Indochina Refugee Situation

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00080R001400210001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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National
Foreign Ol OO Rv
Assessment
Center
Indochina Refugee
Situation
July 1979
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Warning Notice Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
STAT
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Foreign NOFORN
Assessment
Center
Indochina Refugee
Situation (v)
Formation available as of 13 July 1979 has been used
in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was prepared under the auspices of
the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and
the Pacifid
at-Large Dick Clark
Secret
NI 79-10004
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NOFORN
Indochina
Refugee
Situation
Key Judgments Vietnam is in effect expelling its Chinese minority, which it believes is a
security threat, and many ethnic Vietnamese are fleeing economic and
political hardship on their own. Approximately 173,000 refugees from
Vietnam are scattered in camps throughout Asia, and another 240,000 are
in China. (u)
More than 162,000 refugees from Laos and Kampuchea are in UN-
sponsored camps in Thailand. Many more have not been officially counted.
(u)
We expect the rate of arrival for boat people-currently averaging over
10,000 per week-to drop temporarily in coming weeks as the weather
becomes less favorable for small craft
Because Vietnam sees the refugee problem as a security and political issue,
it will resist pressure to change its policy. The Soviet Union will not prod
Vietnam on this issue. (s)
The influx of refugees is causing serious problems for the members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). They are angered by
Vietnam's actions, but they also believe the United States should do more to
resettle the refugees. There is some potential for domestic political strife
because of the refugees in Malaysia and Thailand. (u)
The ASEAN states will not accept large numbers of refugees for permanent
resettlement, and we expect the pattern of resettlement to third countries to
remain about the same, with the United States, Canada, Australia, and
France taking the majority. (u)
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 Secret
NOFORN
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China claims it has accepted 240,000 Vietnamese refugees, and more are
arriving. China has tightened its admission policy in the last year. There is
limited evidence that China may have helped some refugees cross into
Macao and Hong Kong. China recently has approached the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees for financial help but appears reluctant to
establish a refugee-processing center in China. (s NF)
Rumors are circulating that Vietnam may send a refugee ship to a US
possession or territory. We have no evidence any such attempt has been
made as yet. (s NF)
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NOFORN
Indochina
Refugee
Situation (u)
The flow of refugees from Vietnam has increased
markedly since January 1979, but Vietnamese are only
part of the Indochina refugee picture. Lao and Hmong
tribesmen are fleeing economic hardship and govern-
ment persecution; Kampucheans are seeking to escape
war and possible starvation; ethnic Vietnamese are
running away from economic hardship and political
repression, while Sino-Vietnamese, in effect, are being
expelled. Most of the refugees now in Southeast Asian
camps are from Laos and Kampuchea. (u)
As of 30 June 1979, approximately 146,000 Laotians
and 16,000 Kampucheans were in UN-sponsored
camps in Thailand.' Several thousand more
Kampucheans, who have sought refuge in Thailand,
have returned to Kampuchea either voluntarily or
under duress. Many Laotian refugees are never
included in the statistics; they have friends or relatives
in Thailand and resettle themselves. Approximately
413,000 refugees from Vietnam are scattered through-
out Asia. Some 240,000 are in southern China, and
most of the rest are in camps in Hong Kong, Malaysia,
and Indonesia. The weekly average rate of refugee
arrivals has increased to more than eight times the rate
a year ago, and departures for resettlement have fallen
farther and farther behind. Conditions in the over-
crowded refugee camps are grim. In some camps,
shelter is minimal; sanitation and medical services are
inadequate or nonexistent; and food and water supplies
are tight. The probability of a serious epidemic of
contagious disease is high. (u)
The flow of refugees from Laos and Kampuchea will
be difficult to control.' Lowland Lao, fleeing the
regime's harsh economic and political policies, and
Hmong tribesmen, fleeing military operations against
them, easily cross into Thailand. The border is long
and difficult for either the Lao or the Thai to patrol.
