IRANIAN MILITARY READINESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500030012-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: December 7, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
TOP SECRET
SUBJECT: Iranian Military Readiness
Efforts to increase the readiness of Iran's
military forces since the takeover of the US Embassy
on 5 November have been minimal. The limited capa-
bilities of the military forces are probably not the
only reason for this. Khomeini's Zack of trust in
the loyalty of the armed forces probably plays a
large rote.
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This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Strategic
Research for the Iran Task Force. Questions or comments may 25X1
be addressed to Chief, Iran Task Force onl 25X1A
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The armed forces--the Army in particular--have been
ordered to support Iran's new security force, the Revolution-
ary Guards. The Guards are still being formed and their
involvement in defense of the country from external military
threat is limited. Most of the approximately 20,000-man
force consists of armed rabble. There may be as many as
5,000 Guards stationed in Tehran. Two units of 250 men each
are considered to be "strike forces." They are well-armed,
skilled in urban combat, and trained by ex-Special Forces 25X1
personnel. The Guards dispersed to the countryside, however,
have demonstrated their lack of discipline and military train-
ing, inadequate equipment, but high Islamic spirit.
Air Force
Air bases in the southwest have taken some precautions
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We continue to believe that all Iranian F-14s remain
TOP SECRET
the F-14 with the Phoenix missile. I onl ten
Phoenix missiles are considered operational now.
the Iranian technicians have only a limited ability to arm
Iran's F-14 fighters would be less of a threat to hostile
aircraft and ships than its F-4 and F-5 aircraft, which are
more numerous, in better condition, and more familiar to Air
Force personnel. All 163 F-4Es could carry the Maverick air-
to-surface missiles. Some crews are well trained. In joint
exercises with the US in 1977, the carrier Midway served as
a "target" for the Iranian F-4s using the Maverick. The
Iranians performed well.
Iran's F-5s did not participate in the joint exercises
although many Iranian F-5 pilots are accomplished flyers. Like
most other Iranian pilots, however, F-5 pilots probably lack
aggressiveness and fly in a predictable manner. The 176 F-5
aircraft, capable of carrying Sidewinder air-to-air missiles,
are normally used in an air defense role.
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frequently. The only unusual development was the virtual
absence of F-4 aircraft visible at Bushehr since 18 November.
The airfield--like the F-14 bases--has sufficent hardened air-
craft shelters to accommodate the aircraft based there, and
the F-4s, when not flying, are probably in the shelters. Photo-
graphy also confirms the presence of F-4 and F-5 aircraft at 25X1
Mashhad Airfield on 8 November 25X1
0
During November, there was an increased deployment of
antiaircraft artillery at some airfields--particularly those
K1.
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Navy
The operational readiness of the Iranian Navy continues
to be adversely affected by poor maintenance and lack of spare
parts. Iran's nine French-built missile patrol boats have now 25X1
become affected by the parts shortage. The Navy attempted to
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The Navy appears to be conducting regular patrols of the
lower Gulf--specifically the Straits of Hormuz--and the north-
ern Gulf and inland waters of the Shatt-al Arab. Minesweepers?5X1
103-class frigates, and motor gu oats appear to be the ships
relied upon for these missions.
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almost no operational capability to sweep mines. The magnetic
signature of the vessels is so hi h that sweep operations
would be dangerous.
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0 50 100 150 Kilometers
0 50 100 150 Miles
Caspian
Persian
Gulf
Manama
BHA
QAT4AR
Doha
54
Krasnovbdsk
Bandar-
Abbas
Gulf of
Oman
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