IRAN: GROWING LEFTIST INFLUENCE AMONG MINORITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500160018-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 1, 1980
• Content Type: IM

roMqjdW Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP81 Boo401 R00050016aJ.ecret
Foreign
Assessment
Center NOFORN-NOOONTRACT-
ORCON
Iran: Growing Leftist
Influence Among Minorities
Top Secret
PA 80-10033C
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January 1980
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25X1
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UMBRA
NOFORN-NOOONTRACT-
ORCON
Iran: Growing Leftist
Influence Among Minorities (u)
Summary The Iranian Government has been unable to establish control in its
25X1A
minority-populated periphery. This has led these important areas to be
influenced increasingly by leftist groups or organizations that are allied with
or vulnerable to the leftists. There are no competitive, pro-Western groups.
Some minority groups or individuals leading them have had contacts with
the USSR. The Soviets have long supported regional autonomy for the
Iranian Kurds, and we have some evidence that they have indirectly aided
some dissident Kurds. We cannot document as fully Soviet involvement with
other minorities. 25X1 A
held power in Tehran.
Indirect support of Iranian ethnic minorities complements Moscow's hope
that a leftist regime will eventually emerge from the present instability. In
working toward that end, Moscow is not likely to endorse the dismember-
ment of Iran. Rather, it would see more advantages in consolidating its
allies' control in the outlying areas, while an ever-weakening government
25X1A
This memorandum was prepared by ffice of Political Analysis. It was 25X1
coordinated with the National Intel igence ujjicerjor Near East and South Asia. Research
was completed on 22 January 1980. Comments a are welcome and should be
directed to the Chief; Iran Task Force, telephone 25X2SX1
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NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-
ORCON
Kuwait
Shatt a
Iraq - Saudi Arabia
Neutral Zone
Former Kurdish Republic
of Mahabad
Area controlled by the
Kurdish Democratic Party
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
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Caspian
Sea
Persian
Gulf
Manama
Bandar-6
'Abbas
Qa r
Doha
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25X1A
Afghanistan
U.S.S.R.
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UMBRA
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-
ORCON
Iran: Growing Leftist
Influence Among Minorities (u)
Northwest Our most complete information on leftist influences among the Iranian
ethnic minorities is on the Kurdish and Azarbayjani areas in the northwest;
25X1 C this is based on reports from several sources accumulated over the past year.
25X1 C
This region is an important agricultural and industrial area, through which
pass the main road and rail routes to Europe and the USSR. It is coming
under the expanding influence of aggressive Kurdish and Azarbayjani
"Democratic" parties whose programs have changed little since those same
parties headed Soviet puppet regimes after World War II. The Azarbayjani
Democratic Party (ADP) is technically the Communist Tudeh Party's wing
in the far northwest; Tudeh members made up one wing of the Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP). The Kurdish and Azarbayani parties are allied in
a Rejectionist Front with the People's Fedayeen. The Fedayeen are the
"independent" Marxist-Leninist guerrillas who are active among the major
minorities; they have nominated representatives to the Kurdish team that is
negotiating autonomy proposals with Khomeini's representatives. The Front
holds firm control over parts of Kordestan and West Azarbayjan Provinces,
25X1 X The area
most solidly controlled by the KDP approximates that of the former Kurdish
Republic of Mahabad.' According to reports from several sources, the area
around Marivan is a center of "Communist"-probably Fedayeen-
25X1 A activity
Leftist groups of several persuasions are infiltrating Islamic Movement
organizations in the northwest. One branch of the Muslim People's Republic
Party, associated with Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, recently disbanded after
discovering it had been penetrated. The recent decision of the party to go
underground because of both pressure from Khomeini's supporters and
Shariat-Madari's alleged instruction to Azarbayjanis to arm and organize
will open more opportunities for leftist exploitation of organizations backing
Shariat-Madari against Khomeini. Pro-Soviet groups, in particular, want to
penetrate Shariat-Madari's camp because Moscow suspects that an 25X1 A
autonomous Azarbayjan run by supporters of the popular, moderate, and
anti-Communist Ayatollah would not serve Soviet interests
' The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, like the Azarbayjan Democratic Republic, was backed
by the USSR from late 1945 through 1946. Both collapsed after the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from northern Iran 25X1 A
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KDP leader Abdulrahman Qassemlu,
who has longstanding contacts with the USSR
and Middle Eastern Communist Parties
Unclassified
however, that both the ADP and Tudeh have difficulty reaching the
Azarbayjani masses because each has a pro-Soviet image. Party members
and sympathizers, therefore, tend to come from the intelligentsia. The
25X1 D also noted that the Fedayeen, who are ostensibly anti-
