TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500130008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 1, 1980
• Content Type: IM

C
pr%p,g&pr Release 2005/08/02: CIA-RDP81 800401 R0005001 gLOM
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Turkey's Relations
With Iran
D
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Secret
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ILLEGI
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Warning Notice
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National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
lnfformation Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
All material on this page
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Turkey's Relations
With Iran (u)
Summary The relative calm that characterized early Turkish reactions to the Iranian
revolution has given way to growing concern. Ankara's initial response was
influenced in part by a perception that its strategic importance to the West
had been boosted at a time when it was seekin massive
25X1 military assistance from its Western allies
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Turkish leaders have adopted a cautious approach toward the Khomeini
regime and exhort their allies to do likewise. Although the principles of
Iran's theocratic and autocratic regime run counter to Turkey's secular and
democratic outlook, the Turks have sought to maintain, and even expedite,
bilateral trade; thus far they have resisted US requests for economic
25X1 sanctions against Tehran.
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The Turks will attempt to maintain a businesslike relationship with
whatever regime is in power in Tehran because they realize that a hostile
posture would harm Turkey more than Iran. Ankara will also strive to be
responsive to its allies, particularly if they approach unanimity on a
particular course of action toward Iran.
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25X1 A This paper was written by Western Europe Division, Office of Political
Analysis. It was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe, the
Office of Economic Research, and the Directorate of Operations. Research was completed on
25X1 A 10 April 1980. Questions and comments are welcome and should be directed to Chief
Western Europe Division, OPA
iii Secret
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Background
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Turkey's Relations
With Iran (u)
The RCD protocol was signed
in 1964 by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan to foster closer cooperation among
member states in the movement of goods, economic development projects,
and cultural exchanges.' CENTO, which evolved from the 1955 Mutual
Cooperation Pact, aimed at greater military collaboration among Turkey,
Iran, and its other members.'
In the 1960s Ankara's link to NATO and its formidable, US-equipped
armed forces gave the Turks military superiority over their CENTO
partners in the area.
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The Iranian Revolution The victory in January 1979 of the anti-Shah forces in Iran provided both
opportunities and perils for Turkey. The fall of the Shah enhanced Turkey's
25X1. geopolitical importance and hence its leverage with NATO
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have expressed an in eres in reviving the organization by envisaging its expansion to oth er
countries of the region
2CENTO stemmed from t e Mutual Cooperation Pact signed between Turkey and Iraq in
1955 and was then known as the Baghdad Pact. Pakistan and Iran acceded to the protocol
later in 1955. The military alliance became known as CENTO after Iraq withdrew in 1959.
Cooperation did not reach the anticipated level, however, and Iran and Pakistan withdrew
from the moribund organization in March 1979. Shortly thereafter, CENTO officially
ceased to exist. (u)
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At the same time, the Khomeini regime's withdrawal from CENTO and its
general anti-Western rhetoric have left Turkey in an exposed position.
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Coping With Khomeini Given these concerns, Ankara's approach has been to accept the termination
of security ties with Iran and to work for the establishment of cordial
political relations, while preserving and expanding economic ties. So far,
25X1 e ur is Ambassador was the first to be received by
Khomeini a ter t e revolution, and the Turkish Foreign Minister visited
25X1 Tehran in the fall of 1979.
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' The Alevis, who are not ethnically distinct from the Turks and are often mistaken for Shiite
Muslims, number about 11 million, or 25 percent of Turkey's 45 million population. They
follow a syncretic religious doctrine that incorporates elements of shamanism and
Christianity into Islam. (u)
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Turkish-Iranian economic ties, traditionally steadier than political relations,
received a boost last January when the two countries signed an agreement
providing for the exchange of some 2 million tons of Iranian oil in return for
encouragement ot Weir government, meanw arms are aemp -
ing to make inroads into the Iranian market, where wide gaps have been left
by foreign firms that pulled out after the fall of the Shah. Finally,
Turkey, Iran, Regional and East-West tensions heightened by the Iranian revolution and
and the West the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have brought into sharp relief
Turkey's central dilemma: the conflicting demands and pressures of being
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e diminution o
pro-Western sentiment in Turkey, together with the increase in power and
influence of the oil producing states in the region, have made the Turks
increasingly reluctant to play the role of Western agent. F]
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 Sans
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/Jordan
Egypt
Saudi Arabia
North
Yemen
South
Yemen
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Bahrain
sited drab
Emirates
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Outlook The outlook for Turkish-Iranian relations will remain murky because of the
uncertainties of the political situations in both countries. Political relations
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On the other hand, if events in Iran were to stimulate minority and sectarian
unrest in Turkey and help push the level of political violence to the point
In the absence of more political upheaval in Iran and a Turkish decision to
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dangers inherent in their exposed position call for a compensatory increase
in Western military and economic assistance
Turkish position could change if the raman revo ution were to take a
decidedly anti-Turkish turn or if Ankara were to decide that the costs of
ignoring Soviet bellicosity in the region outweighed the benefits.I
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