IRAN CRISIS FINALLY FORCES ITSELF ON VANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500120005-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 29, 1980
• Content Type: NSPR

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.11r n
I
Finally Forces
w_Vance ,
Fifth of a series
By Scott Armstrong
Washington Poststatt writer
Cyrus It Vance became secretary of
state for Jimmy Carter believing that
agreement with the. Soviet Union. Byj
December -1978, as the reign of the;
shah: of Iran was coming to an end?
Vance was still essentially preoccupied
'with the complex negotiations. with:
R
i
uss
a
. .
A disciplined workaholic;'Vance war
often in his_office past 1Lp.m., munch 1
ing on a Roy Rogers cheeseburger, for-
mulating tactics to use on the Soviets;
- and sometimes even on colleagues
in the Carter administration - to keep
.the SALT,talks on course.
Vance's style was to put all .other)
matters out of ? sight and concentrate
on his main goals. He ran the State De-
partment with that in mind; setting in
place people in whom he had great con-
fidence and relying on them to look af-
ter their regional interests,
The system was good for State 'De-
partment morale - and functioned
smoothly in.most?instances. But it had..,
THE WASHINGTON POST
29 October 1980
specific shortcomings. Often aides from.
.State were outranked at meetings with.
the hierarchy of other agencies of gov
ernment. Assistant secretaries and their
deputies, trying to put forth-the State;
Department position, were no match
for national security adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski or Defense Secretary Harold
Brown in matters over-which there was.
-disagreement. And on Iran, there had;
been growing:. disagreement.
-?o - _ salu, ww-, iUUU:
.mid-level State Department aides:triedl
;repeatedly -to get Vance's ear"on.Iran]
lfailing.that, theyurged his..ranking ash 1
Jsistanis, , Deputy Secretary I . Warreral
Christopher and Undersecretary
Political Affairs'David News om,.to im.
:press upon Vance the urgency of the.sit-
mce,however, had added.a second.
priority which preoccupied 'him
the peace talks between Egypt and:
-Israel. After the Camp' David meeting
among 'Carter, Anwar , Sadat ?an
,Menachem :Begin had ended in pre:liminary:accord in-October, Vance was;
working. on . the. important ` `follow-1
:through: negotiations, between the ,twoi
;nations:
CARTER AND
NOV 2 1977- SHAH MEET
FOR F1 ST
MORAN S!NDS_
VANCE MEMO TIME
r~ceu~c ~irtct
UNREST UN'
LESS SHAH
CURBS ARMS
SPENDINO
I I
xJ W 1 a Maa
r`` d r '~o~ t` d e
~.. :.ate.
Christopher, or' "Chris" as virtually .
everyone at State called him, was re-
garded-.as extremely intelligent, pre
cisely in tune with Vance's' reasoning,
a subtle persuader, though something -'
of a procrastinator. In major areas apart
from SALT and the Middle East treaty,
Christopher was, .de: facto, the secretary
of state.
Newsom was the most sophisticated:
'of career diplomats, soft-spoken, me-
ticulous, wary,' accustomed to staving
within the -limits of established policy
.,-and practice. Nei'soin was the chief op- -
erasing officer of the Foreign Service.
.who oversaw.. the flow of diplomatic.
;events-that -.rose=&- major. importance.;
,When assistant secretaries for the var
ious'regions of'the'wortd saw a situation
:developing beyond the limits of estab-?l
fished policy, they usually took ;Lt toy
Newsom Both men, Christoper'- and'
Newsom, had Vance's complete. confi-.
deuce: But ;;either man was'the prei
ident's secretary of state.
Between SALT and his Middle East
duties, the secretary of state was often.
out of the country. Aides said Vance
preferred things that way, finding the
capital a city where he could get little
done. Away on a long trip with only
a few assistants, he had no staff meet-
ings to worry about, no White House
meetings and few social or protocol
functions.
