IRAN-IRAQ AND DANGER OF A WIDER WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500030004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 14, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
14 November 1980
ALERT MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council
SUBJECT: Iran-Iraq and Danger of a Wider War
Recent attacks by Iranian aircraft on Kuwaiti border installations
raise the possibility that Tehran is now prepared to widen the war in
order to stop Arab aid to Iraq. I believe the greatest danger--should
Iran continue this course of action--is the possibility that Kuwaiti or
l facilities will become targets for Iranian attacks.
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STANSFIELD TURNER
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
ALERT MEMORANDUM*
IRAN-IRAQ: Danger of a Wider War
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The Iranian airstrikes near Kuwaiti border installa-
tions on 12 November and possibly 5 November have increased
the danger of a wider war in the Persian Gulf. While it
is not certain that these strikes were intended actually
to hit targets within Kuwait, their purpose was clearly
to intimidate the Kuwaitis. Tehran may now be willing to
use selective military action against Kuwait and possibly
other guZ states to discourage them from aiding Baghdad.
The airstrikes apparently were intended to discourage Kuwait from
continuing its current transshipment of Iraqi goods. Tehran has fre-
quently warned the Arabs that support for Iraq will lead to Iranian
reprisals. The Iranian Ambassador in Kuwait has regularly informed his
government of the flow of supplies to Iraq and has repeatedly called for
airstrikes against highways and bridges in Kuwait to halt it. On 11
November he characterized such strikes as "a necessary action from the
political standpoint" that would have "an effect on the whole region."
Recently, moreover, Iraqi intelligence has been spreading rumors that
Kuwaiti aircraft have attacked Khark Island--in an apparent effort to
enhance at least the appearance of Arab support for Baghdad. Once it
became clear that Iraq would not achieve a quick victory, the Kuwaitis
and other gulf countries began trying to play down their support for
Iraq, but both Iraqi pressure and Arab nationalist sentiment compel t m
to continue providing substantial aid to Baghdad. F I
'The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the
Director of Central intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence
Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior policymakers are
aware of impending potential developments that may have serious
implications for US interests. It is not a prediction that these
developments will occur. This memorandum has been coordinated at
the working level with CIA, DIA, NSA, State/INR, and Army.
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If Tehran decides to widen the war by escalating its
attacks on Kuwait or striking other gulf states, the United
States could become more directly involved in the conflict.
US allies in the region, including Saudi Arabia, would very
likely re ues~tional security assistance from the United
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There is also a danger that US forces in the area could
be attacked--either deliberately or in error--by the Iranians.
Tehran has already accused the United States of supplying in-
telligence collected by the AWACS aircraft to Iraq. Addition-
ally, Iranian officials in the gulf have reported that the US
naval facility in Bahrain is aiding Baghdad. Tehran also
believes that the United States has concluded a secret agree-
ment with the United Arab Emirates requi in American assist-
ance in the event of an Iranian attack.
If the gulf Arabs ignore Tehran's warnings, Iran could
launch further strikes, perhaps against oil installations.
The Iranian Air Force retains a capability to do this all
along the gulf littoral. Iran's more aggressive military
attacks on Iraqi oil installations during the past week
have already made the risk of another explosion in world
oil prices much greater. Given the indefinite suspension
of exports from both Iran and Iraq, the market has no
further room to absorb even small additional interruption
-of supplies from the other gulf countries. 25X1
The Soviets are concerned that a wider war would
lead to closer US cooperation with the area's conserva-
tive Arab states and an expanded US military presence.
The Soviets probably would therefore give additional
support to efforts already under way to end the conflict.
Moscow would also likely renew its proposal for joint
discussions on the security of international maritime
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Execution of Operations
Many of the Army's failures apparently are caused
by poorly conceived and clumsily executed tactics.
At the same time, some of the setbacks can be attrib-
uted to the nature of modern guerrilla warfare. Any
conventional army, regardless of its training and weap-
onry, has difficulty gaining and holding the initiative
against a resourceful, foreign-supported insurgent
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crushed.)
Morale and Discipline
In part because of the problems already noted, the
government cannot prevent deterioration of military
discipline and morale. Soldiers in the field have experi-
enced the effects of poor leadership, inadequate sup-
plies, confused combat operations, and unnecessary
casualties. More basic problems also have kept morale
low and the desertion rate high. Many regular army
soldiers are reluctant to be involved in a war against
fellow Iranians and apparently are not convinced of
the merits of the government's cause. (In contrast,
the Revolutionary Guards fervently believe that the
Kurds are counterrevolutionaries who must be
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Implications
The performance of Iran's forces in operations against
the Kurds highlights deficiencies which, if not cor-
rected, could be fatal during a major conventional
conflict. Government tactical successes against the
insurgents, when they have occurred, have resulted
largely from overwhelming superiority in firepower
and control of the air. In a clash with the conventional
forces of almost any potential enemy, however, these
advantages would almost certainly be absent, forcing
the armed forces to rely more on tactical skills,
interservice coordination, and their own determination
and discipline. These are the areas where the armed
forces demonstrate major weaknesses.
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The military's performance against the insurgents sug-
gests that Iran would have great difficulty organizing
and implementing a complex plan of multiservice op-
erations. Army counterinsurgency tactics have been
erratic and mostly reactive. A stronger enemy presum-
ably would exploit this weakness by striking first and
at several points simultaneously. The Iranian com-
mand would probably order activation of an estab-
lished defensive plan. After implementing such an
operation, Iranian field commanders probably would
be inflexible, fearful of making an error in judgment.
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In engaging a foreign enemy, the armed forces initially
would be more united, more motivated, and less likely
to dwell on interservice distrust than during counter-
insurgency operations. This expected initial period of
patriotic fervor probably would not sustain the mili-
tary, however, in the face of the tactical setbacks
that almost certainly would develop. 1
Iranian forces would probably perform best in a static
battle in which they could use their firepower and
predetermined battle plans to their best advantage
while minimizing the need for complex multiple-unit
coordination. A short war-one that would not criti-
cally strain the ponderous supply system-would also
be to Iran's advantage. 25X1
Iran's recent combat experience provides the military
leaders with useful information about areas of needed
improvement. If Tehran were able to take advantage
of this experience and make the needed changes, a
much stronger, more proficient force would develop.
But the armed forces are still adrift, beset by doubts
about their own mission and capabilities. Only after
the central government is united enough to provide
confident leadership will the prospects for essential
changes significantly improve.
Near East/Africa Branch
Eastern Forces Division
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