Communist policy and idealogy. In addition, they perform some of the functions of the Chaplain and Special Services Officer in a United States Army unit. The Political?officer is also responsible for insuring that all commands and proceedures followed by the unit are in accord with Party doctrine. The political officer system provides its own channel of communication, exclusive of the normal command chain, directly to the Main Political Directorate. The latter agency maintains close liaison with the Party Central Committee for advice concerning the latest twist of the "Party" line and for informing Party leaders on the political health of the Army. It is very probably that this Directorate has recently been given increased importance in keeping with the U. S. S. R. and several other Bloc armies. , (3) Main Directorate of Personnel -- This agency is responsible for administering?the,transfer, promotion, and retirement of military personnel (Possibly officer personnel only). (4) Main Directorate of the Rear --This agency is responsible for the procurement, storage, and distribution of all commonitems .of supply and equipment used in the Army. Counterpart agencies in -the respective branch ,commands .are responsible for-handling items -that are unique to the particular branch. Rear-Services officer's are assigned at every leyel.of command down to battalion. They, like ,the folitical. . officers, employ a channel of communication .for supply matters that is outside of themormal,command.line., Rear-Services officers at higher: levels can refuse the requests of comrnandexs, based on their judgment' of available supply stocks and the requirements of the overall situation. 5 - r /03/04 . CIA-RDP8i-n1n4fl Pnr-v,sznn A n nr-17 c CONFIDENTIAL 14 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CONFIDENTIAL In combat, rear-services officers are responsible generally for all matters pertaining to the rear area. These include movement of troops and supplies 'and the maintenance of storage depots, hospitals, and repair shops.. The medical, ? veterinarian, supply, and administrative services are all supervised by the rear-services agency. (5), .Military Counterintelligence:? Formerly under the General Staff, the military counterintelligence office is now directly responsible to the Ministry of Defense.., It is believ.e4 to be responsible for the detection of actual or potential subversion or sabotage of the Armed Forces. It works closely. with'the Party Central Committee and with Party-member cells that exist throughout the Armed Forces. The counterintelligence apparatus has small working groups at all higher echelon levels and one or a few officers and men at the lower tactical-unit level. These men operate almost completely independ- ently of the local commander who, of course, might himself be a target of their operations. Their findings and reports are transmitted upward to other counterintelligence offices. , The military counterintelligence organization maintains close liaison with security agencies within the Ministry of Interior, and in fact may actually be, supervised and controlled by that Ministry. Such a direct tie cannotsbe confirmed in Czechoslovakia,' but it would correspond with the known system in other Soviet-Bloc countires. It is, in facto a deliberate practice- of Communist or other totalitarian states to not permit an agency to be responsible for its' own security. (6) Directorate for Military Schools -- This agency is believed responsible for coordinating and providing overall guidance for the military school system. It probably reviews curricula for adequacy and conformance to Army-wide standards, , _and participates in estab- lishing, standards for. the acceptance of students and instructors. (7) Air Defense COMmasid --This agency corresponds directly with the Soviet PVO (literally, _"anti-air'defense")_organitation. ? It is responsible .for the 'centralized control of all matters pertaining to the detection and interdiction of ,every air attack against the Czechoslovak homeland. The C techOslovak.Air-Defense Command.isi moreover, tied' ? in with-the Soviet PVO and with comparable organizations in the other European Satellites-,in what amounts. to, a Bloc-wide air-defense system. The ,Air Defense Command has operational antiaircraft.artillery and fighter-interceptor units -directly- as signed, to_ it. .'L These maybe called , 15 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Relea 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 ? 