IMPRESSIONS ON IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000400130015-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: November 30, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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November 30, 1979
FOR . ZBIG BRZEZINSKI
FROM AL MCDONALD
SUBJECT : Impressions on Iran
On Wednesday I spoke at length with a former colleague who
returned to the United States from Iran only about a month
ago. He is Rostam Pirasteh, an Iranian who spent a number
of years in U.S. Universities and businesses here. He
returned to Iran in 1975 as the head of the International
Bank of Iran and later served as the Minister of Finance and
Economic Affairs in the Bakhtiar Government. Pirasteh was
then imprisoned, staying in jail for about four months.
Afterwards, he spent several months observing and trying to
understand developments in Iran before escaping to this
country to start life over again.*
*In 1966 Pirasteh left Yale where he received MS, MIS and
PhD degrees. He then spent 1966-69 with McKinsey, leaving
that firm to join the faculty of Columbia's Graduate School
of Business Administration. He later joined the Chase
Manhattan Bank, resigning as a.Senior Vice President in
early 1975 to go to Iran and establish the IBI. IBI was a
full service commercial bank that was a publicly-owned
corporation (with Chase holding some 35 percent ownership)
until it was nationalized by the Revolutionary Government of
Iran. When Pirasteh left it to join the Bakhtiar Government,
it had become one of Iran's largest banks with a balance
sheet valued'at over $1 billion.
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AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI
Khomeini is a particular study that Pirasteh has observed
for some time. He says Khomeini is not crazy but is an
extremely logical fanatic who is pursuing his own course
without regard for the rest of the world. Here are some of
his major observations.
Khomeini the Person. Khomeini can best be described
as a "seventh to eighth century man," like the Islamic
leader Ali, the successor to Mohammed, after whom Khomeini
patterns himself. Khomeini is an authority only on the Koran,
strictly speaking on the Shiite interpretation of the Koran,
and on the history of the Shiite sect itself.
Khomeini is not a scholar. He is not generally recognized
to be knowledgeable 'on any secular subject. He is not a reader
or a thinker, does not follow the press or show any real
interest in the actions of others. He detests everything about
the .modern world. He speaks a "very layman Farsi" as his only
real language.* Cultivated Iranians readily note that his
expressions are very common and simple, reflecting little
thought and negligible cultural exposure or knowledge
outside of his religious speciality.
Khomeini's Operating Pattern. The Iranian Government is
operating entirely by random. There is no underlying program,
no plan and no anticipation of events. Khomeini rules by
talking, in fact, rambling out loud on whatever topic happens
to come up. There is no staff'work for his comments, no
analysis and no coherent concept or central plan into which
his thoughts fit. The Government cannot provide a figure or
fact on GNP, unemployment, or anything else. Pirasteh said
this was not intended as a malicious judgment,- but simply
a statement of fact that they "just do not know."
After Khomeini speaks, there is no discussion and no
debate on the issues. His words are considered absolute.
as they are initially uttered. Not only is there no
discussion, there are also no questions for greater under-
standing or comprehension of what he really intended. Apparently,
as he rambles on, Khomeini becomes carried away with his
thoughts and they evolve from one idea to the next, very
much as one could observe in the three consecutive television
interviews. After he has spoken, Pirasteh believes there
is noway Khomeini will turn back on his word.
Khomeini's Motivation. Khomeini has no patriotism and
no particular interest In Iran as a country. Islam is his
only allegiance and even then specifically to his sect and
its interpretation of the Koran. and the Shiite role. His
.aim is simple: to eradicate all modern values in Islamic
societies. All of his actions are motivated toward this aim.
Of course he reads Arabic but speaks it.very poorly.-
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He is also deeply concerned about the poor and downtrodden
and about his own personal standing as a religious leader
and prophet.
Khomeini has no interest in international law, no concern
over international public opinion, no particular concern over
life or death. He could not care less about his own person
and might well welcome the opportunity to become a martyr for
the Shiite cause. He is not bothered by death of "infidels
and heathens," and consequently, would not be concerned to see
the hostages die just as he was not bothered by the capital
punishments handed out by his followers in the recent series
of Iranian trials.
. He would be delighted to see the United States move
diligently to deport Iranians to his country. Most of them
would be put immediately in jail. In Pirasteh's view about
95 percent of the adult Iranians here are opposed to Khomeini
with the split among Iranian students being about 50-50. He
attributes the relatively high level of Khomeini support
among Iranian students here to ignorance of the actual
conditions and prospects in Iran.
