THE KURDS OF IRAN: A RUGGED PEOPLE IN A RUGGED LAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500080004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 1, 1980
• Content Type: PAPER

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Foreign NOFORN
Assessment
Center
The Kurds of Iran:
A Rugged People
in a Rugged Land
A Research Paper
Secret
GC 80-10012
February 1980
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ecret
Foreign NOFORN
Assessment
Center
The Kurds of Iran:
A Rugged People
in a Rugged Land (u)
A Research Paper
Research for this report was completed
on 5 February 1980.
This paper was prepared by analysts in the Middle
East-Africa-Latin America Branch of Geography
Division, Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research. It was coordinated with the Iran Task
Force and with the National Intelligence Officer
for the Near East and South Asia. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Branch Chief at - (u)
25X1A
Secret
GC 80-10012
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NOFORN
The Kurds of Iran:
A Rugged People
in a Rugged Land (u)
Three million Kurds live in the little developed, mountainous northwestern
corner of Iran called Iranian Kurdistan. They form one of Iran's largest (9
percent of total population) and most troublesome ethnic minorities. Most
are Sunni Muslims, but some living in the southern part of the region are
Shiites, like the Persians. (u)
Imprecisely demarcated Kurdistan comprises territory in Iraq, Syria,
Turkey, and the Soviet Union, in addition to Iran. The Kurdish people now
number between 9 million and 12 million. For more than 4,000 years the
intransigent Kurds have resisted all efforts by outsiders to subjugate them.
Their fierce independence, however, has also torpedoed occasional attempts
by inspired or ambitious leaders to unite them into a single state. (u)
Although the Shah instituted development programs that benefited the
poorly educated and economically retarded Kurds, most welcomed his
downfall. They saw in it an opportunity to renew demands for greater
autonomy. (c)
After Khomeini proved unsympathetic, Kurdish autonomist political groups
sprang up to resist renewed domination by a government increasingly
identified with Shiism. Armed Kurdish dissidents overran some Iranian
Army outposts. The posts, however, were retaken by Revolutionary Guards
sent by Khomeini. (c)
When, in late November, the acting government indicated willingness to
negotiate, the Kurds declared a unilateral cease-fire. At first, negotiations
went nowhere, so the Kurds boycotted the national constitutional referen-
dum on 3 December 1979. The central government then made some
concessions; it agreed, for example, to withdraw Revolutionary Guards from
certain Kurdish cities. Not satisfied, the Kurds also boycotted the
presidential election held on 25 January 1980. Clashes between dissident
Kurds and Revolutionary Guards occurred with increasing frequency and
intensity in January, signaling the end of the cease-fire. (c)
President Bani-Sadr of Iran has acknowledged that his government cannot
impose a military solution on the Kurds; he has called on Kurdish leaders to
continue negotiations. Longstanding Kurdish demands for autonomy,
however, are fundamentally incompatible with Tehran's views of its
authority as embodied in the new constitution. This leaves little scope for
negotiations. Reports that the Kurds have received arms and other supplies
from Soviet-bloc countries suggest that they are gearing up for a protracted
struggle. (s NF)
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NOFORN
Iranian Kurdistan: A Geographic Primer 1
Climate and Weather 1
A Renewed Quest for Autonomy 6
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NOFORN
The Kurds of Iran:
A Rugged People
in a Rugged Land (u)
The Land
Iranian Kurdistan, a rugged mountainous region that
stretches for more than 1,000 kilometers along Iran's
