IRAN: UNREST IN THE MILITARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500030005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 1, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

Foreign
Assessment
Center
An Intelligence Memorandum
NSA review(s) completed.
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Summary Unrest in the Iranian military appears to be growing as senior officers
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Iran:
Unrest in the Military
become increasingly disenchanted with Ayatollah Khomeini and the clerics
who dominate Iran. Coup plotting apparently has become widespread.
In Jul the re ime uncovered a plot involving some 400 to 500 officers.
Officers planning a coup face numerous difficulties, including a lack of
support among enlisted men and numerous pro-Khomeini informers among
the junior officers. The regime has sought to prevent a coup by purging
the military of dissidents, monitoring the officers' activities through numer-
ous revolutionary committees, and establishing the Revolutionary Guard
as a counterweight to the regular military. 25X1
A successful coup appears unlikely at present, but dissident officers could
try to kill Khomeini, hoping that chaos would ensue and bring down
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This paper was written b-~ Southwest Asia Analytic Center, Near East- 25X1 A
South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the Office
of Strategic Research, the Directorate of Operations, and the National Intelligence Officer
for Near East-South Asia. Information available as of 3 September 1980 was used 25X1 A
in its preparation. Questions and comments are welcome and may be directed to the
25X1 A Chief, Southwest Asia Analytic Center, Near East-South Asia Division, OPA, o4
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Iran:
Unrest in the Military Fl
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Iran's professional military officers are becoming increasingly restless and
dissatisfied with Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Republic. Reports of unrest
in the officer corps have become more widespread in recent months, and
the regime has become increasin 1 alarmed about the threat of a military
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More than 18 months after the fall of the Shah the Iranian military
remains in a state of disarray. The Army, which had almost 300,000
personnel under the Shah, now numbers only about 150,000 men. Major
equipment such as armor is only 50 to 75 percent operational, while
the helicopter fleet is only 30 to 50 percent ready. The Air Force has
dwindled from 130,000 personnel to some 70,000, and only about half
its aircraft are ready for action. The Navy has dropt)ed from 32,000
men to around 20,000.1 1 25X1
The military-especially the Army-has been hard hit by desertions, poor
morale, a lack of leadership, and poor discipline. The leadershp has been
purged down to the field grade level, and the latest purges will extend
even further. Disregarding orders is common. 25X1
Causes of Unrest The decline in the military's effectiveness has been one cause of the
unrest among the officer corps. Professional military men are appalled
by the clerics' disdain for their profession, which many see as the country's
main defense against foreign-especially Soviet and Iraqi-interference
in the country's internal affairs. 25X1
The military was a privileged class under the Shah and the last bastion
of the Pahlavi monarchy. Most of the senior officers sided with the Shah
until the last days before Khomeini took power. The military is still
tied in the public mind with the Shah, and its loyalty to the clerics
who seized control in February 1979 has always been questionable. ^ 25X1
The Shah recruited his officers primarily from the upper and middle
classes. By background and education the officer corps is inclined to
be less sympathetic to the Shia clergy than most Iranians. Many officers
believe the clergy is "ruining" Iran and opening the door to an eventual
Communist and Soviet takeover.= 25X1
The purges of the officer corps have served to increase unhappiness while
intimidating those who remain. Senior officers in every service have been
purged, tried, and executed. Virtually every officer in the military probably
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has seen friends killed by the regime. (The annex lists prominent officers
executed since the revolution.) 25X1
Junior officers and the enlisted ranks are much more sympathetic to
the Islamic Republic than the senior officers. Most are drawn from the
lower classes and tend to be more pious. Some played a key role in
the fighting in February 1979 that brought down Prime Minister Bakhtiar's
government, and most have fought loyally against Khomeini's enemies
in Kordestan and other troubled areas. Nonetheless, the enlisted ranks
and the junior officers are divided, like the majority of Iranians.
