IRAN: NEW ARAB ALIGNMENTS (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500110004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 12, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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JOE-#-SA AV W
IRAN: NEW ARAB ALIGNMENTS
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The war with Iraq has encouraged Tehran to seek
new allies among the radical Arab states. Since Aya-
tollah Rafsanjani's visit to Algeria, Libya, Syria, and
Lebanon last month, Iran has moved rapidly to align it-
self with the radicals' Steadfastness Front. If Tehran's
new alliances endure, Iran may play a larger role in re-
gional politics in the months ahead. II
Iran played little part in Middle Eastern politics
from the fall of the Shah to the start of the war with
Iraq because of its preoccupations with internal prob-
lems and the hostage crisis. Tehran did attempt to
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subvert, its neighbors by aiding dissident Shia movements
in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other Persian Gulf states, but
this aid was limited primarily to propaganda. II 25X1
The Syrian Alliance
Tehran's diplomatic isolation in the early days of
the war encouraged it to seek new allies among the
radical Arabs led by Syria--a traditional enemy of Iraq.
Ties between Syria and Iran were cordial before the war,
but they had not developed significantly. Despite much
talk of cooperation, President Assad never made a long
planned visit to Tehran. 0 25X1
Both Damascus and Tehran had given some aid to
dissident Iraqi Kurdish and Shia groups. Since the
start of the war this aid has been stepped up. Syrian
radio has announced the formation of a unified Iraqi
liberation movement also backed by Tehran, and both
states have given financial and arms support to Iraqi
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Shortly after the start of.the war Syria began
supplying Iran with small arms and ammunition. Syria
has also served as a transshipment point for supplies
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25X1 I Tehran and Damascus
consulted on the Syrian military buildup along the
Jordanian border. Tehran almost certainly encouraged
Assad to keep troops along the border for the duration
of the war in hopes of intimidating Amman into reducing
its support for the Iraqi war effort. Jordan is a key
supply route for Iraqi war materiel--in late November
Tehran reduced relations with Jordan to the charge level
to protest King Hussein's outspoken support for Iraq.
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Tehran backed Syria's boycott of the Amman Arab
summit conference. Prime Minister Rajai recently called
the Syrian boycott "a victory for ourselves," and Presi-
dent Bani-Sadr urged the Jordanian people to topple the
"puppet regime" in Amman. The Iranians have strongly
tested the summit's communique, which supported Iraq.
Libya and the Missing Imam
Tehran's relations with Libya have improved even
more dramatically. Although Libyan leader Qadhafi has
long expressed support for Iran's Islamic revolution,
relations between the two states were troubled by wide-
spread allegations that Qadhafi was responsible for the
mysterious disappearance in 1978 of Lebanese Shia Muslim
leader Imam Musa Sadr, a longtime friend of Ayatollah
Khomeini and President Bani-Sadr.
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The South Yemeni Connection
Iran has also sought to improve ties with Marxist
South Yemen. Iranian Ambassador to Kuwait, Ali Shams
Ardakani, visited Aden in mid-November. Ardakani is
the first senior Iranian official to travel to South
Yemen since the Shah broke relations in the early 1970s
because of Aden's support for the Dhofar rebellion in
Oman. Ira my also soon start to send oil to Aden's
refinery. u
Ardakani's trip reflected Iran's concern about the
close ties between Iraq and the conservative monarchies
in the Arabian peninsula led by Saudi Arabia. Tehran
may hope that the appearance of improved relations with
Communist Aden will serve to remind the monarchs of
Tehran's ability to make trouble by working with dissi-
dent groups in the area. Since the start of the war,
Tehran radio has continued to provide propaganda support
to dissident Shia groups in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and
other Gulf states. lul
The Palestinians' Dilemma
Iran's only close ally in the region before the
war was the Palestine Liberation Organization, which has
long supported the Khomeini revolution. PLO head Yasir
Arafat made two widely publicized trips to Tehran after
the fall of the Shah to demonstrate the closeness of the
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failed and led to strains with both sides.
The war with Iraq, however, has complicated Iranian-
PLO ties because the PLO has sought to preserve its ties
with Arab Baghdad. Arafat initially hoped to mediate.the
differences between the two sides and traveled to both
capitals in the early days of the war, but his mission
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Tehran continues to support the PLO in its struggle
against Israel, however, and relations may again become
more cordial since the PLO's decision to join the Syrian
boycott of the Amman summit. The PLO retains an embassy
in Tehran (the onetime home of the Israeli mission) and
has wide popular support among the Iranian masses. 25X1
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Outlook
It is too early to tell how enduring Iran's new
alliances with the radical Arabs will be. If ties con-
tinue or expand, Iran may begin to play a larger role
in regional affairs. Ties with the radical Arabs will
tend to increase the conservative Arabs' fear of Iranian
subversion and might push them closer to both Iraq and
the United States for protection. A cementing of the
Tehran-Damascus-Tripoli alignment could serve to pub, 25X1
the Amman-Baghdad-Riyadh alliance closer together. u
Improved ties with Tehran will also serve to in-
crease the radicals' clout in Arab-Israeli issues. Al-
though Tehran cannot aid Syria's military position
against Israel, Iran can help Damascus press the Saudis
and other moderate Arab states to continue boycotting
Israel and US peace efforts in the region. I 25X1
Closer ties with the radical Arabs could lead to
an improvement in Iranian-Soviet relations. Syria,
South Yemen, and Libya are Moscow's closest allies in
the area, and Tehran is already gaining increased
access to Soviet military equipment by dealing with
these states. The radical Arabs will probably seek
to persuade the Iranians of the benefits of closer
ties with Moscow. F ____I
A dramatic improvement in Soviet-Iranian ties is
unlikely given Tehran's deeply held suspicions about
Moscow's regional intentions, but some practical im-
provements in relations are possible. Such a move
would in turn lead to increased concern among the
Saudis and others about Tehran's activities in the
region.
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