western border with Iraq and Turkey, consists roughly
of three provinces: Azarbayjan-e Bakhtari (West
Azerbaijan), Kordestan, and Kermanshahan. To-
gether these provinces cover an area of some 92,000
square kilometers. (u)
The northern part of Iranian Kurdistan lies in the
Azerbaijan Highland, a region of high mountains with
jagged, rocky peaks separated by narrow, deep gorges
and well-defined valleys and basins. There are plains in
the extreme north along the Aras River and in the
basin of Lake Urmia, Iran's largest lake. (u)
Southern Kordestan and Kermanshahan are domi-
nated by the northwestern end of the Zagros Moun-
tains, a region of rugged, folded mountains and hills
punctuated by well-defined valleys and intermontane
basins. Throughout Iranian Kurdistan the mountain
peaks average between 2,000 and 3,000 meters in
elevation. A few are higher: in the north the highest
elevation is a 3,608-meter peak west of Reza'iyeh; in
the south the highest elevation is a 3,357-meter peak
northeast of Kermanshah. (u)
Iranian Kurdistan is part of the broad zone of crustal
instability- that stretches from Europe across the
Middle East to the Himalayas. Earthquakes are not
uncommon in the region, and over the years several
severe ones have struck there, causing considerable
casualties and destruction. (u)
The mountain divide that separates the drainage
basins of streams flowing southward into the Persian
Gulf from those flowing northward into the Caspian
Sea passes through Iranian Kurdistan. There are,
however, no major rivers in the region, other than the
Aras, which forms the border between West Azerbai-
jan and the Soviet Union. A few small streams empty
into Lake Urulia, and others disappear into the dry
plateau east of the mountains. (u)
Climate and Weather
The climate in the northern part of Iranian Kurdistan
is somewhat colder than in the south. The mountainous
regions of West Azerbaijan and northern Kordestan
experience long, snowy winters; the higher elevations
are covered with snow for six or more months each
year. Precipitation averages about 12 inches annually,
most of it falling during the winter and spring. During
the winter months, mean daily maximum temperatures
range from 3? to 8? Celsius(C), and mean daily
minimum temperatures range from - 2? C to - 7? C.
The lowest temperature ever recorded in the north was
- 30? C, at Khvoy. In the summer, mean daily
maximum temperatures range from 28? C to 33? C.
The highest temperature ever recorded in the north
was 42? C, also at Khvoy. (u)
In the south the winters are usually milder, although
snow still covers the higher elevations during the
coldest months. The summers are generally hotter and
drier than in the north; although the south gets more
precipitation, about 16 inches annually, almost none of
it falls in the summertime. In the winter, mean daily
maximum temperatures range from 6? C to 10? C, and
mean daily minimum temperatures range from 0? C to
- 7? C. The lowest temperature ever recorded in the
area was - 34? C, at Hamadan, near the southeastern
border of Kordestan. In the summer, mean daily
maximum temperatures range from 30? C to 37? C.
The highest temperature ever recorded in the south
was 45? C, at Sanandaj. (u)
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UNITED ARAB
Unclassified
Predominately Kurdish Provinces
1. Alarbayjan-e Bakhtari
2. Kordestan
3. Kermanshahan
6
tslamabiid
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The People
The Kurds are generally thought to be descendants of
Indo-European tribes that first settled in the moun-
tains of Kurdistan about 4,000 years ago. The Kurds
themselves claim to be descended from the ancient
Medes, who conquered Ninevah in 612 B.C. but were
in turn defeated by the Persians 62 years later. The
Assyrians, and later the Greeks, told tales of tribes
called "Kur-ti-e," or "Kardukai" (but not Medes),
whose warriors descended from mountain strongholds
to battle and harass those who intruded into the area.
