"CHEMICAL, PHYSICAL AND MICRO-EXAMINATION OF RUSSIAN HVAP HARD CARBIDE PENETRATOR"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01044R000100020005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 7, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

proved For R &1FZ&0" )001 S '1 DPWT0'IUgR000100020005-5 25X1A /_) V
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY USSR/Korea
Chemical., Physical and Micro-examination of
Russian HVAP hard carbide Penetrator
DATE DIS1=R. February 51
NO. OF PAGES 3,
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
DATE SUPPLEMENT TO
ACQUIRED
25X1 B
25X1A REPORT NO.
The sample examined is described as follows:
a. Identification of shell from which the penetrator was extracted.-,
88 mm HVA.P., believed to have been manufactured in 191.80
25X1X
c, The size of the penetrator was 27.5 mm diameter x 90,0 mm long
d. The ojive radius was 52 mm and the distance from the point to the
beginning of the ojive was 33 mm.
2,, Physical examination of the penetrator yielded the following information:
Hardness - 71.5 Rockwell "c.11
b. Density - 14.40 Specific gravity.
c. Transverse rupture load ?- 124.9000 pounds per square inch.
d. Axial marks along the penetrator at approximately 1200 angular distance
apart indicate that it was formed in a split mold.
(1)
(2)
The ojive was formed in pressing the specimen in a split mold.
The ojive had been "touched up" by a minimum of what appeared to
be hand grinding.
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X-ray examination showed tungsten carbide and binder phases only,
fa The material was brittle and porous,
(1) The type of porosity suggests that the mix was dry ground.
go Indications are that the specimen was sintered standing upright,
(7n file in the CIAO library is a photographic print illustrating
the penetrator
3. Micro-examination at 1500 diameters revealed the following:
a. Coarse, somewhat porour structure was exhibited, indicating the use of
secondary material as contrasted with the first-quality, lamp-filament
tungsten required by U. S. specifications.
(1) There is evidence that a minor quantity of presintered, scrap,
tungsten-carbide, tool material had been added to the mixtures
b, The structure also indicates a minimum of expensive and time-consuming
powder grinding operations,
(1) Dry instead of wet grinding is indicated.
(a) This grinding process probably eliminates at
least two and possibly three of the powder
preparatory operations.
c. Binder mixing is also estimated as being poor in comparison with US
quality techniques.
Can file in the CIA library is a photo-micrograph print illustrating
the microstructure at 1500 diameters'
Chemical analysis of the penetrator has yielded the following information
concerning its composition:
Graphitic carbon
Carbon (C)
Silicon (Si)
Tungsten (W)
Cobalt (Co)
Titanium (Ti)
Tantalum (Ta)
Iron (Fe)
Nickel (Ni)
Chromium (Cr)
Molybdenum (Yo)
0.03 per cent
5.90 ti
0.15 n It
86.60 a t,
0.58 t1 if
Trace
0.09 per cent
0-86 K t,
3,25 n ca
Trace
2.50 per cent
99.96 per cent
a. In view of the constituents, Fe 0.86;0' and Cr (Trace), it appears
that easily fabricated 18-8 alloy ball mills wort anployed in the
preparation procedure instead of hard, carbide-lined ball-mills
as are used in the USA, England and Germany.
b. The use of some presintered tool-material scrap is shown by the
significant presence of tantalum (0.90;0' Ta) and possibly by the
2.50% Mo, although the presence of this quantity of molybdenum is
not understood unless the M0' W ores are ineffectively reduced.
The presence of cobalt (0,58% Co) may also indicate use of East-
German, hard, carbide-tool-material scrap as a bulk additive to
a secondary material.,
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d, The amount of nickel (3.25% Ni) is scant and might be taken as a.
measure to conserve a scarce metallic element. On the other hand,
the small quantity of nickel may be deliberately intended to yield
better_~erformance in service.
(1)
The following conclusions are suggested by the reported analysis of only
one specimen:
(2) Low binder content (Ni) would improve fragmentation after
penetration had been accomplished.
5.
a. If the specimen were intended as a tool material, almost any
qualified expert would report adversely on its character, composition,
and microstructure and probably on the poor fabrication-procedure
employed.
(1) There is little doubt that the projectile would be rejected. on
the basis of its composition and structure by US ordnance
inspectors. The composition and structure do not meet either
USA or British specifications for similar projectile components*
b. It is nevertheless the opinion of the assessor that this penetrator has
been very efficiently and economically made and is quite adequate for
its expendable application,
(1) The essential metallurgical step of producing WC has been
adequately performed. Graphitic carbon is very low --- 0.03%.
This is a criterion of quality for the metallurgical operation.)
(2) The transverse rupture strength of 124,000 psi, the hardness of
71.5 Rockwell F'cT, and the density of 111.0 SG are all believed
adequate for the.job4
c. The penetrator has been produced by methods which are neither char-
acteristically German (hot pressed) or Pritish-American (cold pressed
and ground in the presintered condition).
(1) It is the opinion of the assessor that the specimen was produced
by a well-calculated process in which well-grounded modification
of German, British, and US practices are indicated.
An increase in Ni would lower the specific gravity of the
penetrator, already reduced by porosity resulting from
cheap, fast, production techniques, thereby lowering the
impact striking force for which the projectile is designed.
(2) The specimen is believed to have been produced by intelligently
planned., cheap, mass-production methods from inexpensive materials.
It is estimated that many thousands of similar penetrators could be
quickly and inexpensively produced from secondary materials, by in-
experienced labor, to perform adequately. Some of the savings in
production time and cost indicated by this analysis are as follows:
(1)
The penetrator is evidently cold pressed in split, mass-
production molds to a conformation that does not require
overall centerless grinding or grinding the ojive.
(2) The major portion of the specimen was in the condition in which
it left the final (and probably only) sintering furnace operation.
(3) A general quality reduction to a level just good enough for the job,
involving omission of time-consuming operations, is indicated by the
micro-examination.
(4) Chemical analysis indicates a composition based on secondary
materials instead of first quality, lamp-filaancnt tungsten,
~- end
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