CHRONOLOGY OF STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE BERLIN CRISIS FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 25, 1959, TO AUGUST 8, 1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R003800020005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 175
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 10, 2014
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 31, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

STAT
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?
BUREAU Of INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH
--srfrrLza,t?tdcifl!
Intelligence Information Brief
? IIB-114.6
CHRONOLOGY OF STATFM:TS AND DOCUMUS CONCERNING THE
BERLIN CRISIS FOR THE PERIOD ME 25, 1959, TO AUGUST 8, 1959
Prepared by
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
August 311 1959
THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND NOT A. STATEMENT, _OF DEPARTMENT
---435(42)Zil!CF(RN

This is a continuation of tho series of chronologies
covering the Berlin crisis. With this number, the series will
be interripted pending further developments. Previ'-un publien-
tions in this series were:
IIB-42 October 24, 1958 - November 30, 1958
IIB-58 December 1, 1958 - December 18, 1):d8
IIB-100 December 19, 1958 - February 1A, 1059
IIB-100S (supplement to IIB-1C0)
IIB-114.1 February 12, 1959 ? March 25, 1950
IIB-114.2 March 25, 1959 - Aril 21 1959
IIB-114.3 April 22, 1959 - May 11, 1959
II3-114.4 May 11, 1.959 - May 2(), 1959
IIB-114.5 May 27, 1959 - June 24, 1959
NCF CR :4
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This document contains summaries, excerpts and texts of
the more important statements made by leaders in the West and
In tho Soviet Union and vast Germany, regarding the Berlin
crisis, for the period Juno 25, 1959 to August 8, 1959. (There
are also a few items predating June 25 which did not anpear in
IIB-114.5 of July 6, 1959).
During these six weeks, the principal events were the
visit of Soviet First Deputy Premier Kozlov to the US, the re-
convening of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers on
July 13, the visit of Vice President Nixon to the USSR and
Pol9nd, and the invitation of President 7,isonhower to Premier
Khrushchov to visit the US which was announced on August 3.
qhe raising of the level of discussions to the top
governmental echelons overshadowed both the Berlin crisis and
the negotiations at Geneva on Berlin by the Foreign Ministers.
However, there was no essential change in the positions of the
'entern i1 lion or the USSR on Berlin by the tire the Geneva
('.inference recessed indefinitely on August 5, to be resumed at
such time as may be arranged through diplomatic channels.
Tho Western Powers, while willing to reach an interim
agreement on Berlin which would preserve their rights and the
freedom of West Berlin, insisted that there could be no final
solution of the Berlin problem short of German reunification
for which the Four Powers are rosnonsible.
The USSR retained its attitude that reunification was a
matter for tho Germans alone. The Soviets maintained that the
Berlin problem should be resolved by completing the end of the
occupntion status in Germany, terminating the last vestiges of
the occupation which exist only in Berlin, agreeing on a new
status, preferable a "free city" status for West Berlin, and
beginning work on a peace treaty.
Those incompatiblo positions nrecluded agreement. Even
the points on which a modus vivendi in Berlin could be based,
as discussed at length from nay 29 - June 19, were only rehashed.
Agreement could not be reached since neither side was willing to
prejudice its larger policy on Germany as a whole by making
concessions in Berlin which might jeopardize its ability to
hold its security Position in .!est or 'est Germany.
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The Geneva recess was received with Renern1 relief by
both sides as well as other nations which were not cltrect
participants in the Conference. It seemed that a ennr,erus
situation had been shoved under the rug, temnornrily at least,
by simply shifting discussions to a higher level which would
consider the broader sphere of global policies.
The organization and material in this 113 follows te
same pattern as previous numbers in this series. Since ver-
batim texts of the restricted Geneva sessions hay-' )1eon cloon-
ly held for security reasons, texts of the oemi-wor.kly
sunnaries to the North Atlantic Council have tenn Lsrsd
reproduce the sessions in a uniforn -Antler.
tr)
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S7CRET/NOFTRY
TADIF CF CONTFnIa
FART ONE
STATFI EMS AID DOCUREIITS FM! 5011 YET BLOC SrIURC7r)
Pare
June 23 : Excerpts from "Life " Article by Averell Harriman on
Interview with Khrushchev 2
June 25 Embassy Moscow's Renort on?Harriman-Khrushchav-ThorrDon
Conversation 5
June 26 Soviet Note to US on Gerran Presieential 7lection in Berlin 8
June 27 : Embassy Moscow's Report of Soviet Reaction to Hertor's
Speech 9
June 28 Statement by Foreign Minister Gramyko on Germany . . ? ? 4 10
June 28 : US Mission Berlin's Peport of Soviet Radio Attack on
Allied Forces . ...... . . 23
June 29 : GDR Note to US on German Prosieential 71ectIon in Berlin ^ 24
July 1 Report of Soviet Deputy Premier Kozlovts Talk with
Secretary Herter ? 25
July 2 Report of Conversation between German Ambassador Kroll and
Soviet Deputy Foreign Finister Zorin . .
July 2 Excerpts from Speech by Soviet Deputy Premier Kozlov . ? 28
July 3 East Berlin Press Comment on GerMan Presieential 1.octian 36
July 7 East German Editorial on Pesumption of Geneva Conference 37
July 9 US Mission Berlin's Report of -7tast German Position on
Geneva Conference 38
July 10 : Further East Berlin Press Comment on German Presidential
Election . .1 0
July 17 : Excerpts from Speech by Khrushchev in Stettin
July 23 : Excerpts-from Joint Deelnration Issued at 7nd of un...AI ?
D616d.Lion#u ViJit to roiand 44
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TABLE OF CONTEPTS
TABLE CF CONTErTS
? PART ONE (Continued)
POT Td0 (Continued)
?
Page
rsslr-'11
July 24 :
GDR Press Treatment of tle Geneva Conference ..
49
June
26
Ambassador Houghton's Report of Conversation with
July 29 :
,
GDR Prose Attack? on HEsnionagell in Berlin
49
Laloy at French Foreign Office
June
26
:
West German Defense rinister Strauss' Press Interview
'71
July 29 :
East Berlin Press Treatment of the Geneva Conference . . .
49
July
1
US Reply to Soviet rote on Gorman Presidential -lecticn
0,1
I.
July 31 :
Eant Berlin Press Treatment of the Geneva Conference . . .
50
July
'1
Excerpts from President 7isenhoeer's Press Cenference
73
July 28 :
Excerpte from Khrushe:lev's Speech at Dnepropetrovsk . . .
51
July
West German Note to USSR in Penly to Soviet roto of
July 29 :
U3 Mission Berlin's Report of GDR Statements on Peace
June 27 on Presidential Election .......
75.
Treaty
54
July
6
:
US Representative's Comment on July 6 rAc Meeting
76
July 31 :
Further Tenort of GDR Stntements on Peace Treaty
56
July
'6
US Representative's Report of Discussion in nkc
76
August 1 :
Ambassador Thomnooni's Report or Kuznetsov Remark
57
July
7
Ambassador Thompson's Report of Kroll-Zorin Ccnverrafiens
August 1 :
Ambassador Thompson's 74-Tort of Khrushche-...Nixon Talks
57
July
7
:
Ambassador Bruce's Peport of Conversation with
August 3 :
East Berlin Press ''reatment of the Geneva Conference . *
58
von Brentano
August 4 :
East Berlin Press Treatment of the Geneva Conference and
July
7
:
US Mission Berlin's Report of Brandt Telegrnm
Eisonhower-Khrunhchev Visits .?
58
to von Brentano
P3
August 6 :
East Berlin Press Treatment of the Geneva Conference . ? ?
58
July
8
:
Excerpts from President Eisenhower's Press Conference
? ?
. .
August 5 :
Excerpts from Reports of Khrushchev's Press Conference ? C
59
July
8
:
British House of Commons Foreign Policy Debate
8;
? ?
August 5 :
Ulbricht Reviews Geneva Conference Results
61
July
9
Excerpts from Secretary Porter's Press Conference ? ?
July
'9'
:
Ambassador Thompson's Comments on Resumption of
Geneva Conference
1 r()
PART 11.10
July
9
Embassy Paris' Febort of French Foreign Office's
STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS FRCM WESTERN SOURCES
Comments on Future of Genova Conference
Page
July
9
US Mission Berlin's Report of 1%ayor Brandt's Views . . .
Juno 25 :
West Berlin Mayor Brandt's Statement to Berlin
?
House of Representatives
65
July
9
Embassy Bonn's Report of German Opinion
I CI.
JUno :
Embassy Bonn's Summary of West German Foreign Minister von
July
10
Erhardrn Proposals for Economic Measures Against
Brontano's Report on Geneva to Bundestag Committee . .
67
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART TWO (Continued)
Page
July 11 : West Gorman Position Papers for resumption of
Geneva Conference 110
July 12 : Excerpts from General Maxwell D. Taylor's Interview
on "Meet the Press" 114
July
July
July
July
July
July
July
12 : Summary of Article by Lord Montgomery 116
12 Excerpts from Averell Harriman's Television Interview . 117
12 : Emtasey Tordon's Report of British Opinion 118
12 : 'iecrotary Herter's Report of Western Ministers'
Discussion at Couve de Murville's Dinner for Pella 121
13 US Delegation's Report of Western Foreign MinisterslMeeting122
: US Mission Berlin's Report of Brandt's Letter and
Memorandum to von Brentano 124
14 : Embassy London's Report of British Foreign Office's
Comment on Alleged USSR Assurances to UK 127
July 14 : U5 Delogetion's Report of Wester., Foreign
Ministers' Meeting 128
July 15 : Excerpts from President Eisenhower's Press Conference . ? 129
July 16 : rcCloy's Repori, of Talk with Chancellor Adenauer ? ? . ? 131
July 16 : Ambassador Whitney's Report of British Conservative
Opinion 131
July 17 : US Delegation's Report of Western Foreign
Ministers' Discussion 132
July lr', - Reformulated Statement of West German Policy at Geneva ? 133
July 20 Summary of Mayor Brandt's Press Conference . . ? ? ? ? ? 138
July 21 Report by Marvin L. Arrowsmith (AP) of President
Eisonhower's Dinner with the Press -14
July 21 : Ug-Dolcgation's Report of Couve de Murvi1le16-Lbratnte
on a Possible Western Summit Meeting 142
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TABLE CF CONTEMS.
PART TWO (Continued)
July 22 US Mission Berlin's Report on West Berlin reaction to
President -isefihower's "Background" Conversation 143
rare
. 144
July 22 Excerpts from President Eisenhower's Press Conference ? .
July 22 : US Mission Berlin's Report on West Berlin 1ornle
July 22 : *Discussion in MAC Meeting of Geneva Conference 1/q
July 22 : US Mission Berlin's Report of Berlin Soma 7lows
July 24 : Embassy London's Report of Foreign Office View.,
July 24 : Secretary Herter's Report of Western Foreign !!instees'
Meeting
July 25 : Secretary Herter's Statement at Berlin rathaus Ceremony . .
July 25 : Excerpts from Mayor Brandt's Speech during Secretery
Herter's Visit to Berlin
July 27 : US Mission Berlin's report of Berlin Peaction to
Secretary Herter's Visit
0.?
July 25 NY Times Report of Secretary Herter's Trip to Berlin ? ? 1%c
July 31) : US Delegation's Report of Herter-Brandt-von Brentano
Conversation
August 2 : Report for Vice-President on Plans for a Western St:emit
August 4 : Berlin Senat's Four Principles for Negotiations on Berlin . 163
August 3 : US Statement on Exchange of Visits between Khrushchev
and President Eisenhower 164
August 1 : US Mission Berlin's Report of Conversation with :,enator
Klein on Brandt's Trip to Geneva
August 4 : Ambassador Matthews' Report of Conversation with
- . Austrian Foreign.Minister Kreisky
161
? 163
August 5
165
46
Excerpts from Secretary Herter's Background Press
Gym erenuts L11.C1of CenevaCcr('-r-4.4-1-m ? 167
? ? ?
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TABLE CF CeritrrS
PART FOUR (Continued) ?
Parn
June
30
: US Mission Berlin's Renort of Autobahn .31:,wCnyns .....
;14
Jay
2
: Letter.from General P.arlett in Penly to Juno 26 7.etter of
Korol and US Mission Berlin's Gm-onts
July
8
: fetter of Protest from Colonel Korol to General P.rIrlet.t
(July 7). nnd US Fission Berlin's Co.r,,nts
July
12
: F.ast German Press Report of U5 Soldier 34'inc: GET.
July
25
tette:. to General '.[orontsov e US :r?Icier
GDR Asylum ? ? ? ? ?
. .
July
21
: U 1:ission Berlin's Fenort of 7nst Gorznn l'cardinc of
US Military Train I ?
July
22
: Letter of Protest from General Ihraett Train incic!,nt
and US Mission Berlin's Comments
July
28
: US Mission Berlin's Eeport of US Governrent
Accepting GDR Visa
-
July*
*
:* Letter of Protest from General Wleman to Snviet,
Commander Earshal Zakharov ? ? .
July
31
: Letter from Colonel Korol in Peply to July 22 Letter frcm
General Hamlett
I
37,cIET/Naimil
? TABLE m C0V11WTS ?
FART TOO (Continued)
August 8 : Wnst German Statement at Cldse of Geneva Conference
and .:mbarisy Bonn*s Comments
Aurust 7:
June
22
4
Juno
26
:
Juno
29
:
'lost German Foreign Minister von Brentanols Comment
on the Geneva Conference
PART T PZE
ib?ba
LT'JJ :ss Criva ',Ern RY
,Page
172
174
Pace
Belgi]an Press:
British Press:
JulY 28 ***** ? ? ? ? ? ?
June 30, July 22, 28, August 6
176
177
French Press;
July 9, 21
183,,
German Press;
June 26, 29, July 9, 10, 13, 15, 16,
20,
?
23, 24, 27, 31, August 4, 5
185
West Berlin Press; June 26, 30, July 3, 11,
14,
21, 22, 23, 25-26, August 1, 2,
10, -
July 29, 31, August 3, 6
196
Swiss Press;
July. 22p 30, August 5, 6
208
?
PART FOUR
REPORT OF THCIDPATS RELATING TO BERLIN
Letter of Protest from General liamlett.to Soviet
General Zakharov
'Letter from Acting Soviet Commandant Korol in Reply to
June 22 Letter from General Hamlett
AWOL US Soldier Seeks Asylum in GDR-. . * ?
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212
213
PART FIVE
REPORTS AND 74C7aPTS OF Fr.CC71Y1rOS
AT TIE G"TF,VA Fr.7:7IGN cn-F -"C.'''.
June
17
:
NkC Meeting on the Geneva Foreicn Ministers' Conference
June
22
:
Report to MC on Geneva Conference by Couve
? ? ?
?
?
21n
June
22
:
Statement of Italian Representative to mc
211
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TAMA OF comurs
? ? TABLE OF.COrTENTS
ART FIVE (Continued)
Pave
POT FIV7 (Continued)
235
July 13 :U
Delegation Summary of 19th Plenary Session
July
28
: of Western Foreign Xinistero on Agreed !rlrer
r:
.fuly 13 :
Statement by Secretary Herter at 19th Plenary Session . . . .
238
.Pegervations
July
28
: Paper Proposed by Soviet Delegation
July 13 :
Statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko at 19th Plenary
Sesoion
243 July
28
: US Delegation Summary of Fast and 'lest Positions ? ? " ? ?
TP"
July 13 :
report by Secretary Herter of Luncheon Talks with
July
29
: UK Delegation Penort to rAC of Ferter-Gromyo Gn:Iv.sr5ntion
111
Harmarskjold
255
July
30
: UK Delegation report to "AC of Private rceting
jrly 1r,
US Delegation'Summarrof 20th Plenary Session
256
July
31
: UK Delegation Report to !AC of Private Vacating,'
11
Tin Delegation Surrnry of 21st Plenary Session
257
July
30
: US Delegation Cornents on Soviet Fronosal of july 2r
;lc
July lA :
Statement by Secretary Herter at 21st Plenary Session .
260
August
1
: Report to MC of Private Y.ecting betyeen Flrtr.r
j.uly 2n :
UK Delegation Peport to PAC of Private fleeting
266
and Gromyko
1
July 20
US Delegation Summary of 22nd Plenary Session
?
266 August
3
: Report of NAG of Private ieeting between Gromyko
and Lloyd
July 20 :
Statement by Secretary Herter at 22nd Plenary Session ? ? ? ?
268
August
5
: Statement by Secretary Herter at 25th Plenary .1;enn1on .
11)
July 20 :
Statement by Foreign Secretary Lloyd at 22nd Plenary Session
273
August
5
: Communique Issued at Close of Geneva Foreign
July 21 :
report to nric of Private Meeting
279
Ministers Conference
July 22 :
U5 Delegation Surmary of 23rd Plenary Sossion
280
July 22 :
Staterent of Foreign Minister 'Gromyko at 23rd Plenary
Session
281
July 22 :
Statement of Secretary Herter at 23rd Plenary Session . . ?
289
July 23 :
US Delegation Surrary of 24th Plenary Session
291
? July 23 :
Statement by Secretary Herter at 24th Plenary Session ? ? ?
295
? July 24 :
Peport to NAC of Private Meeting
300
july.27
Feport to ntic of Private Meeting . ? ? ,
302
July 28 :
qn4
Western Delegatlons
Agreed raner Prorosed by
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FART 0:72,
STAMI:VriS A?) DOCUI?S'r?il.'S Frn: SOVI7e 13I,C)C,
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June
23
.(Unclassified)
(Article in
July 13
.issue)
SECRETACFCR:1
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xcernts from "We" Article by Averell Harriman on Interviaw .
with Khrushchev: As a private person with no official status,
I was careful to avoid raising any =rent dip.lomatio issues.
But Khrushchev insisted on giving me his views in detail, n-t
only on Berlin and Gorman reunification but on all other out-
standing international problems from the Midd.lo 'at to
Formosa.
The state of war with the Germans, he said, wns an annchronimr
and must be terminated. The Western Powers, he clai7ed, had
recognized the West German Federal republic in confreventirn
of wartime agreements. If we would not agree to a e:Atlerent
in Berlin, he would act unilaterally and would torrInate our
rights himself.
"Your generals," he said, "talk of maintnininr, your Ionitinn
in Berlin with force. That is bluff." rhrushchov anoke with
anvy emphasis. "If you send in tanks, they will turn end
make no mistake about it. If yen want war, you can hve it,
but remember it will be your war. our rockets will fly nut-
matically," he added, and his collenguns around the table
chorused the word "automatically."
I exclaimed that his attitude not only was dsngerons but re-
vealed a deep ignorance of the American position. Desoitr,
their other differences, the Fepublican and Democratic parties
were united behind President 7isenhower in his C.ntlrminntinn
to defend the two million West Berliners.
Khrushchev retorted that he was aware that the leaders of bot;1
parties in America sunported -isenhower. Put, ho raId, the
workers did not. His repeated references to the American
"working class" which, he maintained, had no voice in political
affairs illustrates only one of the many nisconcuptions the
Russian premier entertains concerning the United States.
?
Then Khrushchev assume a loss threatening air. ",c, are pre-
pared to give you evely reasonable guarantee that, the reople
of !lest Berlin can retain whatever structurm they desire. Ye
are prepared to have these guarantees snnervised either by one
or more neutral countries or by the United !btions," he vaid.
His arguments did not convince me that his nrcrosals rrovided
adequate safeguards against West Berlins eventual absorptIon
by Eastern Germany.
The Soviet Union, he went on, has no desire to take over West
Berlin. "What are a more two million pearl() to 115 Yltn
bloc of 900 million?" ho asked contemptuously. If the aoviet
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- 3 -
Juno (Cont.) Union were to take over West Berlin, it would only have to
23 feed the people. "We prefer to let you feed them," he said.
(Unclassified)
Ac for the Western troops in Berlin, he said he was ready to
let them stay for a short time, even though he could not under-
stand why we wanted to keep them there. "In the event of
fighting they would be swallowed up in a single gulp." But
he insisted that he would not agree to have any more Western
troops enter Berlin, and those that are there must leave
eventually. "These days of the occupation," he said "are
gone forever."
Turning to the problem of Germany as a whole, Khrushchev said
he strongly doubted that any of the great powers sincerely
wanted reunification. "You can rest assured," he said, "that
I will agree to no reunifiection_which does not provide for
a 'socialist' caning Goranunist,/ system. I am equally sure
that you do not want a reunification that does not provide for
your form of nolitical system." it was obvious to him, there-
fore, that there could be no agreement on reunification at
this time. Hence there was nothing to do but settle the Berlin
issue by ending the occupation status and making peace with the
two Germanies.
Opening up on Chancellor Adenauer, Khrushchev said he would
never accept him as a representative of Germany. When he
charged that Adenauer was "the most unpopular man in Germany,"
I coule.1 not refrain from replying that the West Germans had
been given frequent orportunities to express their estimate
of him at the polls. The East German Premier Grotewohl, on
the contrary, had not faced a single free election. "Your
views and mine on free elections," Khrushchev retorted con-
temptuouel:,, "are hardly identical." He also made it clear
that he had a low opinion of American elections as an expres-
sion of the will of the "working classes."...
3ringing up the subject of disarmament, Khrushchev said he
was in favor of the strictest controls and inspection to ensure
that disarmament is carried out. He said he would even be
willing to accept 7isenhower's proposals for aerial inspection,
although in view of the existence of American bases around
the globe, this was patently unfair to the Soviets. But he
would not agree to aerial inspections as a first step. Before
that, an agreement must be reached on nuclear disarmament, e
.eeeeiallv on the discontinuance of testing.
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June (Cont.)
23
(Unclassified)
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. ?
Khrushchev argued that the Berlin and dinarmeeent rrnhlnr-
are the only serious outstandinr issues of te'ey. If tee
German problem were settled, ho intimated,
would find easy solutions. Fe denied rat. 1;
Soviets had any pretensions in 17.1-e rest ,r
it was evident throughout enr tel3,e th-t he t'olioved tet
Communism, as a superior sceial nremr, wr,r10 r)nrY in'r!t
the globe.
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US Embassy Moscow Eenort on Harriman - Khrushchev - Thompson
Conversation: Khrushchev was serious but genial and repeated-
ly asserted his desire for a neaceful settlement of their
differences with U3. Ho suggested we should draw appropriate
lessons from history which US did not appreciate as much as
Soviet Union which had twice been invaded by Germany. I re-
plied historic lesson we drew was that we should not repeat
error following First World War of giving Germany grounds for
thinking oho was being mistreated. Khrushchev said he was not
imnressed by this argument. He expressed his contempt for
Adenauer who had tried to flatter him and was trying to stir
un trouble not only between Soviet Union and West but also
between Western Allies, narticularly France and Britain. I
said our experience with Adenauer had shown that he genuinely
wanted to prevent a recurrence of German militarism and had
wholeheartedly supported plans for %uropean integration which
yovld prevent this. We said we must face German problem
seriously end recognize that Ulbricht and Adenauer could
never agree. West would never consent to a Coumunist Germany
end he would never agree to Adenauer 's absorbing Fast Germany.
Boat plan was Lc) conclude a peace treaty and liquidate remains
of war. When I pointed out we had recognized present situation
by providing for a phased elan he said we had allowed two and
one-half years whereas he would prefer 250 years. When
Gromyko pointed out our plan based on elections Khrushchev
said West would not allow Vietnam to be absorbed through free
elections and how could we expect Soviet Union to allow
Adennuer to absorb far more important area of rast Germany.
It was clear that a reunited Germany would join MATO. West
wanted then to allow greater population of West Germany to
decide issue. Pe had no good answer to my argument that our
plan provided for possibility separate veto in two parts of
Germany. Yhrushchev asked me if we would ever allow West
Germany to opt for socialism. I said he would doubtless not
believe me but I was sure that if West Germany took such a
decision in a supervised election that was not under pressure
of threats, we would abide by the decision. Khrushchev said
I had best be careful and was I so sure that this might not
one day happen after Soviets had continued to improve their
own economic nosition and standard of living in '?:est Germany
had been raised. He said that Adenauer did not want German
reunification for fear Germany would go socialist.
nruellchev said it was clear German question could not be
settled now and he had therefore put forward his Berlin 1 1.
pro-
pose!. la) had eeveioneo the free e.Lt,?).
SECRET/NCFOBN
?
June (Cont.)
