IRAN - IRAQ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500050003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 17, 1980
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release
The irectoro entry lnte igence
Washington. Q C20505
R000500050003-2
17 September 1980
ALERT MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council
SUBJECT: Iran - Iraq
The intensification of border clashes between Iran and Iraq has
reached a point where a serious conflict is now a distinct possibility.
I believe the most immediate danger--should the hostilities widen--
is the possibility of a disruption of Iraq's oil exports. The attached
Alert Memorandum outlines this and other potential dangers of a major
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Approved For Release
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ALERT MEMORANDUM*
Iran-Iraq Conflict
17-September 1980
Border clashes between Iran and Iraq have escalated
significantly since the beginning of September. Last weekend,
Iraq apparently moved significant elements of an armored divi-
sion to the central border area. Baghdad has occupied terri-
tory it claims should be returned under the 1975 A iers Accord
1 threatened to seize more 25X1
ragi mechanized divisions either are preparing to Leave or
have left their garrisons, possibly for the border area.
Both Baghdad and Tehran have been constrained from initiating a
major conflict in the past by numerous political and economic factors,
including the threat of superpower intervention, the proximity of their
oil installations to the border, and the danger that war would exacerbate
domestic political unrest. These factors continue to restrain both Iran
and Iraq, but Iraq's willingness to seize and hold disputed territory
and its military movements represent a qualitative change that increases
the danger that clashes will escalate out of control or that either side's
perception of the constraints will suddenly change.
The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the
Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community.
Its purpose is to ensure that senior poZicymakers are aware of impending
potential developments that may have serious implications for US interests.
It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. This memoran-
dum has been coordinated at the working Level with CIA, DIA, NSA, and
State/INR, and the Strategic Warning Staff.
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If major hostilities between Iran and Iraq should occur, the US
hostage crisis could be further complicated. Iran has long accused
the United States of encouraging Iraqi aggression, and the militants
holding the US hostages have threatened to kill them if Iraq launches
a "full-scale" attack. Although Iranian propaganda cannot be accepted
at face value, the threat to the hostages prob ould be increased
especially if Iran suffered a serious defeat.
In the event of major hostilities
Ira
i
bl
,
q
s capa
e of occupying
the Khuzestan oilfields. Iraq's close ties to Iranian dissidents provide
the means to set up a puppet government. But, a major Iraqi offensive
into Khuzestan would involve Iraq in a costly and protracted struggle
with Ir Iran, for its part, could disrupt Iraqi shipping in the
Gulf.
Both Iraq and Iran have much of their oil infrastructure located
near the border--two-thirds of Iraq's exports. move through vulnerable
Persian Gulf facilities--and these facilities would probably be damaged
by fighting and sabota
e if th
g
e conflict lasted more than a few days.
Disruption to Iraq's oil exports would result in immediate renewed
pressure on world oil prices. A prolonged cutoff of oil exports would
have a severe impact on supply availability as well as prices. Iraq
currently exports about 3 million barrels of crude oil per day, most of
which is imported by Western Europe, Japan, and Brazil. The United
States obtains only about 1-2 percent of its requirements for imported
oil'from Iraq. Iran currently exports about 800,000 barre crude
oil and products per day; none goes to the United States. I
An expanded conflict could also have a destabilizing impact on
other Middle Eastern states. Iraq would seek to portray the conflict
as one between Arabs and Persians in order to gain Arab backing. Iran
might appeal, probably unsuccessfully, to Syria for support against
their mutual enemy. Tehran would probably step up its appeals to the
Shias in Iraq to revolt and might also urge the Shias in Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Bahrand other Gulf countries to attack Iraqi and US
interests. u
The Soviets have long been concerned that military clashes between
Iran and Iraq will damage their ties with both countries. They may also
be worried that the United States could use i t 'f.'
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con-
flict to justify intervention in Iran or thatnTehranwouldnmovetto resolve
its conflict with the United States in order to better confront Baghdad.
Consequently, the Soviets probably consider their interests best served
by the prevention of the outbreak of full-scale hostilities. 0 25X1
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Should major hostilities occur, the Soviets might offer to act
as a mediator and seek to arrange a ceasefire. If this effort fails,
the Soviets might attempt to use their arms relationship with the
Iraqis to persuade them to desist. The USSR, however, is unlikely to
cut off arms. The consequence of limiting Iraqi arms supply would be
to force Baghdad to search for alternative Western sources of arms and
damage bilateral Soviet-Iraqi relations. If Iraq were to seek to occupy
large parts of Iran--such as the oilfields--Soviet efforts to dissuade 25X1
Baghdad would probably be even stronger, possibly
including warnings
that Iraqi occupation could lead to Soviet military intervention in Iran.
to
r
t
h
'
p
o
ect t
e USSR
s interests along its southern border.
i
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