1. IRAN: THE BAZAAR TURNS TOWARD THE MODERATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000400110001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 19, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
p roved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP81B00401 R000400110001-8
v INTELLIGEN$E AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS: January 19,
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IRAN-. THLN BAZAAR TURNS T WARD THE MODERATES
Iran's ruling clerics are losing the support of one of the
n's traditional sources of power, the bazaar merchants. At
oot of the bazaar's alienation from the Rajai government is
r that the radicals will attempt to undermine the bazaar's
in the economy and eventually establish a government controlled
my. As a result, the bazaaris are edging toward an alliance
the moderates.
Sustained bazaari support would be of immense value to Bani-
Sadr and his fellow moderates since the bazaar can paralyze the
econ my through strikes, provide the moderates with financing,
and cive the moderates an important base in all of Iran's major
urba areas.
The bazaar, a pivotal institution in Iran's social and
econ mic structure, continues to be the focus of Iran's commer-
cial and financial life. It dominates foreign and domestic
trail and has a vice-like grip over the country's distribution
network.
The bazaar has acce- '_) large financial reserves--a fact
which has permitted it to exercise influence over the religious
establishment through its financing of mosques and religious
endowments, schools, and charitable organizations. The bazaar
also has links and influence with the modern middle class as
many bazaari off-spring have entered professional ranks, govern-
ment service and private industry.
While the bazaar merchants clearly favored the overthrow of
the hah, radical exhortations since then for income and property
redistribution have had little appeal to them. In general,
bazaari political instincts lie with the moderates. ?(It was the
bazar, for example, which elected Bazargan to the Majlis following
his esignation as Prime Minister.)
From time to time, the hardlinersi have called for purges in
the azaar in order to "root out corruption and to establish a
just distribution network." A January 15 Khomeini speech to a
grow of bazaar merchants was more subdued, but it did encourage
the azaaris to prevent profiteering and warned the bazaar not to
engage in "usurious practices."
Although the hardliners have not made a frontal assult on
the azaar, several government actions have been unnerving to the
bazai ris. These have included the establishment of an import/ex-
portcompany, closing of bazaari-run foreign exchange markets,
and attempts to administer the bazaar through "Islamic committees."
Many radicals apparently assume that since they have an. independent
sour a of income (oil revenues), they can proceed to run rough-
shod over this vital institution.
State Dept. revie Approved For Release 2007/03/09: CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000400110001-8
CONFIDENTIAL
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BUREAU O INTELLIGEN AND RESLARCII - ANALYSIS: DECEMBER 3, 1980
1. IRAN: ANTI-CLERICAL SENTIMENT
25X1
Conti ing popular demonstrations indicate that anti-clerical
sentiment remains a pervasive undercurrent in Iranian political life. But
we see no evidence that a cohesive anti-clerical political organiza-
tion has yet crystalized which can translate current dissatisfaction
into a significant force. But the clerics will probably now step
up their efforts to curtail the activities of their rivals through
legal and extra-legal means.
In an effort to limit the opportunities for anti-clerical
demonstrations, the fundamentalists:
--persuaded the interior Ministry on November 27 not to
issue a parade permit to students who wanted to march
to Khomeini's residence; and
--appear to have forced a shut-down on December 1 of the
Tehran, Mashad and Qom bazaars.
Ostensibly, the bazaars were closed "as an expression of protest
against plots hatched against the committed clergy" (i.e. the politi-
cal clerics). However, given the continued surfacing of anti-
c3erical sentiment (exemplified most recently by demonstrations in
Mashad on November 29-30), the fundamentalists may have ordered the
bazaar closings as a means of breaking any anti-clerical momentum.
Whatever, the reason, the closing of the bazaar, which is normally
done by the bazaar merchant'- a.= a tactic to wrest concessions from
the government, indicates that the clerics sense an erosion of
support from within this organization.
Although no time limit for reopening the bazaars has been set,
this vital institution, which is the hub of most of Iran's economic
life, cannot long remain closed. The press announcement did state
that if the "plotters continued their devious designs against the
clergy," a country-wide closure might be instituted, a threat which 25X1
appears to be an effort by the clergy to head off more trouble.
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP81B00401 R000400110001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP,1B00401 R000400110001-8
? XL[.~.~r1 CONFI DENTI ~,L
BUREAU OF INTI;I,I.,i E[!CE AND RESEARCH r ANALYSIS: November 27, 1980
IRAN: ERODING SUPPORT FOR THE CLERICS?
The stress of the war has produced increasing discontent with
the clerics' rule, particularly among bazaar merchants. This has
given Rani-Sadr new political opportunities and intensified sparring
between t major factions. Caught between these pressures,
Khomeini is unlikely to agree to recent clerical suggestions that
he' strip Bani-Sadr of his constitutional authority. Nevertheless,
the hardliners will continue their efforts to discredit Bani-Sadr
and soften-up Khomeini.
Public ire, which appears to be directed toward the clerically-
dominated Islamic Republican Party, is motivated by several factors:
--the stifling of political freedom;
--the perception that the radicals are subverting Islam; and
--mismanagement of the war and the economy.
Iran's economic woes have hit the bazaar merchants particularly
hard. They have suffered from skyrocketing prices followed by
erratic price control and rationing: policies, the lack of foreign
exchange, the establishment of a government-run import export firm,
and reduced consumer purchasing power. The latest blow occurred
when the government closer' the convertible currency market, which
will probably increase retail pricey while further reducing the
availability of foreign exchange. ,
Bazaar frustrations bubbled to;the surface following Ghotbzadeh's
arrest two weeks ago. Leaders of the bazaar may have interpreted
it as the beginning of the finalassault on the only political
faction which appears sympathetic t(q their needs.
Sensing a shifting mood, Bani-Sadr has openly attacked the
clerics for trying to monopolize political power. In reaction,
Rajai and other hardliners have hinted that Bani-Sadr must either
be brought in lane or removed.
As an elected official, Bani-Sadr cannot be arbitrarily arrested
or silenced. To reduce his increasing influence, the hardliners
must persuade Khomeini either to appoint a new commander-in-chief
(Khomeini has delegated this authority to Bani-Sadr) or remove
F3ani-Sadr from office--which is permissible under the constitution.
Despite the strong undercurrents of dissatisfaction, clerical
rule is not in danqcr of imminent collapse. The clerics still
control the major governmental organs, and have residual strength
among the masses and the fanatical support of the Revolutionary
Guard. Most importantly, Khomeini remains popular and is determined
to seRppt8Qed Ft"e1~Ase Or7~0 'po~J,)CR- 1fiBre-fy6Bt4rr0 l-,U&J1i ical affairs.
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