50 -Yr 2014/ CONFIDENTIAL home-defense units as distinguished from the tactical units that will be used in connection with ground combat operations. Tactical' AAA and fighter units would be subordinated to the air-defense command in time of emergency, however, to supplement the permanently assigned home- defense units. ? The air-defense command is the only element of the high command that has a distinct operational command function. This is exercised through a system of air-defense regions and sub-regions. The AAA and air units subordinate to the command are subject to the administrative and technical control of their respective branch directorates. (8) Air Force Command -- The Czechoslovak Air Force is not an independent service and the Air Force Command is not an operational headquarters. Instead, it is comparable to the branch commands (actually directorates) discussed in the next paragraph. (9) Branch Commands -- The commands of the various branches of service are similar to the "Special staff" agencies of many of the service branches (Ordnance, Quartermaster, Engineers, etc. ) of the United States Army. They are responsible for the design, procurement, and distribution of specialized branch materiel. They prepare training doctrine and deal with organizational problems peculiar to each branch. They do not exercise operational control over tactical units, but do exert administrative and technical control over all troops of their branch, wherever they are assigned. Territorial Organization For purposes of military administration and control, Czechoslovakia is divided into two military districts. The first Military District has its headquarters in Prague and is responsible for military developments in Bohemia. The Second, at Trenchin, administers Moravia and Slovakia. The district commanders, both lieutenant generals, are in the line of command between general headquarters (GHQ) and the tactical , units. They have a general responsibility for the combat readiness of the troops in their respective areas and participate in the direction of the troop-training program. In addition to these operational functions, the district headquarters have a primary responsibility for various administrative and logistic matters. These include supervision of conscription and the call-up and CONFIDENTIAL 16 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 training of reserves, military construction, the physical maintenance of military installations, and the. movement and storage of certain military supplies. _ ? In wartime, the military district headquarters would take a' direct part in the mobilization, assignment, and movement of reserves. In addition,, it would continue to function as a territorial-administrative headquarters. Meanwhile, the district staffs would provide cadres for the establishment of field-army headquarters should these be necessary in the event of mobilization. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50 -Yr 2014/03/04:CIA-RDPSI- 0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 When considering the Czech armament manufacturing capability, the number of years which have elapsed since the communist court, Soviet aid, and the available accurate equipment counts in camparison to GSFG data, there is every reason to believe that most active Czech units possess their full complement of equipment. It is a well corn- firmed fact that units operating at a reduced personnel strength maintain the majority of their equipment in storage in the unit itself. Because it is in storage casual observers are in a position to count it only on infrequent occasions, and therfore accurate equipment counts are lack- ing. Moreover, it is usually the best equipment which is kept in stor- age for purposes of mobilization and is only used as familiarization training dictates. Occasional observations of a full complement of equipment can usually only be accomplished when a unit is preparing to move out of an installation to a training area. An example 'of this is the observation of 24 x 57 mm AA guns in the STRIBRO barracks in 1957. A comparison with GSFG TO&E indicates that the 11th Rifle Division in STRIBRO has its full complement of this relatively new weapon. In 1957 the Army Artillery Brigades of GSFG upgunned their flat trajectory weapons to 122 mm. In early 1958 these same weapons were observed in LESANY. LESANY is believed to house elements of the I Military District Attillery Brigade (See Artillery). The exceptions to this seem to be in T-54 