(u)
There are some 3 million Kurds in Iran; they compose
about 9 percent of Iran's total population and between
one-fourth and one-third of all Kurds in the Middle
East. Most of them live in West Azerbaijan (which
they share with Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Per-
sians), Kordestan, and Kermanshahan. There are also
small Kurdish communities in Ilam Province, south of
Kermanshahan; along the Soviet border northwest of
Mashhad; near Shiraz; near Birjand in eastern
Khorasan Province; and south of Zahedan in
Baluchestan va Sistan Province. Some of the younger
and more ambitious Kurds have emigrated to the
larger cities, notably Tehran. (u)
Although most Kurds live in small mountain villages
and rural settlements, there are a few important
Kurdish cities. Kermanshah, the capital of
Kermanshahan, has a population of some 291,000,
mostly Kurds. The city is an important commercial
and agricultural center where southern Kurds market
their wares. Reza'iyeh, the capital of West Azerbaijan,
is an Iranian melting pot; its 164,000 inhabitants
include Kurds, Azerbaijanis, Persians, and Arme-
nians. Reza'iyeh is also an important regional market
center. Sanandaj, the capital of Kordestan and another
key regional trading center, has a population of about
100,000, almost entirely Kurdish. Saqqez and
Mahabad are fiercely Kurdish cities with populations
ranging between 30,000 and 40,000; the latter city has
historically been a center of Kurdish nationalist
activities. Even small towns, such as Sar Dasht, a
stronghold near the Iraqi border with a population of
less than 10,000, may be locally important simply
because there are no other towns for many kilometers
around. (u)
Social Structure, Language, and Religion. Kurdish
society traditionally has been tribally based, with
chieftains known as aghas, or khans, wielding consid-
erable power over large clans. The clans were
staunchly loyal to their khans, and looked to them for
guidance, support, and protection. For their part, the
khans handled intertribal business: they supervised the
conduct of feuds, arranged alliances, and resolved
disputes, which were common among the warlike
Kurds; and they represented the interests of their clans
in negotiations with local officials of the outside powers
claiming sovereignty over their homelands. In return
for leadership and protection, the various tribes
supported their khans with gifts and deeds, such as
sharecropping on the sometimes extensive lands owned
by the khans in the name of their clans. (u)
Programs enacted during the Pahlavi era, designed to
"Persianize" the Kurds and reduce their ethnic con-
sciousness, undermined the traditional authority of the
Kurdish tribal leaders and weakened tribal loyalties
and bonds. Before 1962, according to Kurdish sources,
0.3 percent of the Kurds owned 64 percent of the land,
while 72 percent of the Kurds owned no land at all. In
the 1960s and 1970s the Shah implemented land
reforms that broke up and redistributed the large
estates of the khans among the formerly landless
peasants. This reduced the wealth, power, and author-
ity of the khans; as one Kurd commented afterward,
"The days when a khan could order one of his peasants
to walk 10 kilometers to bring him a dish of yogurt are
over." (u)
Another Persianization program, this one much less
popular among the Kurdish masses, was an effort to
suppress the Kurdish language, perhaps the most
important bulwark of Kurdish culture. At first, the
Shah banned all official use of Kurdish-in schools
and public media, for example. In the 1960s he
relented somewhat, and again allowed the broadcast-
ing of radio programs in Kurdish. (Such programs are
currently transmitted by Tehran Domestic Service, by
radio stations in Qasr-e Shirin, Kermanshah, Marivan,
Sanandaj, and by other smaller stations. Kurdish-
language broadcasts from Baghdad Domestic Service
are also received clearly in Iran.) (u)
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Kurdish belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-
European family of languages and is thus related to
Farsi (Persian); the linkage, however, is ancient, and
currently the two languages are mutually unintelligi-
ble. One dialect of Kurdish spoken in southern
Kermanshahan and in 11am does contain a good
number of Farsi words, reflecting the fact that the
Kurds living in this area have become more
Persianized than their northern brethren. Many of
them are Shias, like the Persians; some of the
northerners refer to these southerners disdainfully as
"Fars" (Iranians). (u)
The northern Kurds, or "true Kurds," as they style
themselves, are almost all Sunni Muslims. About a
quarter of them are dervishes, members of an offshoot
of Sufism who use devotional movements (whirling, for
example) to put themselves into trances in which they
perform "miracles" such as eating glass or walking on
hot coals as expressions of their faith. Thus, besides
their cultural distinctiveness and long tradition of
xenophobic insularity, the northern Kurds are alien-
ated from the mainstream of Iranian society by a
difference in religion that is becoming ever more
pronounced as the Iranian Revolution becomes more
closely identified with the Shiite sect. (u)
Education. Few Kurds are well educated; many are
functionally illiterate. The educational level is espe-
cially low in the rural areas, where physical isolation,
dispersion of the population into small villages, and low
investment in education have limited the number and
quality of schools. Furthermore, most of the teachers
have been non-Kurds who taught in Farsi even though
many Kurdish children could not understand Farsi.
