IRAN: FRAGMENTATION IN THE FUTURE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500110007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 1, 1980
• Content Type: IM

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Foreign 25X1
Assessment
Center
Iran:
Fragmentation in the Future?
October 1980
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An Intelligence Memorandum
Z-~ p JBs
)RAw Vv as
NSA review(s) completed.
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Summary
Iran:
Fragmentation in the Future?
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The Iran-Iraq conflict could lead to the partition of Iran. Iraq is considering
establishing an Arab entity in the area of Khuzestan Province. If Iranian
forces become unable to control key points in other border provinces
inhabited by ethnic minorities, autonomous areas or ministates could evolve
there. Some minority leaders, however, would be tempted by Tehran's
weakness to try to replace the Khomeini regime rather than force the
federalization or dismemberment of Iran.
Significant deterioration of Tehran's already limited control of the Iranian
periphery would affect the interests of the USSR, Iraq, Turkey, and
Pakistan, who are deeply concerned about the balance of political forces in
Iran. The other states worry particularly about Soviet exploitation of
Iranian political instability and Moscow's influence among minorities whose
homelands extend into their own territory.
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This memorandum was prepared byl Southwest Asia Analytic Center, and
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USSR-EE Division, Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Asia Analytic Center, OPA, on
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia and the Office of Geographic and
Societal Research. Information available as of 30 September 1980 was used in its prepara-
tion. Comments and queries are welcome and should be directed to the Chief, Southwest
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may/ Z4edan`
Baluchestak-
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Boundary rop,eaentation is
not necessarily authoritative
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Iran:
Fragmentation in the Future?
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Iran was no longer a centralized state when the conflict with Iraq erupted in
late September. In the 19 months since the fall of the Shah's government,
the Khomeini regime has not firmly controlled the border provinces oc-
cupied by ethnic minorities dissatisfied with central government policies.
The political objectives of the various minority peoples vary substantially.
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The Kurds in the northwest have a long history of dissidence. The well-
armed Kurds were able quickly to assert control over much of their area
after the collapse of the monarchy. They have extended their control despite
military campaigns that have forced them from the towns into the hills. Even
before the outbreak of war, Iraqi incursions into Iranian Kurdish territory
were further limiting Tehran's ability to hold the dissidents in check. The
major Kurdish dissident groups-leftists of various persuasions-have ties
to the USSR and have been receiving some aid from Iraq. They have sought
autonomy, not independence. 1- -1 25X1 A
The Azarbayjanis, Iran's largest minority, are well integrated into Iranian
society. Their loyalty to Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, whose moderate posi-
tions contrast with Khomeini's, and the traditional strength of leftist groups
in the far north have prevented pro-Khomeini forces from consolidating
control in their homeland. Unlike most other major ethnic groups, the
Azarbayjanis have been in peaceful opposition, with the exception of the
short-lived disturbances, mainly in Tabriz, in late 1979 and early 1980.
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The Turkomans along the Caspian coast have clashed repeatedly with
government forces and seem to have won considerable autonomy. Their
leaders may have well developed contacts across the Soviet border, but have
not been pressing for independence. 25X1 A
The Baluchis in the southeast appear to have won autonomy similar to that
of the Kurds, but with less violence, possibly because of the isolation of the
province. Some Baluchi dissidents have contacts with the USSR and Iraq as
well as with Baluchi dissidents in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Reports
conflict on whether the strongest groups want autonomy or independence
and on their attitude toward the USSR. 25X1 A
Arab dissidence largely ended in mid-1979 when the Khomeini regime put
the aged Arab spiritual leader Ayatollah Khaqani under house arrest in
Qom. Under the administration of former provincial Governor-General
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 Top Secret
UMBRA
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The Fragmentation
of Iran
leaders and groups in southwestern Iran
Madani, the Arabs were crushed. Most of the subsequent terrorist incidents
in their homeland were probably carried out by Iraqi agents or radical
Iranian leftists. When active, the major Arab dissident groups pressed for
local autonomy in terms similar to that demanded by the Kurds. Some
radical Arab leaders have called for independence.
resuma y to
iscuss a possible role in an Iraqi-backed local regime. The Iraqis have
broadcast statements of support allegedly sent by anti-Khomeini Arab
The Qashqais of south central Iran tried to work within the new Islamic
system, but in the past few months their leaders realized that the Khomeini
regime intended to eliminate tribal chiefs who have emerged as local
leaders. Qashqai leaders have been able to keep most government forces out
of their homeland, and the tribe has remained peaceful except when one of
their leaders was arrested for a short time in mid-1980. The Qashqais have
been arming, but-like the Azarbayjanis-they want to overthrow
Khomeini rather than break away from central control. 25X1 A
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links in outlying provinces.
Iraqi encouragement of the exiles and Arab dissidents could cause further
centrifugal movement in other parts of Iran, especially if the conflict with
Iraq weakens the Iranian Government's armed forces seriously enough that
Tehran cannot retain control at least of the major towns and road and rail
Fragmentation could occur in different ways in the border provinces; the
following distinctions are intended to indicate general patterns of such a
development:
De facto federalization. Local leaders in one or more areas assume control
but do not proclaim independence; weakness forces Tehran to acquiesce.
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? De jure federalization. Local leaders formally announce establishment of
regional autonomy and compel Tehran to agree officially.
? Disintegration. Leaders in one or more areas declare independence with or
without foreign backing; or foreign forces move into border areas to
forestall consolidation of control by local Iranian leaders.
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Incentives and The Iran-Iraq conflict may lift some of the constraints that have influenced
Constraints local leaders to seek sectarian equality under the constitution and local
autonomy rather than independence:
? If oil revenues are unavailable to the Tehran regime, minorities will not
look to the central regime for local investment and subsidies.