The fighting in Kampuchea has also caused a marked
increase recently in the number of refugees fleeing to
Thailand. Wartime conditions and the nature of the
border make it difficult to prevent refugees from
arriving; moreover, Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea
have encouraged the Heng Samrin regime to expel
large numbers of Sino-Khmer. (s NF)
It is impossible to estimate how many more refugees
will flee Indochina. All of Indochina's more than 1.5
million ethnic Chinese, most of whom live in Vietnam,
are potential refugees, but thousands of non-Chinese
residents of the three countries will also continue to
leave.' (u)
The refugees who receive most of the publicity and
pose the thorniest political problems are "boat people"
from Vietnam. Vietnam could greatly reduce its
refugee outflow if it chose to. Some of the refugees
escape on their own, but since spring 1978, the
majority have been Sino-Vietnamese who have in
essence been expelled by Hanoi. Vietnamese officials
consider the Chinese a potential fifth column; more-
over, many belong to an economic class the Communist
regime seeks to eliminate. In addition, the refugees pay
an exit tax in gold, which last year, according to some
estimates, equaled Hanoi's known official foreign
exchange holdings. Hanoi is also probably pleased that
the refugee outflow causes friction between the United
'See appendix C for estimates of the number of Chinese in the States 25X1
of Indochina.
' See appendix A for detailed statistics on refugee flow through June
1979.
2 See appendix B for estimates of tho number of refugees from Laos
and Kampuchea through October 1979.
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Change in Average Refugee
Movement Rates
I Aug 77 to
31 Jan 78
1 Feb 79 to
15 Jun 79
Percent Change
in Rate
All Countries of
First Asylum
Arrivals
1,120
10,606
847
Departures
485
1,933
299
Remaining
635
8,673
1,266
Thailand
Arrivals
892
3,816
328
Departures
300
560
87
Remaining
592
3,256
450
Malaysia
Arrivals
168
2,546
1,415
.Departures
110
988
798
Remaining
58
1,559
2,588
2,450
15,213
Departures
12
164
1,267
Remaining
4
2,285
57,025
Others
Arrivals
44
1,794
3,977
]Departures
63
221
251
Remaining
-19 a
1,573
8,279
Represents refugees in other countries of first asylum prior to
l August 1977 who were apparently transferred to Hong Kong,
Malaysia, or Thailand.
States and members of the Association of Southeast
.Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Singapore, Thailand, Malay-
sia, Indonesia, and the Philippines-as well as among
the ASEAN states themselves. (u)
'Vietnam has created an elaborate but efficient ma-
chinery to process refugees. The Politburo oversees the
program, and the Public Security Bureau-the politi-
cal police-carries it out. Internal policies that dis-
criminated against Sino-Vietnamese began in the
spring of 1978, and many were given the choice of
moving to primitive New Economic Zones or leaving
the country. Those who choose to leave often deal with
a middleman who in turn deals with the Public
Security Bureau. Vietnamese officials certify the
passenger list for each boat, collect an exit fee, and set
the date of departure. The middleman, who is often a
Chinese businessman, arranges for the boat, enlists the
passengers, and collects the passage money. Many
middlemen arrange for a number of boats before
leaving themselves. (u)
Because Hanoi sees the refugee problem as a security
and political issue, Vietnam thus far has vigorously
resisted pressure to change its policy. Vietnam's
leaders seem united on refugee policy. (u)
Although the Soviet Union today has more influence
with Vietnam than any other state, even Moscow is
quite limited in its capacity to change Vietnam's
policy. Hanoi has often resisted Soviet desires on other
issues. In any event, Moscow will almost certainly not
risk its political capital by attempting to prod Hanoi to
change its policy. Soviet propaganda firmly supports
Vietnam on the refugee issue, and the Soviets have told
Western officials that they consider it a Vietnamese
matter and will not get involved. (s)
It would be difficult for the West to impose meaningful
economic sanctions on Vietnam. Less than 20 percent
of Hanoi's aid comes from non-Communist sources,
and much of it is project aid, the loss of which would
have little immediate economic impact. Withdrawal of
aid by important industrialized countries such as
Japan, however, would be a diplomatic setback for
Hanoi and further tarnish its international image. (u)
Vietnam has grown more sensitive to international
criticism on the refugee issue, but it has done virtually
nothing to discourage the outflow of refugees. Hanoi
argues that US and Chinese "aggression" has created
the problem and that Washington and Beijing must
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Distribution of Refugees Among Countries
of First Asylum (1 August 1977 - 15 June 1979)
All Countries
Thailand
Malaysia
Hong Kong
Others
396,333 a
170,551
a
116,352
59,060
50,370
(100%)
(43.0%)
(29.4%)
(14.9%)
(12.7%)
105,627
46,533
42,137
5,780
11,177
(39.9%)
(5.5%)
(10.6%)
Remaining
290,706
124,018
74,215
53,280
39,193
(100%)
(42.7%)
25.5%)
(18.3%)
(13.5%1
a Includes 49,000 unregistered Khmer refugees in Thailand out of
the 89,000 who entered the country in May 1979, The Thai
Government has forcibly repatriated 40,000 of the 89,000 refugees
to Kampuchea.
