STATUS OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500050009-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 30, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
30 November 1979
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Status of the Iraqi Armed Forces
towards Iran.
Z
Iraq's armed forces have not assumed a threatening posture
y
o
ithin three to
w Iraq has a clear military edge over Iran because of the
turmoil in the Iranian armed forces. If the Iraqis decide
to launch a full-scale attack, Iran's oil-rich Khuzestan
target. A major uncertainty for
t likel
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s are qui e mo i e,
owever, an cou be in posi ion to launch a fu le assault
s of receiving orders. II 25X1A
ur da
f
y
e is the mos
provinc 25X1A Iraq in a showdown. n, however, would be the loyalty
of its Shia troops. I
Ground Forces. The Iraqi army numbers some 200,000 men,
about one-third more men than Iran's half-strength-army. Major
combat units include four armored divisions, two mechanized 25X1
divisions, five infantry divisions, and two special forces
brigades. The bulk of Iraq's armor is concentrated around
Ba hdad, see ma
pro a y are a pea coma e ec ive-
ness although ndoubtedly caused some wear on
equipment.
Iraq has the largest armored force of any of the Arab
states. Approximately 2,200 tanks and 2,.000 APCs are in tank
or mechanized units with several hundred additional armored
vehicles in storage awaiting distribution to units. (see chart).
The army is equipped with the latest Soviet weaponry including
T-72 and T-62 tanks, BMP armored infantry fighting vehicles,
and 152mm and 122mm self-propelled artillery. In addition,
the Iraqis equipped with French MILAN and HOT antitank
25X1A missiles. I
This memorandum was prepared by the Office
Research for the Iran Task Force. Questions or
n r
may be addressed to Chief, Iran Task Force o
of Strategic
comments
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Iraq also maintains police, border guard, and reserve
units numbering approximately 50,000 men. They are armed
with older model tanks, APCs, and artillery and generally
are stationed in Kurdish areas. In addition, the Iraqi
regime controls the People's Army, a militia of about
25X1A 125,000 men.
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Air Force. The Air Force numbers about 17,000 men
equipped with 575 combat aircraft, almost 25 percent more
aircraft than Iran's 460 combat aircraft and probably double
the number of operational'Iranian aircraft.1 Iraq has more
MIG-23s and SU-20/22s than Egypt and Syria combined. In 25X1A
addition, the Air Force has 14 TU-22 and seven TU-16 medium
bombers. The new MIG-23s and SU-20/22s have greatly rm roved
the range and payload capabilities of the Air Force.
Most combat aircraft are deployed in the Baghdad area
concentrations in the north
Gulf. near
with additional
and in the 25X1
F I
Iraqis have relatively unsophistica air 25X1
and no precision-guided munitions.
Although Air Force capabilities are improving, they are
still limited. Approximately 10 percent of the force consists
of obsolescent MIG-15/17/19 and Hawker Hunter aircraft. The
d -to-air missiles
0
controls the largest helicopter force
The Iraqi Air Force
in the Arab world, some 370 helicopters of all types. 42Theench
Iraqis have over 50 Soviet MI-24 attack helicopters,
Gazelle helicopters some of which are armed with HOT antitank
missiles, and almost 175 MI-8 transport helicopters. Iraqi
forces are proficient in heliborne oper and helicopters
are used extensively in Kurdish areas. 25X1A
Air Defense. The Air Defense Command numbers 21,000 men
and operates approximately 295 surface-to-air missile launchers
and almost 2,500 antiaircraft guns. The bulk of the SAMS are .
ZAssumes 80 percent of Iraq's combat aircraft are operational
and only 50 percent of Iranian combat aircraft are operational.
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deployed around Baghdad or near Persian Gulf oil fields and
ports. Antiaircraft guns are deployed to protect most major
civilian and military facilities, including airfields. Iraqi
armored units are equipped with shoulder-fired SA-7s, vehicle-
mounted SA-6s and SA-9s, numerous ZSU-23/4 and ZSU-57/2 self-
propelled antiaircraft guns, and large numbers of towed anti-
aircraft guns. The Iraqi radar system provides coverage at
6,000 Peters 0 r the northern 275 kilometers of the Persian
25X1A Gulf.
Navy. Iraq's Navy is the least effective of its armed
forces. It consists of twelve OSA missile boats, four
Polnocny,class landing ships, helicopters with Exocet anti-
ship missiles, five minesweepers, and numerous small patrol
and auxiliary craft. The Navy reportedly has conducted only
two live surface-to-surface missile firings and spends most
25X1A of its time in port.
Capabilities Against Iran. Iraq has a clear military
edge over Iran because of the turmoil in the Iranian armed
forces. Before the Iranian revolution, the two sides were
about equal with Iraq having a slight advantage on the ground
while Iran was superior in the air. At present, however,
many of Iran's sophisticated aircraft and air defense systems
are no longer fully operational. As a result, Iraq now has
a two to one advantage over Iran in operational combat air- 25X1A
craft and has widened its advantage in terms of armored forces.
Iran, however, is still capable of closing the Gulf to Ira i
shipping and of severely damaging Iraqi oil facilities.
Terrain limits Iraq's military options for a full-scale
attack to the southern third of its border with Iran. The
mountains along the northern two-thirds of the border generally
favor an Iranian defense, access by road is limited, and parts
of the area are inhabited by Kurds hostile to both governments.
Moreover, neither country has important military or economic
installations in close proximity to the border. In the past
when they wanted to make a political point, both countries
have initiated border skirmishes along the northern and central
sections of the border. 0 25X1A
The terrain along the southern third of the border permits
large-scale offensive operations except in the spring when
flooding presents a significant obstacle. In addition,vital
Iranian military and economic installations in Khuzestan are
relatively close to the border. The population-of the area
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is largely Arab, hostile to the Iranian government and en-
gaged in guerrilla activity. Iranian efforts to suppress
Arab dissent in the area could provide a ready excuse for
Iraqi intervention.
A full-scale Iraqi attack on Iran's Khuzestan province
is likely to be successful. Iraq's five mountain divisions
and two of its four armored divisions could conduct holding
actions along the northern two-thirds of the border. The
two Iraqi mechanized divisions stationed south of Baghdad
could launch an attack on the single Iranian armored division
defending Khuzestan with little or no warning. More likely,
however, Iraq would expand its southern force to include two
reinforced armored divisions from Baghdad and Tikrit, achieving
reater than four-to-one advantage in men and equipment.
25X1A II
Iraq's armored units are quite mobile, and the two rein-
forced armored divisions could be in position within three
or four days of receiving orders. Although not obsolutely
necessary, some combat aircraft and amphibious equipment also
might be moved from the Baghdad area to bases in the south.
The Iranian armed forces are in such turmoil that they probably
could not react quickly enough to provide significant armor
reinforcements to the armored division defending Khuzestan.
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The loyalty of its Shia troops would be a major uncer-
tainty for Baghdad in any military confrontation with Iran.
Although the percentage of Shias in the Iraqi armed forces
is unknown, Iraq does recruit from all segments o society
hias of the
,qnd
r
attack probably would unite a f? ce resistance.
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complication for Baghdad is that any a a ainst Iranian
Khuzestan would have to be launched from Iraq's largely Shia-
populated southern provinces. Moreover, a full-scale Iraqi d25X1A
anians behind Khomeini, an
11 I
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Iranian forces are likely to put up ier
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i Mountain division garrison
Armored division garrison
4A-- Mechanized division garrison
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Iraqi Air and Naval Deployments
~Turrke
Saudi Arabia
4, Naval base
Major airbase
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