MYTH AND REALITY IN TODAY'S IRAN: (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500110040-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: May 12, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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MYTH AND REALITY IN TODAY'S IRAN:
Politics Amidst Chaos
12 May 1980
.11, he author is a Foreign Service officer who
served in Tehran for four years, the final three
as Deputy Chief of the Political Section. He
returned to the U.S. in the summer of 1979 and is
presently on assignment to the U.S. Naval
Academy. The views expressed here are entirely
his own and do not reflect the views of the Naval
Academy or the U.S. government."
State Department review completed
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_Ht LU #?.&I~LY-IN :LM _X__ i 43.
Politics Amidst Chaos
By John D. Stempel
The taking of American hostages in Iran November 4, 1979,
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan just after Christmas, the
continuing negotiations over the U.S, hostages, and the abortive,
rescue attempt in April, 1980, have overshadowed the intense
dialogue about America's close 30-year involvement with the Shah
and Iran. The Iranian revolutionaries have tried to justify
their extraordinary, illegal detention of diplomats by
e.mphas.izing what they conceive to be the U.S. role.in the Shah's
regime. For the U.S., the, Iranian problem has become part of the
greater strategic question of America's role in the Middle East.
Our continuing inability to bring the hostage episode to an end
has called into question not only our capabilities but our
political will. Hence, the danger to our interests in Iran is
visible and specific rather than remote and symbolic as in
.Afghanistan.
The acrimony accompanying Ayatollah.Khomeini's rise to power
in February 1 97.9 produced a number of myths and misunderstandings
about what really happened in Iran. If some of the beliefs that
undergirded U.S. policy were not always fully accurate, views
advanced by those who challenged that policy contained incorrect-
perceptions as well. In fact, many of the false hopes
surrounding the hostage negotiations developed out of the
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misperceptions which have consistently warped? American and
European understanding of the political.: conf rontat:Y on in the
months following Khomeini's revolution between secular and
religious forces. Analyzing some of these myths can give 'clues
as to how the drama in Iran will be played outs.
Myth I is that Khomeini's Islamic movement was destined to
be victorious regardless of events because of popular opposition
to the Shah 3 In fact, it was not even clear to the
revolutionaries themselves that they would win until very late in
the game. Most of the blame for the successful establishment of
the revolutionary movement can be laid to the Shah-'s -failure to
understand the evolution of Iranian social forces and to take
decisive, leader-like action to block the oppositionists or
divert them into more cooperative endeavors. Many U.S. and
European scholars had been warning of potential trouble for some
time. Iran's political development had clearly lagged behind
economic change, particularly after the supercharged growth spurt
of 1973-76.. The Shah himself began the liberalization process in
1977, but he did not really understand the political implications
of that development toward dissolving support for the monarchy,
He had no conception of what form liberalization ultimately would
take, nor what threats to the monarchy would actually emerge.
Meanwh.i le, the various revolutionary forces were uniting behind
Khomeini as a charismatic figure. In 1977, they intensified a
serious propaganda campaign directed at foreign countries as well
as Iranians at home.
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The Iranian "'establishment," believing that thf Shah's power.
was solid, did little to defend itself and remained ambivalent
about defending the Shah's regime until it was too late. Most
had grievances of some sort; even the elites who had most to gain
were dissatisfied. Many other middle--class Iranians committed to
the Shah's goals of modernization had begun to see their leader`s
governmental structure.as...a. hinderance to their hopes because of
substantial and growing corruption. Few otitside Khomeini's
immediate circle favored theocratic government; virtually none of
his secular allies expected it to evolve as it has.
Nevertheless, "Public opinion" within Iran did not begin to turn
solidily against the Shahuntil it became apparent in the fall of
1973 that there would be no firm, sharp Iranian government
reaction to the expanded violence and unrest which.1,'as triggered
by the killings at Tehran's Jaleh Square, September 9, 1979.