The July Plot The Islamic regime has claimed repeatedly that it has broken up military
coup plots. In December 1979, for example, Tehran claimed to have
destroyed a plot among Azarbayjani officers in Tabriz. President Bani-
Sadr claims to have foiled six plots since he took power in January.
We cannot confirm how many of these claims are based on serious plots
and how many are efforts to rally support for the regime. The Khomeini
regime almost always blames coup plotting on foreign govenments-
usually the United States, Israel, Egypt, and Iraq-in an effort to discredit
its enemies and appeal to Persian nationalism.
By far the most serious plot was unraveled in July. On 10 July Bani-
Sadr announced that a coup had been discovered at the Shahroki Airbase
near Hamadan where about a half dozen officers were shot while preparing
to take off to bomb Bani-Sadr's office, Khomeini's home, the Revolutionary
Guards' headquarters, and the Qom Theological Seminary! The regime
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The regime initiated a massive purge of the military in reaction to the
plot. More than 80 officers have been executed for alleged participation
in the plot, and over 600 have been arrested. Those arrested included
the commander of the 92nd Armored Division located in Khuzistan Prov-
ince, the commander of the Khorramshahr Naval Base, a former com-
mander of the Gendarmerie, and a former commander of the Air Force.
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hat the plot was centered around some 400
to 500 field-grade officers led by Air Force Lieutenant General Mehdiyun
and Gendarmerie commander General Mohaqeqi. Their plan called for
airstrikes on Khomeini's home, Bani-Sadr's office, the Revolutionary Guard
headquarters, and the Qom Theological Seminary, followed by ground
attacks on the President's office and Revolutionary Guard units in Tehran.
The plotters planned to invite former Prime Minister Bakhtiar to return
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Mcers arrestea in July plot meet the press in a ran ore
their execution
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to Iran to head a new government, but it is unclear how involved Bakhtiar
was in the plot.
Iraq, which supports Bakhtiar, may also have been involved in the plotting,
but there is no evidence that Baghdad played a central role in the conspiracy.
There is no good evidence that the plotters commanded the loyalty of
a significant number of enlisted personnel.
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The plot apparently failed because the conspirators were infiltrated by 25X1
a number of regime supporters. the pro-
Soviet Tudeh Party, which backs the Khomeini regime, played a key 25X1
role in helping the regime uncover the conspiracy. Bani-Sadr acknowledged
that the Tudeh helped uncover an earlier plot, and
Itfudeh leader Nureddin Kianouri informed the regime about the
July plot four days before Bani-Sadr announced it had been broken up.
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numerous junior officers.'
The conspirators reportedly tried to maintain the security of their plans
by excluding younger officers from the plot. They were aware that the
Tudeh and the independent leftist group, the Mujahedin, have recruited
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The Regime's The Islamic regime has taken numerous measures to prevent a successful
Countermeasures military coup. The abortive July plot illustrates some of the difficulties
plotters face, including the lack of a significant base among enlisted men
and junior officers and the numerous spies among them. I 25X1
The regime clearly hopes that the mass arrests and executions of senior
officers will intimidate the military as a whole. 25X1
Immediately after the revolution the clerics sought to defend their hold
on power by imposing a system of revolutionary committees to monitor
military activities throughout the armed forces chain of command. In
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who can overrule the commands of the senior officers.
many units the committees include enlisted men, officers, and clerics,
At the top of the chain of command, Khomeini has appointed his own
representatives to report on the activities of the military. After the July
plot was uncovered, the government reportedly added a new directorate
to the joint chiefs under the direction of a cleric to formalize the revolu-
tionary committee structure in the military and ensure its oversight of
the officer corps.
key roles in the past in assuring clerical oversight of the military.
Under the Iranian constitution Khomeini is commander in chief of the
armed forces. He delegated this power to Bani-Sadr in February 1980,
but the President has been unable to gain full control over the military.