25
(Secret)
? SECRET/NCrCRN
- 6 -
although his associates agreed with him. He was ereeered to
give almost any kind of guarantee for the free city. Ho em-
phasized importance that Soviet Government which care to power
after death of Stalin attached to keening Its word end that
it would faithfully fulfill any guarantee given. o should
know that when discussions were resumed in Geneva we should
not expect change in Soviet position as they could not vo
beyond proposals already put forward. Ho understocd cur
position to be that if there was no agreement in Geneva there
would be no summit conference. If this were so, very well,
but he would then conclude separate eerie? treaty and our
occupation righta would cease to exist. 7/1 kept his twarer
when I inquired how he could reconcile this statements with
his previous remarks about the importance the Soviet Gevern-
meat attached to keening its word. This led to a long and
inconclusive argument about who was to blame for breekdewr
of four power cooperation in Germany. He pointed to eer
conclusion of separate treaty with Jan. When I raid vhee
reserved Soviet rights ho rerlied that they Led neen 'Kicked
out of Allied Council and we had establiehed military hoses
in japan. Ukoyan interjected they would rive es na-e deal
on GemarlY as we had riven them on ;Tanen.
Kheunhchee asked what was wrong with Soviet proposal.
emphasized that West Berlin and its -orulation wen ef ne
portance to Soviet Union. I said. I could belleve 'hie nut
Berlin waz clearly important to That Germane who ',tented tn
absorb it and Soviet pronosals seemed to es clearly deeirreel
to facilitate this objective.
Khrushchev referred to Secretary Herteree sreech whleh he
characterized as on incorrect statement of the renitien.
Gromyko had not intended to make public steter-mt but w-el:
now be obliged to nut record strairht.
I referred to his earlier statement that Soviet leilon had
its maximum offer and said I thought same was true of Wont
although various combinations of essentiel element -1 -er
offer were possible. Ho then suggested that -erhaes we en-ele
cancel the meeting. I renlied that I wns not conductIee
negotiations with him but rerely trying to'exelain my under-
standing of my Govornmenys position. I exnlelned this in
some detail referring to Soviet action in diz'oeing of
Berlin ane now teying to move in on West l3erlin. 'lee I
outlined the concessions we ha:! made ane the distance we had
gone to meet his nosition he said ho had carefully ex:trier/I
our proposal which did in fact contain rany cenetree'lee
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elements. It was not bad except for one fact and that was that
it was to operate?until German reunification which was com-
pletely unacceptable. It might be all right as an interim
arrangement to operate until a neace treaty could be drawn up
and concluded.
I referred to a remark he had made that our troops in Berlin
had no military value and that even if we had 100,000 there
thoy wauld be wiped out immediately in the event of war. I
asked why was ho then so anxious to get rid of them. He replied
that while they would have no military value in the event of
war they did have a military value now. Gromyko explained that
subversive organizations in Berlin operated under the protec-
tion of Western troops. If peace treaty were signed they could
no longer fulfill this function. I said this indicated that
Soviet Union or GDR would decide which organizations were
legitimate and which were not. This would constitute inter-
ference in internal affairs of Berlin and showed clearly where
Soviet pronossls would lead. Khrushchev said this was an ex-
agora Led interpretation.
I also referred to the lack of reciprocity in Soviet proposals
on propaganda, etc. Khrushchev said it was obviously imposs-
ible to control activities in rast Germany and allow Bonn to
bo free to continuo them. I said we recognized this and were
prepared to deal with it but could not accept arrangements on
this matter that applied to West Berlin but not T'ast Berlin.
Khrushchev referred to holding of nresidential election in West
Berlin as a provocative act but not in any manner suggesting
Soviets intended to do anything about it. Khrushchev then told
anecdote to illustrate theses I was merely repeating old
arguments. ?
Harriman emphasized strongly that both parties in US supported
President's noeition on Berlin. Khrushchev suggested that
while political rarties mirrht be in agreement some of our
people were not, but he recognized they had to deal with our
Government. Khrushchev conauded conversation by saying we
should work out an interim arrangement that would lead to a
peace treaty an( he suggested this could be done in a way to
avoid any aspect of an ultimatum.
Unless Department perceives objection, I propose inform my
French, British and German colleagues of this conversation.
SECRET/NOFORN
June
26
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Use Only)
S F,CPET/I1CF CP ; '
- 8 -
?
Soviet Note to US on Gerran T'resieential 71e0inn in :erlin:
.According to a communication?of the Federal hopublic c,f c:errany
Government, on July 1 this yenr it is planned to hnlr! ol.,ctinno?
in West Berlin for the Federal Republic of Gormary.
As is known, West Berlin, which is ip the center of the ;',err.an
Democratic Republic, is not a part of the Federal l'opublic of
Germany and the competence of the federal authorities hot
extend to it. This generally recognized fact has also round
expression even in the recent statements of tho Ministors of
Foreign Affairs of the USA, Great Britain and France at th?-?
Conference in Geneva. At the same time the rerresentntiven of
the three powers have repeatedly emphasized their renrons1;,111",
for the situation in West Berlin, from which It follows that ti'
setting of the elections of the Federal 'onublic of (;prrnny
President for this city could not take place without *?,,,ir
knowledge and consent.
The Soviet Government considers the conducting nt-
in West alrlin as a nes atte:-t to use t11,) t-r"n t?:11
situation in the city in order to inflo.r- 'von rnro sit!lft-
tion in Germany and to create additional ohntari-.; en :ntn
to the aethieverent of agreements on urgont T:on-
tions, including the question of West Pnri:n.
In drawing the attention of the Governrent nr .
above, the Goternrent of the exprossoi!.tloY it it
will take annroltriate measures in ordor tat
used for new political demonstrations, incomratibl- te
task of relaxing tension in the center of.'-uro'7?='.
?
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ZrhbaaLya_T%frSy,,ntRejaetion to Herter Speech:
Pravda commentator Plyshevski and Izvestia observer provide
first Soviet editorial comment on Secretary's June 23 speech
and future of Geneva Conference. Both stress virtually same
theme: (1) Genova meeting has had some "positive significance";
(2) Herter speech is "far from objective" and gives "incorrect
interpretation of Soviet proposals which are designed to bring
East-West nositions closer together; (3) Secretary is being
unduly influenced by Adenauer statements and positions; (4)
period between now and resumption of talk should be, in words
of Izvoetia headline, "time for reflection" on part of West.
7mbeasy comment: Tone of both articles quite mild, with current
Soviet effort apnarently directed toward demonstrating willing-
ness to negotiate with possibility of 3UCC068 dependent on
Weat's adoption of proper and reasonable attitude.
SECRET/NOFORN
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?
sgcmlixemy ?
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June Gromyko Statement on Germany: In view of the lively interest
28 displayed in our country in the work of the Geneva Conforonee
? (Uhclassified) of Foreign Ministers and of inquiries received in thtn ratter
by representatives of the press, the necessity has arisen to
make a statement on both the position rollowinr, the -ne of t!;0
first stage p1, the Conference nne on its prospects. This in
especially necessary since in the atatement3 rndo by some other
participants of the negotiations after their return from
particularly in the statement of tho US Secretary rf StroP, it
tendentious interpretation of the course of the neretintionn
and of the attitude of the Soviet Union was ranifest.
What were the real developments in the negotiations In Geneva"'
The inclusion in the Geneva rereign.rin4s'ers' '7onfeIe1eo
representatives of the two German states sho.:s that, den-Ito
the opposition by extremist circler in the q%70 countrion, to
awareness of the necessity to reduce intern/0-10nel tonsin y
mutually acceptable solutions rfevils ever th,, ren-
tion of strength policy.
The Soviet Go.rernnent belongs. as in known, to 4*ns,
that the time has come to wmtifato the stuP'y atmenrho:.0
mistrust and hostility which now exists in internptiohAl rol"
tions as a consequencl of many :,ors of cold wnr nrd to con-
verge the efforts of all sates in one singlo direction - the
consolidation of ream
Nobs few problems have accumulated in the rostwar They
concern all those who seek to relax international tension in-
stead of conceiving the future of mankind as a race toward it
new war. The results of the Second World War in 7urore, net
yet removed because of the absence of a peace treaty with
Germany, are corroding relations between many states. Theo
unsettled position in West Berlin, that reserve of the occurs-
tion regime in the center of a sovereign state - the Gerran
Democratic republic - is constantly causing tension in the
international position. It is therefore quit() natural that
the questions of a peace treaty with Germany are the Berlin
question become important items for discussion nt the Gonovg
Conference.
The first weeks of the Conference were mainly devoted to waur-
ining the question of a peace treaty with Germany. To e.o
extent to which the Ministers of the W?stern "coders touchod
upon the draft peace treaty nut forward by the ::oviat Govern-
ment and the concrete proposals concerning the contenti
futityzaty-with Cerr,flny. the discussion was useful.
the Western nowers made no little effort to wind-u;--tf:(1.
tion of the question of a Poco treaty as rruiezly as nocsftl,,.
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Juni; (Cont;)
? 28
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SECiET/NOFORN
_ _
?
Striving to fence themselves off from a settlement of this
long overdue task, the,qoyernments of the United States,
Britain, and France have kabrtimes hidden behind the state-
ment - as if it were some shield - that their unwillingness
to tackle the settlement of the question of a peate treaty
with the two existing German states is dictated by nothing
less than concern for the unification of Germany!
It would seem impossible to deny that in circumstances where
two sovereign German states exist with differing social systems,;
there is no better way to. help eliminate the alienation between
them and to direct their development into .a common stream of
peaceful policy than to conclude a Germnn peace treaty.
All talk about
sound if it is
the Germans of
in common, and
rapprochement,
talize.
a reunification of Germany remains an empty
not accompanied by a readiness to really help
both German states to bring out what they have
around which, in tha process of a gradual
a single peace-loving German state could crys-
This task can be accomplished by the conclusion of a German
peace treaty. If there are people in the United States who
pretend - to judge by the recent statement of Secretary of
State Uorter - that they do not understand the significance
of a peace treaty for the unification of Germany, the reason
is clear.
They do not want to see the positive effect which the conclus-
ion of a German peace treaty would have for the cause of
German reunification, just as they do not want reunification
itself. The attempts of the US Secretary of State to prove the
opposite only show how little truth is told to the people in
the West concerning the true policy toward Germany and how
much space is devoted there to cheap propaganda in which few
people believe.
Tho endless postponement of the peace treaty has already caused
sufficient harm to the cause of the restoration of German
national unity. There can be no doubt that with further de-
lays of a peaceful settlement with Germany, the paths to
development of the Oh and the Federal German Republic will
diverge more and more and the unification of Germany will
become increasingly reknote.
June (Cont.)
28
(Unclassified).
It is therefore not difficult to guess what it is that causes
certain US statesmen to manipulate trivial arguments denying
the significance of the peace treaty for the solution of the
problem of German reunification. An admission on their part
SCRT,TATOFORN
SECRET/NGF'
- 12 -
of the usefulness of Ihe niece treaty for German reunifientien
would be equivalent to their acknowledgment of the fiasco ef n
Policy On the German question which, both in the least awl todny,
is in fact'aimed?at'consolidating the division rC C-r-ne7.
Of. course, the negative attitude of the Western reworr toward
the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany 0 i r.-)t -n!'-y ?
that this subject may be regardce.as -txhnusted. consy,r,
said the chairman of the I= Council of l'ininters, 'hrenhe!.-v,
on June 19, 1959, that the best solution to thin sro1ee e,e1,!
be the conclusion of a nonce treaty with on n11--r: 'rens e-r:orn-
ment, or with another plenipotentinry or;on ro-res,etiee n1I
of Germany. If however, it is not ressil-lo to eirel,
peace treaty on such a bssic, thsn it will hnve to r'
with the two coveveien German state-, -:hich ex(s*
the aggressive and reectionnry circles nlro rr.eoet teo
elusion of a nence treaty with the two Gerr.en - sr,
will be nothing left but to sirn a reece tre wit.
When the Sotriet Government openly i'eclnres 41?1* I*
lay the question of a neace tre3ty with C'ort-Any
statesmen of the Western Powers try to renrofee. "Ils 11
almost n threat. Such assertions cln hnt-''y tne 1,71--1-
1y. Their_ authors cannot be gloves to thoir rem
to such an extent that they fell to roelize t:e quts:"1-::
here concerns the only way left to the Soviet 'ni'n, whtol.
will be forced to take if the !es tern towerscen?Ahuo to
obstruct joint work on the elimination of thi, r'en.:er:un eeeti-
ges of war and occupation in Germany.
Last week the Conference concentrated its at4ent!en on
second question on the agenea: the Berlin euestion. e-h
and concrete discussion developed on this queetion
of the Conference Was broken off at the very hel
cussion. The Soviet side tried in every way to eorylece the
Western Powers of the need to alter the prneent lorr:oreee
situation which has developed in iost florlin. co- :c
emphasized that the occupation regio I-.ns on on
and that 14 years after the end of the war the 'leeetien of
West Berlin should have found a now solution. '-ient :orlIn
and its occunation regime, barr:cks where foroirn o:e
quarters, organs of the occunntion af'rinietratin whto.e,
the last word in the ao1ition of n11 the rent .17.rrtAr.t 21,n-
tions in the life of the town and Its inhabitants - this is a
sorrowful monument to the period of the war nni th. occurnticn.
?
T+ is trim that sometiros the reinresentatives rf .1e3 :eliern
Powers Say to us' that the occupation regio in est
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?
Juno (Cont.)
28
(Unclassified)
?
r.
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-13-
must not bo preserved forever, lora only until the reunifica-
tion of Germany. But this is an argument for naive people.
To say that the occupation regime in West Germany must be pre-
served until the reunification of Germany means in fact to
stand for its perpetuation, in view of the nresent policy of
tho Western Powers and the Aeenauer government on the question
of Germnn unity.
There is another
look at the man
the -ATO powers
socialist state,
cations and cons
tho states nn0 n
neace in 7uropo.
side to the question. It is sufficient to
to understane that 'lest Berlin, as a base for
-hjch has been formee in the center of a
is a field or subversive activity and prove-
titutes a source of Cangerovs friction between
conntcnt notentil threat to the cause of
They a,7e to convince us that tho situation in West
rrl .i ii (oerl not constitute a danger, and in this respect they
have reforre'l to tho fact that no far nothing terrible has
happenc(1 there. -IAA why wait until sorething terrible occurs,
we asked? If a conflict flares up - and in the present situa-
tion in uest flerlin this can always be expected - it will
possibly be too late to tall:. Woule it not be better to avert
such a possibility?
The Soviet Government calls for this. An improvement of the
situation in West Berlin, the strengthening of eeace in "urope,
and the improvement of relations between the powers have been ?
the aims of all proposals of the Soviet Government on the
Berlin question,and first among these has been the proposal
to grant West Berlin the status of a demilitarized free city.
A3 a result of the stand of the Ministers of the Western
Powers, it was not nossible to.reach agreement on a radical
solution of the problem of West Berlin by granting it the status
of a free city. The representatives of these powers preferred
to Ciscuss only individual - though having a certain signifi-
cance - problems relating to West Berlin. Tho strength of the
armed forces of the three powers stationed in West Berlin and
the measures ithich might be taken with regard to the sub-
versive activities and hostile propaganda against the German
Democratic Thrublic and other socialist countries conducted
from the territory of West Berlin were Points under discussion,
ns uoii n3 tip:. n-er Lr(11iIN LP tAL.L.1 f 2cr'4-
Wo wore, of course, concerned about the clarification of the
attitudes taken toward ench of those problems, having in view
S7CR-T/NOFOPIJ
June (Cont.)
28
(Unclassified)
SECPET/NOFCEN
that they should be solved in combination I the rain rt-tr:
namely, in connection with the future fate of -lest Berlin
Itself.
?
Whether West Berlin should remain a city whos: ponulgtion
doomed to live indefinitely under tho guns of foreign troars
or to become a city free from occupation, lndo-,endently
its, life is the chief problem whose rolutien oannet
evaded. . ?
When the question of the possibility of concltxling an acToomont
came up, we stated clearly that this document 2houl1 not con-
tain stipulations that would perpetuate the occuention stat'
In West Berlin, because this would contradict the interonta
of peace, the interests of relaxation of tension in EureTe in
general, and in Germany in particular.
Since the three Western Powers stubbornly refus-0
that the outdated occupation status in ..4est Porlin on-uld
abolished forthwith, the Soviet Government clopidod, in ti,e
interests of reaching agreement, not lonc, before t':e
In the work of the Geneva Conference, to rut fervar-
posals on the Berlin issue.
Intr,r7q1
The
-
The Soviet Government proposed to licuidato tJlo qbn)n-,111 re-1-
tion in West Berlin gradually, at the same tire rrorari7;7 g
peace treaty and working out measures aired at t?.() unification
of Germany.
?
The new Soviet proposals provide that the four rowers - tr:o
USSP, the United States, Britain, and France - cr,nclude nn
interim agreement, of definite duration, on ''est 2flrlin.
agreement on the interim status of West Berlin would inclo
agreement on the following issues:
A. Reducing the occunation forces of tho Weat.ern r-w-rs in
West Berlin to token contingents;
B. Stopping the ;ubversive activities from Vest rieriln ngnins.
the German Democratic Republic and other socialist ceentrien;
C. Not siting atomic and rocket weapons in 'dent 3'-1 In.
These measures constitute the minimum of what must bn (!-)na at
once with a view to bringing about condi?icns of saf,ty in
West Berlin for the period during which tho intorin -tn?,us -f
weet-BUfIU-17?-6176-alite.
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28
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_15_ ?
A committee which would be set up - consisting of representa-
tives of the United States, the USSR, Britain, and France -
could be in control of the implementation of the obligations
arising from the agreement. During this period the three
Western Powers would retain certain occupation rights in West
Berlin, and its communications with the outer world would be
maintained in the same form as new.
In the meantime, conditions would be prepared for a more cardi-
nal eettlement of the Berlin problem on the basis of a peace
treaty with Germany.
With a view to not permitting a susnension of work on the pre-
paration of a peace treaty and at the same time to actually
hole the ranprochement of both German states, the Soviet Govern-
ment spoke out in its new proposals in favor of an all-German
committee to be created by the two German states on a parity
basis, consisting of representatives of the GDR and the German
Federal Penublic. The duties of the committee would include
expansion and development of tontacto with the two German states,
working out concrete measures for the unification of Germany,
and examination of questions linked to the preparation and
conclusion of a peace treaty with Gertany.
Obviously, shculd the GDR and the Germat Federal Republic pre.
for not to negotiate with each other on the above-mentioned
question. within the framework of such a committee but in sorb
other way, it is their affair. They can elect any form of
cooperation acceptable to them.
The Soviet proposals envisage that by agreement between the
four powers a definite time limit will be established for the
temporary status of West Berlin and for the work of the all-
German committee. Tho establishment of such a time limit is
necessary because it is impossible to d-aw out indefinitely a
peaceful settlement with Germany and maintain an occupation
regime in West Berlin. If no definite time limit is es-
tablished for the all-German committee to carry out its tasks,
there will bo no guarantees that one of the sides will not
rake use of this, and prefer marking time to serious talks.
I say straightforwardly that the present attitude of the
Government of the German Federal Pepublic, both on question
of unifying Germany and on the peace treaty, fully confirms
the grounds for those fears.
It emerges from statements by leading figures of the German
Federal Pepublic that Bonn actually would like not a settle-
ment of outstanding international problems but a continuation
ST,CRET/DICEOP
June (Cont.)
28
(Unclassified)
BECRETAIGFOU
?
? - 16 -
of the former policy.of obstructing their oettlementa, whieN
is so dear to the heart of Chancellor Aci(mauer. Ts it res-
sible not to take this circumstance into account? C"-viously
not!
For its part, the Soviet Government had proposed t!-rtt the
agreement on the temporary status of West Berlin b.1, desienad
for a year and a half. The all-German comritteo would hnvo '-
complete its work by the end of that period.
If, within the time limit agreed upon by the siden, flth Ge:1-nn
states, as a result of negotiations within the frare.Jork of
the all-German committee or in any other form, do not core to
agreement on the neaceful settlement ane unification of Gerr-nnj,
the states represented at the 1959 lenevn Cnnferenc. of Feneli-n
Ministers could return anew to an crxaminntion of the luen'ion
concerning West Berlin.
Such is the essential content of the last pro-o-
Soviet Govetnment.
It may' be ?Asked: What has moved the Soviet rovorp7 *- -
out with new proposals for a terrorary
question? The answer is sinole. We want a selu'i-,h of
Berlin question on a concordant Ixtsis. 1-11:3- re.qr.ir
to be taken at last to bring nearer the conclunion (f a -ea
treaty with Germany. That is why the Soviet Govern-at
as is known, introduced certain changes in its nr-r-o;-In. !n
order to take more fully into account the point of eiee -f
governments of the United States, Great Britain, and ,
as expressed at the Geneva Conference, and to r.rono*e e
rannrochement of the positions of the two sides.
Let us, for example, take the question on thf, tor- at'
of the temporary agreement on West Berlin nrorone(' 17 the
Soviet Union. At first, the Soviet Government re--ono:led to fix
this at one year. However, since this did not suit the
Western Powers, another term was suggested, that in, nn. nnl
a half years. We are prepared to negotiate on tAs tonic.
Let me recall that the Goverments of the United Stn',.:1,
Britain, ane France have. themselves prn^osc,' at the r1.1n.9vn
Conference that a period of two and a half yearn sh,v1l he
fixed for the cornletion of the work of the all-Gem-an
If the two sides come to an agreed view on the rain
appears that it would not bn too difficult to a,ro n th-
requirec perioL 01
? .sEamrjrnFau;
?
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I should like to call special attention to one misinterpretation
of the last Soviet proposals which one often meets in the West
and which, unfortunately, may be heard from statesmen of the
Western Powers. It is asserted that fixing a period of time as
envisaged in our pronosals means that when this period expires
all the rights of the United States, Great Britain, and France
in West Berlin will automatically lapse, while the Soviet Union
will immediately embark upon unilateral acts in relation to West
Berlin. Why is such a conclusion drawn? Does not the fact that
the Soviet Union is proposing to hold new negotiations on West
? Berlin after the expiration of the terms provided for in the
agreement e if by that time the all-German committee does not
eucceed in its work speak for itself?
if only a unilaterni solution of the question of the rights of
Western Powers An Berlin - either now or after the expiration
of the term of validity of the above-mentioned temporary agree-
ment on West Berlin - were envisaged, we would not have proposed
jointly deciding on the temporary status of West Berlin, solving
the question of the ruaranteee of such statue, and creating a
four-power nunervIsory agency. We would not have proposed that
the joint discussion of the Berlin question should be renewed
If the GDR and the German Federal republic fail to come to an
? landorstanding in the all-German committee. Thus, the Soviet
Government prefer() to find an agreed solution regarding our new
proposals also, I repeat, an agreed solution concerning West
? Berlin, which must, of course correspond to the present situation
In Berlin and in Germany and must not, and cannot, emanate from
a denim to perpetuate the occupation regime in West Berlin.
Critics of the Soviet proposals go so far as to try and ascribe
to the Soviet Union the intention to swallow West Berlin and
deprive its inhabitants of freedom. Strange assertions of this
kind were contained, in particular, in the speech made by Mr.
Herter on the radio on his return to the United States from
Genova. Is it necessary to say that such arguments do not con-
tain even one grain of truth? In no way can they testify to a
dosird to throw an objective light on the Soviet Unionls
position.
Leaving aside the question of the kind of freedom for West
Berliners that is supported by foreign tanks and machine guns,
it is necessary to point out that the Soviet Government, both
it9 prnremal to turn West Berlin into a free city and in the
proposal to work out a temporary status for Wt Berlin, ehewed
consideration for the way of life of the West Berlin population
and strived to exclude the possibility of any outside inter-
ference in the internal ffairs of this city. Everybody knows,
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too, that the GDR Government adheres to an nnnloecue point of
view on'this issue, and has solemnly eeclared ita readinenc,
together with the other states, to guarantee the obeervence of
the agreed status of West Berlin.
It is not superfludue to recall that when, in the courne of the
talks, the delegations of the Soviet Union and of the GDR de-
clared the readiness of their governments to guard :est "r1 ?n
from all outside interference, the Ministers of the lies tern
Powers somehow suddenly lost interest in this problem. They
did not want to speak of the rarticination of United "ntions
in the guarantees, althourh from the rostrum they frequently
speak of the organizations role. But, as we sen, srenkine
about it Is ote thing, and respecting it in erneeice is anct-r
thing.