take responsibility for finding a solution. Hanoi may
decide at some point to underscore this point by
sending a boatload of refugees to a US possession or
territory. Rumors of a plan to do so have surfaced
periodically, but we know of no actual attempt. The
option could, however, be exercised at any time. (s
NF)
The rate of arrival of boat people will probably decline
in the weeks ahead; the seas are rougher and fewer
boats will complete the journey.' Some reporting
suggests a boat shortage in Vietnam that will also
reduce the flow of refugees. The decline is likely to be
temporary, however, as Hanoi is determined to rid
itself of "subversive" and "unproductive" elements.
Hanoi may be willing to release the refugees in a more
orderly manner. It has offered to discuss "exit proce-
dures" with the countries of first asylum, but it has not
indicated as yet that it is willing to discuss restrictions
on total outflow. (S NF)
' See appendix D for projected refugee flow through December 1979.
Impact on First Asylum Countries
Most of the refugees flee to non-Communist Southeast
Asian states or to Hong Kong. All of the Southeast
Asian countries of first asylum are members of ASEAN.
The final communique from their foreign ministers'
meeting in Bali in late June strongly condemned
Vietnam for dumping its unwanted people on its
neighbors. The refugee problem has created tension
within ASEAN. Those states that are less affected are
more concerned about continuing to keep refugees out
than about helping their neighbors to deal with the
problem. (s)
The refugee problem has also created difficulties
between ASEAN and the United States. Member states
are annoyed by American criticism of their refusal to
accept more refugees. Some believe that it was
Washington's Indochina policy that created the condi-
tions responsible for the refugee exodus, and all believe
the United States should accept the major burden of
resettling all the refugees. (u)
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Refugees Arriving in, Departing From,
and Remaining in Countries of First Asylum
1 August 1977-15 June 1979
1,98 weeks)
All Countries Thailand _ Malaysia Hong Kong Other
Persons Weekly Persons Weekly Persons Weekly Persons Weekly Persons Weekly
Average Average Average Average Average
Arrivals 396,333' (4,044)
Departures 105,627 (1,078)
Remaining 290,706 (2,966)
I August 1977-31 January 1978
(26 weeks)
Arrivals 29,114
Departures 12,602
Remaining 16,512
170,551' (1,740)116,3.52 (1,187) 59,060 (603) 50,370 (514)
46,533 (475) 42,137 (430) 5,780 (59) 11,177
---------- (114)
124,018 (1,265) 74,215 (757) 53,280 (544) 39,193 (400)
(1,120) 23,190 (892) 4,364 (168) 427 (16) 1,133
(485) 7,803 (300) 2,860 (110)_____ 314 (12) 1,625
(635) 15,387 (592) 1,504
(58) 113 (4) - 4922
1 February 197831 July 1978
(26 weeks)
Arrivals 53,554 (2,060)
Departures 26,450 (1,017)
Remaining 27,104 (1,043)
1 August 1978-31 January 1979
(26 weeks)
Arrivals
Departures
Remaining
31,558 (1,214) 15,629(601) 2,239 (86) 4,128 (159)
17,891 (688) 6323 (243) 332 (13) 1,904 (73)
13,667 (526) 9.306 (358) 1,907 (73) 2,224 (86)
(s,9uo) 39,485 (1,519) 45,434 - (1,747)__ 7,399
27,914 (1,074) 9,640 (371) 13,201 (508) 1,843
73,629 (2,832) 29,845
(1,148) 32,233 (1,240) 5,556
(285) 9,225 (355)
(71) 3,230 (124)
(214) 5,995 (230)
1 February 1979-15 June 1979
(2 0 weeks)
Arrivals
Departures
Remaining
' Includes 49,000 unregistered Khmer refugees in Thailand out of
the 89,000 who entered the country in May 1979. The Thai
Government has forcibly repatriated 40,000 of the 89,000 refugees
to Kampuchea.