The clerics have successfully resisted giving Bani-Sadr control over the
Revolutionary Guards, and some senior fundamentalists, including
Ayatollah Khamanei and former Defense Minister Chamran, have played
Revolutionary Guards The establishment of the Revolutionary Guards (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e
Engelab) in May 1979 was also intended in part to serve as a deterrent.
to coup plotters. The regime hopes that the Pasdaran can serve as a
praetorian guard.
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Party, PA 80-103650, August 1980,
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Revolutionary Guards parading outside the occupied US Embassy
in Tehran
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The Pasdaran's relations with the military are poor. The Guards have
a well-deserved reputation for poor discipline and brutality, and regular
military pesonnel chafe under the Guards' oversight. 25X1
25X1 =he military have been reluctant to participate in joint operational
planning with the Guards, and there have been numerous incidents during
the fighting in Kordestan where Army units h v refused to su ort
Pasdaran in clashes with the Kurdish rebels. 25X1
Despite their combat experience against the Kurds and other dissidents,
the Pasdaran are still largely untested. Their capabilities have been under-
mined by extensive factionalism and infighting among the clerical lead-
ership. The Guards' training has been uneven-many are little more than
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PA 80-10001C, January 1980, 25X1
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Prospects
Despite the regime's efforts, plotting involving the military almost certainly
is continuing in Iran. The rightist exile groups, the leftists such as the
Tudeh and Mujahedin, and other dissidents all recognize the value of
an apparatus in the military.
In order to succeed both in toppling Khomeini and creating a new gov-
ernment, however, coup plotters would have to deal with the Ayatollah's
charismatic hold on millions of Iranians. There is no good evidence that
dissidents among the officer corps have a significant following among
the rank and file-many of whom are loyal to the Islamic regime.
On the other hand disgruntled officers could stage a coup, planning to
kill Khomeini, create chaos, and hope that eventually anti-Khomeini forces
would prevail. Such a move could plunge Iran into civil war pitting loyal
military units and the Revolutionary Guards against dissidents.
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Prominent Iranian Military Officers
Executed Since the Revolution
February
Gen. Nematollah Nasiri
Maj. Gen. Mehdi Rahimi-Larijani
Maj. Gen. Manuchehr Khrosrowdad
Maj Gen. Reza Naji
Maj. Gen. Parviz Amini-Afshar
March
Lt. Gen. Abdollah Khajenuri
Gen. Jafar Qoli Mostofi-Sadri
Lt. Gen. Nader Jahanbani
Brig. Gen. Vali Mohammad Zand-Karimi
April
Lt. Gen. Amir Hosein Rabii
Lt. Gen. Ali Mohammad Kahjenuri
Lt. Gen. Naser Moqadam
Gen. Ali Neshat
Maj. Gen. Hashem Berenjian
Gen. Jahangir Esfandiari
Lt. Gen. Fazlollah Jafari
May
Brig. Gen. Fazollah Nazemi
December
Maj. Gen. Esmail Estahrom
January
Maj. Gen. Hasan Behzadi
March
Maj. Gen. Kamal Nezami
July
Lt. Gen. Hushang Hatam
Gen. Ahmad Ali Mohaqeqi
August
Lt. Gen. Seyed Sajad Mehdiyun
Former Chief of SAVAK
Former Chief, National Police and Martial Law Administrator
Chief of the Army Aviation Command
Martial Law Administrator, Isfahan
Commander, Imperial Guard
Chief, J-3
Former Chief, National Police
Deputy Commander for Plans and Programs, Imperial Air Force
Chief of Prison System
Former Commander, Imperial Air Force
Chief, J-3
Last Head of SAVAK
Imperial Guard
Chief, Counterintelligence, Imperial Air Force
Martial Law Administrator, Western Iran
Former Deputy Chief, National Police
Gendarmerie
Former Military Governor of Qom
Former Deputy Chief, Supreme Commander's Staff
Former Commander of the Gendarmerie
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Sources of Copyrighted Photographs
Page 3: Associated Press
Page 5: Associated Press
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