It has become clear from all this that in reality thy nro con-
cerned not with the maintenance of the exiatinr way er
the West Berlin nonulation ? wit:, which, as is woll knrwn,
nobody interferes - but with the continuation of forolin
occupation in this part of the city. This,*nrd nothinr olso. ?
Why, then, did the US Secretary of State deem it arpronTinto
again to give currency to the version that the ;eviet Union
allegedlY strives for some kind of annexation of 1Jost or! n?
There is nothing but to suppose that this version, too, whici:
has been borrowed from the cold war arsenal, can hardly he in-
tended for anything but to mislead public oninion in '.estern
countries. But it is difficult to combine such rethede with P
business-like approach to the solution of thequeetieen on the
Conference agenda.
During the debate on Berlin, the United States, i!erlin, and
France showed great interest in socurine the further stv of
their tops in West Berlin. Taking this into account, wo ex-
pressed readiness to agrhe to the temporary stay o!' q token
quantity of US, British, and French troops in West erl In. The
Western Powers nitached great imnortance to insurinr fr,,odor of
access for American, British, and French military rersonnel
West Berlin. On this issue, t00, VO Went sor:o way tolrd
meeting the wishes of the Western Powers, having declart,0 tqt
we agreed to the temporary maintenance or the links b.twcen
West Berlin and the outside world in their nresent state and to
i-eturn to the discussion of this question if the work -f tho
all-German committee does not yield nosttive rosults.
Thus, the Soviet Union has gone sore way to meet the
of the Western Powers, althourh they by-nese it in ellenee.
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Apparently, the governments of the Western Powers have nothing
to say to this, for in fact they are interested not in a reason-
able solution of the aforementioned questions, but in the pre
servation of West Berlin as a permanent source of international
tension.
In assessing the situation that has arisen at the Geneva Confer-
ence, one must note that the discussion on the question of a
peace treaty and West Berlin reflected, like in a mirror, the
two lines in the policy of the former members of the anti-
Hitlerite coalition toward Germany. .
Sholada line be drawn uncler World 1:ar
II
develorment of Germany RS an independent,
democratic state be insured? The Soviet
i-only to this question. It in for this r
to prepnre vithout delay and to conclude
Germany.
in urope? Should
peace-loving, and
Union gives a positive
eason that it proposes
a peace treaty with.
In present conditions thig would mean concluding such a treaty
with two German states, thus solving the question of West
Berlin in the interest of peace and eb.3ing tension.
A different reply i5 given by the Western Powers. The existing
situation in Germany anparently suits them better, since it
creates favorable conditions for the transformation of West
Germany into a NATO rocket and atomic base and transforms West
Berlin into a permanent cancerous growth on the bcdy of Germany
and 7urope.
It is apposite to recall that on the eve of the Foreign Minis-
ters' Conference in Geneva, and even during the Conference,
the US Government took further steps to provide nuclear and
rocket armaments for a number of NATO countries, notably for
the Federal German republic. Can this fact be assessed in any
way but as evidence of the governments concerned being guided
not so much by the interests of achieving agreement and easing
tension, hut by the plans of NATO military staffs?
In connection with West Berlin, this is the main question: Shall
an end be put to the occupation regime which is still being pre-
served in that part of the city and shall a fundamental im-
provement in the situation in Berlin - and consequently in
Germany and %rope - be effected?
The Soviet Union gives a clear answer-to?Ulat-question. too.
It strives for the quickest liquidation of the out-dated
occunation rule in West Berlin.
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A different answer is given by the Yestern Futers. Me proposals
they presented for consideration by the neneva Confer-nce !ad but
one aim in view: To preserve at all cost the occurntion re)7imn
in West Berlin, as well as the ocouration 7rivilcZgen. Az:narently
14 years of occupation of that part of the city Is nnt..iln%ch.
How much longer do they want to nrolong it - fryr 5.7), or for 1r0
years? Then let them say so, and also rep:y to thin .:u-nti?n:
How is it possible to state earnest intentions to condl:et
negotiations with the Soviet Union on the nerlin qstion
at the same time clingina to the occupet'en rert7e in
Berlin. The two are incompatible.
Let us tow consider the question of the creation of ,n
German committee, Its essence is briefly this: ;.rn ?
from 7ast ane West to oft at one table In order to tv
cuss concrete steps for bringing together tf'n -1 ?
and then completely reestablishing the unity of nny:
they to work out a co:mon position in relation to a 7PrIc
or are the German people to be deprived of thin rirht': 7-,
Soviet Union supnorts the first courne, the 'entern *cw-rn Ytnd
for the second.
Speaking of the course of the Geneve Conference, it Is
to remain remain silent about the role adonted by the 3overnrent -f
Federal German Tenublic. There is a fully adequate ,finin for
the conviction that the Government of the Federal 'enublic or
Germany sent its delegation to Geneve with inrtructions to
create as many difficulties an possible in the w-rk of the
Foreign Yinistels' Conference an to hinder their q+opt!on of
any kind of positive decisions, 4ith all (,00d will, it Is It--
possible to name a single speech by this delerTtIcn which ev-n
contained a hint of a striving to contribute to the settlerent
of the questions on the agenda of the Conforenc. Y tthene
were questions which directly touch upon the vital int.,r,,sts
of Germans and thoroforo it would seem that the renresentntIves
of the German statos, above all, should be concerned Wcout th?-m.
The role of the delegation of the Federal republic ';errany
looks especially unseemly in light of the fact tat t"e
delegation, headed by Foreign Pinistor Bolz, exert.! 1 lot
effort to cOntribute to the SUCCOS3 of the Confer-nce qnd to
bring together the 7os1tions of the two norman
however, did not meet with due response from the Ado:Au..r
government, to which - and this came out once f?.7tir. durinp
Geneva Conference - the interests of -once in Eur:-Tro ArP, nlien.
Speaking of the two opposing lines which were -urcued
the Genova Conference by the two .'.,rman states - tie n.r0
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Federal republic of Germany - it in essential to emphasize that
the very fact of the active particination of the representatives
of those states in the Geneva Conference has a groat significance
AS q matter of principle. It is an admission that without the
perticirntion of both Germen states it is impossible to consider
problems eealing with Germany. Althourh the Western Powers have
not yet, recognized tha GDR diplomatically, they have nonetheless
boon forced to recognize itu dn facto existence, and even this
lo
in Important success of the Geneva Conference for the German
people.
Let uo add that during the eiscuonion of a peace treaty, the US
Govornment. through the words of Ito Secretary of State, was
forced to et:lee that the Federal Penublic of Germany does not
represent and cannot renreoent nle: Germany. This statement,
which without a doubt represents n etcp foreard in the assessment
of tho real position ehich has develoned An Germany, eas in it
n bucket of cold water on the heads of those polielcians
in Bonn eho have more than once trice to assume the right to
represent all tho German people.
During the last few days Bonn has given a new illustration of
its obstructionist policy by adopting a decision to hold the
president election for the Federal Republic of Germany in
Wost Berlin on July 1, although it is known that the Federal
ronublic of Germany has no relation to West Berlin. Why was
such a demonstration necessary? Moreover, was it timed to take
place at a moment when the question of West Berlin is on the
agenda of tho Genova talks? Of course, not to make the talks
easier, but in order to introduce acerbity in the work of the
Geneva Conference.
Tho leader? of the Federal German Republic, and notably Chancel-
lor Adonauer, openly let it be understood that the most joyous
news from Geneva for them would be an announcement of the
collapse of the negotiations. One can only regret that the
influence of tho rabid oartisans of the cold war is clearly
affecting the positions of our other partners in the negotia-
tione, primarily the governments of France and the United
States. Ono is justified in asking: How rational is a policy
which is built upon the support, even the courting, of those
forces which are preventing the removal of the sources of
friction among states, which live only by the idea of how to
make profits from the eoreeradeee
euees nmona tho great powers and
how to cause a really good quarrel between the USSR-arid Lite US'
satEr/N0FonN-
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June (Cont.) The Geneva Conference of rinisters has been adjourned entil Sely
28 13 at the request of the Foreign 14inisters of thl Ited etates,
(Unclassified) Great Britain, and Franco. If one wore to tale of the causrs
which have led the Western rowers to pronoso n three-wooktroae
in the work of the Conference, those must obvleusly not be
sought in the COUrse of tho talks themselves. Judrinr by every-
thing, this break was planned by the governments of the tel!tr,d
States, Great Britain, and France been:thane, and teoy were
merely lookine for a pretext to declero it.
?
What conclusion can be drawn from the fact that so far it has
not been possible to reach agreement cn the impornont -mentions
for whose consideration tho Conference of the -Foreien Mnintorn
was convened? The USSP Government cons!enrs e1at there cln
ho
only ono conclusion: Further efforts are needed by el' '.on,
represented at the Geneva Conference cf State? to t, set'le
the unsolved international problems.
Though the first half of tho Conference did not hey- teo rn-
sults which the oorld expected, yet the exchange of oelnions
which took nlace has boon definitely useful: lee, eosl'.1-no -f
the participants have become better defined, th,, existing OAS-
aueements have been moro erecise, and attemots h,tvu hoen -nr!.1
to bring the nositions of tho two sides nenrer on cortnin
questions.
All this cannot, of course, fail to facilitate the continuation
of the work of tho Conference. In our orinion, there are roin*,s
of departure which make it noseible to hope that the worl. of the
Geneva Conference will have a positive outcone, unleno, of c,erse,
our nartners intend to mark tine and to hold tho talks from a
position of maintaining the cold war. If the :esire is to h2le
? talks after having barricaded oneself in the trenches of the
cold war, the question may well he asked: Why wan It. necessary
for the Western !inistors to go to Geneva. ?
We share to a great extent the evaluation of the prospects of
the Geneva Conference of 7oreien I iniatere and that of the fol-
lowing summit conference voiced in the:!01137'. of romrn.:* on Juno
24 by the British roroign tinistoreelwyn Lloye, who son about
tho chances of success for the Conference. We should like to be-
lieve that the governments of the "estern 'cv-ri vtl: mf'k
the break in the eork of tho Conference to forms t rore neund
appnyisal of the soviet proposals, renounce unreelistie eleel
which make an understanding more difficult, and beein to ereeere
agreements which will heli' to normalize the situation in eerlin
and to Open the way to a nenceful settlement in (earant. As !ar
as the Soviet Government is concerned, it will continue to -tt:
every effort toTorch mutually accoetable agroenonts nn :ensti-re:
which are under discussion at tho Genova Conference.
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US Misiion Berlin Renort of Attack on Allied Forces
Radio Station in Germany: AP West Berlin carried a brief
story June 28 reprinted in only one West Berlin paper) on
recent violent attack against Allied forces in West Berlin by
Soviet forces radio station in Germany, VOLGA. According to
broadcast Allied troops have acquired infamoUs reputation as
a remit Of their crimes against mankind and frequent partici-
pation in crushing national independence movements. Allied
forces in Berlin according to VOILA are "schooled in spirit of
animal hate against peoples of Socialist camp" by mercenaries
who "entered army to get rich quick and who were accustomed by
bourgeois life to satisfy themselves by murder and robbery."
Although WILGA has regularly criticized West, it has normally
hewed to current Soviet-GDR lino and emphasized their standard
charges against espionage activities West Berlin, etc. BIAS
which monitors WLGA on one check basis states VOLGA attack
is first instance noted since Berlin crisis of direct attack
conduct and character Allied Berlin units.
?
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GDR Note to US on Presidential "lection in Berlin. Presented.
Through Czech Foreign Office: "The Government of the ''rerman
Democratic republic has the honor to inform the Govern=ent of
the USA of the following:
?
"At instigation of Government of German Fodoral Reruhlie election
of President of the Federal Republic is to be held in West Berlin
that does not belong to territory of Gorman Federal i'041:b1 te nn
July 1, 1959. This step is incompatible with statements made at
Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva on May 22, l9 by the
Foreign Einister of the Republic of France, Vr. Gnuve de :113-71110,
also on behalf of the delegations of the USA and t'10 United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Irelanf: that 'territory
of West Berlin is not a part of the territory of the Federnl
Republic of Germany.'
"Realization.of
the election of President of the Gerrnn :'0d0ral
Republic in West Berlin is expression of a policy thnt does nnt
aim at understanding on the West Berlin question arx! at t1.0
lessening of tensions in Germany, but want:; to mnint%in ;?rt
Berlin as focus of permanent provocations.
"Planned step again points to fact that the7.oec!re1 Go7--n-e-*
wants to block understanding of states represented at ,;,.1,-7-1
Conference also in this question.
"Resolution about realization of election of ,:est Cerrnn :%-d-r11
President outside territory of German !'ederal PenW,lto
efforts of the Federal Government to continue fro-. :ert 130r1!::
and by help of West Berlin the provocations against ar,ninlr
security of its population and against its nenceful
as well as agairnt other An-one/in states.
"Government of Gil' considers it right to inforr G,-v.:.rnrent ,r
USA that it most severely protests arainst this reastx).
"It points to fact that authors of those provocations will be
fully responsible for consequences rosulting frn- then..
"This proceedinr proven how ncessar- it in to f!.nd t For01ipl
Ministers' Confr.r.:o in Geneva such a solltion f"ont Devlin
question that in '1,ture will rake innossible rens:Ton
against peace and against security of Goran nat!--
7uropOan nations".
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July *Report of Kozlovls Talk with Secretary Herter: Kozlov talked
? 1 with Secretary for slightly more than one hour this morning.
(Confi(entiel) He was obviously very well briefed on Soviet proposals re Berlin
and Germany. Most emphasis was put on necessity for ending
the "occupation regime". He reiterated abnormality of occupa-
tion situation 14 years after war's end. Time period in Soviet
pronosal, he said, is not an ultimatum since after suggested
year there would be renewed negotiations. The extent of the
time period is not a nrincipal question, but can be discussed.
He failed to respond adequately to the Secretary's question
how Soviet recognition of our juridical and access rights could
be reconci)ed with the statement that if agreement were not
reeched the Soviets would take unilatera ction which somehow
would end those rights.
The Secretary re?enunclated the Western proposal that any
failure to agree nn the nart of the all.German commission
should be revolved by free balloting of the population - if the
vote shower., n win for separate, Germanies, West would respect,
but if reunification were deeired. Soot e ahould respect that
wish, Kozlov said we should let the we German states discuss
the metter . no harm could be done. Az for West Berlin there
never has been and is not any intent te swallow up the West
? -3erlin population. If they prefer the capitalist structure
that is their effair and their wishes will be respected. The
Soviets genrantee and the vast Germans have pledged that any
agreement reecho(' will be fulfilled.
The Secretary asked Kozlov if it would mean war should their
nronosed action to deny us our ric..hts force us to defend those
rights. Kozlov replied force would have to be met by force
but the Soviet Union stands for agreement by peaceful negotia-
tion. Soviets agree that Western proposals regarding reduction
of forces in limit Berlin and no introduction of atomic weapons
in Wept Berlin constitute a rational element and an appropriate
basis for negotiations. The Secretary said that Western pro-
nosals had met many Scviet pointa but had been rejected. On
basis, of six weeks Geneva discussions the West cannot fail to
nsk for a definitive Soviet answer on the question of our
rights, particularly in view of Gromyko's statement that the
best solution for West Berlin would be its inclusion in East
Germany. After the Secretary said we would return to Geneva
in a sincere hone of reaching a mutually natisfactory agree-
ment, hoziov rt ' u tGe the c^nt nronosals for Berlin and
emnhnsized the need of ending the "occupation reg e .
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Report of Conversation Between Germen Ambess,Oor Frcll and
Soviet Deputy Foreipn lmister Zorin: Zorin told Kroll that
the West still hadn't correctly understnod the Intent S,,viet
proposals in their exact significance. :ferter in h'e final
private conversation with Groryko '11: not centest, ther.. Pre
should know that those surgestions contnined ne nl'tnwur
and that the Soviet Government had no 4ntention of tnkinr
unilateral aggressive measures during the duration of th'e
German mixed advisory commission or even after an unrrodue-
tive expiration of this cormission. Such meesuren
a possibility only in the event that, so to snenk, n11 nf
threads are lost ("stricke reissen"). The f,oviet Governr-ent
wishes to reach an understanding as much en the rnster of '
Berlin as on all other outstanding questions.
Kroll asked Zorin about the conditions and terrn under w"
the Foreign Ministers' Conference would renuee if the eel
erations of the mixed cormission should collenee, eeintinn
out that Gromyko had been unclear about this.
Zorin replied that the Western Powers en? the
have to reach an understanding on the provisioned st-ter nr
Berlin before the meeting of the German mixed cor:-Insin.
The West would have the some rights as before, to he sure
in an agreed revised form (e.n., reduced troon centineernel,.
diminished propaganda). If the Foreign flinirters' Cenfer-
ence were resumed in 18 months or two years, Igen the -elleec
of the mixed commission, the West would return wit the 1,17n
revised rights - as long as it had observed the sti-Julat.io:11
of the agreement. When Kroll inquired as to
whether or not the conditions had boon -et, 'nrin re" I.'
that each side would arree not to alter by diolorntft
the agreement over the provisional status of Perl!n.
Zorin stated that the Soviet delention (at nenav70 bflen
astonished at the reaction of the 'est, end ,nnecinIly of
the West Germans to a sugeestion concerninr the r',errnn r!xor!
commission. This nro-osal had in fact be,..n o-! t.'1 'y 771.1e
by the West, but when it was accented by the the
drew back. If the West was not eleened by 2,evie# no,.zentnn
of abandoned Western rronosels, the rn",tmr at best 71,7ht
have been discussed, esnecinlly -ith rer.nrd to tH. 7-n'!?tr .
narity and the scone of the commission. 71? eviet 'een,rne.
men e holds such a commission to '7.4) fully in t!.e inte-tne
bringing together the two (Gerrar0 r3,tee ant' to ? in
relnlitv a step towards reunification. Istru s the ;
received the nroposal
concludes that the West is not renlly teverde
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July: (Cont.) ^ Gorman reunification. However, the Soviets did expect that
2 the West German delegation, at least, would be willing to
(Secret) discuss the proposal.
Zorin stilted that the Soviet Union did not favor the idea of
independent experts being represented on the commission in-
stead of the officials of the two governments.
Regardinr: the duration of the consultations of the commission,
Zorin stated that this was a matter which could be discussed,
mentioning in tho conversation a period of two years as a
nossible compromise.
? Zorin moreover comnlained that Gromyko4s attempt to bring up
for Oiscussion the question of a security zone in %rope
end related problems in the field of disarmament had failed
due to the negative attitude taken by the Western Powers.
Kroll considered it entirely possible that Gromyko will raise
the subject in the forthcoming stage of the conference.
Kroll set forth for Mr. Zorin the point of view of the
Federal Government, which is shared by the Western Powers)
^ that the Wost cannot make any further proposals than it has
already done. Zorin did not express himself clearly on this
point but suggested that the USSr mi,-ht be willing to raise
for discussion at the second conference the same proposals
which it had made previously, as these do not appear to have
been clearly understood by the West.
Jii17
2 Washington: A speech before ouch a largo audience as I face
(Unclassified) today imposes a high responsibility, including the responsil)ili#.y
to make a thorough choice of the topic for my telk,partieulerly
since I have been limited in time.
SECRL'T/NOFCRN
- 28 -
Excerpts from Sneech by Soviet Der;utv Premier Knzlev in
It is therefore only natural that I am eoing to fIT'W," rtbr'ut
what is most iiTlportant - the things that rive our Templer., nnci
not only them alone, their greatest cause for concern. T'lin !-
primarily the question of how mutual understanding nne
ship between the USA and the ussr can bo strengthened t'qt.
American-Soviet relations do not an heretofore -n
basis of the cold war, whose authors reside not in .-c,%ntry.
The possible lines of development of relatinno hetween
Soviet Union and the United States are now the nuthrs::1 If
heated discussions among both statesmen end c?-:7r.cn -
the plants, the factories, on farms and at thn hn?trt.
And this can hardly cause wonder.
After World War II estrangement and distrust unfortuneCe'y
arose between us.
The international situation cams to be poisoned by the ervinm
of suspicion. During this period more often than not the
problemat issue did not only fail to find any nolution, hut
were made even more confused and acute, thus causing additieenl
complications in the development of relations between stat.e..
There were even such days when pence hung by a threw!. 7'.0
greatest achievements of human genius wore nlaced at t*,-) nerv-
ice of the reckless policy of nreparing for another war.
Millions of the ablest and healthiest people have teen t.)en
away from their near and dear ones and extracted fro:- the Iphere
of fruitful labor in order to master the art of nnnihilatinn.
All this, indeed, compels one to ponder over the future rrcs-
poets of the development of international relations.. And not
only to ponder, but to draw the firm conclusion that the tin-s,
has come to abolish once and for all the policy of oltnnininn
and distrust and to resolutely invigorate the international
situation.
Genuine prosperity and hanninoss of the people shottlA en(!
be built up not on the shaky soil of the arraments mce ar!
S'7CP7T/NOFnRN
animosity kindled between nations, nut on to r11111:1 c: e
establishment of mutual trust, the recognition of the -ri-loiplo
of peaceful co-existence of states with different no-iql ftne
SEMET/Nas0P.7
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SECPSTAKF OR N
- 29 -
?
July. (Cont.) political systems, as the major line in the development of
2 international relations.'
(Uriclassified)
?
Only this will permit utilizing to the benefit and not to the
detriment of all men the ability that mankind is acquiring to
command the forces of the atom and to secure progress as yet
unprecedented in world history.
The destiny of this progress, as well as the destiny of peace
in general, depend to no small extent on the relations between
the Soviet Union and the United States, which the entire course
of hietorical development has elected in the focal point of
tajor internntional events,
Do there exist tiny grounds for our relations to be built en
the unshakeable foundation of pence and friendehip?
In the Soviet Union believe that there do exist such grounde.
In this understanding, we proceed from our conviction that
common people in the United States as well az peoples in other
countriee cherish and love peace.
Already in the course of my brief stay in your country I have
soon real proof that this conviction is correct.
Ey colleagues and I have already been able to meet with many
Americans, and all of them, starting from the representatives
of business circles as well as the common workers of the
industrial enterprises which we visited, said with sincerity
and conviction that the nations need peace and as soon as
possible we should eliminate the alienation and suspicion that
exists in relations between our countries.
The politicians of your state with whom I had pleasant and
useful meetings also spoke' to me about the elimination of
international tension.
As for the Soviet people, who on more than one occasion have
been compelled to take up arms in defense of their motherland
against foreign invaders and who have sustained untold losses,
in numerous bloody battles, for them there is no other word
more hateful than war. That this is true could easily be
noted by any unbiased eerson who at least once has visited our
SZCRET/NOrart
- 30 -
Jay, (Cont.) It may be perhaps somewhat more difficult for you Americans,
2 who have not suffered the horrors of war in your horns, to
(Unclassified) understand the feeling of repulsionfor war, of hatred for war
which animates our people.Thereforo, we, somotinen with irony,
more often with feelings of indignation, hear nnd rend eeet
accusations to the effect that the Soviet Government is seek-
ing to unleash a new war, that we have some sort of neer-relive
aspirations.
There is no greater slander .ort the Soviet peoele end ite
Government than this.
Neither are serious the attempts ?o oppose the will eer
people for peace to the actions of the Soviet 0evereeent, whi-.71?
allegedly violates this will.
In availing myself of the opnortenity to addrene you, : eeeld
like once again to emphasize that tee will of the Zee:let
people is a sacred law for the Government of the
?
We, the members of the Government. nee I-et the servnetn of our
people.
We have always held peace dear. It is particularly deer to un
now that the Soviet Union is embarking upon that pried of iti
history which has been the cherished hope of our neople Vd h.13
been gained through much suffering in the otrurelo.
In our country, we can already Perceive the visile feeturen of
the new society which brings happiness to all men of lat-er.
The final completion of this edifice, the realization of our
tremendous ambitions is no longer a ratter of the rnroti ratIcri)..
Ours are plans of peaceful construction are they eereue ene
sole objective - the attainment of happiness rirt nhumInni foe
the people.
We plan to attain in our country in 15 years' tire, ens' -or?eee
even before that, the highest living stamlard in the weelo.
Already in the process of fulfilline the seven-year -len, we
propose to abrogate all forrs of taxation ef the pulti%for., to
expan0 considerably the system of social inevrence, to intro-
duce in the immediate future the shortest werkine ve-1, in tee
world - a working week containin- 30 to 3 1.eers.
country....
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??
July (Cont.)