2 ]Represents refugees in other countries of first asylum prior to
1 August 1977 who were apparently transferred to Hong Kong,
Malaysia, or Thailand.
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212,122' (10,606) 76,318' (3,816) 50,925 (2,546) 48,995 (2,450) 35,884 (1,794)
38,661 (1,933) 11,199 (560) _ 19,753 (988) _ 3,291
(164) 4,418 (221)
173,461 (8,673) 65,119 (3,256) 31,172 (1,559) 45,704
(2,285) 31,466 (1,573)
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Southeast Asian Refugees
All Countries of First Asylum
1 Aug 77 to
1
Feb 78 to
1 Aug 78 to
1 Feb 79 to
31 Jan 78
31 Jul 78
31 Jan 79 15 Jun 79
(26 weeks) (26 weeks)
(26 weeks) (20 weeks)
Reporting Period
Unclassified
579804 7-79
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The refugee problem threatens to cause political
difficulties within some of the ASEAN states. The
domestic political impact of the refugees is greatest in
Malaysia and Thailand, which bear the brunt of the
refugee influx. Large numbers of Vietnamese refugees
that Malaysia has turned away have recently entered
Indonesia, but most them are kept on small, largely
uninhabited islands in the South China Sea, where
they are isolated from public attention. (See appendix
foldout map.) Relatively few refugees have reached the
Philippines, and Singapore continues to prevent refu-
gees from landing. (u)
In both Malaysia and Thailand, the refugees have
become a political issue.
The Thais are also concerned about the potential
problem posed by the thousands of refugees from Laos
now in camps in the north and northeast. This area of
Thailand is economically depressed and suffers from
armed insurgency. The government fears that assis-
tance to the refugees could arouse antagonism among
the local inhabitants, who feel neglected by Bangkok,
though local Thai merchants obviously profit from
support operations for the camps. (u)
The situation in Malaysia is more explosive. The
majority of Vietnamese refugees who have arrived
recently are ethnic Chinese. Malaysia has a long
history of antagonism between its Chinese and Malay
communities, and Malaysian leaders fear that an
incident at a refugee camp could spark racial violence
within Malaysia. The refugees, moreover, are concen-
trated on Malaysia's east coast, an area of Malay
poverty and Muslim orthodoxy where anti-Chinese
passions are strong. Adding to the ethnic problem is a
thriving black market, manipulated by Chinese trad-
ers, that has sprung up near refugee camps and has
caused a sharp rise in the prices of staples needed by
local Malays. The nationalistic youth wing of the
ruling Malay party and the opposition Islamic party
are already exploiting the refugee issue to criticize the
government's pragmatic and moderate racial policies;
this could force the government into a stronger pro-
Malay-Muslim stance that would further damage race
relations. (u)
The intensity of the political problems posed by the
refugees will depend largely on whether the govern-
ments concerned can assure their people that the
situation is temporary, that the refugees will be
speedily resettled elsewhere, and that there will be no
residual communities in countries of first asylum. At
present refugees are arriving much faster than they
can be resettled, and first-asylum countries fear that
resettlement in third countries will be unable to keep
pace and will never include all refugees. This
combination of concerns-along with apprehension
that Western governments, particularly the United
States, may not relieve them of the problem-led
ASEAN states to announce recently that they would
refuse to admit any more refugees. While all the states
realize that their ability to prevent refugees from
arriving is limited, they will continue to deport those
they can find. (u)
No country of first asylum will accept large numbers of
refugees for permanent resettlement. Malaysia has
taken several groups of Kampuchean Muslims, and
Thailand may eventually agree to resettle some of the
Lao and possibly a limited number of Kampuchean
refugees. But no ASEAN state will accept for
resettlement any of the Vietnamese refugees, whether
Sino-Vietnamese or ethnic Vietnamese. (u)
The pattern of third-country resettlement will prob-
ably remain about as it is now, with the United States,
Canada, Australia, and France taking the bulk of the
refugees and with other countries accepting token
numbers. Japan is unlikely to accept more than a
handful, if that, but it has decided to increase
significantly its financial assistance for processing and
resettlement programs. (u)
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Southeast Asian Refugees
Thailand
1Aug77to
31 Jan 78
(26 weeks)
1 Feb 78 to
31 Jul 78
(26 weeks)
1 Aug 78 to
