THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN IRAQI VICTORY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP81B00401R000500050001-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 1, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 26, 1980
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP81B00401R000500050001-4.pdf136.34 KB
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Approved Fplease 2004 - DP81 B00401 R000500050001-4 I THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN IRAQI VICTORY 25X1 of that role, possibly in the security area. Iraq's tendency in such situations has been to bully, but Saddam Hussein has shown ability over the past year to play a subtle political game. The impact of a limited but clear cut military victory over Iran on the regional balance of power would be felt first and foremost in the Persian Gulf. Iraq's status as an Arab leader would be greatly enhanced in the Gulf, as well as in the Arab world. Iraq would probably benefit in the immediate aftermath from a popular sense of exhilaration that an Arab army had defeated longtime enemy Iran. Iraq would, as a consequence, more aggres- sively assert its claim to Arab leadership and may prod other Persian gulf governments to enter into more formal expressions 25X1 In the longer run, however, Baghdad may find it more diffi- cult than it expects to convert its presumed military victory into more lasting strategic and political influence. To be sure, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the smaller Persian Gulf states, and perhaps even Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization, Lill pay greater deference to Iraq, but they also will try to circumscribe Iwer and exploit Iraqi ambitions for their own purposes. The Saudis and other Gulf rulers would, of course, wel- come a limited Iraqi victory, hoping that this would help spike Iran's attempts to export its revoluti-3n and would leave Iraqi forces tied down in Iran. They do not, however, want to see Iran break apart and the local balance of power radically altered in Iraq's favor. They fear they would: 26 September 1980 This memorandum was prepared b Arabian Peninsula Branch, Near East South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis. Questions and comments Ana be addressed to Chief, Near East South Asia Division,1 -1 25X1A 25X1A 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/22 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000500050001-4 Approved For Release 20 - 81 B00401 R000500050001-4 --encourage Iraq to pursue its hegemonic designs aggressively in the Gulf; --open the way for Iranian leftists to seize power in at least some provinces and perhaps Tehran; --lead to the spread of Soviet influence in Iran. Not surprisingly, Israeli and Egyptian leaders share those concerns. II Assuming Iraqi gains remain relatively limited and the Khomeini regime weathers the present onslaught, the Saudis and other Gulf leaders will attempt to placate Baghdad without arousing the ire of Tehran--a delicate blancing act they have pursued throughout the fighting,to avoid Iranian retaliation and unrest among their Shia populations. The weaker states-- especially Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates--will find it more difficult than before to resist Iraqi pressures for closer cooperation on gulf security :natters--including the possible use 25X1 25X1 Jordan, meanwhile, has emerged as Iraq's staunchest supporter. By aligning himself wholeheartedly with the Iraqis, King Husayn hopes a strong Iraq will be able to put an end to divisions in the Arab camp and help devise a workable alternative to the Cam David Accords--one that Jordan has a large say in shaping. II 25X1 Syria--long at odds with Iraq and loosely aligned with Iran-- also may change tack. It has so far struck a more neutral pose during the present fighting. Damascus may be tempted to make some overture to Baghdad in the hope, at minimum, of ex- tracting more financial support from Libya and, at most, of gaining solid Iraqi backing against Israel. The PLO may be similarly inclined to bid for Iraqi support in an effort to lessen i dependence on Syria and increase its room. for maneuver. 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/22 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000500050001-4 Approved For Release 2004/01/22 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000500050001-4 SECRET An increase in Iraqi prestige and influence would be equally unwelcomed in Cairo. The shift of Jordan and Saudi Arabia more solidly into the Tragi camp would leave Egypt more isolated and separated from its potential Arab allies than it is now. It also would increase President Sadat's concern about his ties with the US and make him more anxious to see Washing- ton take a firmer line with Israel on the autonomy talks once the US elections were over. -3- SECRET 25X1 25X6 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/22 : CIA-RD081B00401 R000500050001-4 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2004/01/22 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000500050001-4 Approved For Release 2004/01/22 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000500050001-4