2
(Unclassified)
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? - 31 -
.Ia it npsaible for a people and a government who pursue such
grand aims to contemplate war? Certainly not.
In our vast country we have all the requisites for the fulfill-
ment of the chartered plans. We have a great industrial
people, a highly developed national economy, high standards of
science and engineering and untold natural wealth.
We are buildig a new society and we believe it will be the
most just aocial order on earth.
But we are not and do not intend to foist this by:
force upon anybody. We have declared so repeatedly. And this
is the very basis of our policy.
?
There is only one road acceptable to the people and that is
the road of peaceful co-existence. Provided the Soviet Union
nnd the United States adhere to this path! the differences in
their social order cannot nresent an obstacle to the develop-
ment of good-neighbor and sincere relations between our peoples.
After all, these differences did not stand in the way of our
becoming allies in the struggle against fascism.
Neither should they stand in our way now in the struggle for
better relations between us for the prevention of another war.
Yesterday in Washington, I had a pleasant and very useful con-
versation with President Eisenhower, with whom va cpeke of the
necessity to improve relations between our countr4e3 and solve
peacefully the outstanding questions of internatior-i: relations.
But, my friends, today it is not enough to desire peace, now,
roro than over before, it is necessary to actively fight for
peace. Any any rate, in this, we Soviet leaders see one of
our primary duties.
Accordingly, we are striving to do everything so as not by
word, but by deed to promote the consolidation of peace; the
eatablishment of mutual understanding between peoples, between
states.
To substantiate my statements, I would like to recall just a
few recent facts.
July, (Cont.)
2
(Unclassified)
SECRET/NOFCRN.
-32-
Every passing year witnesses a decrease in the share of rril-
itary expenditures in our budget. e hnve dis=antled our
military bases in the territories of foreign staten - and
the way, we only had a few such military bases.
Is all this not proof of our goodwill?
We are prepared to withdraw our troops from the torritorlen
the (East) German Democratic Republic, !huirgry and Poland,
provided the Western Powers on their nart withdrnw their
troops from the territories of West Gerrany and their other
allies in Europe.
We are willing to have atomic and hydrogen wenronn -nrrletely
prohibited, and even eliminated. And this in nn, nnt 1-ecaunp
we are not strong enough in these weapons.
We propose considerable reductions of e-nvoultinel arrarent.i.
We proposed to your country a treaty nf friendnhir and cc-v-7--
eration.
Is this not a proof of our goodwill?
Wo proposed the aboiition of the existini7
or at least the conclusion of n non-aggresninn treaty 0.w,or
NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
We proposed to sum up the results of the last wnr - the 1,Int
world war - by concluding a peace treaty with Gerrany, id
normalizing the situation in West Perlin.
A lot is now being said in your country about tho
posals on the Gorman question and in particulnr n-1 the
queatiod of West Berlin. And, unfortunately, nfton t!.in
spoken of wrongly.
We are accused of trying to abrogate by our nroronfiln te
situation in urope and throughout the world, of wrintin,ti
-
provoke a serious international conflict. niturn'ly thl
is not true.
Is the proposal to conclude peace with i]errany with two
independent sovereign states existing on hr territory -
German Democratic epublic and the Feonral !eruli-
is this proposal a "cold war?"
In recent years we cut our armed forces by approximately
2,000,000 men; also making corresponding reductions of arma-
ments.
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As soon the question is put in thin way nothin.- r:
arguments of those who decry the eel joy rf tho
043ROfl'flnnnnnc
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2
(Unclassified)
SECR.ET/NOFORN
-233 -
Or take the duestion of West Berlin. More than fourteen years
have elapsed since the end of World War II and there still
exiats in West Berlin the occupation regime - the troops of
the Western Powers are still deployed in the city. Why? For.
what reason? It is said that the reason is to protect the
freedom of the West Berliners.
When the Soviet Government proposes to eliminate in West Berlin
the unjustifiably long occupation regime, to withdraw foreign
troops from that city or at least to reduce them in strength
to create a free city of West Berlin under certain guarantees
of accessibility to it fromr.]ast and from West, we are accused
of having aggressive intentions. And it is stated that we are
putting forward an ultimatum.
Is this correct? We are proposing that over a period of one
year. or eighteen tonths. an all.. German committee made up of
the representatives of both Gerran states on the basis of
parity should work and that there should be established t.
temporary status for West Berlin.
If durInf, this time the Germans do not come to agreement be*
tween each other and a tease treaty is not signed, which of
itself would resolve the Berlin issue, then we propose. onte .
again, to have negotiations on this question and can a proposal
to have negotiations be considered as an ultimatum.
To maintain foreign troops in West Berlin, to insist on the
endless continuation of.the occupation regime, this, if you
please, is tho struggle for peace. But the proposal to elim-
inate a hotbed of provocation and intrigue which is dangerous
for the cause of.peace and which West Berlin has now become -
these are aggressive aspirations. ?
Wo naturally do not share such a viewpoint and are convinced
that in tho long run we will be correctly understood.
Tho statement of the Western countries should insistently and
patiently seek just solutions of the urgent and acute questions
of the international situation.
It is for this that we aspire - tho leaders of the Soviet
Government.
+
Or take the question of the aeveleemszt r .7elde between the
Soviet Union and the United States of America. There was,
indeed, a time when we traded with each other and this was
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SECISTMCFCEIN
?
?
?
- 34 - ?
Jtip. (Cont.).
beneficial to both you and us. But now trade relations b?,:t?toor,
2
(Unclassified)
What is the reason for this?
our states have ceased almost completely.
Who is to blame?
I will say outright that it is not we - the Soviet side -
tt
is to blame. ;In the well-known message of 3. Khrushchev,
the chairman of the Council of Finistere, to United 3taten
President rqsenhower, the Soviet Governront subritted
program for the development of Soviot-Arerioan trade.
We could buy from you equinment and rersonal consumer r-,cds;
and to sell you our goods and raw materials, to hr1!1,7 the turn-
over of trade to several billion dollars n year.
Words can sometimes be heard in your country that - so it in
said - trading with tho USSP and a.gline that country your
machines, the United States would be hol-Am- to build communism
in our country. Those aro foolish assertions. Tho oviet
Union is such a powerful country, it has no many sincere friends
in the world, that we will be quite able to build eormuntnm
without the aid of the capitalists.
Our seven-year plan is based on our internal forces. An0 if we
propose evermore insistently to expand OUT economic ties we -!2
so because mutually beneficial trade is the boot rethod of "re-
serving and developing good rolatiOns between our countries.
We are also sure that trade with tho Soviet Union and resort
to the even greater market of the Socialist countries.ould
bring serious benefits to the business mon of the United .;teten,
would increase the work capacity of your nowt,rful in-'ustry ant
would raise tho employment of the population.
A concrete
Unfortunately, our nronosals, both in the f!eld of nol;:inc,
acute problems of international relations and on. the or-anni,)n
of trade, have as yet not yet mot with ,'ue urx!erstandin;7
part of the United States Government.
This is obviously the influence of thou? qurztorn w!.o to serve
their selfish ends would seek to perpetuate the tension in the
relations between our countries. But we must not lonn heart
and give up. Undoubtedly, it will require no little ti:7e and
effort to obtain a radical improvement in the relati,-,es biltwtIon
th nctt nne thn RcnR_
SECRETACFCRN
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2
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- 35 -
?
On this accro,*the Russians have a good proverb: "Without
effort you cannot even Urag a fish out of the pond."
?
No matter how thorny the road for mutual cooperation of our
etates, every step even the least significant one, made in
this direction is met with a sigh of relief on the part of the
broadest quarters of the population in every country of the
world. And this is so b9cause small as it may be, every such
sten is yet another stone laid in the foundation of the grand
edifice of peace...
?
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sEarET/ncfm:I
-36-
US Mission Berlin Peport of 7nst Berlin Press '7emment en
? Presidential 7.1ect1on: Organ Central Committee of SED, Neues
Deutschland declared today that West will regret having
ignored GDR warnings against holding Federal ?net:bile_ rresi.-
dential election in West Berlin.
?
In editorial entitled "?ow Proof" reties Deutschland dnclqrne
"Bonn thought they could cast serious warninFs rind
to winds. Provocation was carried out. They ?1,1r! -f
Federal Perublic president on territory of r,D7 in :ort
or more precisely, they proclaimne n mn (-11r,f "4- rtntr.."
7ditorial continues that at opening o" thin tra'1r---.:rr.
President of Bonn's "pseudo parliament". ';erstonrni,'r, i'Peo!
"Berlin is a land of bundes renublik." Pnpor orrj'nn17-d
said "Berlin" without limiting his reference ?o city !n
Berlin "to rake clear beyond doubt that it unn d-111,0r,Ito
provocation." ? ?
Only because GBP refused to be provoker', ertico co.1*!n.:Th
were Federal Republic parliamentarians nh3o trnv-1 tnCft
Berlin. Thus by crossing OR borders they ox--orionood thha
fact that Berlin lies on territory of GDR, pe.rmittiee
travels "does not alter the fact that all Berlin hnsicnlly rnd
under international law belongs to the torritr-ry of G:' ."
Gerstenmaier, by declaring Berlin is a stnto of the. Fodorn1
Republic, "was in legal contradiction of internatiennl agree-
ments on subject and even with so-called constitution for
(West) Berlin promulgated 1950." Article also roror?e te
letter from US, UK and French High Corrinsioners !'rty
to Adenauer stating "lest 3erlin, new as nrovin-ily, in 7 t
be regarded regarded as a state of Federal republic". ;leo ritod Etrendt
speech to the Bundestag February 24, 1955 (under int-rnntinlil
law West Berlin does not belong to Federal Republic) a:y1 to
Couve de Yurvillele statement Fay 22 at r:onovn.
Article then states Western rowers have rojocto,1 j t'.1t
West Berlin is state of Federal T'enublic. "They niece ruct:
more value on maintaining so-called four -owo.o a?ittue frer
1945. Gerstenmaier has now destroyed is tV03iB, Wv117.:1 in
fact was already untenable. They res-ret "Lnt tH.y
our warnings to the wind!"
Editorial concludes that Yost 3erlin unfreed in -eet
dangerous threat to peace, internetionel unrierea::ding. _;er.ove
Conference, etc. Most urgent task to mnintni% noaco Is ",tr0-
fore normalization and that in creatiee ,f feeit
city of West Berlin.
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?
July (Cont.)
7
(Official
Use Only)
?
?
?
?
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? e 37 _
US Mission Berlin Renort of East German Editorial on Resumption
of Geneva Talks: East German daily National Zeitung in editor-
ial entitled "The New Phase" repeated charge made in Nej.
Deutschland July 3 that election Federal Republic President
July 1 and Gorstenmaier's statements have weakened Western
legal position in Berlin.
Next phase Geneva, editorial stated, will be followed by summit
conference. Forces of peace have already achieved great
progress since negotiations began. Developments show position
We tern Rowers is weakening. 7ditorial continues "realistic
political circles Went Germany recognize that Bonn hag weakened
this position by West Berlin Presidential election. Western
Powers ecsire maintain occunation status, but Bonn declared
Berlin is a state of the Federal Republic. Bonn gave West
Berlin representatives equal voting rights with West Germans
nn(' let their ballots be east in same urn. If West Berlin is
declared to be Fedora/ Republic state, then in accordance with
Paris treaties, there can no longer be occunation rights there.
On what then are the victors' rights of three Western Powers
in West Berlin, which were so often proclaimed during the
Geneva Conference, based?"
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. - 38 ?
4?i
Julv US Mission Berlin report cf That Gerren -onition en ';eneva
9 Talks: In interval between two phases et' Geneva Foreign
(Confidential) Ministers' talks GDR spokesmen have frequently reiterated lino
developed by GDR delegation Geneva on Cey of adjeurnrent tn
the effect that evaluation of first ni-ase of tell's reveals
important positive results. "raising fact trit negotlatlenn
are under way at all, they list as outstnndinr nch!evo,r-rts
the "do facto recognition of GDR", destruction of Bonn
"pretensions" to be only German Governrent end allered iflsOrr
accentance of "fact" that German nrobleri cennet be nettled
without particination of both Gerrnn states.. :irst
talks also praised for revoalinr to wc71-1 "fact" '!-%1 Ac!nnnuor
leadership is rain obstacle to internator'.1 arree--::t and
chief threat to neace, whereas G'..sa is only ::tate
having nolicies meetinr the true r'esiros of -1Thrily -f (-err-en
people. Tast German snokeseen also reiterated t' 't.
Western leaders (snecifically Foreirm 7?oT!) ?-ve
admitted West Berlin situatioft is "nno-n1elif7," 1.1 :
tible of nimnroverent".
cast German statements of last three wee':s 7ny
indicate posture Soviets/GDR may tate on cet H rH
next round of talks. Continuous reiterinn -f 11.11 rt
for GDR by "mirhty" ussr and Socialist
that at least initial nosture Geneva will hard in
mising, with insistence that negotiations be renwree.1 on c.r.
basis of Gromyko proposals June 17. It is net
Soviet-GDR snokcsmen will utilize early onrortuni'y
a barrage of charges arainst West with Federal 7'enlir. rain
target.
There has been frequent renetition of there tfrt sn=i+, ti
are inevitable and next roune of UV:a at Geneva, w.11., fell-
ing (as expected) to reach major decirions, wi'l succe.A In
major task of nrenering for nummit tal'es;
with this there is firm assertion Yet wants gee nelds
decisions and must not rake serious mistake of qinwr1-7 "qt
Soviets are willing "nay a once" for such tq'.'s. -alt
Germans continue to describe Soviet/GDF rronna's rIn--re
effort to reach mutually accentable cornronin but '--n
not mean "willin-ness to sacrifice basic nrine!-1e.7".
In various ferns 7ast German snoker-ren "Ive ?':'
tions by Soviet srekesr= that ti-n limits (fIrit, ,ira' 1qt -r
18 months) mentioned relative to :,orlIn /- n-t "---
stitute an ultimatum. rowevor, -ast ..,ernes on several
. .
? ?
occasionJ ntivu js.Li ? t.r.y ti imA L., J.. ?J
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-39-
'July (Cont.) settlement for unlillited period of occupation of West Berlin
9 based on r.ighto allegedly derilied from Nazi Germany capitula-
(Confidential) tion. Thia theme Seems to carry intimation they are willing
to consider modified occupation status with rights derived
from new agreement itself and not from World War II capitula-
tion. Recent attacks on Federal Republic presidential election
and Gerstenmaier statement indicate likelihood of charges at
Geneva that thia. demonstrates unclear "anomalous" status of
Wept Berlin.
Shortly before Foreign Ministers' talks adjourned Neues
Deutschland editorial June 17 mentioned Western Powers origin-
ally expressed interest in, but subsequently cooled towards,
creation of all-German commission, some form of zone of re-
duced armaments, non+aggrossion pact and an interim solution
to Lenin. During last three weeks nearly all East German
otatenents re Geneva have stressed importance of creation of
ell-Gorman commission but have either not mentioned or soft-
pedaled other subjects listed June 17. East Germans have also
played up reports alleging "peoples' movement" developing West
Gamely in nunnort of vast/West German negotiations and, in
this connection, have stressed importance of East/West German
tall-s in Geneva (outside of Conference room) letween dele-
gations of citizens and GDP official delegation. Pattern
thus developed may indicate Soviets/GDR will press hard for
agreement on all-German commission in this round of talks.
Attacks against Federal Bepublic, and particularly against
Adonauer personally, have been maintained at high level during
the last throe weeks. Meetings of expelled groups have been
mentioned as examnlos of Bonn's "revanchist policies". In
one instance Vast German statements have hinted at possibility
of Polish and Czech particination in talks might be revived
at Geneva. Khrushchov's scheduled arrival Warsaw July 14
would fit in with such move. In addition, his decision to be
in Warean as Conference resumes suggests he may use locale to
bear down heavily on charges against "aggressive Federal
Poeublic militaristic nolicios" with confidence of finding
considernble resonance this theme among Poles and with hope
of exerting Pressure on Geneva talks.
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Use Only)
- 4C -
US Mission Berlin 7.enort of Further -ant :-!nrlin Prnsn Cr,mrent
on Presidential-rUection: Fast Lerlin daily, :,11.() :;nit, today
returned to 'question of effect of July 1 nrecieentint rInctinr,
and Gerstenmaior's statement union legal nonitinn of 'nntrn
Powers in Berlin and stated flatly C;eviets/GM YI11nroti.
this action at Geneva. In front-nage editorial relit, 7nit
declared lonn has unilaterally changed feur -ewer etatus of
West Berlin. USSF and GDP obliged regard nlectInn nn n
cation, and Gerstenmaier's insistence that West Berlin in Ilhd
of Federal Republic as result of 1957 federal rnnntitutin--1
court was last straw.
Editorial continues "behind all this in fact U-nt -illy PrnrAlt,
who so eagerly mixes into Federal Terublic Porr:n
deliberately refrained from inforninp C. Gorntenrni r
protest by '.!est Berlin corrnndants. The ro-rt 0?riri'n0Y)
which Gerstenmater with great pathos rof-rrn,:, wan nevnr
recognized as legal by Western Allies Necalele It rnalli,!t-d
with their earlier decisions and the st:,t,;:n of Perlin."
Editorial then states Gerstenraier oe
West Berlin electors riftt of vote are r'ir: n-t nven
separate ballot boxes. ""o did not, tl'creby, c'.%n;:, -1 ? "
results. He only insurer that ''oreirn inist .rn n-w
will be faced with l'oll-founeed nrotest from 1..,; rtn t..
They now cannot deny that the often-mentioned flu: ?
status has long been invalidated, with three ':torn 'f,.;?rn
acquiescence, by Donn Government actions includinv,
Bundestag meetings in Berlin rind establinhmr.r.t 1V'To
Republic agencies."
Editorial follows similar statements in -nue:, 1:eutnr.:lad
July 3 and national Znitunr July 7 and is moct eatee,eleql.
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- 41 -
July Txcerpts from Khrushchev Soeech in Stettin: Here on the re-
17 gained Polish western lands, of all the many pages of Polish
(Unclasaified) history, a particularly glorious one is brought to mind--the
battle of Gruenwald, whose 550th anniversary occurs this year.
It was said in ancient times that history is life's teacher.
What does this ancient page of history teach us today?
Gurenwald remains in the people's memory forever as an example
not only of gallant resistance to foreign invaders, but also
of the fact that the road to victory over the enemy lies in
the unity of the threatened people. In one rank with the
Poles, who took upon themselves the main burden of the
struggle with the Teutonic order, were the Lithuanian and Czech
detachments. The Russian, Smolensk, and Belorussian regiments
were also there, firmly repulsing the onslaught of the Crusaders
on the field of Gruenwald. Gruenwald has become the symbol of
the joint struggle of our peoples, who are closely linked by
language and tradition, by their way of life and culture.
110 oleo feel this historic closeness and brotherhood deenly
today. In the days of Joint struggle against Hitlerite in.
vadeee, the Soviet and Polish soldiers fought together as
true comrodes?in?arme. nut today our brotherhood and our unity
have become considerably wider and much stronger. The frater-
nal alliance linking the peoples who have freed themselves
from capitalist slavery, the peoples who are in complete agree?
ment and who, with mutual support, are building their bright
future, 13 a mighty and unconquerable force. The unity of the
? camn of the socialist countries fears no kind of threat.
ay are we toclay recalling and speaking of the lessons of the
long distance past and of World War II? They must be recalled
because there are noople who do want to take into account the
lessons of the past. There are organizations, newspapers,
radio stations uhcso whole activity is directed at fanning
ideas of revanchism. There are statesmen in Bonn, and not only
in Bonn, who patronize this revenge-seeking propaganda, in-
spire it, and proclaim nonrecognition of Poland's western
frontier. They even openly demand its revision. These gentle-
men appear to have lost their sense of reality completely.
They are dreaming that Wroclaw should transform itself again
to Breslau, Gdansk into Danzig, and Szczecin into Stettin.
But let them be aware that Wroclaw, Gdansk, and Szczecin'are
Polish towns and will rennin so forever.
.? 4-^ +hair wAatern lands.
lhe mistorie ()I 1416
the blood Jointly shed by us for their liberation, the tremen-
dous amount of work out in by the Polish people for their re-
construction, are all sacred, and nobody will be allowed to
violate them.
?
STCPET/K1FnRN
IBiz (Cont.)
17
? (Unclassified)
SECP3TPOFCRr
42
?
?
Now times have chaneee. or the first t1r-e 'n Polend's eni!re
history it has a peace-loving neirh'-)or cn its eeetern rrentier.
The first German state of workers end eeaoants, the Cern
Democratic republic, !-as been in existence and grewine n4.rene,r
for 10 years. The imnortance of the GD-' to the reficnful
development of the whole Turone is groat. !leceenitien
GDP of the frontier along the Ceer and "elose, renundl:ion cr
all kinds of territorial claims:, resolete condennation re-
vanchist propaganda, friendshin and cooneration .-st.Yeen
GDP and PAonle's Polar-' rnrching torethor nlonr the r or
development to socialism, are ,111 imnortlnt factor .--lilrqntoo-
ing peace and the inviolability of the frentior:: 'r
Polish People's republic. ?
The mighty socialist clmn is grong n-d becnrIn e?re
'Then the rilitarist circles of tho 'est rn -
argressive milft3ry !!LTO bloc, tl:e soci-Ii-t r 1:ntri-s
forcee to counterbalance this bloc by rfnortin,-
zation of the "arsaw treaty eountriez !Lit t,
mirht uneerstand better that an arrresscr's
socialist country 'ou1 lone to im-orliA:0
from all the countries of the socialist c-tr-.
?
The western border of the socialist courfri::
border between the GDF and the Feder,) -onnblir? -f
lies. We regard this border of the GT; ns
as a line dividlng the vorld of sedans:- fro:- te
capitalism. This border is for each of tio rountri.!
Warsaw alliance and for the entire socialist c-irn ns 1n i 5l
and sacred as the borders of each of our countries.
We have said more than once that we shall firht for t.;:-Lt
frontier against any foe who ray try to encronch on it.
Those who still have any evil designs against 'eorlo's
must know that Poland today is not the sem() as it wan yeern
ago. It now has true alliee, such as the Soviet Union qnri.
all the countries of the socialist cern. They All
the frontiers of People's Poland as they :lef.ne
frontiers. The Soviet Government has reeoatedly are
uvo-
ally made !rnoweits position on this question. Mere in
r'oland's westernmost town it is annronril-e to reenli th.%.
frent4er poste' on the ?der are :'nisse ,111 dnfenr',d
of us, shoulder to shoulder with the "olish nennle.
non,. swirnAncs --
is the preservation and strengthenine of ncoic.1. f:re
and cannot be a more ineortant task than t'qt, of 1-4Irri:-4-
--- I -
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July (Cont.)
17
(Unclassified)
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SC117T/N0F0P1Y
- 43 -
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road to war. Thorn is no more lofty aim than the preservation
and strongthenin7 of nonce. The peoples of the whole world
await an improvement in the international situation and the
end uf the cold war with great hope. Our proposals for the
conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, and thereby for the
liquidation of the occupation regime in "est Berlin, serve the
cause of fleece and te causa of easing international tension.
Wo have firmly uphold and will continue to uphold these pro-
nosals, because we are convinced that their settlement will
lead to the creation of an atmosphere of trust between states
and will nave the way to the settlement of other international
issuer. The people of the world eemand the settlement of such
issues of primordial importance as the questions of discon-
tinuing the tests of nuclear weapons, of reducing armed forces
and armaments, of banning atomic and hydrogen weapons, and of
liquidating military bases in foreign territories. The future
of the world and the security of the peoples are dependent
on the settlerent of these issues.
The Soviet Union wants to decide all controversial questions
not through war, but through peaceful way;, througfi negotia-
tions. However, certain circles in the West oppose this by
every nossiblo means and continue to increase international
tension. This is shown by such facts as the creation of US
rocket bases on the territory of a number of states, the
spoodod-up armament of West Germany, and the preparations for
the equjnning of the West German army with atomic weapons.
Nevertheless, we are convinced that the situation is not work-
inn to the advantage of those amateurs who are taking part
in war ventures. The might and the unity of the socialist camp
and the w?akoning of the camp of imnorialism creates con-
Citions under which a new war can be prevented and peace se-
cured. The peoples of the socialist countries arp vigilantly
wntching the intrigues of the enemies of peace. They are
ready to frustrate any plans of imperialist reaction.