Beneath Christopher and Vance, the
structure of analysts who were expert
on Iran had been sounding alarms over
the shah's future for many months,
with varying degrees of intensity. In
the fall of 1978, for instance, Harold Sa-
unders, assistant secretary for the re-:
sign, had reviewed for a staff meeting ,
_a11 of the 'different groups aligned
against the shah, from the semi-feudal.
landholders to the rural peasants, from
the democratic opposition to oil field
? workers, from the merchants to the Shi
;ite clergy. -
The departmental press secretary,
Nodding Carter III, asked a question.
"Hal, you've just listed every group in
the society.' Who's for him
"The- military," Saunders replied.
tersely. .
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By early December, Henry Precht? I evaluation but Vance had interrupted.''
the desk officer in charge of Iranian of-', There would be no reevaluation, Vance-
fairs, was particularly frustrated. Con said curtly. The president had made
vinced for months that the shah's' re - up. his mind: the U.S. policy was to sup-
gime was in a state of collapse; Precht'. -port the shah.
saw the United States glidl g along!- Piling up on Vance's desk were pleas.
with the same policy, unaware of. the from Precht,.'from Sullivan in Tehran:
implications for the 'future when the' and from Lake and-Raphael as well,
.shah was displaced by ' a new govern generally asking. that the secretary tryment. ` " to-budge the president from his support
Precht complained . to :his -boss, Sa-, of the shah. Precht's arguments, bol-
unders. He said the measures. being to stered by a task force that had just re
ken by the shah - discussions with: turned . from Iran, finally. persuaded
moderate opposition leaders about par-. Newsom and Christopher. But the sec
'ticipating in the government - were retaty was the only one..with enough:
.too little and too late. Even the latest. stature to convince the -White House.:
recommendation by Ambassador Wil- .while. Vance was in-the-Middle.East..j
ham Sullivan, calling for the shah to re. negotiating, the news "leaked" from the' l
linquish control of domestic authority; White House that. SALT negotiations
and temporarily leave the country, was, were proceeding;so well that an agree-,
not enough, Precht said. ment would be finished- by. year's. end
He urged that the shah be told to ab-: and :President Leonid Brezhnev. might
?dicate and begin transferring control; come to Washington- for a summit in'
to an opposition coalition 'acceptable: January. Vance and a handful of others,
to the. United States and to the Aya 'knew better- the president had sum;
ll
h
to
a
Ruhollah Khomeini, who would no doubt take charge in a new regime.
METRINI O JULY 3-
States without any voice in the ultimate
CONTRADICTS WHITE MOUSE
outcome. SULLIVAN MEETING:
NEW YEAR'S
: VIEWS ON SHAMS "WISH
Saunders listened politely but' dis- DAY 1978
,-
- SITUATION UST" CON-
agreed. The shah might bein difficulty. CARTER TOASTS
; SIDERED
SHAY IN
S
but time was on his side. In the face:
TEHRAN
f
id
ti
l d
o
pres
en
a
ecisions to support they
i
shah, Saunders could not' recommend
b
t
hif
'
rup
an a
s
tt. Precht then' -took his argument to
the seventh floor, the corridor of power
in the. State Department, where the of-
.faces-of the secretary of.state; the dep-
uty uty secretary and' the undersecretary
.for political affairs are located
He spoketo? W., Anthony Lake; the i
JAN 8-
O
F
R
O PS
IRE
Arnold Raphel',.ayoung Foreign Service. {
ON CROWD
.
officer who had served-in Iran and was PROTESTING
r
ANTI.' STATE EPT,
KHOMEINI . j MEETING:
.Were said to be sympathetic but told
ARTICLE "
TIME IS
Precht that the tone of his memos, I
NOT ON SHAH'S '
; ADVICE
wrtoo `demnstrat v: = The c-
ee ,'=oeyau SIDE"
IGNORED
jectivelj'
They said the secretar
- -!
.
y
`iVtr. Vance," as the entire staff referred,I
to him - was not receptive to emo-'~
tional appeals.
But. whether ' the appeals were emo-.I
t.ional or calm, Vance, according to
number of his aides, showed no -incli-:f
nation to get deeply involved in dis-
i,t ions about Iran: Lake hadtried per-'!