tanks and heavy AA. T-54 tanks have been confirmed in Czech units, and it is probable that except for famili- arization training they are most often kept in storage and are therefore only infrequently observed. Antiaircraft guns of 100 mm have been confirmed in Czechoslovakia, but home defense units (PLOS) apparently do not possess a full complement, and 122 mm AA guns have never been reported in Czecl- units. For the foregoing reasons details of Czech TO8tEts are badly lacking, and in order to preeent a probable picture it was deemed best to list Soviet TO&E's in comparison to known Czech. It will-be noted that the tables contain two colums for each item of equipment one prefixed by an "S" and the second by a "C". The "S" represents.the Soviets as they are currently believed to be in GSFG, and the "C" represents the highest and/or best count of the same item of Czech epuipment for that unit. In utilizing these tables it is emphasized that cognizance must be taken of probable TO&E. differences and the fact that Czech units more than likely possess their full complement of equipment. py Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: nag PnflOannl Annt-% Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 The Czechoslovak Army is known to possess two tank divisions which have proven to be two of the most nebulous elements of the Czech Armed Forces, This is primarily because one of the two is housed entirely in a single, very secure installation, and the other has half of it's major elements concentrated in one town, and the other half intermingled with other 'units around a field training area. Moreover, it is reported that assignment to a tank division is predicated on "political reliability" wich is probably a major. reason why tank division defectors are mon- existent. Thus, significant information concerning Czech tank divisions is very rare. In keeping with the basic premise that Czech TO&E's generally correspond to those of GSFG, it is presumed that this is true also in tank divisions. This is evidenced by the apparent disappearance of one of the 4th Tank Divisions artillery regiments and the concurrent trans- fer of its rocket launcher battalion. (See the Order of Battle Listing). Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50 -Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-R 4 Figure No. 6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 p. CONFIDENTIAL"): MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS It is believed that all Czech rifle and mechanized divisions are now motorized rifle as are GSFG units. Some old mechanized divisions may still be referred to as ,such, but this is probably a matter of habit, or on the other hand, the name may have been retained as a matter of an honorific. There may be one exception to this in the case of the 5th Mechanized Division where 122nun guns have been observed in divisional artillery barracks, and a separate assault gun. battalion is reported to exist in. Zatec which is directly subordinate to the division headquarters. If true, the-se may well 'be indications ,that,this division has been converted to a tank division as opposed to the continued existence of mechanized divi- sions?with a TOILE different than either-the iank or motorized rifle divisions. Czech mechanized and rifle divisions are now believed to be motor- ized for the following reasons: a. 1522nm.howitzers have been reported in rifle and mechanized t; divisional artillery since 1954. This was one of the major 'recent changes' in the!GSFG reorganization. ??? !, ; ? ? 4-_-b; A rocket4auncher battalion-has-been organic, to-rifle divisions , sinhe11.954:.;: This a.).4:14;_iii` recent In`a.j?OFGSFG change,? ! ? - c. Tanks were reportedly introduced into Czech rifle regiments in 1955, and since have been observed in several installations known to house. rifle,regiments.,-This..was:.still_another.,recent-GSFG-change.