PROJECTED SOVIET RESPONSES TO POSSIBLE US ACTIONS IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500010043-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: November 16, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

SUBJECT: Projected Soviet Responses to Possible US
Actions in Iran
The Soviets want to reap the greatest possible
benefit from the current anti-US hysteria gripping Iran.
They hope to portray the US in the worst possible Light
and to advance their own interests with Iran's rulers.
In view of intense US efforts to free the hostages, they
will be careful to maintain a "correct" official. posture.
But, should the US undertake any active economic or
military operations designed either to put pressure on
Iran or free the hostages, the Soviets will almost cer-
tainZy condemn them and seek to exploit them to improve
their position with Tehran. In the event the US under-
takes any of the military activities discussed in this
paper (a naval blockade, an Entebbe-type raid,' a quick-
strike, division-level intervention), they might go so
far as to put their armed forces on alert and increase
their surveillance activities in the region. However,
'they would try to avoid actions which they believe would
r '
ti~;l' w^`t
ccoontain the risk of military confrontation with the US.
~/~?r u BACKGROUND
The Soviets have been pleased with recent events in
Iran, which have revived their hopes that the Iranian
revolution will assume a shape and direction favorable to
their interests. Soviet media commentary has welcomed the
new revolutionary currents in Tehran and endorsed the out-
pouring of anti-US sentiment. Moscow hopes the current
episode will permanently damage Iranian-US relations and
is fanning Iranian suspicions of US intentions to promote
that goal.
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Soviet responses to US actions will in part be con-
ditioned by Moscow's estimate of their effect on Soviet-
American relations. The Soviets know that gains to be
derived from the Iranian situation must be weighed against
the danger of longterm damage to relations with the US.
If they believe fundamental US national interests are at
stake, they are likely to tread cautiously in seeking
advantages. Since the US demarche of 8 November, for
example, the Soviets have moderated their more strident
official media commentary. Moscow has endorsed the
principle of diplomatic inviolability, although it is
taking a backseat in efforts to secure the releas os-
tages, lest an active stance antagonize Tehran. 5X1
SOVIET REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION
I. Continuation of current US efforts to exert diplomatic
pressure on Iran and to take selective economic action
in response to Iranian moves.
A. The Soviets will continue to avoid diplomatic
actions that appear to pressure Tehran. However,
in forums such as the UN, where their actions are
conspicuous, they will not oppose widely-backed
US efforts. They will not actively disrupt US
attempts to mobilize the international community,
but they will not endorse or participate in such
efforts. This amounts to passive obstruction of
US efforts in certain circumstances, such as in
Tehran, where Soviet non-participation undermined
US efforts to present a unanimous a eal f
ZI&I
diplomatic corps to the Iranian lead
ership. 25X1
B. The Soviet official media will maintain the less
inflammatory line it has followed since the US
demarche of 8 November and will avoid open support
for Iranian actions. However, a bias in favor of
the Iranian position will continue to be reflected
in selective reporting of "factual" material and
in reporting designed to stimulate Iranian suspicions
of US actions. I
C. The Soviets will continue to convey support for
Iranian actions through their broadcasts in Persian
out of Baku over the "National Voice of Iran."
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II. A US policy of economic pressure on Iran, specifically
imposition of a food embargo.
A. The Soviets would undoubtedly condemn such action
on both humanit
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While this station will continue to argue against
measures which might result in harm to the hostages,
its inflammatory tone with respect to US intentions
and operations inside Iran will aim to encourage
and take advantage of the anti-US sentiment in
Iran.
r and political
ing it a furthereffort todestabilize uIran fors
the benefit of counter-revolutionary forces. Their
criticism would be harsh and-aimed at generating
both Iranian and third-world resentment of US
pre s sure
B. If Moscow thought enough third-world backing
were available, it might support a diplomatic
effort at the UN to condemn the use
tool of international politics. food as a
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C. It is possible that the Soviets would try to take
advantage of a US food boycott by making a
"humanitarian" gesture toward Iran, such as sending
a shipment of grain. Their willingness to make
more than a symbolic gesture would probably be
limited, however, by their own grain shortages.
They might also be unwilling to risk the possible
US irritation which might result from a blata
Soviet effort to circumvent such a boycott.
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III. US efforts to mobilize West European and Japanese
economic sanctions, including an oil boycott, against
Iran.
A. The Soviets would also condemn such actions as
"economic imperialism" directed against the third-
world and would suggest to the developed countries
that the US was trying to disrupt their economies.
B. They might encourage East European purchases of
some Iranian oil in an effort to acquire long-term
access to this energy source. They could also
offer their services to Iran as a broker for
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indirect sales to the West. But Moscow does
not have the interest or the resources to pur-
chase large amounts of oil on their own account.
C. Moscow would probably suggest to Tehran that the
Western action demonstrated that Iran should con-
sider developing longer term economic contacts
with the Soviet bloc.. I
IV. A US naval blockade of Iran.
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A. The Soviets would harshly condemn as imperialist
such a US action, labelling it an attempt to bring
down the Iranian regime.
B. They would probably encourage third-world diplo-
matic activity designed to put press the US,
including possible UN condemnation. ?
C. They would increase their own naval deployments in
the area and probably institute surveillance of
US ships participating in such a blockade. However,
they would almost c?=?_a_ttlly try to avoid any sort
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D. They would be likely to issue vaguely-worded warn-
ings to the effect that they could not remain in-
different,warlike activities" close to their
borders. F-1
E. They would likely pass intelligence information on
US actions to their contacts in Iran. ^ 25X1
F. They would probably put their armed forces on
alert status. but they would not directly challenge
the US. u
V. A US-initiated, Entebbe-type raid into Tehran.
A. The Soviet reaction to such an operation would be
similar to that in IV; however, given the very
short duration of such an operation, the Sovi
would have only a limited time for reaction. 25X1
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VI. A US quick-strike military intervention involving an
airborne division.
A. Soviet reaction would be similar to that in IV
and V. Once again, it is likely that the Soviets
would try to avoid any type of direct response
which they anticipated could lead to military con-
frrr++--+-4 ..G Lt i,_
S
In all of the military options discussed above, the
questions of Soviet perceptions of US intentions and the
duration of the operation are highly relevant. In all cases,
it is presumed that the Soviets would be aware that the USSR
is in no way a target of the operation and that the US does
not intend to maintain a permanent military presence in
Iran. Similarly, in all of the options projected, the time-
frame for projected US actions is assumed to be quite short.
The longer a US military operation were to continue, the
more pressure the Soviets would feel to respond effectively
to military action in a bordering country and the reater
the risk of Soviet miscalculation would become.
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In addition, it is conceivable that the Iranians would
request Soviet assistance in the event of a prolonged US
military operation, such as a blockade. Should this occur,
the Soviets would probably still seek to avoid confrontation
with the US_ But they might seek to court Iranian favor by
sharing intelligence information or by makin offers of
military hardware or advisory personnel. II
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