Soviet, have been successfully operating among the Azarbayjani people and
that leftist views predominate in Tabriz. Other reports suggest that the
Fedayeen are staging incidents designed to intensify resentments between
the followers of the two Ayatollahs. Far more than other ethnic minorities,
the Azarbayjanis have been integrated into Iranian society, including the
5X1A
highest civilian and military levels
25X1 D
25X1A
North Central Leftist influence is strong in the fertile north-central coastal plain, according
to several sources. During clashes with the government early last year,
Turkoman tribesmen, who have won substantial autonomy, are said to have
received safe haven in the USSR and aid from Soviet Turkomans. The
Soviet border, according to persistent rumors, was opened to dissident
Turkomans during the early 1979 clashes; at that time some of the dissidents
told newsmen that they were Fedayeen members. One pro-Khomeini group
in the area charged that the Fedayeen had initiated the clashes; as a result
some Fedayeen were arrested by the Khomeini forces. If that was the case,
the Turkomans were certainly quick to seize the opportunity-Khomeini's
representatives reportedly are now almost completely absent from the
Turkomans' homelands
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The Turkomans reportedly are working closely with the Fedayeen and are
arming for another uprising. In September political activity reportedly was
intense in Turkoman areas. The Azarbayjani and Turkoman homelands
have been the targets of Soviet intelligence operations. Such activities have
also been directed against Khorasan Province, an isolated region in
northeast Iran about which we have little current information. In 1944, a
brief tribal revolt backed by the Soviets established the People's Republic of
Khorasan 25X1 A
Southeast Iranian authorities have consistently perceived a greater threat to their
territorial integrity in the isolated southeastern province of Baluchestan va
Sistan than has been borne out by our information on dissident activity
there. This may be the reason that martial law was applied in the province in
early December in what seemed an overreaction to clashes that had broken
out in the provincial capital, Zahedan. Iranian concerns have been
intensified by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On 20 June, a senior
Interior Ministry official publicly accused the USSR of encouraging leftist
activities in Baluchestan. Iranian officials under the Shah and the Khomeini
regime have been particularly concerned that Afghanistan is acting as a
Soviet surrogate in aiding dissident Baluchis. Last fall for the first time the
regime in Kabul invited Iranian Baluchi representatives to participate in
activities during a holiday celebrating ethnic separatism. Iranian intelli-
gence officials met recently in Islamabad with their Pakistani counterparts
to discuss joint efforts to counter Soviet activities among Baluchis in both
countries. ]reported recently that the
Soviets are using Afghan citizens to provide support to the Tudeh 25X1 C
Communist Party from Afghanistan. 25X1 A
25X1 C
Baluchi dissident groups include the Baluchestan Liberation Front and the
Baluchi Student Organization, both recently reactivated separatist groups
allegedly trained by the USSR; the Democratic Party of the Baluchi People
and the House of the Baluchi, newly formed leftist organizations; and the
Islamic Unity Party (IUP), a cleric-led organization that appears to be
working with the Fedayeen. The last two groups reportedly cooperated in
preventing voting on the Islamic Constitution at some polling places in early
December and a few days later sent a joint ultimatum to Khomeini
demanding that Baluchi autonomy be written into the constitution.
25X1 C he older Baluchis-some of whom may be leading 25X1 C
their own dissident bands-tend to be anti-Soviet, but that younger
tribesmen hope the USSR will aid their quest for autonomy. The IUP head
reportedly warned the Khomeini regime in October that "Communists" in
Baluchestan would profit if the government does not act soon to resolve local
political and economic problems. 25X1 A
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Baluchestan va Sistan has strategic importance, and this rouses Iranian
suspicions of Soviet intentions, despite the limited capacity of both roads and
ports in the southeast. Roads in Iran and Afghanistan provide a relatively
direct route over the several hundred miles between the Iranian Gulf port at
Char Bahar and the Soviet rail line at Ashkhabad or its terminus at Kushka.
Moreover, road and rail links that could be vital to Iran if its Gulf ports are
blocked also pass through the province to Pakistan 25X1 A
Southwest Leftist strength in the oil-rich southwest is less visible. Iranian leftists,
including the Tudeh Communist Party, have reportedly tried to build assets
among the oil workers. The Fedayeen, the Arabestan Liberation Front,
which is a newly revitalized radical leftist Arab separatist group, and agents
of radical Arab states and Palestinian groups are all reportedly active in
Khuzestan. The Front apparently changed its name to the Arab Islamic
Revolutionary Front after Khomeini's revolution, presumably to improve its
image with the Khomeini forces. It is well armed and has sought contacts
with the KDP and other Iranian leftists. Most recently, radical leftist groups
have been trying to discredit the moderate leadership of the Qashqai tribe,
which inhabits the area around Shiraz. The Fedayeen are reportedly very
active in the Qashqai's homeland, where they may control several villages.
