THE ARMY DISSENT ISSUE (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000200020006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 19, 1979
• Content Type: MF

National tnte;l+gence Officers
19 July 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, of Central Intelligence
VIA . Robert R. Bowie
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment
FROM
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT . The Army Dissent Issue
differing views are disseminated to policymakers, etc.
1. Attached for your inspection and approval is the final
draft of the IIM.on the Possible Presence of Soviet Ground Forces
in Cuba. Changes and concurrences, with the large exception noted
below, were handled telephonically during the day and I believe
.the agencies involved other than the Army will re and this as a
fair and accurate reflection of their views.
2. The proposed Army footnotes are a different matter.
The picture has changed somewhat since Bob Bowie filled you in
and received your direction to exclude the nuclear site security
force mission tick proposed by Army. I conveyed this decision to
the Army rep who informed me that another Army LDX with revised
language was on the way. Our LDXs broke down so I had to have
the text of the proposed footnote dictated over the phone. It was
accompanied by a long paragraph, which was read to me, citing
chapter and verse of laws which forbid suppression of dissenting
intelligence Agency views and enjoin the DCI to ensure that
3. The new footnote is less offensive and inflammatory than
the two it replaces, but still quite far-fetched and dubiously
germane to the discussion in the IIM.
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department
of the Army, would point out: that, although the mission..
of this Brigade is not clear, its presence in Cuba would
provide the Soviets with a contingency force and would
enhance their capability for power projection in the
Western Hemisp ere. If necessary, extra transport aircraft
could be introduced into Cuba to deploy these troops to a
crisis area. Should the Soviets decide to introduce nuclear
weapons into Cuba this force could also be used to insure
that appropriate security is provided.
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 SUBJECT: The Army Dissent Issue (U)
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ou ptevfousZy ec d c o "reject `and iecaiuse the- 71's-sue of right a
dissent has been raised, I believe you will want an opportunity to
review the new Army language before I go ahead and enforce your
previous decision. F 1
4. Your options:
(a) Reject the ,footnote as before and publish the ILM as
in the present draft with a footnote identifying those agencies
with which it was coordinated and stating that ACSI, Department
of the Array, does not concur. The ACSI, perhaps supported by
General Tighe, will probably try to take you to court.
(b) Agree to include the footnote in which case it. is
essential that other agencies be informed of its content and
offered the opportunity to refute it, which I am certain
at least some of them will insist on doing. I might in that
case attempt to draft a position reflecting the views of all
agencies other than Army. This would take some time tomorrow
and almost certainly would prevent the IIM from being distributed
until Monday.
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(c) Pro ose to ACSI the following substitute footnote drafted
by
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department
of the Army, believes that the above list of possible
missions does not cover the full range of possibilities.
In the interests of disseminating this IIM to policymakers
in a timely fashion, the Director of Central Intelligence
.has directed that interagency discussion of the possibility
of additional missions be deferred until the NFIB representatives
meet again on the forthcoming I111 on the Soviet-Cuban military
relationship.
This would permit the ACSI to indicate disagreement while you asserted
your authority to channel the dispute into amore appropriate and less
time-constrained channel. This would be an ideal solution, but-I doubt
very, much that the ACSI would buy it, unless perhaps you dealt with him
personally.
discuss this further and: receive your instructions.
5. In any case, I will need to have your decision very quickly if
we want to have any chance at all of disseminating an IIM tomorrow.
I shall be phoning you at home this evening from the Ops Center to
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As Stated
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 -o- yy proposed
by the Army which has now been superceded
by the language in Paragraph 3 of my
memorandum.
75 0icinorn!aus
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
6'7'nen Did This Unit First Appear? I
indicates that most or all of the-prThe esent lelements ofithise
brigade were deployed by early 1976. We have seen no sign
f
o a significant alteration of the unit's composition since
that time. These conclusions are possible because, with
the recent pinpointing of the site of the brigade's home
station, we can trace its record through available photography
over the last several years. In fact, we can also note that
preparations for this unit's arrival were begun early in 1975,
although the major construction efforts started a year later.
When Did You First Learn Th
t
a
The Soyoviets Had A Combat Uni
In Cuba? - The first relat:ie
l
a
_
v
+- .
Soviet ground force activity in Cuba became a ns of
beginnin of August 1978 p PFarent at th
ri
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or to that time, occasional uous and conclusion torbee
ry to allow the
a~enta
S
i
ov
et
was taking place. The fact that thisgactivityrreflectedtfthe
actual presence of a Soviet unit became clear only in Jul
-and, the confirmation of an e y 179 1
ssentially fully manned and;.
equipped brigade was available only in late August.