Beginning in the 1970s the Shah's government in-
creased educational investments in Iranian Kurdistan,
but since the revolution, progress has probably ceased.
On the other hand, since the Shah departed, schools in
many parts of the region have begun using and
teaching Kurdish. (u)
There is only one university-level institution in the
region, Razi University in Kermanshah. Two other
universities are located not far away, however, in
Tabriz and Hamadan. As there are few jobs in Iranian
Kurdistan that require a college education, most of the
university graduates have left the region for greener
pastures. During the Shah's reign, many educated
Kurds chose government or military service. Over the
years, this outflow of educated Kurds has kept the
average intellectual level of the Kurdish population
even lower than it would otherwise have been. (u)
The Economy
Agriculture. Before the agrarian reforms that began in
the 1960s, most Kurds either sharecropped on land
owned by the khans or made their livings as nomadic
herdsmen, in the summer taking flocks of sheep and
goats to pastures in the upland valleys, in the winter
bringing them back to villages and plains at the lower
elevations. As a result of the Shah's land reforms most
Kurdish families now live in or near rural villages or
towns and farm their own land; only a few still cling to
the nomadic life. (u)
The Kurds depend largely on snow melt and spring
rains to provide water for agriculture. The seasonal
water shortage, the difficult terrain, and the continued
use of traditional, inefficient farming methods com-
bine to limit the amount and type of crops that can be
grown. Conditions in the region are not suitable for the
development of large-scale irrigated agricultural
projects, but under the Shah's rule two small irrigation
projects were completed; they provide water for
farming near Mahabad and north of Saqqez. The main
crops are winter wheat, barley, tobacco, fruits, and
opium. (u)
Industry and Commerce. Although the cities of
Iranian Kurdistan are little more than overgrown
market towns and regional administrative centers, they
do support some industry. There is a sugar mill at
Reza'iyeh, for example, and an oil refinery at
Kermanshah. But most of the region operates on a
barter economy that has changed little over the
centuries. Farmers and herdsmen come to the towns
and cities to exchange among themselves the food and
handicrafts they have produced and then disappear
back into the mountains. (u)
Kurds also participate in the traditional Iranian
cottage industry of rugmaking. Hand-knotted rugs
from Bijar and Sanandaj in Kordestan Province are
especially prized by collectors for the fineness of their
knots, their durability, and their unique designs which,
unlike those of many other oriental carpets, have not
been widely copied. Sonqor and other villages in
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eastern Kordestan and Kermanshahan produce
coarser rugs of lower quality, similar to rugs made in
the nearby Hamadan area; in fact, these Kurdish rugs
are usually marketed as Hamadans. (u)
Natural Resources. Although the region has never
been thoroughly surveyed, it is likely that Iranian
Kurdistan contains deposits of useful minerals such as,
for example, the copper deposits in neighboring
Azarbayjan-e Khavari (East Azerbaijan) Province.