Subsequent regional separatism and other anti-revolutionary
activity have shown that Khomeini's hold on Iran is far from
secure. The taking of the U.S. Embassy hostages, ewhile
ostensibly strengthening Khomeini's hold on power has, in fact,
breathed new life into the leftist challenged The mnilitan.ts,
many of whom are radical,le_ftists, have succeeded in gaining
their way even against Khomeini's own Revolutionary Council.
Whether Khomeini has supported them because he believes in their
uncompromising position or whether he does not possess the-power
to challenge them makes little difference.
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This leads to Myth 119 The Shah's authoritarian rule forced
his people to oppose him and drove them to z revolutions. The
reality was far different--the Shag emerged as a man who could
not make up his mind whether to compromise (i .e. , allow the
opposition 'a meaningful role in politics) or. -to repress the
opposition completely. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and others tried to
work out a deal with the revolutionary for.ces throughout the
spring of 1.978, but went about it in an awkward fashion,
unwilling to offer any real participation in government. The
Shah's earlier efforts from 1975-77 to create a single political
party in support of the government foundered at the end of 1977
for precisely the same reason.
On the other handy Iran-i's leader was not willing to use firm
military force against the revolution-in short, he-refused to
fulfill Iranian and foreign expectations of strong, authoritarian
leadership in the Persian tradition. He had effectively
dissolved SAVAK by late August 1978 and kept the armed forces
.under very restrictive firing orders after martial law was
imposed in. September 1978. Matters came to a head on November 5
,when Tehran suffered unprecedented violence and the Shah
installer: a military government headed by General Azha.ri. This
was not a true military government? at least half of the civilian
cabinet members remained in place, and the armed forces were
still under very restrictive control. There was no real effort
by the governnent to root out and destroy the revollutionary
organization. It continued to flourish as .the Shah's position
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became more untenable, and thus the revolutionaries' strencit.h
continued to grow.
The military became disheartened as public support
disappeared and the armed forces were left holding the bag as the
only structure of power still loyal to the Shah. The Shah could
organize no civilian political foundation in the months of
November-December 1978, and left the country January .16, 19790
.Aching to confront the revolutionaries forcefully, the armed
forces were kept in check until they. disintegrated following the
February 9, 1973 attack by the revolutionaries on Doshen Tappeh
air base. Reviewil ng events, one is struck by the .image of
executive .weakness and indecisiveness which unfolded. Perhaps
the most intriguing suggestion made to date, and echoed by the
Shah himself, has been the imputation of disloyalty by armed
forces Chief of Staff General Abbas Gharabaghi and by the Shah's
own Chief Imperial Inspector, General Hossein Fardust, Both are
reported to have gone over to the revolutionaries; Fardust is
believed to be heading SAVRAN, the new security organization
created by the revolutionary government to succeed SAVAK.
Myth III concerns the U.S. role in Iran's revolutionary
events. Many, including some former Iranian- officials, believe
the U.S. actually backed the Khomeini movement because it was
displeased with the Shah or (moderate variant) that the American
administration's human rights policy undercut the Shah and caused
the collapse of the monarchy.
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At the root of this is the feeling that eithe=r the U.S. felt-.
the Shah was becoming -"too, big for his britches" after 1973, or
alternately, the U.S. sought an Islamic _Q( aUajL south of
_ndQa
the Soviet Union made up of Afghanistan, Pakistan and perhaps
Iran. . Despi to many obvious reasons why this theory is
.ridiculous, it has enjoyed popularity in some quarters,
The most important reason.why the U.S. would. not: support the
movement Khomeini represented is lack of motive and capability,
Nhy would the U.S. deliberately forfeit satisfactory to excellent
relations with a government that had been helpful in many ways---
protecting the Persian Gulf, selling oil to Israel-to several -
American presidents? Given the post---Nlatergate constraints on
U.S. activity overseas, plus a solid public disinclination to get
involved abroad, it is nonsense to suggest that the U.S, would
embark on a policy of selectively destabilizing a.key ally in a
volatile region for essentially vague and uncertain political
goals. Those who believe this are hypnotized by past U.S.
involvement in Iran which both the Shah and the U.S. government,
each for their own separate reasons, tended to portray as more
significant than it really was.