What Did You Do With This Information.? - This information led
to a realization that
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d
for t h=t -wy-PAly nac long been employed in search
unit, but it had not turned up Pictures =-- deuce differentiating Cuban fror!tssibl
e that et units
on the island.) Quintu
l
d
p
e
collection (by aircraft well off
Cuba's shores) during the first two weeks of August resulted
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--L .) avail
air or sea lift capab
ilitynavaiiable T eitrigade does not have
(or
in Cuba) for assault operations outsiam. ,-F {
L_ even available
u
er strength have Ion rse, Cuban
for
any
action a a' g been read'l
c
5 y defended U.S_ essfully attack such
units of much 'great base as Guatanamo. Of co
ion to fixed installations. Dula provide some
of miles distant, it could probabl (Except that it is hundred
a li ht'i y suc
For example, it
could engage a unit of similarrsizehanduCompositi ne can
defend a small piece of the coast. on- It could
protect' It
location. The errs o a Soviet ground force exercise at a named It, provided the first co cre-tefevidenceaofytheanumb this site
personnel and pieces of equipment that might beers involved with
the Soviet unit. A further recent acquisition of inform
a human source about the camp where Soviets mi
th atldn
lent itself to Photographic collection. From the t be
llityeda:
this information has come the data now wh t led
to the Government's action, of which at hand which has led
you are aware.
What Does The Soviet Combat Unit In Cuba Consist of? - Th
brigade c o nsists of The
rifle battalions, one armored Probably three
(tank motorized
bat alion (including 122mm howitzer)andtmiltipleoroc er
eld~ts), and su 'lie.
medical., transportPorepair.meanti-aircraftheanauartersstaff~che
etc. In all, this probably amounts to some twoatolthree units,
thousand men, commanded by a Colonel. One motorized rifl
battalion is apparently stationed at thelarge viet core
and SIGINT facility at Torrens (Lourdes),
brigade is at a cantonment 5 miles east fWtheeowe ofstnf ago'
de gas Vegas. These locations are on the souther fringes of
go
the Havana metropolitan area.
n frnges of
What Has This Soviet Combat Unit Been Doin In Cuba?
activities observed have been routine exercises indistinThe only
from those conducted by Soviet ground force units of z
and composition in the USSR and Eastern Europe. f similar sia
What Are The Combat Ca abilities Of This
hypothesize ca '1? - Q
the Brigade?
ab
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in advance ti off f
e - The des3 nation of thi L ere
bz~ a ind cotes-that
it"is independent and n!-!:' bordinate
orrela;e3 to any other Soviet unit. d
not a re--x Moreover, "brigade' is
.~lar or frequent designation in Soviet practice-
Whereas, over time, we have had considerable evidence about
How Do You Know That There Aren't More Combat Forces r,h
Than You Now Beev
li
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the existence of this unit, we have not, even with an extensive
collection effort, obtained indications of any kind of any
other units. Nevertheless, we are maintaining a strong
collection program to see whether additional evidence becomes
available.
What Missions Might The USSR Have It Perform? - The mission
of this brigade is not known.
Five hypotheses are:
1. Security of Soviet installations and personnel.
2. Protection of the Castro regime against internal
enemies.
3. Limited participation in the defense of Cuba
against external attack.
4. Training for Cuban military personnel or for
Soviet personnel in tropical conditions.
5. Provisions of psychic reassurance to Castro at
a time when 40,000 Cuban troops are in Africa and the Middle
East on contentious and possibly risky adventures.
Does This Unit Communicate Directly With Moscow? -- We do not
know, but we assume it communicates either through the advisors
mission or directly to the General Staff in Moscow via the
General Staff communications link between. Havana. and Moscow.
When Will You Know The Purpose Of This Brigade? We continue
to collect whatever evidence becomes available, but we may
never know what was in the minds of the Soviet leadership when
it authorized the deployment of the brigade. Indeed, its
mission might have changed or evolved over the years. As a
guess, purposes 1 and 5 of the last question seem the most 25X1
plausible.