31 Jan 79
(26 weeks)
Unclassified
579805 7-79
1 Feb 79 to
15 Jun 79
(20 weeks)
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NOFORN
Southeast Asian Refugees
Malaysia
1Aug77to
31 Jan 78
(26 weeks)
1 Feb 78 to
31 Jul 78
(26 weeks)
1 Aug 78 to
31 Jan 79
(26 weeks)
Reporting Period
Unclassified
579806 7-79
Secret 8
1 Feb 79 to
15 Jun 79
(20 weeks)
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Southeast Asian Refugees
Hong Kong
1iAug77to
31 Jan 78
(26 weeks)
1 Feb 78 to
31 Jul 78
(26 weeks)
1 Aug 78 to
31 Jan 79
(26 weeks)
Unclassified
579807 7-79
1 Feb 79 to
15Jun79
(20 weeks)
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There are also some indications-difficult to verify or
quantify-that China is quietly facilitating the travel
to Hong Kong or Macao of some Vietnamese refugees
who had been resettled in China. Many refugees
reportedly looked on China only as a way station to
Hong Kong; others quickly tired of the hard life in
Beijing now claims that some 240,000 refugees from
Vietnam have entered China since early 1978 and that
about 10,000 a month are continuing to arrive. We
cannot confirm the Chinese figures nor do we know the
breakdown between ethnic Chinese, ethnic Vietnam-
ese, and minority people. The ethnic Chinese are by far
the largest category. The flow of ethnic Chinese has
probably declined over the last year, however, because
of China's current inhospitality and the preferred
destinations of the boat people. (u)
China's policy toward refugees from Vietnam
hardened during 1978. Beijing initially accepted ap-
proximately 160,000 refugees, who crossed into China
after Vietnam decided to force out its ethnic Chinese
minority. The refugees were given assistance and
subsidies for their maintenance, which the Chinese
now claim totals over $350 million. Most refugees who
entered China were assigned to state farms for
overseas Chinese in South China. By mid-July 1978,
however, Sino-Vietnamese relations had deteriorated
and the burden of refugees had become so great that
Beijing closed the border and began-without
success-to insist that Vietnam take back most of the
refugees. As Sino-Vietnamese tensions escalated,
movement of ethnic Chinese overland into China
slowed, but Beijing claims 10,000 per month are still
being forced across the border. An unknown number of
minority peoples in the border areas of Vietnam-and
perhaps Laos as well-may have crossed into China,
however, and may be counted by Beijing as refugees.
(U)
Of the initial 160,000, only about 10,000- Sino-
'Vietnamese fishermen from the Haiphong area-went
to China by sea and stayed. Other boat refugees who
stopped at Chinese ports en route to Hong Kong during
this period were given the option of resettling in China.
!fn the past year, however, China has been increasingly
Beijing's reluctance to accept additional refugees has
not kept it from exploiting the issue. In midJune 1979,
the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement
strongly protesting Vietnam's "barbaric" treatment of
the refugees. It also played up Beijing's efforts on
behalf of the refugees, including the "big drain" on
China's resources, and made clear that China was
Until June, China refused to take part in UN refugee
efforts and turned aside US requests that it accept
more refugees. China now has approached the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for finan-
cial help, but it has not been forthcoming on the
proposal that it establish a refugee-processing center in
China. Such a refugee center would present problems
for the Chinese, however, because they would see it as
taking some of the pressure off Vietnam and thus
actually encouraging Hanoi to continue its harsh
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Southeast Asian Refugees
Other Countries of First Asylum
1 Aug 77 to
31 Jan 78
(26 weeks)
Unclassified
579808 7-79
1 Feb 78 to
31 Jul 78
(26 weeks)
1 Aug 78 to
31 Jan 79
(26 weeks)
Reporting Period
1 Feb79to
15 Jun 79
(20 weeks)
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China's future actions will be shaped by its view of the
refugee question as a political issue, an aspect of its
bitter confrontation with Vietnam. China will appar-
ently attend the Geneva conference, where it will seek
every opportunity to put Vietnam "in the dock." It will
push strongly for a UN Security Council meeting to
discuss political and security aspects of the refugee
situation. China hopes to gain political capital from the
issue, especially in its relations with the ASEAN states
and the nonaligned movement. Its willingness to
cooperate with others on providing assistance to
refugees will be determined largely by the extent to
which this aid would advance its political objectives.