The moderate variant--U.S. human rights policies
destabilized .Iran's monarchy--contains only a grain more truth
Some opposition leaders took heart from the Carter
administration-'s emphasis on human rights, but these were the
same revolutionaries castigating U.S. involvement with the Shah
and the large (45,000) U.S. presence in Iran while picturing
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America as standing solidly behind the regime's excesses.
Ironically, especially in view of Iran's poor human rights-record
since the Khomeini takeover, the Iranian government in. this
period (1977-78) was responding to criticisms of its human rights
record and, to suggestions -privately expressed by the U.S. and
others. There never. was, however, any hard policy linkage
between human rights measures and other issues, Secretary of
State Vance specifically disavowed this in the case of weapons
purchases after the 1977 CENTO meeting in Tehran.
The Shah-'s perceptions of uncertainty about U.S. reaction to
forceful measures against .revolutionaries may have inhibited
Iranian government activities. It is from this perspective that.
former Iranian . government officials will undoubtedly criticize
U.S. human rights policies toward Iran. The bald fact remains:
Iranian government officials, both civilian and military, never
were pressured by official U.S. actions or threats. Ultimately,
the responsibility for acting or. not acting belongs with those
Iranians, and especially the Shah, who held power. They cannot
excuse their own uncertainties .by. insisting that -"the Americans
undercut us."
Myth IV involves another criticism of U.S. policy: The U.S.
did not know what was going on in Iran because it was not in
touch with the opposition and completely misunderstood the .nature
of the Iranian revolution. In fact, the U.S. was considerably
better informed about the nature of this revolution from 1977
until mid-1979 than any other country represented in Tehran.
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This was true even though it is common I;nowlec_i:1e that world-wide
UGS. embassy resources for foreign political and econorrdc
reporting have been substantially reduced over the past 10-12
years. Despite suspicions of U.S. intentions, U.S.. reporting
officers were able to deal with virtually all opposition groups
of any significance except the Marxist-oriented Fedayeen, who
turned down more than one overture.
Why wasn't such information translated into. 20/20 -foresight?.
Senior levels of the U.S. government. were concerned with other
things (the unfolding Camp David talks between Egypt and Israel,
.for example), and standard.. difficulties of ambiguity in
prediction and analysis were intensified by three particular
factors in the Iranian case. These considerations distinctly
increased organizational. misunderstanding of Iran's problems at
both top and middle levels of the government's policy
decisionmaking process. Some of them continue today.
First was the question of unclear information in very fluid
circumstances. From January-September 1978 events were more
confused that the U.S. governmen-'s critics have claimed. It was
by no means obvious that the Shah or others in Iran acting in his
name would neither bring off a meaningful compromise with
religious leaders or opposition politicians nor be able to
suppress the revolution by force. U.S. mission reporting made
this ambiguity clear. Multiple interpretations were easily
possible. Under these circumstances, as students of
policy/decision making have noted, "groupthink" and other
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oressures on objective assessment and action cane isn?to play more
than usual,
fhe second factor was (and still is) a conce:pttual one,
Neither American reporting officers nor analysts rior academic
students of Persian and 'MAiddle Eastern politics fully understood
the explosive potential of religion as a political weapon, A
review of the published literature on Iran for the past 18 months
reveals a perceptual gap .in this regard pervasive enough to
suggest basic deficiencies in the way American social science- is
equipped to deal with the political impact of religious movements
and emotions. Some authors., were more prescient than others, but
no one has yet come up with a comprehensive framework for
handling overriding religious considerations in politics.
The final factor clouding perceptions is the nature of the
events themselves. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the
unfolding Iranian revolution is the lack of any single occurence
explicitly heralding major change in Iran. Of course there were
important 1978 benchmarks-the January Qorrr riots, the February
Tabriz riots, the August burning of the Abidan movie house,
September's Jaleh Square .riot and subsequent shootings, the
burning of substantial parts of Tehran in November and the mass
marches of December. Each, in and of itself, was not enough to
penetrate the threshold of attention of high level
policy/decision makers, for whom time is at a prey,-iuum, Those
closer to the scene foresaw the danger earlier. Warnings from
both embassy and media circles were not sufficient to call forth
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a major governmental reanalysis such as that involved in Truman's
1950 decision to commit U.S. forces to Korea or President
Kennedy's 1962 decision to confront the U. S.S.RR. over i.ts
placement of offensive missiles in Cuba. Substantial additional.