- 7 jd. A recent knowledgeable officer defector stated that the organic ; transportation of his rifle regiment was capable of moving the entire - unit-simult?aneously:-It'sliould be coiiiii:dered here, however; that his '? unit rag prObably helow_wartime;TO&E and his statement Was based on exfsting conditiond......On_the, other hand,:._the:Czechs are apparently self- sufficient as regards to soft-skinned vehicle production. Until very recenty, a Soviet soft-skinned vehicle has never been reported in z ? G?AZ viraiiii-67111"hlir?Te- e'd, - and the Czechs mar well have manufactUred these. ,5 Theinajdidiffereiia-e'TietWeen tlie"Old 'Czech anct?Sairiet - niiedr divisions -4p:eared to be the non-existence of a medium-tank regi7 - . rriene-irk the Czlec11,-:ilifehhan lifecently,; howe;rer,zrnedium tank regiments .have been 'reported in two of these divisions, and in-one, ' the dissolution of the old tank assault gun regiment is also apparent. ; - f.?Last and most important, sOme"rifle regiments and divisions have been reported as motorized rifle units. )15110Rizn RIPI Diit3I011 c.r._ 5 _ ** This unit is'not-belieVid to be organic to GSFG-MOtOrized Rifle - 'Divisions, but has heen?rePOrted'in'the-Ciehh 5th ?MOtOriZeii_ '- Rifle DiiriiiOn-;? ? SeelTank-Dirision'for 1tTOE.fr' 4 ? ." - ? ? ?1., Figure NO..- 7' -4, ?I.:, ?. .s Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 r-- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release CONFIDENTIAL 'ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES General The antiaircraft defense. of, C.zecho,slovalcia.has improved during the last few years but still tends to lag behind the other Soviet Satellite countries. The reason for this may, be that-the country does not lie astride the Soviet lines of communication in the, same way as Poland. Another ? reason may be because the Czechs relild a,larger extent than other Satel- lites on their own industries to produ-c-e,the 'necessary AA equipment. General Organization and Strength z . I"- 'A8 in all other' Soviet Satellites AA defense units can-be divided into two' main categories. ' a. Home Defense AA Units. b. Field Army AA Units. Home defense units from part of an integrated Fighter aircraft/ AA gun! parlYWiining -10r known ai PR prrry. Z DUSNE OBRANY ST ATU-P, . V. O. S. (AA iDegens e of the, State). The AA Artillery and Early Warning Units of PeiV'.0.-S-.--are manned br, the--Army,---while the Fighter - and Grlianizt eontrol units are mannecrby-the Air FO-C-..? 6 The estimated strength of the Army element of P.V. 0. S. is 15, 000. Field Army AA units fo'm an intergral part of the army formations to which they are organic. ? Oxganitation of Honierkefense AA Vz The Readquartets of,P.V. 0.S. is located in Prague and is directly. subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense. , So far five P.V. 0.S. AA artillery divisions have been identified. -Each AA division consisting, of three, AA Regiments. It was thought that these units wre,iitndd eventually,,to have: a, similar oTganization-to that of Russian P. V. 0.S. Regiments (i. e., 48 guns organized .into six eight gun batteries). Recent- observations tend to show that the guns around , Prague may be organized into 6 gun batteries. This could mean that the ? Czechs have not followed Soviet practice blindly, but have organized their regiments into eight troops of Ciiiris each, or alternatively that 25 CONFIDENTIAL - - ???p; Declassified in Part San iti " , opy Approvedor Release 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 ? CONFIDENTIAL they have so far only sufficient guns to deploy six of the proposed total of eight guns on each site. In either case it is considered that the total number' of guns is 48 in each regiment. ? ? ,? ? In addition tb the P.V. 0.S. AA Divisions there area number of airfield defense AA-units manned by army personnel and ?consist-of both 85 mm and 37 or 57 min tAA guns, which- are thought to subordinate to , P.V.O.S. ? s ? ? y ? ? Field Army AA Artillery - . ? - , It is not believed that there are any AA divisions in the Field Army. There-may, however, be one or3more'HAA regiments consisting of 36 x 85 mm AA guns which are either GIs .1 or district troops. In addition each line division is thought to have an organic AA regiment. 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RnPRi_ninAwnrinonn., CONFIDENTIAL 26 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 This unit was originally picked up because of a few low-level report that an artillery division t existed in the Czech Army, -plus its relative geographical isolation and the proximity of type units which in combination formed a "Breakthru".division type pattern. In addition, all other:non-divisional and divisional type artillery-could be accounted for elsewhere,,thus_leaving in close proximity,only_these type units which ordinarily'compriser,a division, of this type. _Since then information confirming the existence of this unit has been received. It is believed to be directly'subordinate to GHQ and in the event of was its employment would depend on. the level of employment of other Czech units, i.e., if an entire Czech.,Army: were employed as such it would be iniplOYed'in a divisional?role-or if Czech units were not employed above division level its; elements would be employed, separately,, and the division head- quarters disolved.:, ' - 2. - - - - ',,) CC ..: N ?