July
23
(Unclassified)
SECR7T/NOFOPN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Ap roved for Release
SECRET/NCFCRN ?
- 44 - ?
Fxceuts from Joint Deelnration Tssllod at Conclusion 2f U7N7.
Delegation's Visit to Poland: The foreign policies of the
Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic are directed
toward thd elimination of the threat of? a now war, toward the
peaceful coexistence of states with different social :systems,
and toward the easing of international tension and the compre-
hensive development of mutual cooperation between nil states.
The successes of the countries of the powerful socialist c-im
will lead to an even greater growth and consolidltion -r
peace-loving forces in the whole world. The furtror ,-rcuth
and consolidation of the world system of socia:Inn crent-s
insurmountable obstacles to the aims of the n;Tressivo crcl
The socialist countries, prirarily the 3oviet. -ut
forward a number of concrete oro-,Pn.11s fc,r nottl of
urgent international nroblems thrr2177,h nocetiq"-nn.
These proposals have the increasing sunnort of w,71-141.:,7 rvcrl?
and certain political circles in oil countries. It is te-
coming increasingly obvious to the broad rnss,s of (word
indistinct) for various political forcer of the canitniin'
world that no position of strength policy can halt the (1,-n1-
nant process of current development of socialiam or aurpresi
the national liberation movement.
Only peaceful coexistence and neaceful competition letiween the
two systems can avert the outbreak of war.. The exi3tence ,f
the socialist camp and its ever-increasing mioht in n Dcw-rf%!
barrier to all attempts to impose upon the world derini-no
arising from the positions of strength policy.
The aggressive imperialist circles, which up until ncu have
profited most from the cold war, however, refused to reaLon
themselves to the fact that the positions-of-strength Tolicy
has brought on an ever-deepening crisis. They stub$x-Irrdy
reject all pronosals which might relax tension Ind do what-
ever they can to prevent a eetonte and oven aogrevtlte the
international situation.
This is the meaning of the policy of aggressive
the United States and NATO leaders for speeding up atomic armn-
ment and supplying atomic weapons to West Ger7-nn
and revanchists, and speeding up the construct .)f 'A:
rocket and atom bases around the countries of 'he rociti
S7.CP3T/NCFCRN
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"
July (Cont.)
23
(Unclapoified)
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? SBCPST/NOFCRN
- 45 -
?
Only peaceful coexistence .and peaceful competition between the
two systems can avert the. outbreak of war. The existence of '
the socialist camp and its ever-increasing might is a powerful
barrier to all attermats to impose upon the world decisions
arising from the positions of strength policy.
Theaggreasivo'imporialist circles, which up until now have
profited most from the cold war, however, refused to resign
thamsolve; to the fact that the nositions-of-strength policy
1120 brought on an over-deepening crisis. They stubbornly re-
ject all proposalswhch mtght relax tension and do whatever
they can to prevent a .,:tfIntEj. and even aggravate the inter-
nation/11 situation. ?
This la the meaning of 4,,124: mlicy of aggressive circles of the
United States and MhT0 leads for speeding up atomic armament
and aunnlying atomic weapons to West German militarists and
rovanchists. and sneeding sp the construction of MATO rocket
and atom bases around the countries of the socialist camp.
The delegations havo given serious attention to questions re-
lating to Germany. It was unanimously noted that the most
Important questions which require immediate settlement are the
signing of a peace treaty with Germany and the liquidation of
the occueation regime in West Berlin. That the German peoples
atill have no peace treaty and that an occupation regime still
exists in West Berlin are absolutely abnormal and intolerable.
This state of affairs which is exploited by forces hostile to
the cause of noace, notably by the Government of the Federal
Gorman Republic, which seeks to aggravate the political situa-
tion in '7;urope, seriously jeonardizes neace. The militariza-
tion of West Germany becomes rarticularly dangerous in view of
the actions of the Federal German Pepublic designed to supply
the Buneeswehr with rocket and atomic weapons.
more is no doubt that West German militarism, adhering to the
Atlantic concept of the policy of strength and counting on
continued tension in international relations, seeks to gain a
dominant position in Western Europe in order to launch in the
future an imnorialist war. Words indistinct) economic
expansion which in the 'course of the past 50 years has twice
^ d74-.atha world to disaster and brought to the German people
nothtng but calamity, death, ar.e. dcE!+ruction.
The Federal republic of Germany sunports the activities of
rovnnchist quartors--it is the only -overnrent in Europe which
hen territorial claims against other states, and it seeks to
?
SnrET/FOFORN
?
?
July (Cont.)
23
(Unclassified)
S7=11N0FaIN ?
-46-
?
?
(perpetuate?) the division of Europe into onpo;ition military
blocs, avoiding the normalization of its relations with rnny
countries in astern Europe.
Revanchist and militarist circl^ es in "est Cerrany, wh-ne int-r-
ests are reprosented by Chancellor Adennuer, at ereneet act an
the main opponent to the relaxation of international ?-nnin
and the champions of cold-war conflicts.
Such a policy is unacceptable to the neoplos -f the w-rd,
particularly to those which only 15 years ago h1' H the .
struggle against ilitlerism.
The delegations of the Soviet Union and the r-011/. .w7-101q
Tepublic believe that at the Genova Cor.foronc' tF-r-17n
Ministers have done a certain amount of useful , r: . Th:';
ference has clarified the positions of thr. rarti-- n
of questions and specified the existing differf.nr?r-
have been made to narrow the gap between tho viewroin'a -f t.
sides. At the same time, the delegations note ,Jith t' at
in view of the attitude of the Yeatern ''cwora 'he
ference has so far failed to reach aFreament on the
a peace treaty with Germany and the normalization thr. .litaa-
tion in West Berlin.
The present attitude of the Western Powers and tho
Republic of Germany makes more remote the agre.r-nt which in
awaited by all the peoples and esti lead to a furter ar-roval-n
of the situation fraught with clangors for the cau:.e
in Europe.
Both delegations consider that a mooting of herv'n of
which would discuss and adopt decisions on the most ,-rgent
problems of the present-day international situation ancl which
would certainly be conducive to the easing of internnal
tension would be of great imnortanco for the s-luti n rf the
major issues of our tiro.
Both parties emphasize the particular right of :01and ant'
Czechoslovakia to take part in the examination of .:i11,-.1?An-._1
pertaining to the German nroblan ane "uropoan nr.ouriey rt?
conferences between -ast an? West aryl exnrean th- rer-rat `.ftt
in spite of the numrrous proposals insistently n'',/ancd y ? q
A^Iyin-h the attitnde of the Western Fold..ra ha n no f-1:
robbed Polane ane Czechoslovakia of the onnortunity to !ra.::q
their contribution to the work of these conferences.
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July (Cent-)
23
(Unclassified)
SECR7T/NCFORIJ.
- 47 -
Both delegations state that the Soviet Union and the Polish
People's republic will continue a consistent struggle for the
conclusion of a peace treaty with an all-German government or
any other nleninotentiary authority respresenting all of
GerMnIV. Taking into account the situation that exists at
present, the parties are of the opinion that in the present
circumstances a eace treaty nuat be signed with both existing
German states. If however, the aggressive Western circles
torpedo a neaceful settlement on this basis, the Polish People's
republic and the Soviet Union will sign a neace treaty with the
GDR. confident that n peace treaty with the GDP will also be
signed by other states which are genuinely concerned in the
stronrtheninr of peace and security in '7urope.
Proceeding from the fact that the maintenance of an occupation
rocine in \lest Berlin is fraught with serious complications
for theintordational situation, the delegations of the Polish
People's ronublic an the Soviet Union declare that one can
no longer tolerate n situation directed toward the preserve.*
tion for an indefinite tine, of the occupation regime in
\leatern Berlin. The granting to Vest Berlin of a votranteed
status as a free city would be a rossible and quite sati6.
factory solution of this question until the reunification of
Germany.
The peoples of Poland and the Soviet Union exnress their soli-
darity with and support of the first Gerran state of workers
and peasants in history, the GDP, which is successfully build-
ing socialism an waging an active struggle for security in
Europe. Both sides note with satisfaction that the GDR
Government made a considerable contribution to the efforts of
peace-loving countries directed toward a speedy conclusion of
a German neace treaty, the solution of the Berlin problem, and
the safeguarding of 7uropean security. .
Nowever, if, in snite of the good will of the GDP and other
socialist countries, the abnormal situation in West Berlin is
not liquidated, Poland and the ussr will sunport the GDR re-
garding those measures which it will deem necessary to under-
take within the framework of its sovereign rights for the
elimination of the abnormal situation in West Berlin.
The Polish reopio r'cr.nl,lic and the Soviet Union fully support
the nronosal of the GDP, for the concluloll cf A nonaggression
pact between the GDP and the Federal Penublic of Geri-aTna
the rejection by both German states of atomic and rocket
weapons.
?
S-,CPET/NOFOPm
11-121z (Cont.)
23
(Unclassified)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
SECr7:TA;Orlr"
- 48 -
The Governments of Poland and the Union ..,e re-
affirmed that the 'frontier along the Or and thn 'Aisnhian
Neisse is the only lawful, junt, and inviolnble fro.lt!er ,,e-
tween Poland and Cermany. The awiet Union and other s"oialint
countries have repeatedly put forward constr1:ctive
for the relaxation of international tension and the rre:'!"n
of an atmosphere of trust between countries.
The 2olish People's Penublic and the f;rviet rnirn
advocated and are advocating the ending of 'he ar-a7-nt ra--
and general disarmament and are consistently irsinti-p -n?
full and unconeitional prohibition or Ito,-ic and h:r*--)r7. n
weapons and their nermanont withernwal from armn-IPrtn.
The Yestern Pov:2rs, r:i-Prily the !nitr.(3 5,10Th 1.,
ly objecting to the nronibition or ..e.o" -trmn. '-
Western Powers have la co ihe thr,nt of thQ un rf n'
weanons at the basis roreimn 'ln
possible to solve this -ost lmrortnnt nroller -r
until now.
The Governments of the 17,-r and 'Ol%rd oimr, r-rr, r-
they support the nronosal for the conclunici "r c
pact between members of the rarsaw Fnct
wauld be an important means for easinp interm'Lenil
increasing confidence, and creating coneitinns fr-
settlemmt of questions at issue.
The Soviet Government once npnin declnres that It fu1ly ?
the pronosal of the rolish Peonle's Governrent
lishnent of an atom and rock-t-free cone in Centrn1
This pronosal, if ncese)ted, could he an imnortnnt st,-- in
easing international tension in -uropo and ellrinatin,: to
threat of a catastrophic atonic war on tho 'uropenn cont!nent.
for thn
An atom-free zone in Central Throne coull 1"ecore ?,r1 irc
link in the establishrint of an atom-fro, zrno !,kn
two opposing military groups. The existence cf. nu-',
uoulc relieve the threat of an atomic wnr !n
the basin of the Baltic Con nne th! Schneinnv!.nn 1.
Coneitions now exist for the peoples of the laltio ar)' qn-
dinavinn ares to make efforts for the st -h -'n 1.n t
Baltic area cf a zone of neaseful coexistence cf emi_ctrl?i
Yith eifforcnt sooini ayst Ali k!:17 I
those countries to dev"lor mutual econ,-,mic, ,1"(1
cultural comeration in the Interests of t1-eir ind
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? ?
- 49 -
July, (Cont,) the creation of an atmosphere oT mutual trust so that the
;13 " Baltic Sea will become a sea of peace.
(Unclassified)
Both parties would welcome and are ready to examine jointly any
initiative designed to ease tension and insure mutual security
And lasting noace in these areas. The Polish People's Republic
and the Soviet Union fully support the proposal to create an
atom-free zone in the Balkan peninsula. A refusal by the
countries of this area to station on their territories rocket
and atomic bases would be an important contribution to the
cause of peacd and security in the Balkans.
Doing mindful of the fact that the imnerialist circles are
speedinF up military preparations directed against the social-
ist countries, both parties stress the necessity of a further
strengthening of the Warsaw Treaty, which is in the present
international situation a powerful factor of peace and security
of ita members. Yet. the Polish People's republic and the
USSR will sunrort any sensible plan designed to reduce the
armed forces the member countries of NATO and the Warsaw
Treaty as well as other measures designed to ease international
Lens ion.
. Juiv GDR Press Treatment of the Geneva Conference: East German
papers today ridiculed "Western propaganda efforts" to pressure
(Official the "Socialist delegations" at Geneva by threats that the West
Use only' might break off negotiations. Neues Deutschland dismissed this
alleged tactic in front page editorial with the statement:
"whon the Western powers threaten to break off the Conference,
it is obviously a transparent bluff. The Conference continues;
the possibilities for understanding are in no way exhausted."
GDR Press Attacks on "Eapionage" in Berlin: Continuing East
Gorman press attacks against West Berlin as an espionage
center have increased in volume again this week. Several
arrests reported in which "culprits" were described as "RIAS
listeners" and "Western agents" attempting to carry out sub-
versive activities including arson which resulted in serious.
fire damage.
East rerlin Press Treatment of the Geneva Conference: There
was little direct reporting with one paper announcing that
the Soviets and the 'Jest had exchanged draft proposals and
thnt, Gromyko and Bolz met twice on Tuesday.
July
?-?)9
(Official
Uso Only)
Julv
29
(Official
1130 Only)
Commentaries were extensive in most papel 4ith,c-phnclis on
the necessity for an all-Gorman committee on a parity basis.
SECRET/NOFORN
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?
Julv (Cont.)
29
(Official
Use Only)
LOA'.
31
(Official
Use -Only)
?
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SEMET/N.Q7CW:
- 50
?
Peues Deutschland heavily attacked 7.onn lcsdors who .!e-line
to meet with Soviet Zone representatives. In a front -v1r.o
editorial and seecial article the raper cited with thn
statement in yesterday's Der Tac (*::ost lerlin (707!) ed.lt,-,ri71
that if the Federal Republic were morally roro tl,ere
would be nothing to fear from all-Gnrrnn tai:-r. with ft.e.
Peues Deutschland also said that Herter's efforts tn
that the Vest had tried for 14 years to reunify GprnAny 17-0
incorrect. It "demonstrated" by "historical review" t':nt
West was responsible for the division of Gerren:%
Zeitunp complained that the West as new unwillinr to rfici,F,
its West Berlin force level althourh t:10 Went ':.10 of?en
mentioned this in the early stages of the Gocfcren7-. ae
paper also complained that the West refun,s
espionage activities in Berlin. Wu() Zeit 'wain
RIAS for attack and charged that the Herter 1"
example of the cold war policy of he II% CPT' f,?.hnv-1
Faorin in a Soviet Zone television . ,
West was seeking another recess ra0f:r !I'no
East Berlin Press Treatment of Genevn Cooferenro: As1 s.r1
gave prominent coverage to develoronts t J!" --
ports generally accusing the West (ie-nars 1-:rr
their power to ensure that the Conference t-rea:1 .!'.
results. Berliner Zeiturws in lead 'tory -1-andt17
"urgent" trip to Geneva as an ntternt "to
circumstances an agreement which would load to a:11r-r!?
conference." Under the title "inrulted by m
Berliner ZeitunR renorted on nrocs conference of a f.ra:e
member of the West Berlin delegation of consumers F71,-,ds
trade.who had been in Geneva Thursday. 7"ne lady 1:an iu,tod
as saying that the US delegation had treated tH,m
and insulted them by saying they were "bought t-y
In editorial comment :leues Deutschland thow:ht it "inc-r.-
prehensible" that Harter should consider th nn-Areri-an
Conference more important than Geneva, and went on *e
the proposal for a permanent cenfer,.nce lf frirri:-!?1:1?-?
or their deputies.
Under the headline "lot West resist?neace treaty w!'1
Moues Deutschland topped, and other 'a-lers ra-r!-O, te
Soviet Zone Premier Crotewohl's remarks before A,^(0
at Wismut. Ho quoted Grotowohl as saying: "If
and tha capitalist world 14 years after war conti-11:, to
.1*
we are determined to make a noaco treaty with tH
all countries whicilare willing to do so.
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?
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-28
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SECRET/NOFORN
-51-
Excerpts from Khrushchev Speech at Dnepropetrovsk: In
one of his speeches, Mr. Nixon said that he favored
world peace. .We said: Add the words "world peace,
the liquidation of military baaea on foreign soil."
(Stormy applause) He is in favor of world peace, but
he does not mention the second part--military bases.
The whole issue is that if he began to speak of the
liquidation of military bases we would really believe
that Mr. Nixon is in favor of world peace. But we do
not lose hope that the time will come when the U.S.
military bases in other countries will be liquidated.
We had quite frank discussions with Mr. Nixon on many
matters, including the revival of militarism in West
Germany. When I explained our position to him, Mr. Nixon
asked: "Are you afraid of the Germans?" We do not fear
German revanchists and militarists, I told him. A
strong man does not fear a mad dog, but he does not
want it to bite him.
Despite the existing difficulties, there is now some
hope, in our opinion, that an acceptable solution of the
problems can be found with the prestige of the states
taking part in the negotiations suffering no lose.
On what is our optimism based? It is based on the fact
that all participants in the talks, it seems to us,
understand the need of doing away with the abnormal
situation in Germany, and primarily in West Berlin. After
bilateral statements it has become obvious to everyone
that the Soviet Union as well as the Western powers do
not want to violate the existing form of life of the
West Berlin population. If the inhabitants of West
Berlin express the desire to live in a capitalist order,
let them do so --itss their internal business and we have
no intention of interfering with them.
At present the lack of clarity and precise understanding
has been eliminated regarding the period of validity of
the agreement on the temporary status of West Berlin
and the all-German organ for direct talks between the
GDR and West Germany. By the way, we have emphasized
more than once that the question of time limit is not the
main question. All this, comrades, gives us the right
to hope that we can come to a settlement of questions
wiiiwould be in accordance with the interests oi
preserving and strengthening peace and in the interests
of the European peoples, including the German people.
SECRET/NOFORN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
SECRETMOFORN
-52-
cont:) The Soviet Government would like to hope that all
interested states will approach the examination of our
proposals regarding talks between the GDR and ',lost
Germany, and on the normalization of the situation in
West Berlin, with due responsibility, and that relevant
decisions will be adopted at the Geneva conference. I
must state frankly that the ministers of foreign affairs
encounter great difficulties, inasmuch as they must .
examine most important unsolved international questions
on which the fate of the world depends. We say outrit,
as we have said earlier, that the discussion and,
moreover, the solution of such problems, is eaeior for
the heads of government. It is precisely the heads of
government who have a greater experience in solvirg
international questions; they also have greater anq more
extensive powers.
(Unclassified)
It seems to US that the time has come when the leadora
of government must tackle this difficult work. Lot the
ministers make new efforts in the search for mutually
acceptable solutions and agree an what they are able
to agree, while the remainder, which is the most difficult,
and based on principles, will be examined by the head/2
of government,
We pin our hopes on the belief that agreement can be
reached on many issues in dispute and that peace can be
insured. We consider that this agreement should be such
as not to inflict any moral or material damage to either
side. As regards the Soviet Union, it is ready for such
an agreement.
The relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States are of paramount importance for the entire
international situation. Our country and the United
States are the two most powerful states in the world. If
the other countries come to blows they can be taken
apart. But if war should start between America and our
country no one else will be able to stop it. It will be
a catastrophe on a tremendous scale. Therefore every
effort should be made to settle existing disputes without
recourse to war, to achieve a relaxation of international
tension, to insure peaceful coexistence of states with
different social and political systems.
I think that President Eisenhower and Vice President
Nixon realize this and do not want war, Mr. Eisenhower
knows what war means. During World War II when ho van
the commander in chief of the Anglo-American troops on
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the Western front, Mr. Eisenhower fulfilled honestly
all the terms of. the agreement with us. He should be
given his due in this respect. We have no complaints
against him on this score. We want to hope that
President Eisenhower will strive for understanding with
the Soviet Union and will do everything within his
power to prevent the unleashing of a new warp
As for us, we shall not be found wanting. We are always
ready to display good will. The Soviet Union will
continue to fight ceaselessly for a relaxation of
international tension, for the solution of 4isputes by
peaceful means. In this struggle we have the support
.ef all peace-loving mations& of all the peoples of the
worlds
The present leaders in the United States are naturally
alarmed by the growth of the forces of communism, and
this situation cannot be disregarded. However, we
think that they will be reasonable. The more
soberminded representatives of the capitalist world are
coming to realize that it is senseless to fight communist
ideas by arms and that guns will not stop the spread of
communist ideas. It would be no less ridiculous to
try to spread these ideas by force of arms. The Soviet
Union never pursued and never will pursue such aims
which are incompatible with the.great teaching of
Marxism-Leninism.
In the West, even the representatives of the ruling
circles are beginning to clearly understand that the
Soviet Union does not want war. Mr. Nixon told us: We
believe that the Soviet people and the Soviet Government
do not want war. To this I replied: If you believe in
the peaceful intentions of our country then why do you
continue the armament race and why do you build military
bases around our frontiers?
After all, as long as your military bases are around the
frontiers of the Soviet Union, friction between ourselves
and the United States is inevitable. The danger is always
present that the friction might produce a fire. (TASS
English version quoted Khrushchev as saying that this
friction "might produce war."--Ed.) When two soldiers
fr-m-dif.fcrant k.,uuritriea -face each other accicreTffa?dan
always happen, accidents which can lead to catastrophic
consequences. Then why allow this to happen? It is
bettor to conduct affairs in a way which will avoid a
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-54-
situation. It is better to liquidate foreign military
bases on foreign territories and to withdrew troops
within the limits of one's national frontiers. Then
there will be no points of contact between our armed
forces, and no reaction which might produce the spark
capable of starting a fire.
We consider the Soviet Union's position to be more .
secure than it over has been before. Our oconoric
successes are tremendous. Our people have rillied
closely around our own Communist Party. '10 possess
allies who have united together with ourselves into
the invincible camp of peace and socialism. F!Irti..'r
good and concerted work both in the factories and on the
collective farms will be a pled of the sucoes!,
great cause and a pledge of the consolidation
(APrlatse)
Comrades, the Central Committee cf our party an:1 'ho
Soviet Government believe that a situltion has at
present been created in which the imperialist:, will
hardly dare to launch a war against our mc,therland
against the countries of socialism. Our tomes an
those of our socialist allies are colossal and in the
West, apparently, this is now understood.
As a result of World War I, Soviet Aussie heca:re a
socialist country. As a result of World War II, 12 ether
countries became socialist countries. As a result of
a third world war, should it ever be launched by the
imperialists, capitalism will be eliminated. 'r,e are
convinced of this. We hope that the imperialists also
understand this and will not play with fire,
US Mission Berlin Ponort of ur Stateri,nts c)n Treqty:
Past week has seen in several statements by GLYe. spokouran
renewed threat of separate peace treaty in event four
powers reach no agreement, but such statements accerpaniod
by hints of need for patience and extended time-table,
While Ulbricht on July 25 insisted separate peace trelty
will be concluded if no four power resolution ?erlin
and German problems and warned against any action by
West which might lead to World War 3 (Curtel 123 ept,
115 Bonn, 55 Geneva), ho nonetheless acknowledged four
3?...ni.in problems may require
several conferences "to bring about accommodation stop
by step."
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In July issue, S) ideological magazine Einheit article
reviewing negotiations Geneva again specified USSft and
GDR will, if western powers continue reject "socialist"
proposals, take necessary measures end threat to peace
posed by West Berlin. In such event GDR will conclude
peace treaty with USSR and other states. "The
conclusion of such a peace treaty will, beyond question,
invalidate .agreement between USSR and GDR reached in
exchange of letters between respective fonmins in 1955,
and grant all sovereign ?rights concerning Berlin and
access to West Berlin to the GDRO" Article concludes
that duo to threat to peace resulting from West Berlin
problem soviets and GDR doing everything possible reach
agreement with Western powers. "They must, however,
understand that a change is essential ..* if the
problem cannot be completely solved by one fonmin conference,
then certain partial solutions must be achieved in
the interest of peace. The objective remains the same,
West Berlin, as a seat of tension, must be done away with,"
Although above indications as to how long Sovs -GDR will
"exercise patience" are elusive, they could be significant
when considered against a background of retreat from
previous deadlines and Orotewohlls specific statement on
returning from Moscow June 21: "We have no illusions
that any quick or decisive change in this situation
can be brought about by our trip or Geneva negotiations."
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?
?