There is a small oilfield at Naft-e Shah in western
Kermanshahan near the Iraqi border; a pipeline carries
the crude oil from the field to the refinery at
Kermanshah. (u)
Illicit Activities. International boundaries in many
parts of Kurdistan are little more than lines on maps,
lines drawn by outsiders and ignored whenever possible
by Kurds on both sides of the border. In such an
environment smuggling endeavors thrive. Currently,
the most frequently smuggled commodities are weap-
ons, livestock, and drugs, particularly opium and its
derivatives. (u)
In parts of West Azerbaijan and northern Kordestan
opium poppies are a traditional crop, grown both by
Kurds and by other Iranians living in the region. In
recent years opium production there-and elsewhere
in Iran-has been rising. Iran is now producing about
400 tons of opium per year. Another 400 tons enter
Iran annually from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-
though some of this opium is consumed by Iranian
addicts, most of it is headed for illicit narcotics
entrepots in Turkey and the Middle East. Almost all of
the opium exported from Iran is smuggled into Turkey
from West Azerbaijan. The main crossing points are in
the valley northwest of Reza'iyeh through which
passes the international rail line to Turkey. (s NF)
Transportation
Railroads. The only rail line in Iranian Kurdistan is a
single-track, low-capacity, standard-gauge line that
traverses the rugged Azerbaijan Highlands north of
Lake Urmia. It extends from Sufian, a town on the
Tabriz-Jolfa line in East Azerbaijan Province, west-
ward across the Turkish border to Van, the eastern
terminus of the Lake Van Rail Ferry. This
unprepossessing railroad is the sole rail link between
Europe and Iran that does not transit the USSR. (u)
The Sufian-Van line has a freight-carrying capacity of
about 5,000 tons per day in each direction but rarely
carries that much, partly because the Lake Van rail
ferry can only handle about 2,000 tons per day and
partly because it chiefly carries passengers rather than
freight. Most winters the track is blocked by snow for
extended periods. Four trains per day are currently
scheduled in each direction but apparently none are
now running. The nearest rail yard is at Tabriz,
although a few cars per day can be classified (sorted
and routed) at Sufian. (s)
Roads. The road network is sparse and of generally low
capacity. Most of the roads in the region are mere dirt
or gravel tracks. There are a few two-lane, bituminous
roads with capacities of 20,000 tons per day. One
extends practically the entire length of West Azerbai-
jan, from Bazargan, near the Turkish border in the
north, through Khvoy, Shahpur, and Reza'iyeh to
Mahabad, south of Lake Urmia. A somewhat lower
capacity spur leads from a junction south of Bazargan
southeastward to Marand in East Azerbaijan Prov-
ince. Another bituminous, two-lane road leads from a
junction at Benab, a town east of Lake Urmia,
southward through Kordestan to Kermanshah. (u)
Only in southern Kermanshahan are there any east-
west roads of significance. A two-lane, bituminous
road runs southeastward from Qasr-e Shirin, near the
Iraqi border, through Shahabad-e Gharb to
Khorramabad in Lorestan Province. At the Iraqi
border this road links up with the highway to Baghdad.
From Shahabad a branch leads northeastward through
Kermanshah to Hamadan. (u)
Even these few good roads, however, are characterized
by sharp curves, steep grades, low-capacity bridges,
tunnels with limited vertical clearances, and
chokepoints in the towns and villages through which
they pass. Moreover, they are subject to blockage by
snow in the winter and flooding in the spring. (c)
Airfields. There are 29 airfields (or airstrips) in or
near Iranian Kurdistan. Most of them, however, have
relatively short, gravel or graded-earth runways; only
nine of them can accommodate anything more de-
manding than a C-47. Most of the latter do have
runways strong enough to bear loads at least as heavy
as those imposed by C- 130 aircraft, and four of them
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have runways long enough to accommodate B-747 and
C-5A aircraft. There are civil air terminals at
Reza'iyeh, Tabriz, Sanandaj, Hamadan, and
Kermanshah. An Iranian Air Force helicopter base is
also located at Kermanshah, and there are F-4 fighter
bases at Tabriz and at Shahrokhi, north of Hamadan.