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 As the Administration has stated, this bri a
significant Soviet unit in termc of It - g de is not a
Our evidence Points to the arrival of this unit ea l?,.4and the unit has remained virtually unchanged since late August, however, we could not determine rl~i iua 1976,
included more than a skeleton structure of per then. Until;
nclude men. that this several
several
i Thus, what has, changed over the past months
has been our estimate, not te actual sizeast months
in Cuba , Of Soviet
military
B. That apart from a military advisory does not warrant the conclusion that there are any significant, P our intelligence
Soviet other
presence in Cuba overoth-J -L egnf1cant increase in Soviet military
of a Soviet military past several years or of the
base" and presence
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D, i d The Secretar
Write 0ri July 27 Tha
A. "There has been n
L? 1S - security
Construction activities at Cienfeugos
e
ne in
Arm
one in
And ror;. let union Have Other Brigades Dep
at Purposes? - loye
units = There are onl
=s=gnated as brigades in the Sovi
ytheo
tf e
-~? '.uud.
1''here Dc~es The Sov'
st-Lons. One of v1tzes are also-
however, be to prot th-e missions of the brigade may
~ect er ov ~e
n a broader sense, the brigadetmar Soviet
represent one aspect of an expanding Soviet- y well
relationship, of which these other at' Cuban =ailitar
man+Fe
3e The appearance of Soviet Pilot flying
aircraft in Cuba
4. The delivery Of MIG-23s
At present, we see-no direct connection with the sense that there is no evidence that the brigade
in conjunction with or in any of these, in
activities g of these functionLEG1B
2? Soviet naval activities in the Caribbean
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SEC T
a Dictiona US Defines, Base As
ace Fron Which 2lilitar 7p S
erati Of ons TheAre
A up
3 Fl ~ot ss^he Presence Of
I q
East Germany, one in cen `
1`I.xlatary District ``?~ USSR, one in the Far
, and one i
Ea
t
s
SI
s
Isis n:ds.
ecently formed in
do
n
t
fff"""
o
trile
know what their missi
appear to h
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ons are u
ave been formed for re but they
specific areas, general purpose missions in
2'he Official Milit
A Base Bri Ode Indicate That Theortea Does
In Cuba' We cannot now characterize Soviets Have
as constituting a base in the sense of this unit's
a locality from which etoE
Y opera tions--~the common definition of a n
Whatever this unit's mission and capabilities, however
a unmet that
could operate -without extensive outsid "base.
,.-- it rv Ftc
ssupporuppor`tItUt it arcould not conduct assault operation e logistic
kind Of air and sea lift not s without the
defintion Of a "base", according in Cuba. (The agreed
; efj and the Inter- g to the Department of
American Defense Board is: Defense,
fr-0-17 is=9 operations are
projected or supported ~~1) ~' locality
or _.. operations : 2) An area
or c- u- containing installations which provide to
pport. 11 ) logistic
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 Doesn't The Commitment Of A Soviet Brigade Indicate Virtually
Comolet!? Identity Between Soviet And Cuban Forei n Polk Airs?
It certainly suggests a high degree of security cooperation. EGIB
The Cubans would have had some reasons of their own for deploying
armed forces abroad to s h
er
t
h
re an.ous about Cuba s own security. Hence, Soviet troop
r)rPgArat u
S
ec zvesas ell; and these same actions probably made them.
mo
ns as a ru1e, seem to nave coincided with Soviet
o ' 4
ve a
t
ey call revolutionary causes,
but these actin
ection
When We Promised in 1962 That We Would Not Invade Cuba? - As
you recall, that promise had been conditioned on
e
But Why Should The Cubans Feel A Need For Soviet Prot
p
rmission
for adequate inspection in Cuba of the withdrawal f
o nuclear
missiles and bombers from the island. In 1962, this permission
was ref d
u
Of
well have doubts about the reliability under all contingencies
of U.S. pledges non-intervention. In any case, Cuba would
se .
course, the U.S. has since then repeatedly
stated its intention not to invade Cuba. However, given the
overwhelming power of the U.S. compared to Cuba, given Cuba's
location adjacent to the U.S., and given Cuba's practice of
pursuing foreign policy objectives and foreign operations
completely inimical to Washington's interests Havana
Does The Unit Present In Cuba Constitute A Violation Of The
Understanding With The Soviets On Cuba? - Ground forces per se
in a generic sense do not figure in our bilateral understanding
with the USSR, which was directed at offensive weapons systems,
although the U.S. made known its concern about any Soviet
forces in Cuba. Nonetheless, the USSR did withdraw those
forces which had come to Cuba to operate or to protect the
missiles which'the Soviets had installed.
ROTE: All questions related to current US-Soviet and US-Cuban
diplomatic activity should be characterized as a non-intelligence
matter, and should be referred to Secretary Vance for answers
during his forthcoming SFRC testimony.
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