31 US Micibidia4Barlin_Reebrt'SidrIGUR..$4teoents I:Warding Peace
(Official Treaty: East prp_ss today carried two additional references to
Use 0?4y) possibility:GDR-MR might negotiatoperate ponce trenty.
Neues Deutschland carried excepts Tromrspeoch given Rnnnehrg
July 30 by }lin-Pres Grotewohl. Report cited_Grotavohl an
saying West could Work against peace treaty at Geneva if it
wished,hut.day.ldll come Fhep a peace treaty no longer ca: te
denied. German people.- Repdrt-continved with-quote: "If West
Germany and capitalist world 14 years after war's er.i continue
withheld (Welter Vorenthalten) German peace treaty, then we
say today we are determined to conclude a peace treaty with
USSR and 41 countries which are prepared therefore."
A second reference to separate treaty appeared in Niti'_nn)
geitung editorial which included following statament: "If the
circumlocution is now brought to an enri, Western Pnvri are?
confronted by this question: Either they show theraelver.
in944ned (Peneipt) to resolve the West Berlrn with
GDR or they must accept as part of the bargain that tiis
question will be clarified (Screinirt) by Ck--ZIP. gni :;:)R
them." ?
Comment: Two statements reported above reveal no re" forruln
regarding circumstances under which, or time whnn, separate
treaty might be concluded. We inclined believe such :Itat,nt:,
appearing not; for purpose of restating threat contained in
Ulbrichtis radio speech of July 25 as current phase Fonmin
talks draws near end.
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?
?
.AuFust Ambassador Thompsonts Report of Kuznetsev Remark: While
1 awaiting Rhrushchev at airport today I remarked to . ?
(Confidential) Kuznetsev that things did not seem to be going well at
Geneva. He replied to effect that his impression was.
? beth sides were trying to find a way to disengage. He
added with a smile that this was far from easy to doo
August Ambassador Thompsonts Report of Khrushchev -Nixon Talk:
In Khrushchevls talk with VP last Sunday he made statement
(Secret) several times to effect that if occupation regime in
Berlin was to be maintained there was no point in making
an agreement since occupation regime already existed.
This together with his speech at Dnepropetrovsk and
Kuznetsevls remark reported above leads me to conclusion
that Khrushchev has very possibly decided not (rpt not)
to force issue on Berlin or on separate peace treaty at
this time but simply let conference adjourn and hope
eventually to resume discussions on a higher level. Wish
to point out however that I have been absorbed with VPs
visit and have not had time for thorough study of record.
?
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East Berlin Press Treatnent of Geneva Conference: Nouns
Deutschland front-paged a radio interview with Kegol. The
Soviet Zone spokesman was quoted as saying the nresent
situation of the "six-power" conference was "difficsat," hut
that there were still "chances for an undoratsnding dun to
the attitude of the at German and Soviet delegations which
are ready for understanding." Kegel adeed that he regarded
Herter 's announcement that he would have to leave Gnnova on
August 6 as an attempt to blackmail delegatiors of the two
Socialist countries.
East Berlin Press Treatment of the Geneva Confflrence and
'.isenhower-Khrushchev Visits: Announcement of the Khrushchnv
Eisenhower visits received top headlines and cornletoly
drt-
r.ated all other news in the %eat Berlin naners. The reports
frequently quoted President "isenhowerle press c-2nference
statement that he honed the "talk with Khrushchev Youlr! hoin
melt the ice in US-Soviet relations".
All papers reported on the Cromyko-Lloyd tal'.s in r,,,n-rn on
Monday, with the general lament being that there were .'.111
great chances to core to an agreement on West Berlin"
fore the, present nhase of the Conference terminates. -nuns
Deutschland continued to charge Bonn with making all-out
efforts to ensure that the Conference ends without r0s?IltJ.
East Berlin Press Treatrnnt of the Geneva Conference: All ?
papers gave prominent coverage to the Geneva windup with'
'particular attention '-said to Gromyko's and Bolz' final spenchel
(Moues Deutschland carried comnlote texts). 't'ational Znitunc
noted that both Gromyho and idoyd had emnhanized the necessity
of summit meetings, and that Lloyd "oven mentioned a whole
series" of such top level meetings. 7eitor1al corrent was
limited to Noue Zeit (vast CDU) which continued on theme that
Bonn was chief "treUblemaker" and that Western rowers wr?re
resnonsible for ftalure to reach an agreement in Conovn.
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August Excerpts from New York Times Times Report of Khrushchev
5 ? News Conference: Mr. Khrushchev reported that there
(Unclassified) had been no agreement yet between him and President
Eisenhower on what particular points would be discussed
in the talks.
?
? "Any questions that will help to melt the ice, as the
President put it so well at his press conference yesterday,
will have priority," the Premier said.
In his awn mind, however, the "principal and most important
question is that of liquidating the consequences of the
Second World War," the Premier declared.
"Therefore, great importance is attached to the problem
of a peace treaty with Germany to bring that about," he
asserted. "It is quite apparent that this peace treaty
will be with two German states unless beforehand they
are united or have joined together in a federation.
"The German peace treaty of course is the question of
questions--the problem of problems. And Berlin is the
Gordian knot that must be cut. It is a consequence of
the main problem of removing the consequences of World
War II.
"It seems there is little hope of unifying Germany either
from the West or the East. We should work toward a peace
treaty with the two German states. And a settlement of
that problem brings up the problem of Berlin, because
it is a city with a capitalist system on the territory
of a state with a Socialist system. ?
"The best solution is that West Berlin should become a
.froo city Uith guarantees of noninterference in its
internal affairs or in its communications with the rest
of the world. We cannot see a different way out of the
problem."
?
Excerpts from Tass Summary of Khrushchev News Conference:
An American correspondent asked whether Mr. Khrushchev
intended tn havro nonsultations with friendly countries
regarding his trip to the United States, whether his
meeting with President Eisenhower would be in lieu of a
summit conference and whether the Berlin status would
rAmninunphancari Iln+41 4-hca rrunex+ingo hek.A. FA-
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government of the Soviet Union and the United antes
were over.
Nikita Khrushchev stated that he considered that any
-consultations with friends were always useful. They
made for better understanding of pi-oblemst ApTnrently,
he said, we shall exchange views in seep form or other.
The question of ensuring peace is not a controversial
one for the countries of tho Socialist carp. They
approve of all the steps of the Soviet Government in
that direction, just as we approve of steps in that
direction by the governments of any countries,
Socialist or non-Socialist.
?
As to a meeting with President rasenhower, the hoad
of the Soviet Government said, it will he a rectin,,,
of representatives of two states and cannot substitute
for a meeting of heads of governments, 'which was 'Jo
much talked about by the press. One does not
contradict or exclude the other.
Mr. Khrushchev noted that the Soviet Government believed
that there can be no change in the Berlin status while
negotiations were in progress. This was the Goviet
Governmentls position before and it is the same new,
he said.
Then Khrushchev was asked what place the quest:!cn
of Berlin and of a peace treaty with Germany wculd
occupy in the talks. Khrushchev replied that in the
first place it was essential to do away with the
aftermath of World War II and sign a peace treaty with
Germany. The Berlin problem was only an outgrowth of
the German problem,
Khrushchev stated that, in view of the circumstances,
it was necessary to deal with two German states. The
prospects for their reunification in the near future
were unrealistic. If a reasonable view was taken of
this situation, a peace treaty was possible.
Khrushchev noted the contradictory position of those
who talk about peace but refuse to eliminate all the
consequences of World War II. These consequences,
as represented by the German and Berlin problem were
a burning ruse -threatening with an axploalon. In the
first place, it was necessary to extinguish this fuse.
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;.uguat (continued)
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(Unclassified.
Aurunt
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Khrushchev was asked how his Meeting with Eisenhower
could affect French plans to stage nuclear-weapons
tests in the Sahara and the Paris-Bonn axis in general.
Nikita Khrushchev pointed out that then) had been
axes in the past but all of them) as is known) were
broken and thrown into the ditch. The axis which rests
on Bonn with one end is) of course) an unreliable
axis. Bonn is an aggressive support for an axis.
The marriage between Paris and Bonn) Khrughchev said)
is not a love match) and since this is so it will
break up. As for the plans of testing nuclear weapons
in the Sahara) it is now high time to ban tests and .
not to plan them.
Ulbricht Reviews Geneva Talks Results: Walter Ulbricht,
first secretary of the BED Central Committee, today summed
up the results of the.Geneva six=powor conference.
Addrosping the workers of the largest GDR production
enterprise, the Leuna works at Halle, Ulbricht said:
What was the purpose of the Geneva Conference and what
is the purpose of a future conference? The purpose of
Geneva?to do away with the powder kegs in West Berlin
and West Gormany in order to prevent another war. Who-
over wants to prevent war must first of all clear away
what is loft of the last war. This moans that it is
nocossary to eliminate those points whore the cinders
of the last war ate still smoldor.ing. Those danger
points are tho occupation status.and. tho Wost Berlin
agent and divorsiOnary centors, the claims of frontier
revision and rovengo, and tho prosence of foroign
troons in Wunt Berlin.
Why was tho Berlin question raisid? It was because
of the agont and diversionary activities of 'West Germany,
the US, British and French centers, dirocted from West
Berlin against the GDR and tho socialist countries.
Brandt, head of the 'dist Berlin administration, said him-
self that West Berlin should play tho part of trouble-
mker against thrGDR. However, tho quostion of West
Burlin also aros'.J by virtue of tho atomic armamcnt and
rsynn-er4rtt,,,,4n. in U.,nt Gormanv. The West German
riiiitrists us,d WJst E'rlin.as their advance outpost.
Our prorosal for tho transformation of West Berlin into
d,militarizod Proo city and for tho preparation of a
peac_ treaty is a program for safogunrding peace. Of
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August (Cont.) course one cannot bring about a r_Inc,! tretIty -t on. try. .2r.00
5 ? the entiro attention of the U5SR w%s.
(Unclassified) focused on the problem of making rossibl 'r-nnition
acceptable to tho 1.1estern Powers. The Hst...rn "ow w-uld
lose nothing by no conclusion of renc tn,
coneitions of the peacc? treaty would rrrly to !oth rt f.
Germany. In both Tarts of Gorman:: atoric arnn,m-nt wo1:1,!
forbidden, tho size of the military forces wouJd.h.
upon, and aggressive militarist forcs woulrl b.2.c1,:rl.d.
would be a big stride forw-rd to tho reunific-.tion of '
?
Wo have made all concessionn, ?
not r.c.]:e any concessions at th2 cxrens!
working people.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
Although to agreement could be reached at the n v- ?r n.
it is obvious that useful nreparai,ory wor;.
a number of further international con!' rs_nc n to
mutual invitations of arushchov and 7in -r
international illmortance and will contributo to
easing of international tension. The announc.,:r at
has been joyfully welcomed throurhout the world. 77:in
could initiate a turning noint in the r.lationn tw2.a
nations.
Tho groat importance of the Genova Conf,:rence )1:-_1 in ti:: f ct
that the delegations of the two Gernan stats, 1_41 by t. Ir
two foreign ministers, took :-.)art in t:lo Coaferen an 'quail.
The GDF. delegation made an in-lort,Int c-structIv.
at the Geneva Conference of 7oreign :"In!stern.
The Bonn Government, on the oth4r tri
Gonave Conference right from the start. Dy its attitull, t.
Bonn Government has become evn r.ore isolated in
throughout the world.
NO agrooment was reached at Geneva beccs Act v r rn-
merit was opposed to it and the S-D 7ic:cutive no
to focus attention on its own nn for G.2r-Pny -r tn x rt -r
sure on tho Adennuer Government,. tn?, 'orn' it)
took a nassive attitude, the Adunauer Covernr to
provent a nnrrowin7 of the ran th;
Geneva.
?
It should ba clearly nnelnrItnne ttiflt ttl-t1 rft!..)
of a pence treaty With Gt.:a:rimy is delay :d , whi 1 2 n11.71 yar ? :7-7?-?-?
in West Gort?nry continr-la, the rreftt..:r ?
provocation in West Berlin and :ezit G-:17,ftny. I s t. :r?;t' ?rs,
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-63-
??
Aurruut (Cont.) the main task of all peace-loving people to curb German mill-
) tarium.
(Unclassified)
?
In the United States, the armament tycoons are the decisive
politicrl power. Those billionaires want to safeguard their
profits. Thoy aro against the relaxation of tension and are
pressing ?resident 7isonhower to maintain US military bases in
other countries. Nevertheless, the forces of Peace in the
United States are also grot4ing. The fact that 1.;cCarthyism is
grnexally disannearing in tho United States is, after all, a
sign cf some changes.
The US Secretary of St?te has said 'Uwe the Soviet Union on17
w?to to have the GDR recognizec1. but he is mistaken if he
nssume3 that recognition of tho GDR is the main issue for us.
The Government's main concern is building socialism in the GDR
nre. 14orl:ing for peace.
vory realistic.nerson understands that reunification is not
possible without tho formation of an all-German committee. If
the Bonn Government rejects reunification, we must wait until
the peoplc of West Germany reject those ministers in Bonn who
do not want a Peace treaty and reunification.
It is clear after Genova that the reunification of Germany is
not Possible without the removal of Adenauer, Strauss, and
Schroeder by tho'West German population. This is one of tho
things which Geneva has taught.
C.
?
?
??
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PART 'RIO
STATEMENTS ;OD DOCIR-7-7TS FRG' .1-37.7.?..11 SCUC
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June Mayor Brandt's Foreipn Policy Statement to a Specin:lv Convakori
25 Session of Berlin nous? of representatives: rayor Prnndt ma&
(Official following main points:
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(1) Soviet proposals eo not constitute serious basis for perc-
tiations since they are coupled with ultimatum and nn cionn
examination reveal they are designed to incornorato all "rl In
into Ulbricht state.
(2) Western Powers have rade far-reaching offers to :Joviot
Union; their proposals for solution Berlth quostinn pl t!c, lirit
of what can be tolerated.
(3) Soviet Union must return to Geneva with now ideas if Y,r-
eign Ministers' Conference to have real menninr,: it would
realistic for USEr, to start July 13 with lnst stacd '1134f?rn
position ane then try to bargain it down.
(4) Second phase of Geneva Conference shouii corrr,tt,, ni
little as possible on DerlJn issue, osneci-lly a1i c)urs^ ,f
negotiations so far has demonstrated correctnoss of nss-rti n
there is no real solution of Berlin problem in 1no3_aon; r0,11
themes are F.ast- 'lest conflict, 71:ronean c,,curity. Cierrw,
(5) Time until resumption Geneva Confernnce s!nni,!,
to clarify and improve Western position ',her-el/2r no?rsory %pt!
make clear to Kremlin through dinlomatic chhnry.ls
conference can only core about if "long term intnrir. anlutis,n"
for Berlin achieved.
The first step Western neace plan (i.e. unification of Berlin'
Drandt said united Berlin must not be placed in vacIrr: but !rust
be free to choose affiliation with legal and currency a-nters
of either Part of Gerrany. Re Western four-point pro-nrn1 Juno
1, Brandt said these proposals accented by rierlin and Gerrnn
public with "skeptical reservation" because it conntitutns tJw
extreme limit of what can be offered to Soviets in r:oed con-
science.
Brandt rejected Gromyko's June 10 proposal but uncl,,rlinr,1 tint
Gromyko had explicitly confirmed legal basis Allied -resent
position. Mayor stressed any new 3erlin arTeeront must in-
dispensably include recognition -resent legal position of
Western Powers. 7v1dent purpose of ussr is to repine() those
uf 3uv1ut., nu lunt?Ir contAli, *cry (1,)4
agreement which might be subject to cancellation at will.
Western presence Berlin would then cea:o to be on booth
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indisputable right but be placed on basis "magnanimous Soviet
nermiscion" for interin period of one year or 18 months. Re
Western garrisons, Brandt said West cannot agree to reduction
to "symbolic units" because these incapable of exercising pro-
tective functions. "urpose of Western garrisons is fittingly
described as "trin. wire defense" but for this purpose more than
a elntoon guarding the flag is necessary.
Brandt rejected Soviet charges West Berlin is nropagenda and
osnionaee base and said Senator for Interior.will, in addition
to his Previous statements, publish detailed documentation
proving -ast 2er1in is espionage center.
Ke.regulotbon Berlin traffic to the Federal Renublic, Rrandt
expressed belief that solution taking into account interests
till participants could be found. It might be in interest of
four rovers, ns well as both German administrations, to agree
to invoke neutral office or united nations to solve disputes
of technical nature. He also suggested creating of "inter-
administrative commission" (i.e. composed of representatives
both Germanies) to be competent in all practical questions
arising between two German areas. This institution would deal
with queetions of trade, communications, payments, scientific
and cultural exchanges, etc., and might have sub-commission for
Berlin questions. It clear, however, that mixed "inter-
administrative commission" should not be competent in questions
which are responsibility of four powers; nevertheless four
powers could instruct commission to deal with certain other
subjects on which representatives of both administrations in
Germany entitled to be consulted (editorial note: for example,
certain aspects of reunification). Brandt said such "inter-
administrative commission" would be preferable to four power
commission (with German experts) designed to deal with ques-
tions of Berlin traffic alone.
Brandt emnhasized that West's
valid and that Western Powers
abandon their rights or their
population.
Berlin security guarantees remain
able make it clear they will not
responsibilities toward Berlin
Rb possible visit by Secretary
Secretary had expressed to him
his duties permitted, possibly
return to Telrope. "lie will be
Herter, Brandt said that
intention of coming as soon as
at suitable time after his
very welcome hero," said Brandt.
Re question of Berlin advisers, to German.delegation, Brandt
explicitly denied that he had written letter to Von Brentano
? ? .
S7CRET/N0F0Pm
June (Cont.)
25
(Official
Use Only)
June
25
(Confidential)
SEMET/NOFCE:7
-67-
?
?
containing suggestions for inoroved cosultation with Perlin
Senat. He said, however, he unable to ngree with Federal preas
chief that arrangements heretofore had been satisfactory and
that there is no need to improve Past system for koorinr,
informed. He strongly urged that documents concernni: fqtn
of Berlin should be made known to qualified Kerlin official
before they reed them in the nress. It is not only n question
of being kept informed on continuing basis, he said, 1-ut also
of being able to participate in formulation of documents
affecting Berlin. Brandt reported Senator Klein fhis
discussed this question with Von "Irentann.
Brandt speech endorsed by SD and CDU fcction leaders Vnel:or
and "ndres in speeches following Brnndt's.
Endres met Mayor's criticism of lad' of infor7:ation r?iven Derlin
representative to German delegation (Von Lottenheim\ by saying
this partly due to fact that representative sent to Genova not
high ranking enough. After Endres ended his sreech Drandt rose
to say 'at official in question was qualified; nroblem was
that certain documents vital to Berlin situation sirrly not
made available.
Embassy Bonn Penort Following Foreign Einister Brentanp Perort
on'Geneva to Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee: Apart from
factbal summary he stressed harshness Soviets, hero that next
round could get back to consideration of total German probler
for which solution is essential if there is to be real and
durable solution Berlin problem, and, in contradiction
ChanCellor, especially unity of the West. All parties sun-ort-
ed him in these points. Government Parties were anxioun to
avoid controversy in thbeting and it was harmonious and rather
superficial although'it lasted over four hours. Brentano said
Government would of course respond if foreign policy detato
were demanded but considered present timo inonnortune. Cr-on-
ition spokesmen reserved final decision for party 1ender9 but
were themselves agreeable to having no debate now.
Berlin deputies of all parties expressed concern that last
Western Berlin proposals may have gone to outer linlits of tho
possible. They mentioned especially troop ceilings which they
feared would involve Soviet controls and mieht lend to further
reduction of Western forces. They wore also concerned about
restriction propaganda activities which they believed Commun-
ists would abuse. Other deputies did not join this discusnion
SECRET/NOFORN
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?
-68-
?
except to express understanding of the Berlin point of view.
Committee Chairman Furler's press conference after meeting
gave contrary impression general expression concern at West's
position. Brentano reassured them on both counts and said
specifically PIAS, which had been srecial concern, would not
be affected.
In Committee's discussion CDU spokesmen, especially those close
to Chancellor, like Guttenberg and Kliesing, tended to opinion
that West had played risky, though perhaps necessary, game with
offers to Soviets, and should now turn back to relentless hard-
ness. Equally the opposition stood by its foreign nolicy pro-
grams and urged that their well-known ideas be taken up in
future Conova negotiations. Discussion became briefly somewhat
sharper as SFD defended parity in all- German groups having
only an advisory role but generally meeting reflected confidence
that West had done best possible at Geneva and unusual degree
of agreement in assessment of interim situation.
Mood of opposition for present is one of resignation and,
although they must as in Committee continue to uphold es-
tablished party policies, some SPD and PDF deputies go so far
as to say privately that they are inclined to stop fighting the
'government on reunification issue, that they believe division
of Germany has reached point where it can only be ended by
fundamental changes in world situation, that Berlin will
probably be lost in time, and that they believe the prices for
which the Soviets might once have accepted a German solution
(Germany out of NATO, disengagement, atomic ban, etc.) are no
longer of interest to Soviets. Nevertheless, they are anxious
for another try at Geneva and hope elements of Western package,
which they believe mist remain related, will be negotiated
further. Especially they feel that the one avenue which Soviets
seem to have left open, some sort of diseussion between Germans
from both sides under Allied aegis, should be explored.
Similar views held by CDU deputies such as Gerstenmaier and
Gradl who feel most strongly about reunification and who would'
revive 1958 Bundestag proposals (now considered in retrospect
by more conservative CDU elements as having gone too far) for
permanent four power commission on German problem, with which
would be associated some sort of all- German group. They
would make this concession to Soviet position that reunification
is matter for Germans, even if only to prove this too is futile
and to maintain nublic confidence by appearing to remain
active. Brentano in committee said it might, be po332'lc raise
this proposal in second phase at Geneva.
SECRET/M.70RA'
June
26
(Confidential)
s7cn:T/No7cEr
- 69 -
Ambassador Houghton's Penort of Conversation with Lalcv at
French Foreign Office: In conversation with' Laloy ho said
he was turning over in his mind what steps the Western Powers
might take between now and reconvening at Genova to irorove
their position in negotiations with Soviets over norlin. 1:n
agrees that experts should not be called together, but 'hinks
it would be useful to begin exchange of views between rovorn-
meats on Geneva prospects as soon as nosIible. Ho incicated
that French Embassy in Washington would be instructed in r.,,nr
future to contact Derartmental renresentative, -robebly
Herchant, in this rernre.
Laloy said he fears Soviets will nttomnt to nut the ',;(1st in
'position of accepting the latest Soviet nronenals as boils
for discussion when talks beRin July 13. To forestall this
move, Laloy is considering whether it mi,ht fv. (!esirrIble f'nr
Western three to senci notes to So%-iet Govr,rnr.ent rlv n
July which would recapitulate nositinns of t':o o?.n"nr1:0
reasonableness of .:estorn nrori7;;;nin and state
that latter will be noint of eennrturo ror further (11:;cwsl n.
?
Laloy said he realized there wore nessibl? 1raicst:sthIs
procedure, but he thought advanteges might out-o1,11 dis-
advantages and that move would put us in stronger nosition.
(Note: Laloy emnhasized that the idea of the note was ruroly
personal and tentative one which ho did not wish to be dis-
cussed with other governments at this strga. Thorofare, no
mention of this should be made to :ronch officials.)
Laloy praised Secretary's radio and television sreoch !1.1-hly
and said it struck right note of firmness and resolution.
However, he thought Lloyd's and lhcmillan's staterentohAvo
been overly ontimistic, and he fears that attitude reflected
in these statements nay make it very hard to ronint 5ovlot
pressures in next round of talks to ro beyond conconni(mD
have alrendy made.
Laloy said several United States journalists 'Ave 'old Mm
they felt lost was "missing bet" for good cornromise in not
discussing last Gromyko nrcnosnl (]rbassy has ',enrd sari)
line also), but that he continues to believe it wou1,1 be fatal
to accept any hind of time 1;r it for occunattcn statuto,
with nrovision for review of situPtion aft .1-- f#X- }ration of
time limit.
Laloy and other Ctni officials are also nerturbect try ur(777Ko n
insistence on Pan-Gorman committen and its link with Perlin
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June (COnt.)