? If the armed forces, especially the airborne units, are substantially weak-
ened, the balance of power between dissident and government forces will
shift in the minorities' favor, at least for the short term.
Important constraints would remain. If they came to depend on foreign
backing, local leaders would run the risk of serving the interests of their
patrons rather than their own. Without such backing, their homelands
would be fair game whenever the central government managed to regroup
its armed forces. If more than one area seceded, cooperation among their
disparate populations would not be likely, and the central government might
be able to move against them one by one. Even if it succeeded, however,
Tehran would still need substantial military resources to garrison the
regions that were retaken. 25X1 A
Most minority leaders could not easily dominate autonomous or independent
administrations. Rival political forces would have to be put down, and
territorial disagreements with other ethnic groups would have to be settled
by force. The people's hopes for an end to fighting and improvements in their
standard of living would have to be postponed.
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Azarbayjanis, Qashqais, and others would take advantage of significant
k
i
h
b
wea
ness
n Te
ran, not to esta
lish Sell-government, out to topple the
Khomeini regime and set up a more moderate government. Qashgai leaders
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Radical leftist groups-mujahedin and fedayeen, who have been active
among the minorities but have no territorial base of their own-support
increased local autonomy in a constitutional framework, but would not
necessarily support independence or formal autonomy for their ethnic allies.
Foreign Attitudes The Soviets probably would view the establishment of local ethnic regimes
within Iran as the first step toward Iran's disintegration along ethnic lines.
They probably would be ambivalent about such a course of events.
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Fragmentation would enable the USSR to work for pro-Soviet, stable
regimes on its southern border as well as in other regions of Iran. It already
has assets in many areas, some of which could play a leading role in local
governments. Control of Kurdish, Azarbayjani, and Turkoman regions
probably would be Moscow's first concern. Soviet ties to leftist elements in
each of these areas would facilitate Soviet efforts to promote pro-Soviet
regimes there.
A pro-Soviet regime in Baluchistan, which would be more difficult to
achieve, would give the Soviets access to port facilities on the Arabian Sea,
put them in a position to oversee oil routes in the Persian Gulf, and enable
them to increase pressure on Pakistan. Control of Iranian borders with
Afghanistan would help the Soviets close off avenues of support for the
Afghan insurgents.
nation on the USSR's border.
Moreover, the weakening of central authority in Tehran might curtail the
aggressive, proselytizing compulsions of the current regime. It would also
preempt US efforts to reestablish its influence and presence in a strong
and East Europe's efforts to gain access to oil.
In spite of these apparent incentives, there would be many disadvantages.
The Soviets have no guarantee short of military intervention that their assets
would prevail in key regions or that the new political entities would prove
sympathetic to their interests. These new regimes might be eager to prevent
Soviet domination and might turn instead to Iraq or the West. Moreover,
Moscow would not win the main prize-Khuzestan-unless it could quickly
install in Tehran a leftist government strong enough to retake the oilfields.
Assuming an Iraqi-dominated or affiliated Khuzestan, Soviet ability to use
relations with any of Iran's other ethnic regions would not help the USSR's
Iraq's claims to dominance in the Gulf would also be strongly reinforced by
Iran's decline. The Soviets might find themselves facing a strong regional
power determined to prevent superpower activity in the region. The exist-
ence of two roughly equivalent powers, preoccupied with each other, better
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serves Soviet interests.
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The USSR's concern about possible US exploitation of instability in Iran
appears genuine; fragmentation and the creation of additional ambiguities
might add to this concern.
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The disadvantages of Iran's disintegration appear to be more significant
than the benefits and suggest that the Soviets are unlikely to promote
fragmentation actively. Should mounting pressures on Iran set in train a
process leading toward disintegration, however, the Soviets would almost
certainly seek to minimize the negative impact and reap the greatest possible
advantage:
? They would seek to ensure that the newly formed neighboring entities were
pro-Soviet, using their own contacts and assets within the various regions
and establishing formal and supportive links to those in power.
? They would try to strengthen their ties to Baghdad and try to forestall the
possibility that a more powerful Iraq might turn toward the West.
? They would seek to maintain ties to the rump government in Tehran,
whatever its persuasion, to protect their remaining assets within Iran and
prevent the restoration of US influence. Moscow would not back that
government in a revanchist war against Iraq so long as the latter controlled
the Gulf.
? The possibility of Soviet military intervention, either to stabilize areas
along its own borders or to assist a weak, leftist regime in Tehran, would
increase significantly. Moscow's assessment of the probable US response
to such a move would be a major consideration, and the Soviets might
calculate that the United States would be unlikely to protect an oil-
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deficient Iran.
Pakistan and Turkey The governments of Pakistan and Turkey would regard the fragmentation of
Iran as a catastrophe with grave consequences for their own security because
of possible exploitation of the situation by the USSR and by autonomy-
minded ethnic minorities. Both would try to forestall Iran's disintegration
and would support the installation of an effective, moderate central govern-
ment free of Soviet influence.
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The joint agreement assumes at least a minimal ability or willingness on the
part of Iranian forces in the southeast to resist an enemy. If Iran were to
fragment soon, the immediate enemy would be the local Baluchi leaders,
and the military units still in the province might not be willing or able to op-
pose them on behalf of the Khomeini regime. Pakistan would react with
dismay to a Baluchi declaration of autonomy or independence. It would
probably move quickly to close its border with Iran and might seize
Zahedan-the provincial capital through which the main road and rail links
to Pakistan run-and the airbase and port at Chah Bahar to preempt the
consolidation of a Baluchi entity.
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