(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500060006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 29, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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7 January 1980
SUBJECT: Khomeini's Dwindling Power Base
Ayatollah Khomeini remains Iran's unchallenged
ruler, but his base of support has narrowed signifi-
cantly since the start of the hostage crisis.
Khomeini's refusal to compromise with his opponents
now, while they are still divided, is steadily reduc-
ing his chances for survival in the Long run. The
danger for the US is that the Longer Khomeini remains
in power, the more Iran's politics will be radical=
ized; the moderate center has almost completely
eroded and the extreme left is gaining influence.
If Khomeini's objective at the start of the hostage
crisis was to rally domestic support for his Islamic Republic,
he has failed. While the struggle with the US is popular,
the confusion created by the crisis and by Khomeini's drive
to impose his constitution on Iran have given leftist groups
and ethnic dissidents time to recruit and organize. The
regime's preoccupation with the struggle with the US has
prevented it from focusing on solving its domestic problems.
Since the resignation of Prime Minister Bazargan, the
government has become increasingly paralyzed. The clerics
who dominate the Revolutionary Council are unprepared to rule
the country effectively and have not been able to get the
bureaucracy to function any better than it did under Bazargan.
Despite his radical rhetoric, there is no sign that Finance
Minister Bani-Sadr knows how to deal with Iran's economic
woes and Deputy Defense Minister Khamanei seems more intent
on purging the military officer corps than on creating a
viable security forces.
Eroding Power Base
The biggest loss has been the disaffection of Iran's
Azarbayjani minority. More than 20 percent of the country's
This memorandum was prepared by
Iran Task Force.
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population, the Azaris gave Khomeini important support during
the revolution, but have clearly withdrawn it now. The
Azarbayjanis would be an even more significant problem if
their spiritual leader, Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, was willing
to confront Khomeini openly. Shariat-Madari's caution is
giving the left opportunity to gather strength in the. strate-
gic northwest area.
Iran's other minorities, already restless before the
hostage crisis, have been further disaffected in the last two
months. The Kurdish dissidents are the best organized and
are already effectively in control of their homelands, and
the regime's hold on the other minority areas is slipping.
Khuzestan--quiet since summer--and Khomeini's oil revenues
remain vulnerable to Arab autonomists, radical Palestinian or
Arab agitators, and Iranian leftists.
The Iranian left has profited from the freer operational
environment produced by the hostage crisis. The pro-Soviet
Tudeh has not been noticeably damaged by the regime's adverse
but cautious reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan. While
publicly supporting Khomeini, the Tudeh is probably recruiting
in the military and oilfields, preparing for an ultimate bid
for power.
Iran's other leftists, including the more numerous
Peoples Fedayeen guerrillas, are badly divided. The Fedayeen
has been active in cementing its ties to the minorities. For
the first time in months, Fedayeen supporte n
clashed with Khomeini's backers last week.
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Even Khomeini's staunchest backers are starting to waver.
Many in the religious establishment have long prefered
Shariat-Madari and his view that the clergy should not play 25X1
a prominent role in politics. The lower classes are increas-
ingly unhappy with high unemployment and underemployment. II 25X1
Khomeini's Style
The Ayatollah's leadership--aloof and uncompromising
served him well against the Shah, but has consistently damaged
his prospects in recent months. By failing to compromise
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with Shariat-Madari over the constitution, Khomeini-_lost-the
Azarbayjanis. By refusing to accept the other minorities'
original requests for autonomy and their concerns about the
constitution, he has pushed them to demand even more self-
rule.
Khomeini's single-minded pursuit of the Islamic Republic
has alienated the secularist intelligentsia, the technocrats
and the bulk.of the middle classes. Without their backing
his regime has little hope of creating the effective bureau-
cracy, military. and economy necessary to satisfy Iranian
needs.
Out look
Khomeini's opponents remain divided and none are confi-
dent enough as yet to openly challenge his hold on the centra
l
government. The military is disaffected, but paralyzed by
poor morale and continuous purges. Moreover Khomeini's
charisma can still mobilize the mobs.
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Nonetheless, while the Ayatollah's short term prospects
remain good, the long term trend is clear. As presently
constituted, Khomeini's regime is too narrowly based to
survive. Further economic deterioration or simultaneous up-
risings by the minorities could lead to the regime's collapse
.
The Ayatollah's death could lead to complete chaos.
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The danger for the US is that the longer Khomeini remain
in power, the more radicalized Iran becomes. The moderate
s
centrist parties like the National Front and National Demo-
cratic Front have been destroyed. It is becoming increasingl
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likely that Khomeini's successor will be just as extreme.
Even worse, the collapse of Khomeini's regime with or without,
the Ayatollah could throw the country into complete anarchy.
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