26
(Confidential)
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-70-
solution. They feel Gromyko may be disposed to give slightly
on question of parity in composition of commission to extent
of saying this is something which could be discussed at summit
once principle of committee is accepted. Laloy fears this
mi.Eht appeal to British. He said French would strongly opposes
It, however, and added that Grewe had made special point of
telling him just before leaving Geneva that any move in di-
rection of accepting Soviet proposals for German committee
would be Qisastrous to Federal Republic policies and would
be big step toward recognition of GDR.
s7a7T/ncrarm
June
-g-.
(Official
Use Only)
SECFETAITORZI
- 71 -
German Press Service Report of Defense Minister 3trauss' res
Interview: In sin! interview with the CDU-sponsored
Norrespondenz Defense Minister Strauss nn:is the. the ?
West must be temperate, united, patient, nne constnntly pre-
pared for a peace with tho .;ast, which will replace th- preanat
balance of terror by a Policy of genuine coexistence where
human dignity and national independence in the sense of the
United Nations charter rest on a safe political eoundetion.
Strauss emphasized that there may be need for year-lnur, nec:n-
tiations with the Soviets to which the ir-ericsn-J:bines tans
in Warsaw may serve as examrlo.
In these negotiations the West will have to be firm and free cf
the illusion that it is possible at the present time tn chnni-e
the German status toward obtaininr greater freedom for nil of
Germany. The Atlantic defense efforts must be carried nn
necessary. Advance concessions liable to waken the lestern
defense are out of the question. They would he danr,ernua nnd
perhaps even fatal. Under no circumstancon would they cAU.710
the Soviets to assume a more yielding attitude.
Strauss called for great patience in promotinr the 7uronenn
integration effort combined with readiness to renounce cnrtnin
sovereign rights. It would be erroneous to believe, however,
that Europe would become a third world politic91 rxrv.r with to
the predictable future. Therefore, the "'uropenn intec:ratien
effort must be connected with an intensification of 'Airooenn-
American cooperation, because there is no other way for the
, free world to really master its tasks.
Strauss accused the Soviet Union of tryinr to revive German
nationalism by suggesting to the Germans th.at a neutrcAl
Germany should be their national aim. The Soviet Union in try-
ing to create anti-Western sentiment in the Went German nuhlic.
?
S7GR2T/YOFOrN
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July
1
(Secret)
SECR7T/NOF0RN
- '72 -
US Peply to Soviet !kite on German Presidential Election: The
. Government of the United States acknowledges receipt of the
note of the Government of the USSR of June 26, 1959 concerning
the German decision to hold the Federal Assembly for the elec-
tion of the President of the Federal Republic of Germany in .
Berlin on July 1, 1959.
Tho Government of the USSR will recall that the second Federal
Assembly for the election of the President of the Federal
Pepublic of Germany vas convened in Berlin on July 17, 1954 and
that there have been regular meetings of the Federal German
Bundestag in that city every year since. The United States
Government, therefore, consieers the nresent German decision to
convene the present Federal Assembly on July 1, 1959 as a con-
tinuation of an established tradition, which does not contra-
vene any existing agreements either among the four powers or
between the United States Government and the Federal Republic.
It has long been publicly assumed that the next German
Presidential elections would be held in Berlin, and the Presi-
(lent of the Federal German Bundestag, Dr. Gerstenmaier, who is
constitutionally responsible for convening the electoral
assembly, formally proposed to the Bundestag Council of Elders
on the 14th of October, 1958 that the assembly meet in Berlin.
The United States Government believes there is no warrant for
? the expression of concern on the part of the Government of the
U5SE over a peaceful assemblage in furtherance of democratic
processes. The United States Government does not consider that,
in the circumstances, any action on its part is required.
STMET/NOFORN
1
(Unclassified)
- 73 -
x? ceriets from President Eisenhower's Press Corifornnce: Fobert
C. Piermont of CBS Pews - Mr. President, in view of sore recent
statements by British statesmen, indicating that they feel that
a Summit conference may already be justified by the Gonevn talk,
I wonder if you could reconcile the apparent differenr.en 1,0tween
ourselves and the British?
? - Well, you say the differences between ours,Avos
British. There are just as many opinions in Britain
probably are in or. country abcut the wisdom of many
procedures contemplated in this field of negotiaticn.
Now, we have always taken the attitude here that.
grounds discovered or prepared by the legittmato din1r7at1c
agencies of governments which make such a - rivn scme kind of
promise to this summit meeting.
and the
4s there
cf the
thopt, wan ex.ro.
Now, this was tho opinion and conviction of the foreiim ministers
as they came back from Geneva, when they asked - when they
arranged the recess, and I think it still is.
Ray L. Scherer of NBC :lows - What sort of
get of Ir. (Frol n.) Koslov (First Deputy
his place in the Russian scheme of thinrs
New York,
an impreseinn dId you
Soviet :torier) nd
frr-m your visit to
A. - Well, of course in most of the personal visits with re-rv-
sentatives of the Soviet Government, you find that you have had
a rather pleasant personal experience. They are outrivinr,
they apparently like to have fun, they approciato a joke, they
see humor in a number of things and so, by this standard, end
I mean in this, you might say in this habit you richt say, I
found a man that was very friendly end frankly I enjr-g(t the
visit I had with him.
It was entirely personal, it was not political. nut, we were -
he showed me with a great deal of interest and I think Justi-
fiable pride the - many items "?hay had to show In their
tion, and I think it will attract the eye end interest of anytody.
So, I would say that, and I am looking forward to my visit with
him this morning, I think it's at 11:15, end unquestionably I
dontt know what we are going to talk about, it's a meeting with-
out agenda. But whatever we talk about I em sure it will t'e
little bit more serious than that one.
SECPET/NCFGRN
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?
SECRET/NOFORN
- 74 -
July Stewart Hensley of United Press International - A little more on
1 Vr. Yozlov. You said you expect your talk with him in a few
(Unclassified) minutes to be a little more serious than the New ye,,..ck
?
A. - You.
Q. - Visit. He said when he arrived here yesterday that he hoped
his talks with you and with others hero would lead to getting
rid of some of what he called the abnormalities in the Russian- .
American situation.
Do you have any suggestion for him as to how this can be done,
or is the ball on his side of the court?
A. - Well, I suppose that in such a situation, each side rather
thinks the other has some new or additional responsibility. We
have, as our position, that described by Nr. Herter, here a few
niphts ago after he came back from Geneva, when he said there is
only two or throe basic principles which nark a minimum position
in our negotiable, you night say, our readiness for negotiation,
and everything else we try to be flexible in and we certainly
will attempt to promote and develop some ideas that we hope will
be fruitful.
But, of course, in this one or two basic things which I have so
often repeated, why, of course, we cannot, we cannot recede.
SECRET/NOFCRN
?
July
4
(Confidential) ?
,
sEcRser/roFcr
- 75 -
West German Note to USSF. in Ronly to Soviet Note nf Jung 27
rj
Presidential Election: "The Government of the Fedoral Pnrublio
has -received with surprise the fact t.hat U3 has raisee forral
objections and doubts four days before election day ngninst
calling Federal Assembly in Berlin for election or the
President.
The Government of USSR is aware that the President of t!:n
Bundestag, who is constitutionally responsible for calling t..41
Federal Assembly, had alreaey made nublic night montks ago,
on the 14th of October, 1958, that the Federal Ac 1:1
again meet in Berlin. It is also well known 4.o the
tiiit
the present President of the German Theeral Ferublic was
elected in Berlin in 1954 and that since that tine -netings
of the German Bundestag have taken 71nce in :)nrlin etch
The Government of the USSP has never exrressed 0oubts or
objections against this. It is not clear to the Feenrnl Pe-
public -why the Government of USSP could once again have changed
its attitude on the matter. Callim7 of the Federal Assembly
for Berlin furthermore is not pertinently suited to rrlvidn
grounds for objections or concerns of }find which are expressed
in Note of Soviet Embassy of June 27, 1959. Yeeting of
Federal Assembly for election of 7edera1 Presic'ent is nenceful
action in peaceful fulfillment of democratic tasks of repre-
sentatives of German people designated by Constitution for
task. The Federal Government can only hope that the Government
of the USSR, too, as in past will not conceal its knowledge of
this fact.
Under these circumstances, the Foreign Office esnn-inlly re-
grets that the tkbassy of the USSP has declare(' itself not
in a position to be representee at the election or. July 1."
S7Q1STPICFORN
?
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? -;?ip
JUlv.
6
(Secret)
Julv
6
(Secret)
?
SECRET/W.1'11V
- 76 -
?
?
US Representative's Comment on July 6 MAC Meeting: Following
len-fthy and exhaustive discission, consensus in Council re-
flected confidence in powers negotiating at Geneva and agree-
ment on resuming Geneva talks on basis present Western position.
Ihs feel this is end of pressures for ministerial meeting.
Mxchange of views brought out emphasis on necessity to seek
clarification from Soviets re ultimatum attributed to their
proposals and especially re status of existing Western rights
after lapse of time ;cried proposed by Soviets. Council unan-
imous in opinion that any abandonment of existing Western rights
inadmissable.
US Representative's Renort of Diuoaamn in MC. NAC
discussion, reflected largely reactions to question in I.S.
(International Secretariat) paper designed to bring out Council's
.thinking on Western approach to Berlin and German problems at
resumption of Geneva talks and thus provide basis for reaching
decision as to whether ministerial meeting should be held before
July 13.
Belgian permanent representative opened discussion by directing
attention to "ultimatum" attributed to Soviet nroposals. After
reviewing these proposals in light of July 19 Gromyko press
communiqua, Tess statement (which De Staerke admitted was un-
official) and June 28 Gromyko stat6ment, he was of opinion
there was no ultimatum. xpressed his Government's hope that
Western Ministers would probe Soviet views at Geneva on this
point to make clear no intention on Soviet part to make uni-
lateral change in Berlin arrangements after lapse of time period.
Speak agreed with Belgium. Believe it was of even greater im-
portance to clarify ambiguity of Soviet position on status of
existing Western rights following time limit. Understood
Western reluctance to rely on Soviet pronouncements that were
not official or formal declaration of Conference. Should seek
to get Soviet assurance on this point at Geneva.
Greek and Italian permanent representatives, with some nuances,
agreed with necessity of getting such assurance. German perma-
nent representative felt, however, it was clear Soviets, in
event failure to reach agreement, intend to claim Western rights
no longer exist.
United States permanent representative gave gist of Khrushahev
views and of Kozlov talks. Emphasized Secretary's statement to
SECP.ET/NOFOR
?
July (Cont.)
6
(Secret)
S7CRET/NGFORH
- 77 -
?
Yozlov re need for definite Soviet answer on question of
past West probing of Soviets on this point at Genova and .4nstere.
intent make further probe on resumption of talks as resperse to
Belgian permanent representative's concern.
Netherland-permanent representative, after nay 1r tribute to
unity of Western Ministers at Geneva and their firm suPport of
Western principles agreed by Council, reviewed Dutch response.
to I.S. questions against background of Communist objectives
world domination and Turonean aims to secure disenglgo-ent,
withdrawal of foreign troops, recognition of G7., nnd st:i11:n-
tien of satellites. Noted Soviets really not negotiqtini: wie
Ministers but attempting to work on Western -ublic o-ini-n
over Ministers' heads to create divicions in .:est.
of solution of German nroblem and agreed Soviets sh-ulr!
probed re ultimatum. Suggested, however, S-Nints should 1,0
pressed on meaning they attach to Pan-German whi-n
might offer possible point of agreement. rewevnr, folt
German Committee in form now Put fervard by Sovints, with -Irl
basis and dealing with problems of reunification and reacn
treaty, was dangerous idea, four-power rachinory to study '0:77nn
problem night be second alternative but doubted Sevints
accept it.
Norwegian permanent representative agreed no pronnect of solntio.n
of German problem and doubted whether it should be discussed
further at Geneva. Pe lorlin, thought latest (lrcryko proposal
recognized Western rights, at least during interim period, sri'
saw nothing to fear on Western side ro pro sod rill-German
committee, although idea of latter dealing with 7,enco treaty
might be dangerous. Felt it might be better not to discuss
Berlin situation in time-period stipulated in any provisional
agreement but saw considerable merit in four-powers tnkin;7,
discussion after lap's? of time period. "erwogian nermanent
representative doubted Soviets could be nornuadad. to rled:o
they would not turn over functions in Berlin to GD1 or rio
separate neace treaty. However, saw possibility or provisi-ziai
arrangement in last two Soviet public statements which oruld
provide basis for proceeding to discussion in o:-o
(presumably summit).
Danish permanent representative stated, on in.structi-ns, tjnt in
event Geneva Foreign Ministers' meeting did not load to
ment, his Foreign Minister, would roviv,1 nror-onni mtv'n at A.ril
Ministerial meeting for establishment of exr0rts cormitt,.o,
SECRET/NCFMN
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July (Cont.)
6
(Secret)
SEGRET/NOFURN
-78-
?
including consultants from East and West Germany to study_ ,
problem. Re summit, Denmark favored it in principle and be-
lieved it would eventuate either as result of favorable develop-
ments at Geneva or crisis following failure. Felt West should
play Cown position that satisfactory progress necessary for
summit since decision to hold Conference might otherwise be in-
terpreted as defeat for West and victory for Khrushchev.
Canadian permanent representative agreed with Denmark re summit
conference. r!lx rzomed concern lest failure to reach agreement
turn clock back to neriod following November 27 and permit
Soviets to resume full freedom of action to turn Berlin functions
over to GDR and make separate peace treaty. Warning that opinion
in IP would not be sympathetic to idea of war threat resulting
from 'est Germans assuming functions in connection with military
access to Berlin, urged western Einisters to continue search for
agreement and remove conditions and barriers to summit meeting,
French acting permanent representative stressed link established
by Soviets between all-German committee and time limit arrange-
ments an means of undermining existing Western rights. Pointed
to Khrushchev statement, as revealed by US permanent representa.
tive, that 250 years nreferable time period for achieving
German reunification, as proof Soviets have no serious idea of
all-German ccmmittee achieving agreement. Thus, if Western
Powers countersigned agreement along these lines, would only
weaken existing rights since Soviets would contend maintenance
these rights linked to time period and mount new 'pressures for
"free city plan" that would eventuate in East German take over
of West Berlin. Agreed Gromyko must be pressed to clarify pro-
posal for all-German committee and Soviet position on Western
rights after time period.
Belgium permanent representative disagreed with France, stating
that German committee proposal offered possibility of mutually
acceptable agreement. Called attention to October Bundestag
resolution which presented idea of quadripartite commission with
German advisors to study problem that had communicated to
3oviets in Federal Republic note of November 17. Should take
this up if Western "package proposal" fails. Re summit asked
if' there were not divergencies of views among Western negotiat-
ing powers. German permanent representative voiced opposition
to any four-power committee with Fast German advisers to deal
with Berlin nroblem since it would tend to recognize certain
rights of East Germany in West Berlin where it had none.
UK permanent representative stressed complete unity of three
powers but went on to make vague statement agreeing with
S7C11ET/NOFORN
iECRET/KOra".1
. - 79 -
?
July (Cont.) skeptical attitude re Soviet intentions and necessity to neold
6 falling into trap but questioning whether West could afford to
(Confidential) "stay where we are". 'lest at Geneva had achieved nelrn advance
In diminishing and exposing Soviet threat. :luestion now wns
how to diminish it still further and nostnono it. In Inkier
whether it were possible to reach agreerent on 2,01rlin, stresserl
it was just as impossible to get Soviets to reaffirm :tern
rights as it is for West to accent abandonment of their existing
rights at end of time period. What West is trying to do in to
prolong situation. Should be cautious about nsing ereeino
questions of Soviets. Better to internret Soviets st-Iteents
as we see them. Indicete:4, however, Western Yinisters w-eld
continue to probe Soviet intentions. Said his words were en-
tirely impromptu, and that ho spoke only to ovid any hint ,f
split between three powers.
Speak) in summarizing discussion, began t/y s'lying he felt "ere
was no agreement in Council on Geneva reters rlinna
tion whether Ministerial meeting ,/ould re-11y 'e 1.sele.11.
over, after pointing out difference of opinion
conditions for holding summit, lin ircee-(1.1 te --w 'Jit n.-ree-
ment actually existed in Council on nt.7-1-k-sr -f
support for temporary solution of lierlin situnti,n,
of Soviet proposals, which require c1irtic.n. slw
as basic question whether any temporary arranre-enes he
agreed on Berlin. Believinq this was ressihle, 'ressed
? ability of utilizing any tire Ipriod trthli5.. 17 such
visional arrangement arrangement to have four-power study of 4..rman
West, therefore, should resume talks at Geneva with will Ini7ne's.3
to agree to provisional settlement of 18 months er yegee, !n-
eluding question of troop ceilings, eubversIve activitio3 %na
nuclear weapons in Berlin, without, however, giving ur
rights and should advance proposal for study of Gerrnn r-oblem.
Agreed with Denmark, that every effort should he r:Ide to koon
discussions going and not break off.
Norway disagreed vigorously with Sraak assertion that there was
no agreement in Council. All agreed there wris ne
provisional settlerent with tire limit that did net arfect ex-
isting Western rights. All agreed Soviet ideal on Gerran c-r-
mittee unacceptable in Present form and that '7%7' in this
matter should be guided by German views. o dinagre-,ren? in
Council but merely differences in nuances. ,.T-Ank then
that his approach had boon designed to demon3trIte just ? qt
unity.
Turkish permanent representative stated it was clear to
that Soviet Public statements re resumption of neeotintion
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JulY (Cont.) after lapse of time limit on basis of "existing situation" re-
6 forred to situation that would be created by unila:teral Soviet
(Secret) action. Saw Western chances of success at Geneva talks depend-
ing on maintenance of policy of firmness and holding to posi-
tions.
US permanent representative agreed with Turkey on necessity of
Western firmness. Felt Council discussion had brought out some
useful ideas. Re procedures of negotiations and tactics, em-
phasized Western Ministers must resume Geneva discussions with
same firm positions as before recess. If West should begin by
making concessions, Soviets would have US at serious disadvan-
tage. Must therefore proceed from our nresent position which
is good and sound one. Important that Western Ministers have
support of Council. Agreed with Norway that differences ex-
pressed in Council discussion were of nuance and detail.
In conclusion of discussions, Belgium permanent representative
stated he would report views expressed in Council to his Govern-
ment which would find them useful in further consideration of
possibility of holding Ilinisterial meeting later on if other
questions arise. Italian permanent representative suggested
Council might give further consideration to question of going
to summit meeting. Canadian permanent representative emphasized
necessity of consulting Council in the event Geneva talks
should become deadlocked.
Spaak assumed and UK confirmed that negotiating powers would
continue same close consultation with NAC as in first Geneva
session.
There was no mention of any further discussion in NAC before
July 13 resumption at Geneva.
SECP.7,T/NOFOIIN
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Ambassador Thamnson's renart of Kroll-Zorin
German Ambassador 'informs me he had lonr cenversatt-n
Zorin from which it was clear that at th- Foreirn tn4.sters'
meeting in Geneva the Soviets will attempt to roo-Pn
of separate nePce treaty and of security zone in
Berlin problem.
1141.1
? Regarding the latter he reneatadly ctatee no ul'i-AtIrIn-
.
tended by Soviet nroposal and inficated o
prepared to accept time period of two years. ,1'.11 r-stoct t-
allied rights he said certain of those r!r:Its 'V!
by agreement itself. At end or ire rer:orl.
Ministers would meet and Allied rirhts would ho o nn
they were at beginning of time rariod. :loth :',,,r7an anf'
Netherlands Ambassador, who was nresent, fitta&,Pri
importance to this statement. I disagreed stronrly
out that Soviet view was that acceptance of th'ir r!--)N-nnl
would virtually have ended occupation status.
Zarin remarked that senarate peace treaty would 1-o vory
step and Soviets would resort to it only after n11 qttnr-t-
negotiate had failed.
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-82?
Ambassador Bruce's Report of Conversation with Von Brentano:
I saw the Foreign Minister last night. He said he had met with
Couvo and Lloyd at Geneva on June 20. Neither he personally nor
Federal Government was nrepared to agree to all-German commission
as long as that commission does not have a definite task assigned
to it, that is, something within stipulations of Western Peace.
Pin n.
Ho had gone on to tell his British and French colleagues that
he could imagine ono could revert to some of the ideas suggested
by Ambassador Grewe during nreparations for the Conference.
These envisaged establishment of four-power commission to con-
sider problems connected with reunification of Germany. There
would be no objection to German experts being called in in an
advisory canacity, nrovided they would have no executive or
legislative powers, and further provided their functions were
clearly defined by tho four-power commission so that they would
act merely as an auxiliary to that commission. In such case,
said the Foreign Minister, no question of narity between two
Gormanies would arise, since it would not be an autonomous
organization. Hence, the number of experts would not matter.
On July 3 Foreign Minister had discussed above with Grewe and
Duckwitz and will take it up today with Chancellor. Thereafter,
he will inform the Allies of the German position in this respect,
If possibll before the Geneva Conference reconvenes. However,
he is not certain ho can meet this deadline.
Tho Foreign Minister said in last days of Conference, Von
'ckardt hod submitted a paper on his nersonal initiative, to
the German Colegation. Foreign rinister had not been in agree-
ment with some of his ideas, but is continuing to consider his
proposals. He said he was unhappy that an informal private
paper submitted by a non-member of the Foreign Office had been
brourht to tho Allies' attention. I told him, in defense of
Von 7ckardt, that this 'Imbassy had no copy of the proposals, nor
cJe. I believe tho Department had ever received one. Additional-
ly, I said I had recently mentioned the matter myself to Von
'ckardt, who answered that the paper was nurely a representation
of his nrivate views.
I die not tell the Foreign Minister that two days ago Von 7ckardt
had said to me he intended to renew his suggestions to the
Chancellor and Foreign Minister.
SECRET/r0FORN
July (Cont.)
7
(Secret)
July
7
(Confidential)
yor,r,amYrrrrrrral`mbilVIRIn.,rr.0.2
stTRET/InFor.N
? - 83 -
I think at this point it would be a rista:Ke for the :lonartmont
to mention Von 7ckardt'3 nroposals. Ile will IlAvr) Tre'r^ of them
and some of them may be worth considerntion, 1-rut ony they
are put forward with apnroval of the Foroirn lAninter.
The Foreign Minister exrects to arrive Geneva Saturday
US Mission Berlin Report of Brandt's Telerram to Von 'Prentan-:
On instructions governing Mayor, Inn ion officers worn s' nwn
lengthy telegram Brandt sent to Foreign Vinister ','on -'rentnno
July 4 covering the following points:
Consultation of Berlin delegates at Ccnev,. ':rr,ndt ntrczv'l'i
reiterated his nrevious public and nrivnte st,Aterents t,,at "n-1
representatives at Genova inadequately inforryi aryl
his case by detailed account of two instanc,s whop. inforratt--
which had already been transmitted to acviets wan wIthel(', fr--
Berlin delegation. Brandt reminded "nn 'rontano nf later':;
promise of full narticination of Berlin rlpresentatIv;:s ars' in-
sisted they be not only fully inforred hut also consultod in
drafting stages. Brandt informed Von Brentano that Von
Mettenheim and Deputy Press Chief Kettlein will ar,nin repr.t
Berlin; Senator Klein would be available for consultatInn on
short notice..
Decision on Berlin reetirr of Federal Assembly. 7ditho,lt co--
nt
Brandt stated in telegram that on May 30 Von :irentano had
? denied to Senator Klein that locum of assembly hnd boon
of conversation among '/estern Foreirn nini:tnrs; subsequently,
Brandt learned that subject had boon dismannd on Vay 2.
Governing Mayor then stated it had bon hi 7 in-,rnnsion /:117-1-17
his conversation with the throe :lestern Foreir,n rinist-rs "
they not opposed to holding the elections in 'erlin nr, that
Secretary Herter especially positive on this noint. Re Allied
intercession with Gorstenmaier, governinr Vayor correctly
summarized substance of Burns' conversation iith hin. Brandt
then stated he and Senator Klein saw Goretenrninr and cs%Y.)y-d
to him ressage delivered by Burns. Brandt nnntionn,1 only
Gerstenmaier said he would esnocially stress MM.-se rIr.hts in
Berlin, but Brandt's telegram reported npthinr further re
Gerstonmaier's decision.
Second phase of Geneva. Brandt reiterated public and rriv-ttv
statements that Western plan of Juno 16 reprovents 1Lrit of w"at
can be offered "in good conscience." Brandt Promised that
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!July (Cont.) detailed working paper on access containing specific proposals
7 for improvement will be forwarded to the German delegation.:
(Confidential) (USBEP learned on another occasion that a small working group
of experts from Senat Departments of Economics and Traffic are
working on this problem but have not yet issued a report.)