Khomeini's Logic. From Khomeini's viewpoint, anyone who
helped the Shah.(or for that matter the United States) is:
a) against his cause and his religion
b) condemned to death as a "corruption of the earth"
From his point of view they already have enough "evidence"
of help to the Shah that the hostages and Americans in general
are already condemned.
Their criteria for evidence are almost non-existent.
Even an indirect letter mentioning the Shah's name will
suffice as appropriate for conviction of direct support and
"spying." Therefore, there. is little prospect that in any
trial situation legitimate evidence would be pursued or
considered essential to the results. To the contrary, even
the lightest item would be considered adequate and would be
paraded in a public relations rather than a legal format.
Since"Khomeini considers the hostages guilty in their
own right as individuals as well as Americans, he does not
even consider the return of the Shah to be an exchange.
For him this is not a quid pro quo issue. Rather, he would
probably interpret any such exchange of the Shah'.for hostages
as a set of circumstances under which God would permit him
to forgive the hostages by getting his hands on a greater evil.
As for the prospect of reducing tensions by releasing
the hostages, this is not of great concern. To the contrary,
it is likely that Khomeini feels that Iran is less vulnerable
for military action, retaliation or other dramatic moves as
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long as they hold the hostages. Consequently, Pirasteh sees
no motivation for them to release the hostages, even suggesting
that this might become a semi-permanent situation. Khomeini
figures that as long as he has our people, the hands of the
U.S. President are tied.
Khomeini's Followers. Whether they wear religious garb.
or regular street clothes, Khomeini's followers essentially
act and think alike if they remain in his inner circle.
Anyone showing the slightest interest in compromise or
flexibility in interpreting his views are quickly pushed
aside. This was substantiated by the dismissal of Bani-sadr,
whose replacement, Ghotbzadeh, is considered to be strictly
a public relations mouthpiece for the Ayatollah with no
individual latitude for influencing decisions.
Khomeini is a master of crowd psychology, particularly
among the poor since this is the group to which he appeals.
Although his themes make little sense, he does stir them up
dramatically with his public statements on public TV and
radio. This began through the Farsi broadcasts by BBC into
Iran while the Ayatollah was still in Paris and has continued
regularly since his arrival there. His broadcasts are also
moving beyond the borders of Iran and to the Islamic
downtrodden. Everywhere there seems to be great appeal.
In his appeal to the masses, they do not question why
he says what he does, but simply accept the fact that he says
these things with which they can identify. Apparently, his
ramblings have great mass appeal since all of :the :desperate
in society can envision themselves in the top spots. At
the same time because of his lack of concern over non-
religious aspects of life, Khomeini could change his domestic
policies easily. It would not concern him to shift them about
in a fairly volatile fashion as long as they would do nothing
to hurt Islam and his view of his faith.
For the short term, he is also "being good" at least
superficially to the masses. There is no Shah. There are
no bosses or managers. There is no discipline. Nobody works
or is required to work, and for the moment there is sufficient
food.
Khomeini believes he has a special calling to the poor
and it is for this reason that he has particularly singled
out the blacks in the United States, believing they would
readily follow him and lead a countermovement to the
President's position in the United States. Since no one
will discuss with him the truth and since he does not read
or concern himself with reports from other countries, it is
highly probable that he is deluded into believing that his.
program is a success.
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In. Pirasteh's judgment,.- the Iranian population is not
aware of Khomeini's dedication to eliminating modern values.
They have gotten a taste of the good life and of material
luxuries and will certainly be reluctant to give them up as
time goes on. Pirasteh suspects that the views of a majority
of the Iranian population could be shifted within a period
of one month with control over public TV and radio. To do
this, however, one could not work personally against Khomeini
but would need to target another scapegoat for the.domestic
difficulties.
OTHER IRANIAN OBSERVATIONS
As for other forces within Iran, Pirasteh is of the opinion
that the Khomeini's time in power will be quite limited. He
believes that economic forces (and a continuing disintegration
of the country's chaotic governmental apparatus) will soon
bring him down, even with high oil prices. If oil income is
reduced or cut off, then the time period in which this would
happen would probably be a matter of months.
Khomeini is already having trouble with oil workers and the
leftists groups. In Pirasteh's view these are not Russian
affiliated groups but are socialists and v1arxists.
