THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN IRAQI VICTORY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500050001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 26, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved Fplease 2004 - DP81 B00401 R000500050001-4
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN IRAQI VICTORY
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of that role, possibly in the security area. Iraq's tendency
in such situations has been to bully, but Saddam Hussein has
shown ability over the past year to play a subtle political game.
The impact of a limited but clear cut military victory over
Iran on the regional balance of power would be felt first and
foremost in the Persian Gulf. Iraq's status as an Arab leader
would be greatly enhanced in the Gulf, as well as in the Arab
world. Iraq would probably benefit in the immediate aftermath
from a popular sense of exhilaration that an Arab army had defeated
longtime enemy Iran. Iraq would, as a consequence, more aggres-
sively assert its claim to Arab leadership and may prod other
Persian gulf governments to enter into more formal expressions 25X1
In the longer run, however, Baghdad may find it more diffi-
cult than it expects to convert its presumed military victory
into more lasting strategic and political influence. To be
sure, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the smaller Persian Gulf states, and
perhaps even Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization,
Lill pay greater deference to Iraq, but they also will try to
circumscribe Iwer and exploit Iraqi ambitions for their
own purposes.
The Saudis and other Gulf rulers would, of course, wel-
come a limited Iraqi victory, hoping that this would help spike
Iran's attempts to export its revoluti-3n and would leave Iraqi
forces tied down in Iran. They do not, however, want to see
Iran break apart and the local balance of power radically altered
in Iraq's favor. They fear they would:
26 September 1980
This memorandum was prepared b Arabian
Peninsula Branch, Near East South Asia Division, Office of
Political Analysis. Questions and comments Ana be addressed
to Chief, Near East South Asia Division,1 -1
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--encourage Iraq to pursue its hegemonic designs
aggressively in the Gulf;
--open the way for Iranian leftists to seize power
in at least some provinces and perhaps Tehran;
--lead to the spread of Soviet influence in Iran.
Not surprisingly, Israeli and Egyptian leaders share those
concerns. II
Assuming Iraqi gains remain relatively limited and the
Khomeini regime weathers the present onslaught, the Saudis
and other Gulf leaders will attempt to placate Baghdad without
arousing the ire of Tehran--a delicate blancing act they have
pursued throughout the fighting,to avoid Iranian retaliation
and unrest among their Shia populations. The weaker states--
especially Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates--will find it
more difficult than before to resist Iraqi pressures for closer
cooperation on gulf security :natters--including the possible use
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Jordan, meanwhile, has emerged as Iraq's staunchest supporter.
By aligning himself wholeheartedly with the Iraqis, King Husayn
hopes a strong Iraq will be able to put an end to divisions in
the Arab camp and help devise a workable alternative to the Cam
David Accords--one that Jordan has a large say in shaping. II 25X1
Syria--long at odds with Iraq and loosely aligned with Iran--
also may change tack. It has so far struck a more neutral
pose during the present fighting. Damascus may be tempted to
make some overture to Baghdad in the hope, at minimum, of ex-
tracting more financial support from Libya and, at most, of gaining
solid Iraqi backing against Israel. The PLO may be similarly
inclined to bid for Iraqi support in an effort to lessen i
dependence on Syria and increase its room. for maneuver. 25X1
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An increase in Iraqi prestige and influence would be
equally unwelcomed in Cairo. The shift of Jordan and Saudi
Arabia more solidly into the Tragi camp would leave Egypt more
isolated and separated from its potential Arab allies than it is
now. It also would increase President Sadat's concern about
his ties with the US and make him more anxious to see Washing-
ton take a firmer line with Israel on the autonomy talks once
the US elections were over.
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 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2004/01/22 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000500050001-4
Approved For Release 2004/01/22 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000500050001-4