THE IMPACT OF RESISTANCE BY SHARIAT-MADARI'S FOLLOWERS ON KHOMEINI'S LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500060008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: December 21, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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SECRE
SUBJECT: The Impact of Resistance by Shariat-Madari's
Followers on Khomeini's Leadership
PAGE 1 25X6
1. We believe Khomeini has a limited capacity to deal with
more than one major problem at a time. The uprising by
Shariat-Madari's followers in Azarbayjan coming hard on the heels of
smaller uprisings in Kurdistan, Khurestan, and Baluchistan drew
Khomeini's primary focus of attention away from the hostages and
his confrontation with the US. During this period of time, there was
an apparentlull and seeming movement toward more moderate pastures,
as exemplified by Khomeini's agreement to permit visitors to the
hostages and his temporary shift from trial of the hostages to an
international tribunal. We believe that while Khomeini was diverted
by the political instability in Iran's periphery, the more pragmatic
members of his entourage were temporarily given a wider latitude for
action and may well have had greater influence upon Khomeini.
2. Although internal difficulties in 25X6
general are distracting,
a sustained uprising in Azarbayjan under the leadership of aria -
Madari would be particularly threatening. For
political reasons, Khomeini's typical reactions to internal 25X6
at have been to place the blame on an outside enemy. But this
has proven particularly problematic in the current situation. II
politically F_ J it threatens his self-procla me
position as unified nation of 35,000,000. Moreover,
Khomeini has highly ambivalent feelings concerning Ayatollah
Shariat-Madari. Indeed, he may owe his life to Shariat-Madari. It
is reported that it was Shariat-Madari who elevated Khomeini to the
rank of Ayatollah in 1963, thus sparing him from execution at the
hands of SAVAK. Shariat-Madari is also renowned for his expertise
in religious scholarship while Khomeini is generally regarded to
have a less profound understanding of Islamic thought. Thus, the
possibility of Shariat-Madari branding Khomeini in violation of
Islamic law is particularly threatening. It was in response to
these mixed feelings that Khomeini made a gesture of respect to
Shariat-Madari when he first returned to Iran and then made an
apparently conciliatory visit to Shariat-Madari after one of his
guards was killed in the December 5th uprising by Khomeini's
supporters. But afterwards he resorted to his characteristic tactic
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of branding his opponent as anti-Islamic counterrevolutionaries,
tools of a nefarious imperialist power. The tactic failed on this
occasion and will continue to do so, for it was quickly countered by
the weight of Shariat-Madari's authority.
3. Khomeini has for the present successfully neutralized
Shariat-Madari, who is now effectively under house arrest.
Furthermore, at least in the past, Shariat-Madari has backed away
from outright confrontation with Khomeini. However he has always
been concerned that Khomeini's short-sighted leadership and the
domination of the political process by the clergy would lead
ultimately to the elimination of the Iranian religious establishment
and perhaps even the dissolution of the country. With the
spontaneous uprising in Azarbayjan, he is also faced with the
problem that he could be out-stripped by his followers. The
pressure of recent events has led Shariat-Madari to make his most
forceful stand to date.
4. Should circumstances develop that Shariat-Madari is
persuaded of the need more actively to confront Khomeini and that he
would be supported in this effort, there is every chance that the
moderate leadership of the established clergy who share his concerns
might also dissent openly. Until now, a number of senior ayatollahs
have muted their dissent in light of Khomeini's popularity with the
masses. But as the radical--and in traditional eyes,
unqualified--clergy who took control of the revolution last August
appear to be moving Iran closer to civil war and perhaps an eventual
leftist victory, they might feel emboldened to join Shariat-Madari
in protest.
5. The report that Ayatollah Khoi has come out in support of
Shariat-Madari and had circulated a written document among the
Shiite religious community attesting to this suggests an important
avenue of approach. Read by the media of this important support,
particularly radio, could provide an important enhancement to
Shariat-Madari's support, and might encourage Shariat-Madari further
in his efforts to become a focal rallying point.
6. A sustained uprising in Azarbayjan would continually drain
Khomeini's attention, and might diminish his iron hold on leadership
decisions. Although this on the one hand could give greater
latitude to the more pragmatic members of his entourage, as it
apparently did during the recent lull, this does not of course
necessarily mean that the captors' determination would be weakened.
Nevertheless, it would seem to be an avenue worth exploring.
25X1
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