THE MAJLES ELECTION AND THE HOSTAGES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500100002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 3, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2662kN 1fi Q :~ R000500100002-7 25X1 A
3. March 1980
SUBJECT: The Majles Election and the Hostages
Ayatollah Khomeini's decision to give Iran's National
Assembly or Majles responsibility for the fate of the
hostages threatens to introduce new complications into the
power struggle in Iran. There is little reason to believe
that the Assembly--which will not meet until April--will
choose to release 1 he hostages rapidly and without further
The majles e ections will be a crucial test of President
Bani-Sadr's ability to consolidate his hold on power in Iran.
His supporters are said to believe that if he fails to gain
a majority in the elections, Bani-Sadr will not be able to
function as president. Although he has refused to set up
his own political party, he organized a "Congress of the
Iranian Islamic Revolution" in early February to help mobilize
his supporters behind candidates favorable to him. He has
apparently failed, however, in his efforts to advance the
timetable for the elections. He unsuccessfully urged the
Revolutionary Council to eliminate the second. round of voting
for runoffs that is to be held on 3 April, after a preliminary
round on 1.4 March.
Bani-Sadr's major opposition comes from the Islamic
Republic Party headed by Ayatollah Beheshti. Beheshti and
his hardline supporters clearly hope to do better in the
Majles elections than they did in the presidential voting in
order to reduce Bani-Sadr to an impotent figurehead. Usually
well informed observers in Tehran expect the IRP to do well
in the voting and several senior officials of the Party,
including: Ayatollahs Rafsanjani and Kharuanei, have resigned
cabinet positions in order to run for the Assembly,,
US concessions.
This memorandum was prepared by
of the Iran Task Force, Ques one an c r
be sed to Chief, Iran Task Force Qn 351-5297.
SC 01225-80
Copy # _
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The outcome of the elections is also complicated because
several other parties are running including the radical
Mujahedin guerrillas and the leftist Fedayeen group. The
largest Kurdish organization,.the Kurdish Democratic Party,
is backing the Mujahedin's candidates. The pro-Soviet Tudeh
party and Admiral Madani's supporters are also putting forward
slates of candidates. In all over 1,000 candidates have filed
for 270 seats.
Prospects
The most likely outcome--barring intervention,.. by Khomeini--
is a divided Assembly, unsure of its responsibilities and
eager to establish its revolutionary credentials. The consti-
tution gives the Majles responsibility for determining its own
internal regulations and the legislators will have to spend
some time on these. Moreover, the Assembly will have to approve
a prime minister and cabinet named by Bani-Sadr--a task which
could prove difficult if the IRP has a majority in the Majles.
The legislators--whoever they owe loyalty to---will
probably want to move cautiously on the hostage issue and not
get too far in front of Ayatollah Khomeini. They may well
decide to avoid a tough decision and demand further, concessions
from the US. For example, the constitution gives the Assembly
authority to conduct investigations of national problems--the
legislators could choose the delay their decision by initiating
an investigation of the Shah. W 25X1A
In any case, Khomeini could always overrule the Assembly.
One source reports that many Iranian clerics already believe
he will do so if the legislature makes an "npopular decision.
Moreover, while the captors have said they will respect the.
Majles' decision, press reports have quoted them as also
saying they will appeal to Khomeini any Majles decision that
does not link the hostages release to the Shah's extradition.
Constitutional Powers
The Iranian constitution divides executive power between
the supreme religious leader (Ayatollah Khomeini}, the preside1?L5X1A
and the prime minister. Khomeini retains ultimate power and
in practical terms he can overrule any decision by anyone.
The constitution leave vague many of the relations
between the three top executives. Its drafters deliberately
sought to prevent the creation of another Shah-like figure
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by careful checks and balances. In all likelihood the relation-
ship between them will in practice depend on the individuals
involved. If Bani-Sadr can select a prime minister with close
ties to himself, the president's position will be strengthened-.
If the IRP can block his selection in the Males, Rani.-Sadr
may well lose almost all of his authority. 25X1A
Finally, the situation is further clouded because the
constitution also creates a Council of Guardians--composed of
six clerics and six lawyers--which is responsible for over-
seeing all legislation. If Khomeini chooses he can refer any
.Majles decision on the hostages to the Council of Guardians.
Khomeini has so far appointed the six clerics and has chosen
primarily members of the Qom Theological society, a hardline
group which was among the earliest backers of the Embassy seizure..
.The other six are to be appointed by the Majles. - 25X1A
Resolution of the hostage issue is likely to become a
factor in the political infighting certain to accompany the
working out of the relationship between the executive officials.
The president cannot get too far out in front on the. issue of
releasing the hostages or risk Khomeini's wrath. The Supreme
Court--headed by Bani-Sadr's rival Ayatollah Beheshti--may
charge the president with violating his duties toward the Assembly
and recommend to the religious leader that the president be
dismissed. M
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 UNCLASSIFIED
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Religious leader (Ayatollah Khomeini)
--Approves presidential candidates and dismisses
president upon recommendation of the Supreme
Court
--Appoints highest judicial authorities and half
of Council of Guardians which reviews all
legislation
--Declares war
--Commander-in-chief of the armed forces- (Khomeini
delegated this power to Bani-Sadr in.February)
--"Holder of the highest official power next to
the office of the leader"
--Nominates prime minister, subject to approval
by Assembly
--Approves treaties, accredits ambassadors
--Appoints cabinet ministers, subject to approval
of president and Assembly
--Heads cabinet and "selects government policies
and executes the law"
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Iranian Government Structure Under New Constitution
Ayatollah Khomeini
Religious Leader
(Velayat-eh-Faqih)
High Council
for
National Defense
Council of
Guardians
Prime Minister
and
Cabinet
Parliament
(Majles)
High Council
of
Judiciary
Supreme Council
of the
Provinces
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Approvpd~n.jq- 20- J2W'- -111 IA-RDP81600401 R000500100002-7
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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