resources and high level, attention were not focused on Iran until
the end of. 1978. After that full policy review, it ,was almost
too late for any action. other than post-hoc adjustment. The
baggage of our historical connection with. Iran evidently weighed
heavily, especially as the whole question of the U.S. presence in
Iran took on a major anti-Shah cast. Perhaps the U.S.
government's willingness to "_walk the extra mile" in restraint
during the hostage crisis stems in part from this as well as Myth
Myth V is the belief that the U.S. could somehow normalize
ties with the Khomeini revolution after February 1979. In short,
the U.S. and Iran could "do a deal." Not even the insulting
Iranian responses to U.S. efforts to .free the hostages have fully
destroyed this myth, which developed by confusing a basic U.S.
-desire to retain access to Iranian oil and prevent Soviet
encroachment in Iran with some wishful thinking about the nature
of the post-revolutionary Iranian governing elites. Having had
some contact with the more moderate elements of the secular side
of the revolution, and desiring to minimize the difficulty in
reestablishi.ng relations, the U.S. underestimated the degree to
which the fundamentalist religious and Arab radical elements of
the revolutionary leadership hate and suspect the U.S. more .than
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they fear the Soviet Union Perhaps the best recent evidence of
this perceptual difficulty is that American newsmen continue to
refer to President Bani-Sadr as a "moderate". He is nothing of
the sort; he is a radical who happens to believe .that release of
the American hostages is a prerequisite for reshaping Iran into
an "Islamic socialist" society rooting out all vestiges of IJrS.
influence.
By moving-toward a policy of accommodation in mid-79, before
the revolutionary mode-rates had consolidated their power, the
U.S. revived suspicions that it was more interested in
overthrowing Iran-?-s revolution than cooperating with ita. --When
the Shah was admitted to the U.S. for medical treatment, Iran's
leftists and radicals concluded that this was not a humanitarian
act but the beginning of a. reactionary plot, The' Bazargan
government, weak since its inception, was powerless to prevent
the left and the Moslem radicals from moving in on the American
Embassy. Iran's religious forces had b,:en gradually undercutting
leftist influence until that time. Seizing the U.S. Embassy gave
the,le.ft new prestige and position which Bani-Sadr or any future
Iranian leader. must diminish. . Moreover, the divisions among the
militants at the embassy as well as the internal struggle between
Bani---Sadr and the Islamic Republican Party, reflected most
.recently in the parliamentary ,ele.ctions, suggest the hostages are
and will remain markers in Iranian politics. Ayatollah Beheshti,
.a moderate on the. hostage issue until Bani-Sadr's election as
president, is now firmly against giving the hostages back before
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the Iranian parliament has a chance to decide their :{ate.
Khomeinils repeated insistence that only parliament can decide
the fate of the hostages is a formula for continued demands on
the U.S. and further delay over the hostage questions not 'a
suggestion.for resolving the crisis.
The analysis that flows from these five misconceptions must
be corrected. The hostage episode and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan pose substantial problems involving .Iran for U.S.
policy makers. Public reaction to the seizure of the.hostages
will undoubtedly call for additional penalties against Iran after
the hostages are returned. On the other hand, strategic
.considerations .suggest leaving open the possibility of evolving a
relationship with whatever. government eventually emerges. This
does not preclude options involving the use of- force against Iran
to resolve the hostage crisis. Indeed, modest military action
may be required to reestablish minimum levels of U.S. credibility
in the area. Should .Iran collapse into chaos from within---a
likely outcome'--then standby forces might be helpful for rescuing
U.S. hostages, or retrieving them from groups into whose hands
they fall. Given the hostile dynamics of Iranian political
maneuvering over the hostages, there will be no hope of a
negotiated solution that would preserve any element of respect
for the U.S. in Iran or elsewhere. There should be no question
of any kind of direct diplomatic tiesuntil the hostages are no
longer captives.