1:;onally at a recent meeting of assistant i
;,Secretaries , to propose a full-scale re-i
SPRING-
TL'
--------- ---
i.:
4
JUNel-
0 TI ISTI
MC
SUWVAN
REPORT
-
~
.
,.
. N1'arninas of Urgencv
On Dec. lay when Vance flew back
to Washington-from Cairo, he encoun-
tered the issue of Iran and finally heard
warnings of urgency, some from outside
'
which moved Vance
the administration,
to take Iran onto his list of most im-
portant issues. One came from Sen. Ed-....
ward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) whose of-
fice had been approached by an un-
happy. aide at State, asking for help.,
in arousing.-Vance on. the Iranian crisis.
Two days after Vance's return, Ken-
nedy met with, . him,,- ostensibly for a:
briefing .on Iran. According to sources
familiar with the meeting, Kennedy lis-;
tened'-politely ' Vance but thought'
the secretary had little idea of how:,
strongly the people of Iran' had turned'
against the shah. The senator recom-
mended that Vance` look carefully at?'!
their ecommendations that George Ball had _just:: made to. President Carter a:
few; days- earlier,. urging, Carter to..back -
away from the shah: and help form a.=1
transitional government of IranianModerates.
Later that day, Vance read Ball's re-
port and called the investment banker .
at his vacation home in Florida. ` To
Ball, Vance seemed ignorant of what .1
had transpired in his absence, not fo- ?.,
cusing on Iran sufficiently. To Vance,
the presence of elder statesman Ball.
certified Iran as`a crisis worthy of his..a
.attention. .
Ball' warned 'the secretary of state
.that the situation in Iran was-critical,
that the shah could not last, and that '
Carter and Brzezinskiwere. being un-
realistic in their hopes for maintaining-,
the status quo.
The president, Ball said, was' listeri-
ing only- to Brzezinski and perhaps to
Brown, whose views on Iran seemed un.
characteristically hawkish-. Ball urged
Vance to become personally involved. `i
He backed Sullivan's proposals for-im .
mediate communications with the op-1
position, so long as the contact was .;
made in a way that allowed, the gov-'
ernment to deny it. He said the .shah:.
should be encouraged to relinquish real .;
power.
When Vance finally turned his at-
tention to Iran, the situation was rel-,
atively tranquil.. The :president` and';
Brzezinskr seemed to think that. since
the, shah had: gotten through .the reli-'
pious holiday.-that the CIA had pre-
-dicted wotdd be his most crucial test,
:the worst: vas-past _..,
moved him. home for the announce-
ment of normalization with communist I
China, an event that was sure to upset
the Soviets and postpone the SALT-
agreement.
Vance favored normalization, but not'
at the expense of a SALT treaty. Brze
zinski's accelerated schedule, for nor {
malization was undercutting Vance's of
forts. There were other disagreements
on U.S.-Soviet relations.-Vance was be-
ginning to feel crowded by Brzezinski.
2
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13
_
:
e
as oom - Zvi the first time wary of Bizezinski. I
.' TROOPS
?exceotion of Precht anti finllivan w}ini EARLY AUG
-. '
"""`C relurne(1 .empty-handed to
SEPT. B- ~- -
At the State Department, those who; BLACK FRIDAY
Washington on Christmas Eve = for I
'
felt the shah d
- ?
d -th th
. A
N
SSACR:.
..~~.~ wit; secretary of state had been
SUWVA
- SUWVAN
both continued to hammer away for:, gone, the State Department had es-_
LOBBIES FOR D!MONSTRA
CONCLUDES
more drastic concessions from the shah TORS
SHAM'S "WISH IN .-.,~ =
tablished contact, almost. accidentally,
- FALL SHAMWILL
UST
were content to sit back and wait. SQUARE JALEH :?1 .: with Khomeini's people: Precht, earlier
AUG. 19 - -_ 1L_ _
It was just a matter of time until the th
, , - I
e
REX
TOBER_
FIRE IN . KMOMEINI : {
TEHRAN taping of the MacNeil/Lehrer Report:
Soon the opposition began. to escalate
ABADAN GOES TO TEHRAN
" and met Dr..Irahim Yazdi, .who served,:
.its -activity ity with massive national: BURNS
FRANC!
