IRAN: CLERICS TIGHTEN THEIR GRIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500110027-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2002
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: July 16, 1980
• Content Type: SUMMARY

1. IRAN: CLERICS TIGHTEN THEIR GRIP State/INR Morning Summary l~,,v
qpp
~ 27,g amina,tion
The r ~ R edaF?1r s~ /ate e^ ~- 1 1 c ~
of parliamentary credentials have given Iran's clerical leadership
additional opportunities to make a more definite break with certain
prominent moderates and their followers, as well as with some left-
ist organizations. The immediate result, of course, is a fu--r-her
increase in the clerics' power. But, in the longer run, a more in;>rr-
tant one is the widening of the gap between the clerics and those
experienced moderates who have the technical expertise necessary to
make Iran's Islamic government work effectively.
i
In looking for scapegoats connected with the apparent rn.lir~ry
coup attempt and in scrutinizing the worthiness to serve in
ment of those elected in May, the clerical leadership has:
--forced Admiral Madani, one of the most effective figures to
be brought to power by the revolution and a leading candid,-te
to be the first Prime Minister, to announce that he will nn
longer associate himself with the parliament. Some of hi.,
followers in Kerman have been arrested, and Ayatollah Pafsar.=ant
has hinted that Madani may have had some connection wi th the
coup plotting.
--led an overwhelming vote rejecting the parliamentary ere-fer,t:~?
of Khosro Qashgai, leader of the powerful Qashna.i tribe.
Qashcai has also been accused off having been a CIA agent run,
by Tom Ahern. The Qashgai leadership has long been an .immport-
ant element in Iran's national Governments, but the cleri
apparently prefer a break rather than a coalition.
--stated that at least some of the leaders of the National Front,
the Iran Party and, perhaps, the Toilers Party were implicated
in the coup planning. These organizations contain some of
what remains of the old Westernized, moderate elite that was
involved with Khomeini in the Shah's overthrow.
--suggested that the Tudeh (Communist) Party and perhaps other
leftists may have had connections with the coup plotters.
These latest events will make it almost impossible for many
moderate laymen to work with the clerics. Madani has not, however,
given up seeking a place for himself on the political scene. in a
speech in Tehran on July 13 he said that "specialists should :overt."
and "slogans are not enough; there must be action." This is about
as critical of the government as Iranian leaders dare to be these
days. Such comments will undoubtedly be taken as one more count
against Madani.
All of these developments further weaken President Bani-Sadr.
It was he who had once considered appointing Madani as Prime ~4i n n - .-- ,
In addition, only a few weeks ago Bani-Sadr had rescued Qashq;ai from
arrest as a result of charges of subversion by the parliamentary
leadership.
State Department review completed
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81B00401 R000500110027-9