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The U.S. has accepted the fact of Iran's revolution and
probably will deal with it in the interests of hiq er U.S.
strategic goals. The Shah's move to Ecjypt, despite his failing
health, has triggered renewed paranoia among Iran's rulers about
U.S. efforts to overthrow the revolution and restore the Shah.
Iran's revolutionary circles have never accepted either U.S.
willingness to deal with the revoluti_on----their- hostility. runs too
deep--or American protestations that it is not trying to undo the
Ayatollah. Even earlier, President Bani-Sadr himself said the
Soviet threat should not be an excuse to allow the U.S. to gain a
new foothold in Iran. The day before the Shah's move to Egypt,
Iranian Defense Minister Mustafa Chamran announced confidently
that Iran expected the U.S. to counter any Soviet attack on Iran.
Most revolutionaries probably see no inconsistency between .Baniw-
Sadr's statement and the holding of hostages on one hand; and.
Chamrari-' s remarks on the other.
In view of the contradictions in Iranian thinking and the
dynamics of hostility that indicate no negotiated solution to the
crisis is possible, some basic truths suggest themselvesx The
U.S. should be much more reserved in its dealings ,iith, Iran's
present government. Because of our attachment to the prospect of
6 deal, we have given Iran signals of -weakness and
unintentionally undercut the moderates while the radicals have
been able to argue that the U.S. will do nothing. Assuming a
post-hostage period eventually arrives, there is no reason for an
official American presence in Iran. The Interests of both
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countries can be adequately met in other wwraystr Our European
allies can best represent the West in Iran for the :[orseeable
future. The withdrawal of all U.S. official personnel would
eliminate a major source of suspicion and fear among anti-western
Iranians and remove from Iranian internal politics one of the few
issues which unites extreme right and extreme left. Our ultimate
deterrent posture y,.L ;.._aa-j,_ , the Soviet Union would not be
affected.
Regardless of the outcome of the hostage crisis, Iran .faces
substantial continued internal turmoil as it struggles with
competing value systems. There is little the U.S. can or should
do for the present. The Iranian government must. still get itself
organized. In the current circumstances U.S. interests are best
served by a wait-and-see attitude. Iranians will undoubtedly
resume trading with U.S..if they see it in their interest to do
so. In terms of deterring violations of diplomatic rights, Iran
should probably be punished in some ,,ray if the present government
remains in power but the U.S. should not organize a vendetta to
continue Iran's isolation from the community of nations once the
hostages have been .released, Lonq-term, American interests will
be best protected by not offering an obvious target for scapegoat
status. This would only serve to advance the interests of those
within Iran less committed to Persian independence within the
broader strategic equation involving the Soviet Union.
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May 8, 1980
J.D.Stempel
Notes on Tomorrow's Iran
1. The government will gradually loose its grip and chaos is the
most liekely outcome.
2. There is little we can do about the hostages other than to keep
discreet pressure on Iran, and hope that random groups, such as the tr b
tribes, can perhaps liberate groups of hostages when times are ripe,
3. The GOI will not be disposed to negotiate if we are too forthcoming,
and will not be forthcoming at all unless they believe we are axod?x
taking action of some kind. The failure of the rescue attempt appears to
have convinced some of the religious groups -that we mean to do some :-iin_g
If conditions develop so that they feel the hostages are a liabilit
rather than an asset, they might work something out. A stand-off yL5X1
posture, however, is better for us right now to induce this belief.
5.In the longer term, we really have to begi.nq to check out the
exile possibilities. My sources indicate that the exiles may be,
or have already, getting together in Paris or Geneva. Perhaps
this is not really a s State function, but we ought to have an input..
6. The dynamics of the situation are l _i_kely to revolve around how
we handle a collapsing internal situation. If State is to truly take
the lead in overall pnsi : policy formulation-, we have at least got to
have some represenation on the military contingency planning side.
For example, If Iran Nan collapses in civil war, it may be possible to
use special forces or the 1800-man Marina detatchment to secure come
of our hostatges.
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