strikes roughly speaking; as a chief of staff
for the swirl of mullahs and technocrats
Vance was ready to move, but it' surrounding the ayatollah, They dined l
was not :his. style to-go :'directly and afterwards with their host; but Precht., de- O " Vance lost
ask the president to undo a previous nt was reluctant to discuss anything sub-
cision:'nce an argument " stantive, because- U.S. policy at that
and the president decided,. he respected : point prohibited any contact with Kho-
it. His aides thought this. was an unfair meini s representatives. He proposed
disadvantage because trzezinski never
CIA' I Yazdi as a contact point,%if the pres-i
seemed to give up on.. his positions, - ESTIMATE: - ident approved,
"IRAN BRZEZINSKI ,.. ,,.,,
And Vance had another potential ad= ? NOT IN Later in the month, the'top political.
CALLS - +
versary on the subject now. Energy Sec- A REVD- SHAH URGES I officer in the Paris embassy, Warren
,
LUTION
retary James Schlesinger, former CIA ARY FORCE Zimmerman, was authorized to meet!
OR PRE.
?24_MA5- SHAH AP
director, former secretary. o eense, REVOLUTION. OCT with Yazdi, a 47-year-old Moslem who I
-- SHAH APPOINTS
had weighed. in with his own proposal ARY SITUA- - was educated in America -and worked'
Sly! DEMON- MILITARY
TION" STRATIONS
- send a high-level envoy such.' as'! 'GOVT:: for years as a cancer researcher at Bay-
- . r
Brzezinski or Brown. to meet with the' for University, while -coordinating the"
shah; bolster his resolve and perhaps State Department position.. that the radical Islamic Students Association in
show him how to take control over the United States must establish. direct:' the United States. Yazdi was regarded
domestic unrest. Schlesinger had stud- contact with Khomeini. lucent reports- as a moderating influence in the Kho-
ied CIA profiles that described the shah' from Tehran, ..Vance said;; described' meini entourage.
as w iozen in fear Brzezinski liked support for Khomeini, not only in the:; From other sources, the United
the idea but suggested that, Schlesinger' Islamic clergy;:.but in the mercantile i States learned that the revolutionary himself be ,the envoy. centers and general population: He was group had laid more groundwork for
CIA Director Stansfield Turner sug- the symbol of emerging national, inde- . a takeover of Iran than intelligence re-
ges e , meanwhile, a program o covert pendence and the United States 'must- ports had suspected. Khomeini's agents
action - a campaign of "black propa- begin dealing with him: had successfully infiltrated SAVAK the
ganda" that would confuse and divide The president agreed, at least partly.. shah's secret police. '
the shah's opponents by portraying-! ' He would postpone ,the idea of a high. The CIA, in contrast, had been un-
Khomeini as an unwitting pawn of the;i level envoy to see the-'shah-In stead, able to ---es-95 s whether Iran's generals.
left, espousing anti-Islamic goals. Mem- they would urge the shah to accom- were moving toward accommodation
hers' of Khomeini's entourae in Parismodate the opposition, but retain con-
0 with the shah's opposition. One secret:
would, then be exposed: as the sources) trol of the military.' But Carter was report said the senior officers held Na-
of these accusations - "SAVAK~i less. sure of Sullivan's plan to begin con- tional Front leaders in contempt as.
agents" secretly working for the shah.') tact with Khomeini. :Everyone, even' "coffee-house politicians susceptible to'
Although the plan was discussed at' Ball, had noted the virulent anti- communist penetrations and influences
objections, cabinet-level it was meeting and met no American rhetoric from Khomeini,-The 1 but the junior officers may be more sus-i,
o -apparently put off P sdent was concerned that the shah.) ceptible to' the Front's. appeal." The
might-see any U.S:approach to the aya-.I CIA knew little-about the potential for
Contacting the Ayatollah 1 ?,tollah as desertion; Other allies in.-the.' a r atI
- region eseciallT onT between the generals and,:
g p y Saudi Arabia; would: ' the ayatollah.