How fast.Khomeini falls may heavily depend on the United
States. Pirasteh believes it was a mistake for the United
States to have been so easy on Khomeini following the revolution,
encouraging some Americans to continue in Iran and continuing
to provide technological help and spare parts.
Pirasteh believes that a cut-off of oil revenue would make
the country desperate. He estimates that their present
available assets range up to about $3-1/2-$4 billion and
that these would fall at the rate of some $700 million per
month without a significant new oil income. At the time
they would hit the 1-1/2 billion mark, in his judgment, the
country would be in desperate shape.
He rates the Iranian military as "not worth a damn." He
says their officers are all scared for their lives and are
essentially staying out of sight and are reluctant to exer-
cise discipline. He says that the Iranian armed forces were
never good even at their peak under the Shah; now they are a
group without the ability to organize and operate themselves.
PROSPECTS FOR SOLUTION
As indicated above, Pirasteh feels that the situation with
the hostages could continue indefinitely. He believes there
is no possibility for a reconciliation with the United States
as long as Khomeini is in power and believes that nothing
but a hard U.S. line should be followed.
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He thinks that the redefinition of the scene would have
little impact on the situation. For example, the Shah's
departure might only make the students and Khomeini madder.
The constitutional vote is not in question so Khomeini is
not waiting for that date to pass. The expression of world
opinion by the Security Council will have no meaning.
In struggling to think of pressures that Khomeini might
understand, there are only two that he considered to be
important. One would be the development of a direct appeal
from Islamic religious leaders, and the second would be
strong expressions of concern for the hostages by the world's
poor (e.g., including blacks and Hispanics in the United
States) and third world leaders in other countries (e.g.,.
the African and poor Asian nations).
Islamic Religious Pressure. Khomeini is not the ranking
religious leader in Iran. The Ayatollah Sheariat-madari is
higher than Khomeini and at least two others are.his equals
(Galpayegani and'Khonsari). Apparently these four occasionally
meet, sit in the four corners of a room and talk about some
of.,the biggest decisions facing them.
Also, Ayatollah Najaffi in Iraq apparently outranks
Khomeini and is a respected Islamic spokesman whose views
impress Khomeini.
A movement that would reflect the expressions of concern
by Islamic leaders, emphasizing that holding of the hostages
is against the teachings of the Koran and is harmful to
Islam might have some weight. If a proclamation were signed
by four or five of the major Sunni leaders and by Islamic
scholars from Moslem universities, this would be far more
valuable to our cause than anything governments could say or
support the Security Council could muster.
Opposition from the Poor. Again, if Khomeini could
sense that his actions were not helping the poor, but were
in. fact incurring their opposition, this might also influence
his thinking since he identifies with the cause of the poor.
For example, Pirasteh suggested that a few demonstrations by
blacks and Mexican farm workers in U.S. mosques in support
of the hostages would be very impressive acts to Khomeini. A
demonstration by the Black Moslems in their mosques would
also hit home in this area. Pirasteh said we.should also
not forget the third world developing countries since
Khomeini would be much more impressed by their statements of
support than from the industrial affluent nations.
In sum, he feels that the only way Khomeini might,
through his own logic,. become more flexible is by sensing
himself increasingly isolated on religious and humanistic
grounds.
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Pirasteh said the United States certainly cannot give
in to him in anyway. Any show of weakness would only be
used to accentuate and escalate their demands. At the same
time, there is no price that Khomeini considers too high to
pay if it helps achieve his Islamic goals. Consequently,
we are clearly facing a myopic religious fanatic whose
interests, motivations and thinking are all completely
inconsistent with the parameters of modern diplomacy or
governmental activities.
Religious reasons might also be used as excuses for
obtaining better treatment for the hostages. Pirasteh said
that Khomeini might be'receptive to an appeal, regardless
of how farfetched, that a "shave and a bath are necessary
prerequisites for certain religious sacraments." Consequently,
he suggested that appeals related to expressions of religious
beliefs for the hostages might be a route for somewhat better
treatment for them.
Pirasteh cautioned that Khomeini should always be treated
with respect. Any personal disrespect to him would be viewed
as disrespect for his religion and would only tend to intensify
hisAdedication for absolute achievement of his aims and
"condemnation of the heathen."
cc: Hamilton Jordan
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