(s)
Telecommunications
Telephone service in Iranian Kurdistan is pretty much
limited to the larger urban areas. There are main
telephone exchanges at Khvoy, Reza'iyeh, and
Kermanshah, and smaller ones at Shahpur, Mahabad,
Saqqez, Sanandaj, and Sonqor. Nearby Tabriz, in East
Azerbaijan, contains one of the country's five central
telecommunications exchanges. (The others are in
Tehran, Ahvaz, Mashhad, and Esfahan.) Microwave
telephone bands link Reza'iyeh and Kermanshah with
Tabriz and Tehran. There is also a telegraph link
between Kermanshah and Tehran. (u)
Iran's entire telecommunications system underwent
rapid improvement beginning in the 1970s, and the
Kurdish provinces benefited from this expansion. Since
the revolution, however, Iran's internal communica-
tions have fallen into some disarray; currently, direct
telephone calls can only be made between Tehran and
some of the larger cities. Government plans to further
upgrade and expand the telecommunications system-
the number of telephones in use was to more than
double between 1977 and 1980-have probably been
set aside. Construction of additions to the domestic
network was at a standstill as of June 1979. (u)
Throughout history, the fiercely independent
tribespeople inhabiting the never precisely demar-
cated, mountainous region called Kurdistan have
intransigently resisted outside interference in their
affairs. In their attitude toward outsiders the Kurds do
not differ all that much from mountain-dwellers in
many other parts of the world; one may compare the
determined neutrality of the Swiss, the separatist
demands of the Basques, the lawlessness of the
untameable Pathans on the Pakistan-Afghanistan
frontier. (u)
But even among the mountaineers of the world, the
Kurds stand out as rugged individualists. In more than
4,000 years, they never united in a viable, greater
Kurdish state, mostly because the loyalty of the Kurd
has been chiefly to his own tribe and the khan who led
his tribe. Although various leaders tried, from time to
time, to establish such a state, their efforts usually
foundered on provincial concerns-quarrels over graz-
ing rights, leadership, or marital arrangements-or
were rather easily suppressed by central-government
forces. (u)
Historical Perspective
On several occasions in modern Kurdish history,
charismatic leaders have been able to command
loyalties that extended beyond the immediate tribal
structure, but on each occasion their confederations
proved ephemeral. (u)
In the 1880s the Turkish Kurd Obeidullah, seeking to
unite all of the Kurds, led a revolt against the Turkish
and Persian empires, by then both in decline. Since the
16th century, Kurdistan had served as a buffer
between the two empires, both of which claimed
sovereignty over the region. Some Kurdish tribes were
allied with the Turks, others with the Persians, and
some had tried to remain neutral. Obeidullah's at-
tempt at Kurdish unification failed, partly because not
enough Kurds joined his cause and partly because the
Turks and Persians suspended their mutual enmity
long enough to cooperate in putting down the threat.
(u)
Following World War I, when the authority of the
Iranian central government was weak (and many
Kurds were starving), a group of Kurdish khans
formed a confederation of independent clans under the
leadership of Ismael Agha Simko, one of the more
prominent among their number. Their headquarters
were in the small Kurdish city of Mahabad (in West
Azerbaijan), then as now a hotbed of Kurdish autono-
mist sentiment. The group fell to quarreling over which
clans should dominate, however, and the revolt was
eventually put down by forces under Reza Khan, the
future Shah and father of the recently deposed
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. (u)
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abrrz
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By the end of World War II, the authority of the
central government in Tehran had again attenuated.
Supported by the Soviet Union, a group of Kurdish
intellectuals proclaimed the founding of the
"Kurdistan Autonomous Republic" at Mahabad. The
President of the "Mahabad Republic" was Qazi
Muhammad, a member of a prominent local religious
family. Qazi Muhammad claimed to speak for all
Kurds, although the republic occupied only a small
corner of northwestern Iran, and Kurds came from
Iraq, Turkey, and Syria (but not from the USSR) to
offer their services. An Iraqi Kurd, Mullah Mustapha
Barzani, was named commander of the Kurdish armed
forces. Independence was short lived, however. By
December 1946 the Soviets had yielded to world
pressure and withdrawn. The republic fell to the
Iranian Army almost immediately thereafter, less than
a year after it had been founded. The leaders of the
republic were executed, except for Barzani, who
escaped to the Soviet Union. (u)
On any of these occasions, had all of the Kurds united
and vigorously fought for the establishment of a viable,
independent greater Kurdish state, it is possible they
would have succeeded, for the opposition in each case
was weak. But unite they never did and apparently
never would. Thus, when Barzani rematerialized in
Iraq some years later to lead a rebellion there, the Shah
had no compunctions about supporting his former
enemy as long as he considered it to be in Iran's
interest to promote trouble in Iraq; he was confident
that the rebellion in Iraq would not spill over into Iran.