_ . A .t,'. 1: 1 .4 it- P.4 44 .,....0?7. I: 1 , mt.!. 0 4 ,...tif to 4 .: T. *: t.., ? _ 1 Immot/ ..4...-- .? ....- I i 1! ; UNIT i i, -.,.... ? ? t." .1 C .? .',.-- 4 : -- ;- I ' .4 ; 0 ', 1-' S iniwj :4-- ; 0 ? '....? U -.? - 5 Z ral u) .-- . ' LI _ "??? 4 a 0 N u) a g' U _ .. o I' .or N ro .. - r 1.4 2 ) i .5!:? i (..) 3 o tl. ?.:) i ?-? )u) - .. .6... r...., -z 'a t .,',"'' ' 4..) 1 -t,..... ? 17 , ? ; t _ -70 - 140 . 21 . ';' : ,? - -?... ?r ... t' ,i, : , 1 . . i ? - ow-B-ri 104834 93-8 41 -, - ..1 ,.., , - -12 ?--- 12----? -18- ? i ; - 834 834 ? ; ? __ , - ?? ? : .. ? ? . . . ? , . ? ? . : : t i , 3 , . ? . -, , 1- : ,. 1 .-. - ? ; ,_1,.. t Brigade . ? _ - ;, . 12 ' 'r ' ? ? .,'? , 36. , r, ? 24 ....01,27i01131,, 1 - ' ' ' .- ? It - _ ?, 1 i ;.ta :4,50 ., _ j22,3S% .ttb... ; ' ? ' e ' t 4 - ? , ' 4 , Svc .T attel M-B`ion- i3 d ea t Oq ?L. --: .-,i,., ? ......t......, '1 '., _ -.... ? TN 1 i ....,..... , 1...... 1 1 198 : r - :-TOTALL. -- 6274S08 -48, --i- , ---- -12 .-.L48 - :, 4-- -34 .-2-1 "-24?rd4-- 4 ? . . . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04- CIA RDP81 010 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 CONFIDENTIAL MD= AID um wirt.ssinacus, axriusar DITISIOI ? - Figure No. 10 MUSIC ? .0 0 0 NMI :UNIT-. .. a t' , TOTAL', , a Primary Wpn '_...1j57/76/85Gu -0 Trk ' ..% - k ,0 ??-) :. u) . 0 ? ' X -.0 ,jaos ,v) ' - U co -;!? IC Vans , -,v) .. - s I-Iq Btr_y., ? 29 60 89 - - 4 - ... 7, ' ? ,- ' Aity-Bii(41 . _ /1- 23 220 243 12 ..._ . 26 ,- , , , _ . _ ., .? .,, Svc..Sec _._ . -3-? ,65 :68 . 32 Maint!Plat-'____-'-=-, , ?14 - ?,,, _ giviilif--Plif -'::- 15 .15 " ' MUsic Sec' -15 16 Med.ica.1,-; , Platoon ;P' 2 '5 .. , . . ., ,- .., - . ,, , _ ....- -TOTAL 127 10541161 48 12 '166 12 ._ ._ ?,. ? , ? Figure No., CONFIDENTIAL ??- CONFIDENTIAL ROCKET LAUNCHER BRIGADE ARTILLERY DIVISION Figure No. 12 _ 4'. s , i UNIT , Officers 1 ,.... - f,x1 TOTAL S 200 RL ? 6 1: S 240,.RL, I s . (?;,- 0 ! ?Ern a 0 [ATG 0 , 0 IS Trks .- C Trks- - . , .... . ? Btr - - 29 -60 89 ------ ?.' , .--- ' ,..._-.? 20 ,?..Y,?-? ..,,,to? 1 ? 2i c 200 MM'RL;?Bn? 23-- 209 232 -1.2 -- -. ' f ? . RI...Bn0 23 209 232 ---- , --- -' 12: i ....., . ' 41-' .----- ? . :- ' t ,2.4nMM Sec 3- -65 -68 --`-? ? "' 32- , ,Svc ,.. - , .? Maiiit Sec 14 14 ... .- ... . ,-.... Support Plat 15 1 , , _. . , -4.. , , Sec 1 15 - . 16 ..?. ' - ? .... ,....?..- ,Music Medical Plattoox 2 5 7 ?, ........_ ...---,-...t., - . TOTAL ' 127 1010 1137 12 ' ' 36' -24' s 232 -- a, ?'F'igure' No. 13 _CONFIDENTIAL '30 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007 5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 31 CONFIDENTIAL MORTAR BRIGADE ARTILLERY DIVISION HQ 11 " 4-r Mort I ? ? ?svc I MINT A SOP ? ? ? ??,?1 larr Figure No. 14 U111/1 INN w UNIT z ., : I / " -, , 1. ,$-? _CI ... .: ', PI LTOTAL I ' r-- ' S 240 RL.1-: ..,.-.. ,-.1 ' 1:4 ? c,? 0. . ...., -' ...... ? 1.4 - H . ';._. -..:-..., ,..-,..-, i, ':, ;? . ' ,, 3 , - . ... f4 . , 4 ' , , H? Btr ? , 2960 -.1- ? 89-': ,. - , ;'? , _ 20 , , ' ? . 1.-?-?? 4 .? - i : . , ! - `.- ? , - - ? ' 240 MM Mort.Bn(3) 26 274 300 16' . 1 40, ? , )3n Hq- ?1 . ...1, .. i (14) (381(5k, , :: : (8)' ... , 240MM Mot Btry( . (3)j59)6) (4) " (.81 ,_,..,.?, , ., ..t. :: ,,,... .1.....,.i,.....,: Svc Sec ' ? ' ? 3, .--I,-- 65 - 68, ---i", ' ' -1 ,-, . 32 ? ? "? 3 ` ' ' ' ' - ' ", ' ''_:L , . .. :. * M-a-iiii'Plaf,----r----:' --;-4' f i '14 , '' i ? ' ?7 --- '--- r.. ----- , i 431)i Flit' ''.-- - ' --- 15 '15'. ........ : z Music-Sec-i? -,-- ---I '-15 -16 , - 1, ? ,,, Medi'd41 Platbon ''', -2 -5- i- ''-7.4. 1 IA ' - ?; -4'? : r- . '''.. ? ; 4 , , - T'OTAL ------ c.------..` 11.3 996f1t09 _ - "?:- '''''4 ' 188 '" t , - , - . . ,Figure No., 15 jCONFIDENTIAL e ? , ".?;t1;;;" , kFA, CONFIDENTIAL MOTORIZED RIFLE REGT tINE DIVISION LI 1 HQ Et1 CID MED ? s HQ TFC ? ? ?_? , SERVICE 4 ? ? ? icmatickil DEFENSE ; t t _ ? ? a ,?????=?????=1 IMPAIR 71/nrirr ,VERICLE REP1111 / 1 Csenh Rifle Regiitents-May-licit-heye a-full ?complement of Med Tics, ., although the_ pros snow,. of ' them is fairly well,. oOnfirmodw-!;.. - t, Cseeh Rifle-and Nees. Regiments apparently W.re-reported,1Y" equiPPWA' with 160 Morts rather than 1201s. 1 7 Figure'No. :16. t ; I ? ? .. .. ? 