CURRENT STATUS OF HOSTAGE CRISIS AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF U. S. POLICY OPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500020037-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: July 7, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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R T
3~? 1
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washin&ton,QC20505
7 July 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: Current Status of Hostage Crisis
and the Implications of U .S
Policy Options F777 I
Attached is a brief paper that attempts to
..,summarize:
- current situation in Iran;
- impact on Iran and other key nations
of several courses of action we might take
over next six months or so.
Attachment
DISTR (Per PB/NSC)
1 - DDCI
1 - DDO
1 - C/NE/DDO
1 - DD/NFA
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - PB/NSC
1 - ER File
/f` S#ana~ial~ Turner
STANSFIELD TURNER.
Rvw on 7 Jul 1986
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7 July 1980
MEMORANDUM
CURRENT STATUS OF. THE HOSTAGE CRISIS AND
THE. IMPLICATIONS OF US POLICY OPTIONS
personal refusal to reverse his position.
The continuing lack.of movement on the hostage issue
reflects both the political cost to any Iranian leader of
favoring a resolution of the crisis and.Ayatollah Khomeini's
--Bani-Sadr.and other moderates on the hostage
issue have apparently halted. their efforts
to have the captives released. The moderates
clearly calculate that if they sponsor any
new effort to resolve the crisis they will
be damaged politically.
--Movement toward releasing the hostages might
begin if Beheshti or another leader could
achieve a clearly predominant political
position. A resolution of factional conflict
seems unlikely, however, any time soon.
Khomeini has actively reentered politics, pre-
venting any one leader or from making
significant gains.
E
--Khomeini's policy that the National Assembly
m
t d
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us ecide the issue--which shifts the moral
and political costs of any decision to others--
will delay any movement for weeks or possibly
months until the Assembly takes up the hostage
question. There is no indication that the
Assembly will soon complete its initial tasks
of establishing procedures and considering
the nomination of a prime minister and cabinet.
PA M 80-10296
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--Even when the Assembly does turn to the issue,
members are likely to try to avoid reaching
a decision. Hardliners will prolong the de-
lay by establishing their revolutionary cre-
dentials in lengthy condemnations of the US.
--One possible outcome is a release of some
the hosts es.
Khomeini's deep antip-
athy to the US and Western values, and his
belief that he can affect domestic US poli-
tics as well as US policy toward Iran by
holding the hostages, make it likely that he
will support continued detentinp of some of
the hostages.
Implications
of a US Low Profile Policy
The current US low profile on the hostage issue has con-
tribitted-to waning Iranian public interest in the crisis. It
has coincided with developments in Iran which have reduced
public attention to the hostages. Khomeini's criticism of
the government and calls for a "cultural revolution," infighting
and compromise between Beheshti and Bani-Sadr, and the renewed
crackdown on the left have directed attention toward other
issues. The militants holding the hostages have made .few
public statements.
Continuing the current US policy could reinforce the
low level of Iranian public interest in the hostages and
reduce the ability of th. militants to capitalize on anti-
US themes.
--US public emphasis on sanctions or discussion
of a military option provide Khomeini the op-
portunities to call for unity against US
"imperialism" and might provoke renewed calls
for hostage trials.
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leftists.
--The US low profile allows Bani-Sadr and other
moderates to disassociate themselves from the
hostage question while they attempt to strength-
en their political position against competing
groups including both clerical hardliners and
more support for resolving the crisis.
the political utility of trying or holding them.
This might eventually allow moderates to gather
--A continuing low level of public interest in
the hostages could contribute to a decline in
This approach relies on internal Iranian mechanisms to solve
the crisis and recognizes the. limitations of any US initiative.
It has the flaw that once National Assembly debate on the
hostages begins, Iranian public attention will be redirected
to the hostages regardless of US policy.. Clerical hardliners
and the. militants probably will renew their calls for.trials,
once the Assembly begins debate.
Policy Initiatives Without Renewing Threats
. --:The-`US could take more active steps but not renew threats
to Iran. We could make new expressions of concern for the
physical condition of the hostages, continue efforts to
orchestrate further diplomatic initiatives by third parties,
--Iranian leaders including Khomeini have been
sensitive to any charges concerning the welfare
of the hostages.. Expressions of humanitarian
concern have produced movement in the past--
including visits by outside observers and some
accounting of the hostages' condition. An
approach by an international agency or third
party might at least yield information on the
location of the hostages. Iranian public
opinion could be reminded of the moral costs
of continuing to hold the hostages. A flaw
in this approach is that it could be rebuffed
on grounds of the need for security following
the rescue effort. It also revives Iranian
new political problems for Bani-Sadr.
interest in the hostages and could present
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--Renewed indirect diplomatic initiatives could
be targeted on clerical leaders rather than
the secular moderates on the hostage issue.
~Rep-
resentatives of Islamic states or religious
organizations could be asked to present a case
for the hostages based on Islamic law to
Ghodussi, senior ayatollahs such as Shariat-
Madari, and other clerics. The Islamic
month of Ramadan, which begins in July, pre-
sents a timely o ortunity for such demarches.
--Focus on the immediate hostage issue should
not distract us from longer term US interests
in T-rAn. F_
e -
supported Tudeh party con inues to gain
politically from its current policy of.pub-
licly supporting Khomeini. Following
Khomeini's death, the Tudeh party's recruit-
ment efforts among the military, students,
and workers could leave it in a strong
position relative to the less organized
clerical and moderate groups.
Policy Options Renewing Threats
The advantages of the low public attention to the hostages
in Iran will be reduced when the National Assembly begins
debate-on the issue. Moreover, the low profile US approach
may reinforce an Iranian public perception that there are
few costs to continuing to hold the hostages. A renewed
high profile US approach to the Iranian crisis, on the other
hand, risks heightening pressure for trials of the hostages.
New initiatives might also weaken Bani-Sadr by forcing him to
respond, making him the target of attacks by clerical hard-
liners.
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An opportunity for a shift in US policy may be provided
if the -National Assembly calls for hostage trials or if the
crisis continues after a significant anniversary such as the
one year point this November 4th. At that time the US could
initiate further major diplomatic efforts to isolate Iran
or undertake military moves such as a naval blockade, mining,
or violating Iranian airspace.
Military action would do little to influence Iranian
moderates who are.-already aware of the costs of holding the
hostages. Military moves would also play into the hands of
clerical hardliners who have been able to deflect public
criticism to the US in the past when we have taken a tough
position. The justifications for further military moves
would be to punish Iran; to indicate to world opinion the
importance we attach to the hostage crisis and the inviola-
bility of diplomatic missions generally; and to demonstrate.
that although we are capable of being patient, there is a
limit to which this superpower can be pushed; and to ward
off danger that continued stalemate between the US and Iran
will enhance the probability of a takeover in Iran by forces
of the left, if not the Soviet Union. Military action would
risk--the--US being charged with overreaction, adding to
tensions in the area-and setting in motion developments that
could-have more far-reaching adverse consequences.
The dilemma for the US remains that we lack direct
leverage to influence decision-makers or public opinion in
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