The southwest has remained relatively quiet since midsummer, although
incidents of sabotage against oil industry and public facilities occur
25X1 A regularl
Soviet Position At present, the USSR and the Tudeh Party publicly support the Khomeini
regime and favor peaceful resolution of ethnic disagreements. Secular and
clerical officials of the Khomeini regime, however, have consistently
indicated that they suspect the Soviets are deeply involved in ethnic
25X1 A dissidence=
As of 1978 the USSR was running intelligence operations into Iran and
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25X1 n 25X1 D:
25X1 C
from residencies of the Committee of State Security (K(jB) in Baku and
Ashkhabad conversation with a Soviet official.
These residencies were independent of KGB components at the Soviet
Embassy in Tehran and the Consulate General in Tabriz, and they usually
used officers of Soviet Azarbayjani extraction. Those Iranian recruits who
had the capacity to advance themselves were trained and financed by the
KGB to infiltrate the Iranian civil and security services or military. Some
were sent to live in other Iranian areas of interest to the USSR or in Iranian
communities elsewhere in the Middle East. Less promising recruits reported
on local Iranian military disposition 25X1 A
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25X1
wtuscow was en ready to provide-through pro-Soviet Middle Eastern 25X1
Communist parties-"material and personnel" support to Iranian minor-
ities to prolong Iranian instability. Th thought Kurdish and
Azarbayjani representatives and others would attend a meeting in Moscow
on 1 April to discuss details. In early September Tudeh spokesmen publicly
denied that two party members executed in western Iran by the Khomeini
regime were involved in "events in Kordestan Province"; the Revolutionary
Court thought otherwise 25X1 A
Recent reporting indicates that the Soviets may be providing indirect aid-
such as East European arms sent by Bulgaria-to some Kurdish dissident
groups. As part of a long-term effort to promote leftist prospects, the USSR
has supported Tudeh and pro-Soviet groups' efforts to infiltrate Islamic
Movement organizations and the military. I 25X1 A
The spottiness of evidence of Soviet involvement with dissident minorities in
Iran does not mean that the USSR is not backing them. Collection of such
evidence is inhibited by the isolation of the areas involved, their contiguity to
the USSR, Moscow's ability to provide indirect aid, and its operatives'
ability to exploit ethnic similarities and old contacts. By keeping their
support well hidden, the USSR can pursue a dual policy-denying 25X1 A
involvement with Khonieini's opposition while maintaining its options in the
event that such groups succeed in gaining power. Moscow's goal is the
eventual emergence of a more pro-Soviet government in Tehran.
People's Fedayeen and Fragmentary reporting suggests the Fedayeen may be trying to develop a
the Minorities capacity to initiate incidents in several minority areas. The Fedayeen's aim
is to exploit ethnic unrest in order to increase their own national influence.
The Marxist-Leninist Fedayeen do not now seem likely to develop sufficient
strength to come to power independently. They can, however, help
perpetuate the instability that prevents the formation of a stable central
government. To further their goals, the Fedayeen have formed temporary
alliances with several other, often competing, groups. Fedayeen members
have been repeatedly accused of posing as Revolutionary Guards or minority
dissidents to promote disturbances for their own purposes. They are said to
operate under their own name in larger towns obscure their identity in
smaller, more conservative villages 25X1 A
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According to a report received earlier this month, a senior Tudeh official
had recently made critical remarks about the Fedayeen-partly because of
their leaders' professed anti-Soviet, anti-Tudeh stance, but also because the
group seems to be successfully rivaling the Tudeh in the provinces and
among the youth. The Fedayeen are deeply factionalized; they have six
factions at their Tehran headquarters, which reportedly has little control
over provincial branches. At least one of the Fedayeen's factions is probably
at least tacitly pro-Soviet, despite their public posture. Fedayeen leaders
have chosen to remain anonymous. The group has long received aid from
radical Arab states and Palestinian groups.
Outlook Whatever the details of the autonomy granted by the Khomeini regime to
the ethnic minorities-or simply taken by them-the local administrations
on the Iranian periphery will be left-leaning, allied with aggressive leftist
groups, or vulnerable to them. Such a situation, however, would not
necessarily lead to the dismemberment of Iran. The best organized groups
are those with contacts with the USSR. These groups and the Soviets might
consider a policy of consolidating dissident control in the outlying areas to be
more advantageous while an ever-weakening government holds power in
Tehran; this course could facilitate the eventual emergence of a leftist
regime in Tehran without precipitating US intervention. The groups that
look to the USSR for assistance are not likely to see the invasion of
Afghanistan as a threat. The Fedayeen find advantages in attacking the
Soviet invasion in order to win additional ethnic support at the expense of
more openly pro-Soviet organizations.
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Sources of the Copyrighted Photographs
Page 2: Iran Week, 30 November 1979
Page 6: AP
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