7. I ? , , ? , t? 1 , , ,- . !: ? i 1 -I 1.? i ? , i t`.7 : , s t ` , I " i ' , ;; : i. .. ;?.._..._?,, . r ':',. "??I... ,.2,,,-..- ..? --- -.',.. ? :CONFIDENTIAL 32 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 i!4 0 0 CONFIDENTIAL Z-Dcill. 0 Z-Dc:111 S I laoyi 28 0 I ? 4.zoyi ZEI S . 01"I'1 1 H S .1111 XI 0 .14 ILSS flciZ 0 fIcIZ S _ ? .. 941 J. S co ... ? N , . . . V 0 tn .. VV LS 0 -.? NY L 5 S 4.zow OZI 0 so .o ,- -- 4.zoinl OZ I S ..0 , . . .0 unD,s8 0 N .... N ... UnO 8 S 1111 Z 8 0 - 411 Z 8 S .0 . IN, ?-? ILOOVO 'HII LOI S -- - . ..-: ,04:1V 0 in N _ , 0 cilf S in N V '' ...I cc, O.InLl q ?P wV o0 . hu n11111 Iia. EU. PaIli S III ....ii cn . . ? 'I V.L 01. . a. V cr. es.1 rd CO til 0 V N NI 0. .1. N [-- I N a I? C? m cn m 0 ra. CO .-? N '-' ..-. ..-. in . IP M ... sioTmo ... --i W .0 - ,-. ...? .. N M In ?rt? ttr rnur CL v TOTAL 1172 - . . E-I I-1 Z ? s0.- ... t4 _ ?14 ii .4 U Z " +.. ?-? ;.. HE4C1)1(-)E 6) ?.S qg 0 4,? , g oxwbo v .4:1` Z (-) 0 u 7. 33 *CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL RIFLE BN MOTORIZE]; RIFLE REGT i"ol I HQ HQ ? ? ? A T 1 MG ? ? ? ? ? ? CONFIDENTIAL 34, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 35' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 CONFIDENTIAL Z-f1d2 0 , * - N S. ' Z-f1d2 S . `11. 0. ? ? 4 'XXI 0 N t el - ? - N ..-1 . 4 i ' 1e1 ? N s. N A .? ,t 1 .X4 I. S .. ???4 i ol . r . I I , ??????4 .4 ' N.-4 .,', r; DWI 0 as , I . . r , . as ? ? ,.,-, 4444.4 1 .. ????? .. _ . r v . I .. 1 011H 0 r v I ?I , e I . . I * I ' ' r VI DYIH 5/ .... 4, ... en I . ? - en. ....... 4.4 S. ...c...? 4 ; en ..... I I ; 7 I - - '.., Z - D d 11 0 I .c. ?, .... I 4 - 1 _.z7pclu s os ;7, _ : 40 .ir _ tlzow vii 0 ... . .. r r , , . 0 423^1 28 S . _ . .''' ; _ . . ,- ??;: el , II ?, Z8 0 c ,; ? c - ; - c , v , : S. Al I I 1 2111 28 S I I 1 . ? , 4 * 4 AI ? . ,LV LS 0 ? ,-. . ; - , . . ? . r , N ? I -.IX LS S ,.. _ z?-.' II * . 4 . * 4 I 9 dV. - - ...10 ? . ? .'" .4 .4 1 i _ 4 4.4, . ? ' A OC I V 'S4 . ? 4 v. 44 III . 71 ..... ; en . irt." - "IN ' . . ? in .ra .=TY,1,0,1.? P.' .4 .' ;14 ,r ""'" ...... r -4. '''' ....... 0 -?- ` a en ?'-' c?- rn ' co , v., 1 os. 't. ,._ , ? ' - . Yia ?.II (9, iS... ,N1 FI en ?-?" .74 ..44 ..r. ....I ert N i , tsj A , , , ?cc I ; -.?,. -, l? , . ?-? ? ? 4.. ?????. i 4.., E t?-? . Z 0 . - ? ,141 ? _. a o 0 ........ o ,4 ed 4) .-? el ..* . ,,0 . . el; rl 0 (14 w a a Au a -0 . t .,54 o 3 , ,4 0 - g i 41 ? 0 a . ..4,3 ?-; ? 4. co, Z 0 tr?4 0-1 CO5 ,, ? .,i. 1 til e. . 0 , , - -5: > V r r7:11,1 col 4 , 1 . ' -- li ' 44, 44 .01,4 a - 0 1 'tn "C1.1 :3 pi tn ,,,, , 1 ; 7: 44 El 0 ? _ CONFIDENTIAL' *4 44 0 44V '5 0 f/3 `kk) ;.? ? ? ? ? ? CONFIDENTIAL. REGIMENTAL ARTILLERY' - MOTORIZED RIFLE REGT PAEGTL RTY HQ lb 1- 1 IMORT I GUN 1 R:R ? ? ? ? HQ, Figure No. 20 ? ? - ; 1 ? .,?'? _444 . ? , , - , -- , -- - ? - - I -.-.- i I --?, (.4)::: UNIT , 1 ,,g 1.? ? , ,, i I : 44.I $.? 01 .0 - C-120 Mort E-6 .:1-< (4 . so ,_ to 1-4 .7.' 0. U) co 0 IS1O7 RR IO.:1'07 RR ' 1 --., r- .,...,Ln ! hi .',.., t 0 ;PEIj.1.,:7 - .. 1 o ..; _ ; IQ ........ / :1.:0:.? 1_,.:En--2 : A Ar H. k 7 11 , _ _.1.?17. - i ?? _. ,,.:1 , ; ! i ' , , : '' -- ortar-Btr ? , '?54 ' 42 -46 -6' 'r - ,- - -/- --.; -f-- 1 ,,, , ' 1 ' ? , "--' - ! ; - ? ,.., .4--. ---7 ------ ? - 3 39 42 -? - ? 6 i i ; , , -, , - "! , ,, - ; ? ., i Qun.Btrv?-- Btrv 3 34 37 ' .. .? ' ??, '-- -; . .?;?"---. ..; ";-"z- 1. - :: ,- " 6 -----: , AB . ? .1-.`... AAA Bn ...- _ -.4' 11 ,, 1.? 73 .. ..1 84, -.,!,.. ,, .3 .?.), , , , ??'t . ., , i -A` .' .,, .. ? , l' 14 ?S; ,,!, ? .. :: , 1 , -10 t ,,,,_? ,1 = -----*.:------;,------ ' Ha --- (31 ---'. :-., (71 ---?'.? '. 4 ---.'? '. --'3.? -'.- - . ---- '? ..-3- -? f -- ?-..? f".4?- . - 4 .--;, - 4-.= -, i..7, ., , . ? ,.- (2) :2;4,', ; . . Dn ; Btrv ,(41 (471 (51;? I,. f ,". - --.1 ???- (41 i r. .' 1 ..... ? ; 1 .. 1? .. (41 tr?,... A ftA 4.A MG Bti-V- 4(41 (4) (t (22A - ' i (26;." ''''. ''): - ' '!'. : - - ' i'''' - - ".; -I" L.k.- -1. `i-..1. , ..' s 4,---' -7- (4) '. 4-7,-; ' ' :::).-. 11 -5 (4) $=?11.- ' f Plat 1 1 21 24 .*" ' -- _ 1 . 1 ' , - ? : - . '..? .1 ?,- ' i : :- ? a .,..,.: ,, - , 4 1 ?iffnal "'."'-?7 - - -5- f - - - - i 7 t -:,.3, , ""- ,, -------,- ,,, ;. ., ,.? --- ,,..- ? :- , i --)- ? - -rw. I, . - .7 1, " 1- : ?, ,.. , . ? .7 ..._.?... _ . ..,., - TOTAL 1 .-..-.. .?._,. 26i, , 216 242-; e, i 6', 19 .6, i . . ; ; ? c?i ?-? 1"--..-'-?--Bali-85;an'i-d71-90-trn1;----kiG'un-s- have-also-been-reported ityCsec,, s. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007 9 Figure No. 21 ' CONFIDENTIAL') 37 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co .y Ap roved for Release ?50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 CONFIDENTIAL 111011111 TAU REM', LINZ DIVISION 'U III ? ?? TFC REG ? ? , Figure No. 22 0 ? SVCS 0 ? MUSIC ? ? ? WIPM N . U,..-,1s1 I' ",r :6- ; -; , k ..9. '??-? ..-- 11-1:-)TAL S Med Tk 1C:Cied Tk S Kmith Tk .e E. X .1 ,L) - u p -W. ,,..; L.) ,,_,.54E. 'to [I- [IC Tk Retr N h tr; ---,, ...tsi '' rq ul, ,1'.1 U IS ZPU 2-4 N ,..t4 U 1211=_Vehicles 1CVehicles A lkeit %? , C (2) - FirC(31 ' ' 24' ., IA% ,T. i5% 31.01 .. : ? ; ,T'arik SU Co . 15 138 .43 Ron Co - 3 :. ? 35 38 ? , _ 13:try 3 41 44 1 . , d,AA 6.!-.- ??.,- -4- Tfc Rea Platl ,' i 3..8 '-r- c_-- -39 .- . 7...;::, .:.... . Sig?CO' 1 .1'3 41 -44 . .? ,. -- ?' ? _ . - . Mt Co' 55 49 ' 53" ,. Arty de Tk . ? . ? _ Medical i ,?;,, Sigliga s .-.. F. ' . ???T:9-2?.?????': ..--.--- Music' Sec 1" ' -16 1:7' ' ' , 1 _ ? .. : ',',. Sariper'Plat '1-- '14 15' ..-- , '' ID ' - .:. 132 799 4,31 ,44 62 5. ? Figure No. 23 ? -; CONFIDENTIAL ? .) CONFIDENTIAL *NUNN TAU IATTAIICe. 10DINK TANK MAIM ? ? ? 1=1 Figure No. 24 -. - I I- I ??-? r UNIT Officers W TOTAL S Med Tk C Med Tk S Trucks Trucks k g X Ea rn IC Tk Retr Bn H? 9 16 , 25 1 1 1 ' Comd Grn (9) (9) ? I .I Hq Plat 41 (12) 4 I (12) .. I V ...,-. Hq Tk (4). ' , ? , . - ....... . 4 Tank Co 3 ? .14) 3 . 4 10 ? 10 ... 1 Co Hq (a) (1) - Tk Plat (1) (11) (12) (3) (3) : , . . ..? Tank Repair Shon ? (5) , 15) ' ??'. , . 2 , . 2 , TOTAL 27 133 , 160 31 , 31 3 3 1.? -_, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co.y Ap?roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04- CIA RDP81 01043R00280014nnn7 Figure No. 25 CONFIDENTIAL , 38 ) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 _CONFIDENTIAL HEAVY TANK REGIMENT, TANK DIVISION HQ 0 ? ? Figure No. 26 I. ? . - ? -..... ..? ,_ UNIT ' * . ...... . - ? Officers ' , - JTOTAL S Hv Tit 1 C IvTk [ VL S ......,c. U . 0 1 S Trucks , . ,?... ' 1--- --- - ? Hqs Plat ' . ?-- 5 26 -63- ' - 1 - . .. - --? ------1 '' ? Hy`TIEB;ri' (3) - 24 ' 15- 139.. 31 .? ' _ ' 4 4 - ... Recon?Plat. --- ? .--) - - 22 24 ? ' ..... . -,- ,.. ? I ',5 ., - - 1, - .. ? AA p ompany" ' '4 ' 51-? , A 55 ? - . .4. , ? . Services .-----,'---- , -14- ? 268' 282 TOTALS '-----' 127- 774841', ' 94- -'6-- 9 . - 97 -.. - 39 r Figure. No. 27 CONFIDENTIAL Elks) ? ? CONFIDENTIAL IHQ I 1 IHQ 1 ? ? ? 1-1 ,3 Its each. . 7 I I. 1 UNIT, I VI $4 'V U - 'TOTAL 1 ?S Hv-Tks C Hv Tks S Trks Trks ..- ,. Hia & Hq Plat _ . 9 , . 16 25 1 .- 11 ? - , , .1-Ivy Tli Co (3) -- '5 '38. 43 10 10 , 3 , Plat-- 1 34 34 ? . ,Svc : - ? 124' ' - - - , ' _ . TOTAL 26 11'6, 212 31 31 4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 Figure No. 29 CONFIDENTIAL -1 40 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 CONFIDENTIAL ARTILLERY RIOT - TAU DIVISION Ill ? HQ ? Ill ? HQ 122 ma Now 152 ma How ?ARTY CNTL SURV Figure No. 30 svc .--- t _ .... I I / . UNIT ,1 Officers ? kl TOTAL O N -. co , O N 0u ' _C 122 How S 100 Gun C 100 Gun S 76 ATG C 76 ATG S D7 ATG C 57 ATG _S APC U U S Trk .. U 0 to 1 A Arty Regt1 Hcl 19 44 636 _ r , 100 rnm Cinn fin..?,Z3 32 255 18 ._ . 28 3 IN Btry (8) (16) (24) -. . (4), _ , pun Btry (3 (5) (72) 232 (77)_ 255 , (6) 1 (5)i 28 (1)1 HowBn(Z)23 ,12,2nun 154mm How Bn 2:3 232 255 18 ?18 28 aurvey Platoon 1 231 24 ?-. ... 3I , i Sional Coi-Floa.ny '5 57" 62 - 4 peirvice -C Elm -3 61..' 64 32 , - Arty Cntl Btrv 4 51 r 155 Ptedical Oat 2 5 74 ? ? ' 126 1691295 18 36 , 18 141 .. ,TOTAL , :..-Figure 41 CONFIDENTIAL ? CONFIDENTIAL MOTORIZED DIT ARTY X X 1 Ilim???=???1?????? HQ ARTY CNTL H RCN WIRE 08TR MRTR Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 Figure No. 32 CONFIDENTIAL 42 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 CONFIDENTIAL MOTORIZED DIVISION ARTILLERY , . UNIT _ el N. C ' 41 - 1-1 S pc Art PC C u) 0 u 4 , E-1 ul C Trks S Radar C Radar i Div Arty Ha 8 .. 19 27 4 6.rty-1/ rgt 121 9 Et Ji Q1 897 54 9 4 139 HqicHq Platoon (20) (45) (65) ... (9) .4.4? ?? : Platoon R (21) (22) (5)4 . purvey ... 5unrav Platoon , 4 , (9) , " - - . ? . .(1414(14), 7 Vehicle Repair - - - (2) - (18) 20 , 17 Arty Repaii Shop - m (111,112) (15)(16)(8) 4_ 4 , (7)4 ? ?vc Platoon in . ... . A Bn 3 , 23 224 247) 41 (18) (18) (3) . rs.. .... (28) ;Arty Cntl-Btry . 62 67 _ 9 -.. Btrv Hqs (1) 1 (4) 9) (5) (10) , A (1)? (1) . , Telephone Sec ! ? I I: ? ? 6 17 Computation g 0 r i? 4 AN n 131 ' Counter Morta- _?Section .. (1)_,111)112). ,,,(3) ? , , ? S . (1 TOTAL 205 16831888 108 _ .. 