On Dec. 20, the general heading the, have the same reaction.
shah's mill Zimmerman- asked Yazdi about the'
tary government suffered a: Vance pointed out that it could be ayatollah's potential ' relationship mild heart attack and told Sullivan he I -done discreetly, -probably with ' the. -the Iranian mill wi
tn;'
could not continue. The shah was too. shah's knowledge and; support.' tart, a crucial question;'
indecisive to last much longer. :? for American policy makers who saw
,iCarter was not- ready for;such:a bold the Iranian generals as the enduring
Sullivan, convinced the military :'-.step.-
.would splinter unless arrangements' On'Dec. 22 , Vance was`in Geneva ne unable to enlighten In r Yazdi was wor werecl Wkdn out with thee oopposition, gotiating with Soviet Foreign Minister the blv tollah~was an enigma, but b
ars,
ut Gromylco, when he received a pecially on questions of hypothetical:
gestion. A high-level envoy should be telephone call from Brzezinski. Brze-' situations that did not vet exist. Only ;
sent to nie3t directly with Khomeini zinski said that he and Turner had con- contact with Khomeini. himself could
in Paris. "winced the president to reject one of help.
With coin plicating developments th
it
V
e
ems
ance had already negotiated
the Middle - East, "China 'aar
id SALTwith Gromyko. Vance objected that the
Vance had-still had little time to discuss i change was not worth jeopardizing the
Iran with the president, but lie now ar-' i entire SALT agreement; he' wanted to-
z,ueci against Schlesinger's proposal for discuss it directly with the president. -
a high-level envoy and instead for the Carter was on his way to Plains, Ga.,'
for Christmas and was unavailable
.
OCT
26
MA
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Demands by Military
.In Tehran,' the shah's position con
tinned to deteriorate. The demonstra-
tions were becoming more frequent.
TM' shah -had attempted t6-entice,.-
two . opposition leaders. into some form
of 'coalition .government. He released,
them from jail and proposed that'he re-
'tain.only his title of monarch and\con-,
trol over foreign policy and the military.
They turned him down.
On Christmas Day, the U.S. Embassy'
was attacked:.
The message-was,clear_to Sullivan,
the shah'.was losing control.
...,The shah's-military. leaders began
clamoring for action. -They, demanded
that he appoint one of their own, Gen.
.Gholam Ali. Oveissi;. to::head the- gov-
ernment. ..Oveissi was perhaps the
toughest of the generals; since October
he had been urging the shah' to put
down the -demonstrations' with force.
Oveissi was also the choice of Iranian
Ambassador- Ardeshir, Zahedi who,.. at
Brzezinski's suggestion, had returned
to, Tehran to bolster the shah's resolve.
The shah, as he had done so often
in crisis, turned to the United States
for advice, calling in Sullivan. What
should he do? Should he appoint a ci-
vilian government with opposition par-
ticipation? Should he finally agree to
crack down? ;
Communicating. on a special secure
BRZEZINSKI
+'
.
CONVINCES
'
VANa
NOV
9,1978-
CARTER BALI
S
CARTER DRAFT
SULLIVAN
PLAN WON'T
LETTER
URGES
WORK; URGES
'TO SHAH
E
U.S
SUPPORT
M
ETING WITH
O?POSITiON -
.
SHAH
SUWVAN
CALLS
BRZEZINSKI
"
CARTER'S
PUTS MEETING
POSITION
1 ON HCL
D
*SHORT-
i SIGHTED"
SHAH GETS
THROUGH
DE-C.10-
' HOLIDAY
GEORGE BAIL
CRIAS .,..
CARTER DE
MEETS WITH
CARTER, SAYS
MANDS SUL
-
SHAH'S
R
VAN OUSTER;
SITUATION
SETTLES ON
HOPELESS
PICMt
REPRIMAND
Advice for Carter Carter told Vane, as'-he had told'
' Ball less than two weeks earlier, that'
On the afternoon of Dec. 28, Vance,;: he did not want to tell another world
now immersed in the. Iranian situation, .1 ? leader to abdicate. Vance said the shah-'
went to see Carter at Camp David,
where the president was spending a
few days in retreat..