And when, in 1976, the Shah mended his fences with
Iraq and ceased supporting Barzani's forces, this
rebellion quickly withered away, just like the others
had. (u)
Recent Developments
After the Mahabad Republic was crushed, the Iranian
Kurds remained relatively quiescent for more than .
three decades. They were intimidated on one hand by
the Shah's massive security apparatus, and mollified
on the other by increased government expenditures for
economic and educational programs in Kurdish areas.
Furthermore, the Shah's land reforms had earned the
gratitude of many formerly landless Kurdish peasants.
And the increasing economic opportunities in the
larger cities, fed by burgeoning oil revenues, attracted
Secret
and co-opted many of the younger, more energetic,
better educated Kurds who might otherwise have
stayed behind to foment resistance. (u)
Nonetheless, because they chafed under the Shah's
tight control, the Iranian Kurds initially welcomed the
fall of the Pahlavi regime and the rise of Ayatollah
Khomeini. During the early phases of the revolution a
variety of Kurdish political factions sprang up, and
Kurdish leaders proclaimed their support for
Khomeini. For his part, Khomeini referred to the
Kurds as "brothers" and intimated he sympathized
with their desires for regional autonomy. (c)
After the Shah fell, Kurds seized the Iranian Army
garrison at Mahabad, which offered little resistance.
When the armed forces in other outposts throughout
the Kurdish area proved disinclined to actively oppose
the revolution, the Kurds found themselves in effective
control of most of their region. Taking immediate
advantage of this unusual situation, they proclaimed
the Kurdish language "official" and began using and
teaching it in the schools in Mahabad, Sanandaj,
Kermanshah, and probably other cities as well. (c)
In the general discussion over the future shape of the
country that ensued after the revolution, the Sunni
Kurds called for the establishment of an autonomous
Kurdish province, comprising the Kurdish areas of the
three existing provinces of Iranian Kurdistan, to be led
by a freely elected assembly. Furthermore, they
wanted a constitutional guarantee that Kurdish would
remain their official language. They opposed the
establishment of Shiism as the official Iranian state
religion, as well as the vesting of ultimate formal
political authority in a Shiite religious figure such as
Ayatollah Khomeini. (c)
As it gradually became clear that Ayatollah
Khomeini's views and goals were diametrically op-
posed to theirs, the Kurds took action. Inspired by
Shaikh Ez-ed-din Hoseini, a popular Sunni spiritual
leader in Mahabad, and Abdol Rahman Qasemlu, the
Secretary-General of the leftist Kurdish Democratic
Party (KDP), by midsummer Kurdish irregulars had
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ment's military outposts between Shahpur and
Sanandaj and were threatening several large towns in
the area. (In this endeavor they apparently received
both encouragement and some material assistance
from their Iraqi cousins.) The government responded
by rushing reinforcements to the region, and soon
regained most of the lost outposts. Contingents of
Revolutionary Guards loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini
were stationed in Mahabad and Sanandaj and other
urban areas to help maintain order. When, in late
November, the government appeared willing to negoti-
ate with the Kurds over their demands, Hoseini and
Qasemlu declared a unilateral Kurdish cease-fire,
which was to end in mid-December unless acceptable
progress was made in the negotiations. (c)
Preoccupied with preparations for the 3 December
referendum on the new national constitution, and
threatened by vigorous demands for autonomy by
other minority peoples, particularly the Azerbaijanis,
the acting central government made no concessions to
the Kurds. In response, most of the Kurds boycotted
the referendum on the constitution. The cease-fire
continued to hold after the mid-December deadline,
however, although skirmishes in Sanandaj and other
Kurdish cities between rebellious Kurds and Revolu-
tionary Guards highlighted its fragility. Perhaps the
Kurdish leaders had been given reason to believe the
government would become more flexible, for in late
December and early January some concessions were
forthcoming. The Revolutionary Council agreed to
amend the new constitution to permit Sunni minorities
to set up their own courts; it also agreed to withdraw
the Revolutionary Guards from Sanandaj and
Mahabad. At the same time, however, Khomeini
disqualified all candidates from the 25 January
presidential election who had not voted in favor of the
constitution. The Ayatollah's decision eliminated
Masoud Rajavi, the candidate endorsed by the Kurds.