SEMET/NOFORN
tinad
SECRETP4CFCR?
- 85 -
July. Excerpts from President asenhower's "rryss Conferencet jehn
8-
(Unclassified) Scali of the Associated Press - Fr. Presi%ent, :veroll
Harriman reports that on June 23, Premier Thrushev told
"Your generals talk of maintaining your position In --rl!n
with force. That is bluff. If you sent in tan!:s,
burn and make no mistake about it. If you went war, yu can
have it, but remember, it will be your war. ur roo.ta .,111
fly automatically."
What do you think of talh such as this?
A. - Well, I don't think anythin phout It at all. 1
believe that responsible people shoule irs'ulg^ in anyfil,n:
can be even remotely consieored ultiratuns or troat:-.
not the way to reach peaceful solutions.
Peter Lisagor of the Chicero Daily - r.!r.
Harriman also renortee that he thow-'lt it ...1-40r1
if Er. Khrushchev were invited to .,e ri0
of some of his misconceptions. 7 ?o hnvo
this before, but what do you thir:. an .o
at this time, inasmuch as Er. (:.r, -'as I. ?i.::7,ynn Frn1
Kozlov (Soviet Deputy Premiers) have alry
?
A. - Well, here is something that I wolde never
realm of possibility. 3ut we have, as I soy, vrsry
questions to settle. to have to concert our resitirsns
our friends and alliss, so if this ran were to he - rpke,
ceremonial visit, I'd say there it voul0 en1:- a7-epc
his own, let's cry, oh, reception w-,u1e t. tL' ht: tat
be important f.1 11:,e co,mtry.
Chalmers M. P.ots of the '.:aLtir-rn -oqt '!,ralr -
Er. President, the Foreign Vinistors are :-oinc: to 1201 tic. at
Geneva again on Monday. I wonder if you coul'' toll s if y,-.0
see any change in the nrospects of agreerent on Berlin and
thereby the pos:Thilitios of a surit,whether you have rivctn
Secretary Hertel' any new instructions this -,rninF.?
A. - Well, I thin:: there has been no chPngo in our attit'o
from that reported by Yr. Herter shortly after he return' frrm
Geneva from his nrior visit.
We continue to say that the firm nositIon we have in !_-Rs_ offi -
that of respecting our responsibilities ane certain t.ztt
we retain our rights with respect to :21-cr t'.)rc
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- 86 -
?
and with that solid conviction as the unmovable stone in the
whole structure, we are ready to tan: and discuss anything be-
cause we certainly do want to find some way of reaching a
solution that will not keep the whole world on edge, well, for
example, as evidenced by the number of questions that are
properly brought up on this matter right here in meetings such
as this. And, I concede that under the present conditions they
are proper, and they are newsworthy. But we are trying to get
to n place where that will be little less than that, and we must
do it in my opinion if we are going to do a real service for the
cltizens of the world,
Lnwrence H. curd of the Chicano Tribune - Mr. President, you had
rather a lonr tan last week after you saw us with Fr. Yozlov,
1dd anything - was anything rroduced out of that talk that would
-Ivo nny now hopes, any new ?.lements raised?
A. - I saw nothing new. If course that was a great protestation
of friendly intantions, just as I say - on my side that we want
to he friendly, that we recognize that there is a basic friend.
rhin between tho l'ussian noople and our neople. 7verybody that
comer tv,ch rirW renorts this, reports the interest of the Eussian
peonle in what we are doing, how we live, and then, seem to feel
that it will be a great service to mankind when the feelings of
those people are allowed to give away, to take - be influential,
let'a any. And, I say the same thing.
I woel(' say I think the American people basically like the
Husnian people, as they know them. So therefbre I think there
ought to be some way of exploiting that natural almost affinity
between tho two peoples and see whether we can't get somewhere.
Poscoo Drummond of the Vow York Herald Tribune - Mr. President,
in light of the tenor of the questions -here this morning on West
Derlin, and in light of Mr. Khrushchev's provocative remarks to
Governor Harriman, do you feel that the American people are
adequately alerted to the consequences that might flow from
failure to get an agreed solution on this problem?
A. - Well, I think they are, Fr. Drummond. It seems to me we
have boon talking about - both the near and far-term consequen-
ces of failure to get some kind of an agreement. We are con-
stantly plagued with this, that we are putting more of our sub-
stance, more of our sweat, our toil and our man-hours into these
negative things we call armaments for no reason whatsoever, no
constructive thing. They're just to hold on what we have.
S7MET/R7ORN
SECRET/NO[7CM;
-87-
July (Cont.) We are, even our minds are atmosphered in the trourh of destruc-
. 8 tion. We think in terms of atomic bombs ane misniler. Wo, the
(Unclassified) world, is suffering a terrible loss, and I think sp1ritu:1117 and
in every way, materially, in this failure. row, but I'm q...;:.te
sure that the people are alerted to what could be the evonteal
consequences of this failure, and that's the roanon we must
never stop trying, and that's the reason I say I am -orsonally
ready to go any place where I think any -cod can be :'-)ne and nt,
any time.
So, I really - if they are not alert to it, "Then I on't 1:nrw
where they are, because I do moot a good many tyre'l rr
that are working around me, one I know that their und.-rs'ant'in,'
is quite clear, that this is a tough situation all '1'0 41?.
July
8
London Times Penort of Debate in Goonn en -or,.1r7n Aff1171:
Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for :01-01,-::
(Unclassified) debate on foreign affairs.
He said that the two major ratt,:rs of dinnr-re,!:-.?:,t, ,Lf
the Geneva Conference on nuclear tests Coalt
and facilities of the control posts antl
and the circumstances in which an inspection te,-
There were other natters outstanding, 'Alt he hel1evod
differences between the two sides wore definitely nnrro.
What the West wanted was a system that was sufficien',1y
to form an efficient deterrent to potential brea',-ere of
firr.?
realifoic
treatlsis.
Not much progress could be claimed at the :"oreiv.n rinls4.er5'
Conference on German reunification, althourh the erolorred dis-
cussions on this, in an atmosphere of frankness and cordiality,
were the best-humoured discussions in which he had tageon -art
with Soviet representatives in the last seven years. The:- must
be a continuing review of those problems, because time could
bring about the possibility of an agreement on so-n of thr.r.
After all, there had been more than 300 meetings before the
Austrian treaty was signed, and if they wore 5uf1i7Aently
patient and persevering, agreement could be attained in 0.0 lonr
run.
It was clear that they must return to Geneva next Xorday deter-
mined to make another attempt to reach agreement a" 5erlin. In
the present state of relations between 7.ast and 'jest it was of
supreme importance to achieve some agreement, however limited.
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- 88 -
July, (Cont.) They could not make an agreement merely for the sake of doing
8 so; that meant abandoning their basic position that the West
(Unclassified) Berliners must be free to choose their way of life, must feel
confident of that freedom, and must have free access to the
outWe world, which made that freedom a reality and not a
paper formula. Buf if, subject to that proviso, they could
reach a limited agreement, it could-be a turning point to the
wider agreements which would mean so much to the peace and
stability of Europe.
On the summit meetings they must proceed step by step, and the
next step was to make a success of the coming phase of the
l'oroign Ninisters' Conferenee at Geneva. It might be limited
success, but the way would then be open for a meeting of heads
of Golvirnments. To start speculating on what might happen if
the talks broke Cown seemed to be the best way of ensuring that
they would break down. SineTebruary the atmosphere had been
steadily improving; they had sought to maintain that improve-.
merit, and were working quietly and steadily together for agree-
ment.
He still believed it was possible to reach agreement on Berlin,
oven though it was not finalized at the' Foreign Ministers'
Conference. Such an agreement would open the way to further
progress, and with that belief he would go back to the meeting
on Monday.
Mr. Bevan said that the opposition were glad to hear the Foreign
Secretary's optimism about the eventual outcome of the Confer-
ence on the suspension of nuclear tests, and they hoped that if
it went on indefinitely and no agreement on control and inspec-
tion was reached, the tests would remain suspended. The best
thing, short of an agreement about inspection, was that the
Conference on tests should continue indefinitely.
It was probably a goed.thing that the Foreign Ministers' Confer-
ence wont into recess. 'veryone was tired ',a:nd had begun to
misunderstand each other more than ordinarily. Mr. Khrushchev
had been making a aerie S of statements.TgLwas unfortunate that
while the Conference was on there were all kinds of "noises
off." There were "noises off" by Dr. Adenauer.
Did Mr. Lloyd expect an agreement on matters of substance at
Genova? All that Bri-tain did at the Conference was to put for-
ward proposals which were based not 'on what they understood to
be the strategy of the Prime Minister but on the strategy of
the other Western Powers.
Isla (Cont.)
8
(Unclassified)
SECRET/NOFORY
- 89.--
The oppositionvhad-been led tb b'elieve-that the visits of the
Prime Minister to.Hostow, Bonn, Paris, and Washington ineicntod
a new initiative on the nart of the 'Iritish Government. Those
visits were one of the most hiehly nublicized odysseys since t'ne
Greeks. Mr. Macmillan'said'he was goine to Proceed rodestly,
and if some small step forward' could be taken he would be
gratified. He said it with that assumption of tired ..risOcn he
had now adopted. The:opposition accented it all in ocd faith.
They should never have been so credulous.
Did the Prime Minister fight for his nroposals? If se where
were they? Did he run away? It was not the first tirn he haci
started to fight and run away. He who foueht nn e ran away lived
to.run away another day. As we were the third hydrogen powor,
Great Britain was supposed to have some influence on colleneues;
but the Federal Republic of Germany, and Franco, who wore not
hydrogen powers, had had more influence on American dinlematic
strategy. than Great Britain.
Any fair-minded treatment of the discessions at Geneva would
verify that so far there was no sign that what the iTi7b !J?nister
had told them was his approach had had the slirb'Ys-. --roct en
either France, Germany, or the United States. e, ..-o
there been from the other Powers any concessien to wnn
assumed to be the British noint of view.
The opposition considered that to try to roach aereerent on no
vide a front, on so many issues, before machine nereerent on
any one, was a .profound blunder and a recine for failure. The
opposition believed that an essential condition was that there
should be an area of disengagement in turope. That van the
right form of approach.
The Government's record on disarmament would have a malign in-
fluence on the development of discussions. that the rrime
Minister had admitted to the House was that to eive Great Elritain
the opportunity of having and testing the hydrogen bomb he was
prepared to sabotage and destroy the disarmament carmittee.
Hr. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister - I should not be naked.
Vr..Bevan - The Prime Minister has been waving tho bomb about for
the last' sixmonths, and lost his balance with it.
4re make clear now and I want to emphasize it so thee() will be no
misunderstanding - it would be a bad thing to try to misreprosent
the position of the British Labour narty in thin mattor ti.at we
SECRET/NWORP
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8
(Unclassified)
SECRET/NC/1'0Pu
-90-
do not believe it is any contribution to the peace of the world
to bring about a sudden rupture and dismantling in the Western
alliances.
We believe that if any action were taken by a British Government
the effects of which were to destroy the Western alliance, it
would not be a contribution to peace. It might precipitate the
world into war. It is a great mistake for people to imagine
that by suddenly getting rid of our friends and allies we make
any contribution to peace. On the contrary, we would invite
adventures of all sorts that might land us in the very place we
want to avoid.
That is our position today, and it has been our position before.
What we have said is that any repudiation of the hydrogen bomb
that involved the repudiation of the alliances, would be opposed
by the opposition. If, however, the time ever arrives when the
creator authority of the United Nations could supersede the
authority of NATO we would be more pleased than anyone else.
We therefore would suggest that even now we should try to open
disarmament negotiations, because we think the world situation
in deteriorating so rapidly that something ought to be done to
arrest it...
Although there was a great deal of attractiveness in turning the
back on reality when it was grim, this did not dispose ot it.
One still had to face it.
The opposition had been trying to do so, and trying to do so
honestly. Their proposal was that all nations which had not yet
made these weapons, or had not yet had tests, should renounce
them and agree to systems of inspection. If a significant
number did so, Britain should accept renunciation herself.
If this were achieved the USSR and the United States would be
surrounded with such a climate of international opinion as to
make it easier for them to reach agreement about the destruction
of their stocks.
Mr. Arthur Henderson said that if it was correct, as Nr. Averell
Harriman had rePorted, that Hr. Khrushchev had said that he
would agree to no reunification of Germany which did not provide
for a Communist system, it was to be hoped that the Soviet
Government would modify their view, otherwise it would place an
insurmountable obstacle in the path of a,rOnnited Germany.
SP,CRET/NOFORN
szcnET/m7mN
-91-
July (Cont.) Mr. Macmillan said that in general the nuclear test conference
8 was proceeding slowly but steadily. 'Iut there were obstacles
(Unclassified) to be overcome. He believedit was nossiblo in one or two cases
that they could only be resolved by the heads of the Governments
concerned. Nevertheless he thoughtthese conferences should tse
able to clarify the final points that might remain for settle-
ment and present them in a form in which the heads of Government
could reach a decision.
Although he had been incorrect in saying the other day, that nll
the Powers had made declarations that while discussions were
going on the tests would not take niece, he felt rretty confident
that while the discussions were going on, the tests w,uld not
take place. The agreement would come into force, Is rererds te
renunciation, from the date of the agreement.
The objective of a start in international control and insreesion,
a comprehensive agreement covering all ty-,es of test, and sipned
by the three great Powers, operating in this sphere, was a c7rent
prize, worth long effort and much patience in tryinr to ntt:Iin.
For it was on control ane inspection, rather than in sore
generalized plan, that real progress in eisarmarent, convent4on-
al and unconventional, depended.
Three great question marks surrounded Mr. Gaitskoll's nrorosnl.
Was it a practical one? Was there any real chance that to
other countries would agree, at any rate until the three rowers
had themselves reached some agreement on tests? If not, it was
just a formula for internal use.
Secondly, what would be the conditions of this club: non-
manufacture or non-possession? If it was only non-manufacture,
there were certain limitPtions, including the enormous exrenni,
involved. It was no good stopping manufacture unless on- o,u1'1
stop possession, for what was to prevent the great Powers t:,1nt
remained in the nuclear field from giving those weano%s to their
allies or satellites?
But, whatever the decision, it must he enforced, am: they WgsTO
having a lot of trouble in agreeing the conditions for enforcing
an inspection of tests. If they were to enforce, nil over the
world, both non-manufacture and nen-possession it 5,:eme4 n very
formidable task. Unless these questions wore answered, thin
concept was not realistic. ?
Uhile recognizing the immense material power of the two great
riiants, 111.12sia and America, was it really 'esirable e,nt tis
power, with all its influence on the gravest issu.s of foreirn
SECRET/NOFORN
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- 92 -
.Tulv (Cont.) policy, ohould be their perpetual mononoly, uninfluenced and
8 untempored from any other sources?
(Unclassified)
Any British Government, with their responsibility to themselves
and to the Commonwealth, and as a leading '7!nropean "aower, must
think long and carefully before taking such decisions. They
would do better to concentrate on the disarmament efforts which
they wore making.
He believed that certain questions could only be decided by a
summit meeting, and it mirTht be that the Berlin question was one
of them. ?
This meeting might be able to give the answers to questions
pnosed on to it by the Geneva Conference. Then they might find
it possible to define the next target to be approached - and
here, he thourtt, the question of general disarmament was the
most hopeful. If they could only succeed in taking this first
stop - a solution, even a temporary solution with the reduction
of sanctions in Berlin - then they might begin on the wider
questions on which the whole future of the world must depend.
Ho recognized the dangers, although he thought they had been
overestimated, of a great spread of nuclear power. But if the
three Powers were unable to agree among themselves, of what
value would a gesture be to other, nations? ,The pilgrimage ahead
was likely to be .a long one, and it would require patience as
well as faith. .
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Excerpts from Secretary Herter's lbws Conference: Ladies and
gentlemen., if I may, I would like to soy just a word or two
before the questions begin. As Andy Bording (Andrew E. Bon'irv),
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs) just told you,
this is my first open press conference and I hope that it will
be one ofa regular series, just as soon as I can got my life
regulated to a point where I will be in Washington for any
extended period of time.
During the two and a' half months that I have been 3ecrotnry,
I have had a number. of background conferences, one h-re and
four in Geneva. But I feel very strongly that there ahmad
be periodic open press conferences of this kind ane,, no I say,
I hope that the exigencies of the Foreir7n Ministers' Confer,,n-p
will make it possible for me to be with you at rorulnr inter-
vale in the near future. I say this because of n rrofound
conviction that any Secretary of State has a definite rooronn-
ibility to make as clear as he is able to the bas-s on which
our Government acts in the foreign policy field.
With that rather brief preliminary statonent I would 1-o very
glad to answer any questions that I can.
Q. - Mr. Secretary, you are returning now to Geneva to rosure
your talks with Mr. Gromyko and the Western Ministers. Would
you give us at this time your assessment of the noonihility of
reaching any worthwhile agreement on Berlin there qnd layinr
the groundwork for any surmit conference, please.
A. -1-am afraid I could not give that to you in terra of
betting odds. We naturally do not knot' just what we will find
at Geneva from the noint of view of any chan:70 or any more
explicit interpretation of what at the moment we aro not cer-
tain about in the Pussian position.
As you know, at midnight of the nieht on which we decided to
recess, Mr. Gromyko put out a statement in Geneva which indi-
cated that the position we had taken with respect to the Inot
proposal made by the Soviets contained certain misintornrota-
tions. However, our statement that we nut out earlier in tho
day was based not only on the working of the docuront hut on
Mr. Khrushchev's radio speech which had come over to un
same afternoon.
Here in Washington I made a report to the nation a few days
after our return and I think it was on Juno 28 that Fr.
Gromyko saw fit to answer that narticular statement. Po took
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oxception to some of the things I had -said and wehaVil
studying with great care .the Wording that he has used with
respect to the exceptions that he has. taken.
In particular he objected to an assumptioirthat we had made
and I think we probably. made on'the basis 'of evidence before
us, that if we entered into any interim agreement with respect
to Berlin and then resufied negotiations'at the'expiration of
the term of that agreement, ie would have forfeited our occupa-
tion rights. Mr. Gromyko indicaterl that was an entirely false
assumption, and that otherwise they would not have suggested
we would resume negotiations after a,blank period of time.
That is a new point on which we certainly would want some
clarification.
The other point, which is very indefinite, of course, is the
one concerning their suggestioft of an interim agreement, at
first for a year and then one and a half years, Both Nr.
Gromyko and Mr. Khrushchev made the statement that the period
of time was neither a matter of importance nor of principle.
This presumably means the period of time is one for negotiation.
,17
I think that we shall have to explore first of. all, when we get
back to Geneva, the meaning of those statements, if the mean-
ings are as apparently intended by the Russians, but certainly
not borne out by the earlier documents.
I think there is some possibility we might Ireach agreement.
I eare pay there is some possibility but we are not saying it
with optimism. I have never been optimistic, as you know,
about reaching a successful negotiation.
With respect to the summit conference, I think that was made
amply clear by the President: 'Unless we can make progress
which would justify such a conference, that he would not be
willing to go. -
Q. - Mr. Secretary, have you made an effort, through Ambassador
(Llewellyn E.) Thompson in Moscow, to clarify these two points
in Mr. Gromyko's statement?
A..- NO, we haven't.
.Q. - Mr. Secretary, if tho Soviet Union indicates in Geneva,
as Gromyko's statement seems to indicate, that OUT rights
would not run out at the end of this period, would we be will-
ing to settle for an indefinite or an intermediate extension
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- 95 -
of those rights laid down, as you put it, I believe, in your
speech or in the official Western statement, until the reuni-
fication of Germany is brought about.
A. - I woule hesitate to make any commitment on that. Actually,
it is difficult to make a commitment, sneaking as only one ?
foreign minister among,four. Obviously, the first thinr, and
the very important thing is to concert our positions with our
Allies.
Before raking any reply as to what we might do unc'er hyr1)-
thetical circumstances, naturally, we would want to ho certain
of the attitude of the Allies.
Q. - Has there not been in this period any ,'Iscussinn vith or
Allies on this point?
A. - Very little discussion largelibocause of other on;7,r,,-
ments on the part of our Allies. Couve dn :urvill,, tpo
Foreign Yinister of France, went to !adar,ascar with Gr.norll
Gaulle and has been away from Paris. Mr. von arentqn-, Nis
been away for some time from 3onn. The consultntinno
take place just as soon as we return to Geneva.
Q. - Mr. Secretary, what is your reaction to the chnrncter nf
the remarks which Mr. arushchev made to Governor Parrinan':
A. - Well, I don't know just how to characterize them. I
think the President did it pretty well yesterday and I think
we had better stand on what he then said.
Q. - Mr. Secretary, in the event that your negotiations at
Geneva are not successful, is there a fully agreed Allied plan
on counter-measures to maintain our position in Berlin, if
the Soviets take some unilateral action?
A. - That matter has been discussed for a considerable ported
of time and I would say that on the whole our position is well
concerted. ' ?
Q. - Gould you estimate on that?
A. - NO, I would not go into details.
Q. Mr. SoCretary, you spoke of the absonoo of the German
and the French Foreign Ministers. Have you boon in consulta-
tion with Secretary Lloyd oyor the last several weeks?
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July (Cont.) A. - No, I have not been in direct conversation. with him at
9 all. I have talked with the Ambassador o* or twice, here.
(Unclassified)
Q. - Has there been contact between the President and Mr.
Macmillan?
A. - None direct, that I know of.
Q. - Mr. Secretary, in view of the lack of these contacts in
the interim, plus a number of other items, including an inter-
nretction Tr. Macmillen which differed frop ours on the
progress of the first meeting,. 'and,the near-crisis situation
in some, respects between our Oovernment and France over
nuclear armaments, taking these things cumulatively, how much
are they likely to militate against a united front amongst
the Western Allies at this second meeting?
A. - Well, I assume that any family difficultie6 we have are
always taken account of by the,Eussians. nn the other hand,
I con say this, I have said it before, and I want to repeat it;
that in Geneva the unit'ed front was a genuine front and I hope
it is a front that will hold, and hold effectively. Both the
process of consultatccin and the process of reaching agreement,
and I mean genuine agreement, was very real, and to me very
heartening.
Q. - Hr. Secretary, in your sneech I believe you said that Hr.
Khrushchev had said that no item in the Western proposal
nackago was negotiable. Have .you any reason to revise your
oninion of that now?
A. - NO, that statemen:t of Mr. Khrushchev !:s appged to our
proposal, the sevon-point'propasal with regard to West Berlin,
not to the initial Western peace plan. It was on that that
ho said that none orthe seven points was subject to negotia-
tion.
Q. - Mr. Secretary, how long would you go on in Geneva if. there
were no nrogreas, as there was in the previous six weeks?
Would you stay on two or three weeks, or longer? Or how
seriously do you take your Puerto rico engagement?
A. - Well, I wish I could give yOu the answer io.that. I am
hoping that we will not be Wire longer than three weeks.
'
Q. - Mr. Secretary, in viqw of the position the United States
has taken vith regard to the 'continuation of our rights in
Berlin, how could these be modified at all in any new dis-
cussion based on those latest remarks of Mr. Gromykols?
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A. - Well, as I say, the remarks of Er. Khrashchev, and tne
of Pr. Gromyko do not exactly nbc, and I think that our first
responsibility is to find out what the official nos!ti?n
As you know, the remarks of Pr. Khrushchev were ns
in an interview, the remarks of rr. Gronyko in documentary ?
form, and I think that we have a definite responsibility tn
find out which represents the officiP1 7ussion:attitues.
Q. - Do you have any idea that the United States rirht roe:ify
its position on the maintenance of its rights in ierlin?
A. - We have not indicated any such thing.
Q. - If the Russians withdraw their limitations on nlloged or
proposed limitation on our rights in Berlin, does that qualtry
as the progress that is necessary to go on to the surrit? rr
will we require some other further progress?
A. - 'len, an you know, we had not coo cic,se to nrreor
There are other elements, obviously, that have stL11
planned out, end when I mentioned this one narticulnr n
of the Pussians, it does not necessarily r:nan thnt n nn
factory answer to that means a satisfactory nrrr,orint.
Q. - Er. Secretary, if the Soviets Cid rive a sntisctery
answer on that point, would it 'le -ossibln for te .rn
Powers then to join in negotiations -n the basin ":o
proposal?
A. - Not necessarily. The Soviet nron