18 ?1 291 1 .I ....... ...? r ? Figure No; 33 CONFIDENTIAL ? CONFIDENTIAL mumanr BATTERY LINE DIVISION ADVILIZIT ? ? ? ? ? ? GUN Figure No. 34 GUN ; C Trks 11-U lr & I N 1 . .?!?_, ... - ...., UNIT .. , Officers 41 TOTAL. ::14 ...T. d ; ' E'0 k cA I ?, -14 ? - 5 a k U I.S Trks 1 r . Battery Hq ' ? ' 2 , , 2 , 4' . . Hq plitoon. l.. ._ .18 , - --. 19_ - ' 2. -, ? - 1 ,.. ' 1 . ,. . .... _?,, .. GUN Platoon - - .... 2 , II .. 1? 28 2? e. .:,.....0 --,-..? ,- -- ..---_---?-, Platoon Hq -- -. ., ., = (1) t ,_.?...?__.... (1) :(2)i ......--,:.....;... - .. .,..,.. .......,..*P..' ..7.:-....2,:-LI-, 3 ,_-..., ?-, GUN Sec (3) : .., --..,--77.: t. ? ?, .7.., :-._:-::::.-., (9)' 17,..--::,:: (1)- ',;',:.:::.':.,7,7,.. " '-''''' (1) _ TOTAL , 5 ? 72 77 6 .._ -.?,-...-- - !: 8 1 1k 1 11. A 0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 Figure No.35 ceit4OIDENtAL 44 ii Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 CONFIDENTIAL ASSAULT GUN BN, TANK DIVISION It HQ 41, HQ Figure No. 36 SVC 3 JSU ea k w i .., -- ? , , UNIT . 4 k C.) ,4-1 oz , t???1 44 0 N N .'4 6 in u.1 C JSU 122 0 cn E U. S Trki ,C Trks , '-Ha lk Ho -Platoon ? 9 16. 25 . , 1 . , . (3) Asiault Gun cl ' 5 48 53 , 10- 10 ' 1 I SVC Platoon : ' i ` 1 '31 -32- -..' _ ... 6 4, , TOTAL - ? 25.- 191 ii 216 ?30' 30; ' ? i 8 '. A ' k ' 45 , This unithas.been reported in' the Czech 5th Moidrized Rifle Division and JSU, 152ts have been reported-as organic to it. This may indicate a conversion-to a tank divisionas well as a.differeuce in Czech TOE. .. . ? , . . - Figure No. 37 CONFIDENTIAL J CONFIDENTIAL ANTIAIRCRAFT REGIMENT - LINE DIVISION HIQ 1 1 ? ? ? HQI 57 MK ? ? ? MT ? ? ? 1SUPPLY Figure No. 38 ORD I AIN'T SHOP ? ? UNIT Officers I fll 0 E4 CIi .tc c c ce co 0 crA 0 In 0 K N a E._4 IC Tric' a Rezimental Hg 23 9 32 HQ Plato(); 35 36 , 100mm AA Btrir (Z ,1, 5 2 77 57mm AA Btrv (4 5 6 65 , 6 6 1 2 1 ' , Mt Platoon '1 20 21 - 16 .. Supply Platoon 1 17 18 Ord Maint' Shot) 115 16 _ Medical Sec 1 6 24 6 12 P Z 55 .. TOTAL 58 t86 544 , 12 12 24 , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 Figure No. 39 CONFIDENTIAL 46 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 CONFIDENTIAL ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY - LINE .DIVISION AA REGIMENT HQ RAW HQ Figure No. 40 ? ? _ - UNIT ? , Officers - tx.1 -El El 0 N . ci) .0 AN. U a, co cli U co C PUAZO ,g co ,C Son ? - a.) 0 S Trk . - k U - . .. Battery Hq . 2 ,3 5 , 1 . ? r 1 , _ . ..... Radar Platoor 1 11 12 , ? - , 1 1- 1 - 3 .. . .- , - ....... _,. ; - .-__. Platoon Hg - -- (1) (2)' (3)-. ... . (2) IM.iifSe (3)' -- (7) (7) ??..---.-- (1) '-' ? . .. TOTAL '.5. 60 65 -6 , 1 ,.,_ _ 1 ., 1 - 1, ,14 :." ? Figure No. 41, .=CONFIDENTIAL ????? ? ? ? HQ CONFIDENTIAL ROOKER IAA/DOER BR, TX DIV ? ? .1. ? ? Figure No. 42 ? ? SVC t. I. UNIT a v U ... . ... OW I I- 11 11 TOTAL S 240 RI, a c- o ;.._ RS Trks II G TrIcs II S LMG 0 a , 0 -1 , BN HQ 11 ft- 8. 19 i 1 Rid Btrv (3) 3 36 3 9 4* 6 I 2 Btry HQ .. (L) (4) .- (5) -. . Sig Sec (4)' (4) - R Spr --. 8 1 en Sig Platoon 18 ?_1} 18.- ..._ 2 , . . MT Platoon 1 , 40 41 14 Maint Platoon 1 13 14 3 . Svc Section 9 9 ? 1 a Aid Section 1 5 6 _I 2 TOTAL _ 23 A209 232 12 _ 41 _ 6 _ _ * May be 3 batteries of 6 RLis each. Cannot au s an . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 Figure No. 43 -CONFIDENTIAL .48 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 49 HQ CONFIDENTIAL ROCKET WENCHER DN, MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION HQ ? ? 0 Imer La-;- IL LL- ? ? ? ? ? 'MAINT Figure No. 44 ? ? ? ? ? SVC UNIT 1 Officers 1 ... W TOTAL 1 S 140 RL I 4 c4 C'. U I S Trks C Trks 0 .1 in 1 C LMG I Battalion Hq 11 8 19 ,RICT Btrv (31 3 52 55 6 6 6 2 , Btry Fin _ (1) (4 (5) RKT Plat (2) (1) (22) (23) (3) (3) (3) (1) Signal Sec (4) (4) , Rcn Sec, 8 8 1 Signal Plat 18 18 , 2 .. Mt Platoon 1 40 41 - 14 Maint Platoon 1 13 14 3 1 Svc Sec .. O .4 1 , Aid Sta 1 5 6 ... 2 , ? , . . ? TOTAL 23 257 280 _ 18 _ 18 ' 41 2 Figure Na. 45 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL SAPPER BATTALION, LINE DIVISION 1=1 1 75 EM 1 1TECH 1 (c) 60 EK (C) 4 Off (0) 75 111 48 IMP Sec (0) 60 - 70 1 Crane 1 Power Boat (C) 6 1 Amphibious Track 6 Tracked Anphib 2 Bull Dozers 9 BTR 1621s 1 Dry Gap Bridge (0) 65 Trks Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 Figure No. 46 CONFIDENTIAL TRANS 50 HQ I ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5 CONFIDENTIAL RECON BATTALION -- LI1EC DIVISIONS I MTCL I - Figure No. 47 Sr ? SVC 1 4 - 7 UNIT ., , . ? (.4 ITOTAL FS Med Tks C Med Tks Amphb Tks C Amphb Tks a.