(s NF)
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Appendix A
Refugee Flow
In the period from 1 August 1977 through 15 June
1979 (98 weeks), nearly 400,000 refugees arrived in
Asian countries of first asylum-primarily Thailand,
Malaysia, and Hong Kong.* The rate of arrival
averaged 4,044 persons per week, but the rate of
departure for resettlement countries averaged only
1,078 persons per week. As a result of the disparity
between arrival and departure rates, the refugee
population in countries of first asylum grew at an
average rate of 2,966 persons per week. As of 15 June
1979, the countries of first asylum contained a total of
290,706 refugees awaiting processing and
resettlement. (u)
Thailand, Malaysia, and Hong Kong have together
received 346,000 refugees, or 87.3 percent of all
arrivals in countries of first asylum. The refugees are
not, however, evenly distributed among these coun-
tries. Thailand has received both the largest number
of refugees (170,551) and the largest proportion
(43 percent) of the refugee arrivals. Thailand has also
accumulated the largest population of refugees
awaiting processing and resettlement-124,018 per-
sons, or 42.7 percent of the total. Malaysia has
received almost 30 percent of the arrivals (116,352
persons) and held 25.5 percent of the people awaiting
resettlement. as of 15 June 1979. Hong Kong has
received 15 percent of the arrivals (59,060 persons)
and holds 18.3 percent of the people awaiting
resettlement. Other countries of first asylum (Indone-
sia, the Philippines, Macao, Singapore, Japan, Korea,
Taiwan, India, and Australia) have received and
currently hold approximately 13 percent of the arrivals
and population awaiting resettlement. (u)
* This figure includes 49,000 unregistered Khmer refugees in
Thailand out of the 89,000 who entered the country in May 1979.
The Thai Government has forcibly repatriated 40,000 of the 89,000
refugees to Kampuchea.
The rates at which refugees arrived in countries of first
asylum, departed for resettlement countries, and were
added to refugee populations remaining in holding
areas increased dramatically during the period be-
tween 1 August 1977 and 15 June 1979. The average
weekly rate of arrival in countries of first asylum
increased 847 percent, but the rate of departure for
resettlement countries rose only 299 percent. The
failure of departures to keep pace with arrivals meant a
1,266-percent increase in the rate at which additions to
holding-area populations accrued. The rates in individ-
ual countries of first asylum have varied considerably
but indicate a problem common to all of them--
mushrooming refugee populations that must be pro-
vided with basic necessities. (u)
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Appendix B
Estimated numbers of refugees (Lao, Hmong,Khmer,
ethnic Chinese) from Laos and Kampuchea reaching
Thai inland camps, July-October 1979
July
6,500-7,500
August
6,600-7,700
September
6,600-7,900
October
6,500-7,900
Appendix C
Estimated numbers of Ethnic Chinese remaining in
Indochinese countries as of 30 June 1979
Best
Approximation
Range of
Estimate
Northern Vietnam
36,000
35,000-37,000
Southern Vietnam
1,114,400
1,050,000-1,150,000
Kampuchea
325,000
275,000-350,000
Laos
70,000
50,000-90,000
Total
1,545
1,410,000-1,617,000
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Appendix D
Projected Flow of Boat Refugees per Month
From Vietnam, July-December 1979
In Thousands
These numbers represent an estimate of possible flow
projected from current rates. Actual arrivals over the
next six months will be greatly affected by both
weather conditions in the South China Sea and
political decisions in Hanoi.
Low
Probable
High
July
30
36
42
August
31
35
41
September
36
41
46
October
45
49
54
November
50
70
90
December
46
50
55
Low
Probable
High
July
29
30
31
August
27
29
30
September
24
27
28
October
20
24
26
November
16
22
24
December
10
20
22
If Vietnam Stops Assisting Refugees to Leave and Actively Attempts
to Prevent Departures (In Effect, a Return to the Rates of
Two Years Ago)
July 29
August 24
September 17
October 12
November 7
December 3
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Secret
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