Vance found that even as the shah's
strength was declining, Carter's support
for him was increasing. Brzezinski had
continued to present a compelling case.
Even if the. shah. was going to fall,
Brzezinski argued, it was important to
seemed to be begging for advice, and
that the British were about to tell him'
to take a vacation. At a minimum' the
United States should not block that eff'
fort. -
Carter finally agreed. The shah wou>?d
be encouraged to bring moderate op
position leaders into his government'
and give them real power over domestic!,
show the world that the United States `affairs. If, the shah asked again, 'he
stood by its friends in deep crises. Only. should be told that the United States
by maintaining unwavering support for;i h d'" was objection" to hilavin Iran.
di-
the shah, Vance was. told, could the'.; : yet ready approve
United States assure the Saudi Arabian rect contact with Khomeini," however::
leaders that it would not desert them The president said' he wanted-to know'
if a crisis arose. Already feeling threat- that the shah agreed too
eneci oy the soviet union and perhaps
by internal unrest as well, the Saudis
had privately hinted that they were re-
thinking their position toward the Unit-
ed States. Intelligence reports indicated
that Moscow was about to portray the
Camp David accords as anti-Arab, hop-
ing thereby to entice the Saudis into
a better relationship.
Indeed, the reasoning went, if the
United States was perceived as having
sold out the shah, the continuing Egy-
ptian-Israeli peace' negotiations might
be undermined as well. How Could
Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin.:
take pledges of support from Carter at
face value if the United States dropped,,
.the,shah?
Brzezinski had 'a new line of argu-
ment as well.' Bolstered by a study by:',
Schlesinger, he maintained that the po-
tential loss of Iranian oil under a hostile
regime would have dramatic impact on
Europe, Japan and Israel. Under the
Camp David agreement, Israel was being asked to give up the oil fields inV
the Sinai, so the Iranian-source (50 per-.
cent- of Israel's oil) was even more sig- I
nificant. It could scuttle a Middle East'I
peace . accord.,'Schlesinger also had'
urged. that the shah be told to unleash:
his military. ` .. :.
Vance reiterated= the arguments he
had mastered in the last month Unless
.America acts quickly, he'told the ore's-.,
ident, it would have no voice in the fui='
ture of Iran, for-it-was not the shah
but Khomeini who was now the, dom-
inant force. Iranian oil production had
peen cut substantially because of earlier
labor, unrest, and new strikes were
looming. Israel was already looking for
new sources of oil.and could sign asup
ply-contract with Mexico.
DC2S
I.. US EMBASSY
,.. IN TEHRAN -
DEC 17-
ATTjCKM
'
KENNEDY & BALL
=MI D DEG-?
URGE VANCE
USDIPLOMAT. . DEC29- ..
TO GET
MEETS SEC. I : SHAH ASKS
INVOLVED IN
RETLY WITH BAKHTIAR
"
I
KHOMEINI TO BECOME
IRAN POL
CY
CHIEF OF PRIME
STATP ' . I MINISTER
LATE DEC-
DEC.20- CARTER
SULLIVAN - APPROVES
URGES DIRECT ' " DIRECT
CONTACT i... KHOMEINI
W ITH KHOMBM ; `. CONTACT
MIC?DE POST- 1
E I CHPISTMAS-
VANCE/BR BRZE2?
VANCE GOES
RISES TENSION TO CAMP DAVID;
RISES OVER OVER GETS CARTER '
'
SOVIET
REtATNNfS
OK TO T81
SMAK TO TAKE
VACATION"-
If HEASXS
Sharing Power
In Tehran, after Sullivan. received'
these new instructions, he cabled back
almost immediately, saying that .-the
shah was considering the appointment.?
of a moderate opposition member,-
Shahpour Bakhtiar, as prime minister,,`
and that the -shah agreed that the Unit-:
ed States should probably establish
contact with Khomeini.
. Bakhtiar's selection reassured the
White House. He was described as a
slightly right-of-center opposition lead-
The shah, Vance said, must be en-:
courazed to abdicate. If, he refused,' he,
..should be -told `to. leave the country:
and let. things quiet clown. It could he
'called - a -vacation, Vance -said.- _ : .
