STATUS OF IRANIAN FORCES IN KHUZESTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500070003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 28, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Releo
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
SUBJECT.: Status of Iranian Forces in Khuzestan
Iranian forces in Khuzestan consist of one armored
division reinforced with Revolutionary Guards, three
squadrons of F-5 interceptors, five batteries of HAWK
surface-to-air missiles, and a few small naval combatant
ships. These forces are on alert as part of a wider
military alert because of the confrontation with the US.
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Iranian forces in the province are capable of suppressing
Arab opposition if Iraq does not increase its support to the
dissidents. The government forces now there do not have
sufficient manpower to protect the numerous oil installations
in the area from sabotage, however. Iran could not hold the
province against a full-scale Iraqi attack. 25X1
Units. The 92nd Armored Division headquartered at Ahvaz 25X1
(see map comprises the bulk of the ground forces in the
province and is generally oriented to face an Iraqi attack.
Subordinate armored units are located at Ahvaz, Dezful, and
Hamidiyeh. In addition, an infantry brigade occupies static
defenses along the border with Iraq. The armored division
is equipped with approximately 320 Chieftain tanks and 250
to 300 APCs. 25X1
This memorandum was prepared by the office of Strategic
Research for the Iran Task Force. Qeustions or comments
may be addressed to Chief, Iran Task Force
NSA and NAVY review(s) completed. 25X1
TCS 9220/79
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The division has been reinforced by several contingents
of Khomeini's Revolutionary Guards. The Guards have assumed
almost complete responsibility for internal security, in-
cluding oil installations, and have been brutal in suppressing
dissent. Although we have no information on the number of 25X1
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Revolutionary Guards in the province, they probably number
several thousand based on the scope of their activities.
Three squadrons equipped with 80 F-5 interceptors are
stationed at Vahdati Air Base near Dezful. A few F-5 air-
the Shah and capabilities have declined since the Revolution.
Five HAWK surface-to-air missile batteries, each with
six launchers, are deployed near Dezful. In addition, there
are three unoccupied HAWK sites near Ahvaz. We have no in-
formation on the combat readiness of the crews and equipment
at the Dezful sites. Iran had achieved only a marginal
ability to operate the HAWK system without US support under
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The Navy stations only a small portion of its Persian
Gulf fleet in Khuzestan's ports. Four corvettes, one missile
boat, four minesweepers, and eight patrol boats were based
in Abadan, Khorramshahr, and Bandar-e Shahpur between 15 and
25 November. One of the corvettes and the missile boat were
undergoing minor repairs at Abadan.
Capabilities. Iranian ground forces in the province
are capable of suppressing internal opposition as long as
Iraq does not increase its support to the dissidents. Arab
guerrillas operating in small groups are mounting raids,
attacking government and oil installations, and ambushing
Revolutionary Guards. Government forces have reacted harshly
by engaging in mass arrests, surprise searches, and summary
executions, in an attempt to break the resistance. Despite
these efforts, Iranian forces do not have enough manpower to
adequately protect all installations. As recently as 16
November, Arab guerrillas bombed an oil pipeline near Abadan
and a Navy warehouse in'Khorramshahr.
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Iraq is supplying large quantities of arms and
explosives to the guerrillas and began training Iranian
Arabs this summer in guerrilla camps it maintains for the
Palestinians. Soon after training began, there was a
notable increase in the professionalism of guerrilla
operations. Infiltration of men and arms from Iraq report-
edly has increased in recent months. In the past, Iraq
dispatched hundreds of special forces troops and commandos
to reinforce Palestinian forces in Lebanon. Should Iraq
take similar action in Khuzestan, the local Iranian forces
would be hard pressed. to control the situation.
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Iraq's armed forces have not assumed a threatening
posture toward Iran. Were they torattack, however, Iranian
forces could not hold the province. The Iraqis would likely
mount an attack against Khuzestan using two reinforced
armored divisions and two mechanized-divisions--approximately
1,300 tanks--with extensive air support. This would permit
the Iraqis to achieve a four to one advantage in men and
equipment on the ground while leavin seven divisions to
hold the rest of the border. 25X1
In the past Iran counted on its superior air force and
armored and heliborne reinforcements from Iranian forces out-
side the province to offset Iraq's advantage on the ground.
With many aircraft not operational, however, the Iranian Air
Force is unlikely to be much help to the ground forces. The
Army's logistic and transport systems are in chaos and probably
unable to move large quantities of armor to Khuzestan on
short notice. Much of the helicopter force is grounded and
air defenses are likely to he weak. Iranian armored units
have no mobile surface-to-air missile system like the Iraqi
SA-6, leaving them vulnerable to Iraqi air strikes. The
Iranians do have sufficient air power to inflict serious
damage on Iraqi oil facilities. 1 -1 25X1
Because of Iran's past air and naval superiority over
the other Gulf states, the defenses of Khuzestan are not
oriented towards repelling an attack from the sea. There-
are no known coastal defense sites or naval minefields and
most military units are stationed some distance from the
coast. Extensive coastal mud flats, however, could hamper
an amphibious assault.
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Iranian Forces in Khuzestan
Ground Forces
Ahvaz
Division headquarters/one armored brigade
112 medium tanks
200 APCs
18 ZSU-57/2 anti-aircraft artillery
60 155mm self-propelled howitzers
Dezful
Armored brigade
83 medium tanks
50 APCs
18 155mm self-propelled howitzers
Hamidiyeh
Armored brigade
92 medium tanks
85 APCs
Air Force
Vahdati (near Dezful)
three fighter squadrons
60 F-5E
20 F-5IF
Ahvaz
3 unoccupied HAWK sites
Dezful
5 HAWK batteries
Navy
Abadan
1 missile boat (in drydock)
3 corvettes (1 in drydock)
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Bandar-e Shapur
1 corvette
3 minesweepers
Khorramshahr
8 patrol boats
1 minesweeper
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Military Units in Khuzestan Province, Iran
ahdati Airbase
ezfOl
Hamidlyeh" `ti
Ahvaz
Airbase J& Refinery
Naval based Oilfield
Armored brigade Oil pipeline
Infantry brigade
Occupied HAWK sites
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25X1 626059 11-79 CIA
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