IRAN: DECLINE IN AIR FORCE CAPABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500030011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 1, 1989
• Content Type: IM

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Iran:
Decline in Air Force Capability
Top Secret
SR 80-10069CX
May
1 . A 7
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 Summary
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Iran:
Decline in Air Force Capability
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The effectiveness of Iran's Air Force has seriously eroded since the ouster
of the Shah, largely because of a purge of pilots, a drastic reduction in
pilot training, inadequate maintenance of aircraft, and a shortage of spare
parts.
The Air Force's problems have been exacerbated by civilian authorities and
military chiefs in Tehran who have failed to establish operational standards
and long-range goals. Iran's advanced F-14 fighters appear to be the most
seriously affected by these problems
Iran will rely more on its older F-4 and F-5 fighter aircraft,
but they too have severe problems
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This memorandum was prepared by ofthe Eastern Forces Division, Office of
Strategic Research. It was coordinated wit the Iran Task Force and the National
Intelligence Officerfor the Near East - South Asia. Information available as of 1 May 1980
was used in its preparation. Questions or comments should be directed to the Chief, Eastern
Forces Division, Office of Strategic Research, telephone 25X1 A
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Iran:
Decline in Air Force Capability I
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F-14 Activity Problems with equipment and maintenance have continued this year to
disrupt regular flight operations of Iran's 76 F-14 fighters.
Inadequate crew training has handicapped the F-14 program from its
inception. Fewer than 100 pilots were trained to fly the F-14 before the
Revolution, and only three completed the entire combat training course.
None of the weapon systems officers for the F- 14 had advanced beyond the
first phase of training, which covered only simple intercepts, that is, firing
one missile at a time against a single target.
Equipment problems have had a major impact on the F- 14 program,
sometimes forcing ground crews to adopt extraordinary measures. Because
of a severe shortage of spare parts and inadequate maintenance, the Air 25X1 X
Force has been forced to cannibalize many of the F-14s. In fact, some F-14s
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Although Iran is having problems with its F-I 4s, the evidence does not allow
a valid iudgment about the number now o erat'
Iranian Air Force commanders probably recognize that, given the shortage
of combat-capable F- 14 pilots and the absence of realistic combat training,
continued frequent operation of the aircraft would further weaken the
aircraft while contributing virtually nothing to national defense. Few of the
flyable aircraft are thought to be combat ready. Despite this predicament,
the government has indicated that it will keep the aircraft in the inventory,
at least for the near future, rather than sell them to another country.
Keeping these aircraft more or less in limbo, however, will not ensure their
availability in a future crisis, because lack of use by itself induces technical
rp oblems, especially with sophisticated subsystems like those on the F-14.
F-4 and F-5 Activity Iran's other fighter aircraft, F-4s and F-5s, have suffered similar problems,
but they have been less serious, and these fighters certainly would present a
greater threat to enemy aircraft than the F-14s. On the one hand, their
effectiveness has been limited by inadequate flight time, a purge of pilots,
and a fear of too quickly exhausting the spare-parts inventory provided by
the United States. We estimate that flight activity may be at only about 10
to 20 percent of the pre-Revolution level. On the other hand, such activity
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-4 and F-5 pilots and technicians are
more numerous and experienced than those trained on F-14s, primarily
because the F-4s and F-5s have been in Iran for more than 10 years.
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About half of the 190 F-4s and more than half of the 135 F-5s in the
inventory are thought to be operational. (Spare parts problems for the F-5
are not as severe as those for the F-4.) The combat readiness of these aircraft 25X
is difficult to determine and varies considerably from base to base. Those at
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The Air Force is probably using only its best pilots and aircraft for these
flights. This limits the risks while guaran ost capable pilots
would be ready in the event of hostilities. 1 7
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Major Iranian Airbases
U. S. S. R.
L Sha roki 0
O Kurdish-inhabited area
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
0 50 100 150 Miles
Persian
Gulf
Boundary rrpre
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Prospects
Unless there is a major political change in Tehran, the Iranian Air Force
faces a bleak future, during which even normal training flights will become
increasingly hazardous. In the event of hostilities, Iran would be able to rely
on only a small core of proficient pilots and combat-ready fighter aircraft.
These pilots and aircraft probably would be hard pressed to carry out
intensive combat o erations against any plausible enemy air force for more
than a few days. II 25X1
Iran's fleet of F-14s currently does not pose a serious combat threat, and the
Air Force is likely to continue to limit the number of F- 14 sorties except,
perhaps, when there is a major threat. Regardless of the amount of F- 14
activity, however, the government will be forced to face critical questions
about how to obtain desperately needed spare parts and technical assistance.
Pilot proficiency will deteriorate further, and spare-parts shortages will
force even more cannibalization. At the current rate of deterioration, few, if
any, of Iran's F-14s will be airworthy beyond the end of this year 25X1
The Air Force will probably continue to fly some of its F-4 and F-5 fighters
at the current low but steady rate to ensure that at least the best pilots will be
ready for combat. Iran will try to obtain additional aircraft and spare parts
as well as assistance with maintenance, primarily from Western Europe,
using both overt and clandestine methods. As the country becomes more
isolated, these efforts may become prohibitively difficult.
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Even if the Air Force is able to keep a number of its aircraft flying, it will
have to overcome other major hurdles to become an effective military
organization. Political committees at Air Force bases still handicap military
commanders, morale is low, dissension and mistrust within the service are
strong, and there is a shortage of experienced senior officers.
Perhaps the greatest problem for the Air Force-and for the entire Iranian
armed forces-is the absence of a clear sense of direction and mission.=
establish national goals and standards for the military, leaving base
commanders to establish their own training programs and operational
priorities. This lack of direction probably will be reflected in uneven or
the current regime has failed to
erratic training.
Even at this stage, Iran's Air Force probably could not defeat Iraq in a major
air war, and its capability will probably continue to decline in the months
ahead. Maintenance problems and inadequate training will hamper efforts
to reverse the trend. Of equal or even greater importance will be the
weakness of Tehran's overall management of the Air Force. If the current
regime remains in power, the Air Force may well not be a credible defense
force against any conceivable air threat by mid-1981.
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