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telephone line,' Sullivan . relayed the
question to State, where aides thought
the ambassador sounded "frantic." As
he had several times before, Sullivan
urged direct communications be made.;
with Khomeini himself.
 Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000500120005-2
er. A junior'officer in the Mossadegh
administration :".25 years before,
Bakhtiar was'portiayed in. the CIAs,i
Vance, still at Camp David, took.; the,.i
question back to the president. Brae
ki
till
i
h
zms
was s
oppos
ng t
e idea, wt
Vance prevailed: Carter approved the
mission to Khomeini. ;
Who should ga.to see the ayatollah?
Vance's staff, thinking.of Khorapini's
background- as a teacher of philosophy,.'
wanted someone with stature as a schol-
ar and preferably .a. -strong.' Christian
background. Ball's. name was consid
:ered, but ultimately Vance chose a re-
tired diplomat, Theodore Eliot,.;w,lo
had. served in Iran, spoke fluent?Far.si
And understood'the nuances of Shiite
beliefs, and was an intellectual and a
moralist
'Eliot came back to Washington for
-briefings on? the. -rn* ssion.T For -_a .brief
time, -at' the.close of 1978, it; seerried
..that the;:secretary of state had reg i ed '
control over foreign policy toward Iran.
In Tehran, British Foreign Secretaiy
Lord George Brown, a friend front the;,
early days of the shah's reign, arrived
secretly and told the shah he had to re-i
:linquish control ' of his country:" He
should leave for a two-month' vacation,
Brown said, to do otherwise would ~e
to risk chaos. He had to give a neW'gov-
;ernment time to succeed. Brown'tvas
.warm but direct with his old friend:
The shah, for the first time, agreed
that he must leave Iran.
Later that day, the shah forrii*
.,asked Bakhtiar to take over as prime
minister and form a new.civilian
gdv-
' ernment.
Explaining to Sullivan that he had
decided to leave the country, the shah,
who had once given himself the'title_;
of "King of Kings," stopped at one
point and asked: "Where will I go?".--,[
vocate of an activist policy
something of a loner ... close ties to
the workers and the students ....
rough and blunt man with considerable
political shrewdness and ambition.''.
Bakhtiar, "although an avowed"id-
cialist, is usually associated- with ;the
right wing' of "the National Front,"; tie
CIA reported." This ' faction . woit!d
fly, favor' a compromise Settle='
ment and. might participate 'in'er&.
tions.".,,_. ,~i..
The White '.House optimisiri ,over.'.
looked the CIA's month-old estimate
that the National ront, because: ot di-
visions and quarrels, would- prokiablei
"be unable to produce an effective'ad`.
ministration and a realistic goveriiin- dr
program" . ,:,r
On the other hand, the _' CIA':had
missed some calls, too. It incorreetly
.:predicted that Bakhtiar would be' ohe
of those least likely to settle withy the.
=shah
At-.'the' embassy- in.Tehran aii4 do
the State Department, there was much
less enthusiasm for Bakhtiar,because
.those analysts assumed he would fail,
only Postponing ?a~.U.S. reckoning withy
Khomeini.. Sullivan and Precht. thought
the shah should be negotiatingPwith,
Mehdi Bazargan, leader of the ."Free.'
dom Movement' in 2 Iran,", whom. the
`CIA dismissed as "a narrow-minded;re.~
ligious fanatic .with a flare for dema;,
gogic rabble-rousing." Sullivan thought
that Bazargan would probably be-Khe
meini's first prime minister- once he
took power. (a prediction that 'proved'
accurate). Of those closest to Khomeini,'
`Bazargan. was the: most likely too- pre,
serve a. relationship ..with. the-;United
States.. 9.?, ?. :y.., 1:.
Sullivan
.-relayed,. Washington sLoffi,
:cial reaction to the shah and inquired'
;about the proposed U.S. approach to
Khomeini. The shah agreed that it was,
probably. a good. idea,particularly if,
A he %nilitary.was to beheld ,togetheri
The generals -would need assurances,
-about the future.;. :.j
Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000500120005-2