Consequently, the Kurds boycotted the election. (c)
The semi-Persianized Shiite-Kurdish minority living
in southernmost Kermanshahan and in Ham Province
took little part in any of these doings. Most of the
Shiite Kurds apparently support Khomeini's policies,
in general if not every specific, and probably voted both
in the constitutional referendum and in the presiden-
tial election. (c)
To some extent, the Kurds are already enjoying their
long-sought autonomy, since the central government
has yet to reconstitute the civil and military institu-
tions necessary to reestablish and maintain control.
There is, however, no legal basis for this autonomy; to
provide one, the new constitution would have to be
heavily amended, and this does not appear likely, at
least not very soon. (c)
The future of Iranian Kurdistan, like that of Iran as a
whole, is hostage to a number of imponderables,
among them the attitudes, capabilities, and powers of
President Bani-Sadr's yet-to-be-formed government;
the declining vigor of Ayatollah Khomeini; the con-
tinuing problem of the prisoners at the US Embassy;
the degree, nature, and impact of Soviet meddling; and
the amount of pressure brought to bear on the central
government by other national minorities seeking spe-
cial arrangements with Tehran. (u)
Well aware that their fortunes are at least partly tied
to those of the other minorities, the Kurds have tried to
make common cause with their neighbors, the ethnic-
Turkish, Shiite Azerbaijanis. In December, Kurds
participated alongside Azerbaijanis in the huge
demonstations in Tabriz in support of political auton-
omy for Iranian Azerbaijan and in defense of
Khomeini's beleaguered rival, Ayatollah
Shariatmadari. And in recent months KDP leaders
have gone to great lengths to defuse and discourage
conflicts between the Kurds and Azerbaijanis in West
Azerbaijan Province. It is too soon to tell whether these
efforts will bear fruit in the form of Azerbaijani
support for Kurdish autonomy. (s NF)
By the end of January 1980 there were frequent
reports of renewed armed conflict in Iranian
Kurdistan, including one battle in which at least 50
people allegedly were killed, and such clashes are
continuing. Some have been between dissident Kurds
and Revolutionary Guards, but others were apparently
between rival Kurdish factions. The Kurdish dissidents
reportedly have been obtaining Soviet-made weapons
from sympathizers in Turkey and Iraq; furthermore,
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several Soviet-bloc countries are allegedly providing
food, clothing, and medical supplies indirectly, via
Iraq. Apparently, the Kurds are amassing provisions
for a long struggle. Meanwhile, President-elect Bani-
Sadr has acknowledged publicly that the government
cannot impose a military solution on the Kurds and has
called on Kurdish leaders to continue negotiations.
(S NF)
The reports of armed clashes between rival Kurdish
factions are not surprising, considering the long history
of Kurdish disunity and political fragmentation. It is
questionable whether even an autonomous Kurdish
government could maintain effective control over this
truculent people. (C)
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Secret
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Geographic and Photo Supplement for OGCR
Research Paper, GC 80-10012
entitled
.The Kurds of Iran: A Rugged People in a Rugged Land"
CONTENTS
1. Geographic Supplement
Appendix A -- Iranian Kurdistan: Suitability for Military Operations
Appendix B -- Airfields in or near Iranian Kurdistan
2. Photo Supplement
Rail Photos:
1. Iran-Turkey Rail Line (Near Turkish border)
2. Iran-Turkey RaIL Line (Tunnels, bridging, rugged terrain)
Urban Photos:
3. Reza'iyeh (Urmi a )
4. t 1ahabad
5. Sar Dasht
6. Sagge.z
7. Sanaridaj
8. Kermanshah
NOTE: This info was compiled in Geography Division, OGCR.
Comments. and queries are welcome and may be directed
to the Chief, Middle East/Africa/Western Hemisphere
Branch,
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