WORLDWIDE THREAT TO US DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS RESULTING FROM THE SITUATION IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000600050029-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: November 21, 1979
• Content Type: IM

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roDedcFroRelease 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP81600401 R0006000 'Vti
Central
Intelligence
Worldwide Threat to
US Diplomatic Missions Resulting
From the Situation in Iran
Secret
NI IIM 79-10024
21 November 1979
Copy 2 9 9
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WORLDWIDE THREAT TO US DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS
RESULTING FROM THE SITUATION IN IRAN
1. A serious risk of additional attacks on US diplo-
matic missions* and personnel exists virtually throughout the
Middle East and South Asia?and would increase substantially
in the event of hostilities between the United States and
Iran. The likelihood of such actions seems to be the highest
in the small Persian Gulf states, where the security services
are generally weak; in Lebanon, where civil disorder is en-
demic; and perhaps in Syria, where security has deteriorated
in recent months and the government is backing Iran's anti-US
actions. The risk will be highest through 18 December, the
end of the Muslim month of mourning, Moharram.
2. Local security services in the region vary widely
in their ability and determination to protect US interests
against attack. Most could deal successfully with anti-US
demonstrations. Unless they were forewarned, however, few
if any could prevent a determined effort by an armed group
to seize a US embassy. Only Libya might condone or organize
a popular occupation of the US Embassy, although it would
probably seek to prevent violence.
3. Outside the Middle East, the risk of violent anti-
US actions appears greatest in Western Europe, where there
are thousands of Iranian students as well as indigenous anti-
US and antigovernment radical groups. West European security
services are, of course, highly capable and determined to
prevent attacks on US missions.
NOTE: This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum was prepared in the
Office of Political Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center,
under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for the Near
East and South Asia. It was coordinated at the working level with the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and with the intelligence staffs of the Depart-
ments of Army, Navy, and Air Force.
*DIA wishes to stress that many of the points in this assessment of
the threat to US diplomatic missions also apply to other US installa-
tions, facilities, and bases abroad.
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Middle East and South Asia*
4. US diplomatic personnel and missions throughout
the Middle East and South Asia are highly vulnerable to at-
tacks by disaffected groups and individuals. Events in
Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have the potential to in-
spire violent anti-US actions not only by Shia Islamic
groups, but also by fanatic Sunni Muslim factions and by
the many radical secular opposition and terrorist groups
across the political spectrum that might be tempted to join
in the spreading anti-Americanism.
5. The threat seems to be most immediate in those
states where Shia Muslims responsive to Khomeini comprise a
sizable proportion of the population or constitute a chronic
domestic political problem. In addition to Iran this would
include the Arab states on the Persian Gulf and Lebanon.
Serious security problems exist in Lebanon, Syria, Pakistan,
and Afghanistan, and this adds to the overall risk to US
missions in those countries. Similarly, statements support-
ive of Iran's anti-US actions made by the governments of
Libya, Syria, and South Yemen can only increase the likeli-
hood of anti-US actions in the area.
6. We have! 25X1
25X1
no basis on which to
predict the specific countries where such an attack might
occur. In the relatively volatile Shia area, the danger
will be especially high during the current Muslim month of
mourning, Moharram, and it may increase still further if the
situation in Iran continues to deteriorate. In the Arab
world the likelihood of anti-US actions in general will in-
crease somewhat early next year with the scheduled exchange
of ambassadors between Israel and Egypt.
7. Virtually all governments in the area would at-
tempt to prevent an attack on a US diplomatic mission.
Libya might constitute an exception; the regime would likely
*At annex is a country-by-country threat assessment for the Middle
East and South Asia that was not coordinated within the Intelligence
Community because of time constraints.
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attempt to prevent bloodshed, but might condone an occupa-
tion of the US Embassy. Area security services vary widely
in their quality and in their determination
interests. 25X1
Most could deal successfully
with popular demonstrations; few if any could prevent a
determined, small group from attacking or seizing a US
embassy.
Western Europe
8. US diplomatic missions and personnel in Western
Europe seem especially vulnerable to attack, as there are
in Western Europe thousands of Iranian students and a lar e
number of indigenous radical groups. 25X1
reports of I I suggesting that 25X1
Iranian students in Italy and France, for example, may take
some action against the local American community. Demonstra-
tions in front of the embassies and kidnaping of US officials
have been mentioned as possibilities. We have nothing to in-
dicate that either Iranians or European radicals are planning
actions against US installations
and France.
9. Any decision by Iranian or other radical groups
to move against a US target in Western Europe would have
to be made in the face of countervailing considerations.
The attempt would encounter stiff and almost certainly ef-
fective resistance from the local security forces, and pub-
lic reaction would be unsympathetic or hostile. We there-
fore judge that the odds are against such an attempt. The
likelihood of such action would increase, however, if the
United States took military action against Iran.
USSR and Eastern Europe
10. There is virtually no chance of a takeover of the
US Embassy in Moscow, the Consulate in Leningrad, or the ad-
vance party in Kiev. Soviet security for US facilities is
adequate to deal with any action that visiting foreign
students--the only conceivable disaffected element that
could be inspired by events in Iran or Pakistan--might take.
Anyone contemplating action against a US facility would know
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that Soviet security personnel would oppose the action forc-
ibly. If the Soviet regime staged a demonstration against
a US facility in reaction to US military moves threatening
Iran, the "outraged citizens" would not be permitted to pene-
trate or take over the facility.
11. It is unlikely that any East European regime would
allow foreign students to occupy a US installation. The East
Europeans might permit an anti-US demonstration, but they
would carefully control it. Tightened security is already
apparent around some US installations. A surprise move
against an American facility is possible, but the regimes
would certainly respond quickly to protect US personnel.
One country where it is conceivable that the government
might not be able to prevent demonstrations and possible
violence is Yugoslavia, where there are 3.8 million Muslims.
Although we have no evidence of Khomeini's influence among
Yugoslav Muslims, an anti-American move by small groups,
possibly against the US Information Center in Sarajevo,
cannot be ruled out.
12. Dissident political groups in most of East Asia
are unlikely to seize on current developments in the Middle
East as cause to attack US diplomatic missions or personnel.
There are several possible exceptions, however, in Southeast
Asia. The Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Thailand all have disaffected non-Shia Muslim elements; these
groups saw the Iranian revolution as an example of how devout
Muslims could overwhelm a seemingly more powerful secular
government. Muslims in the Philippines and Thailand are en-
gaged in armed separatist rebellions. Both Philippine and
Thai Muslims have engaged in terrorist acts against govern-
ment installations, but thus far not against American targets.
Action by a small group of radical Muslims against a US em-
bassy, consulate, or binational center could not be ruled
out in any of the five countries cited.
Latin America
13. El Salvador probably presents the most serious
threat of an embassy takeover by dissidents in Latin America,
although there is little likelihood that such an attempt
would be precipitated by events in the Middle East.
Terrorist-controlled leftist organizations have employed
takeovers of government buildings and international offices
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over the past two years, most recently holding two govern-
ment ministers and several dozen others hostage. Leftists
have made one attack against the US Embassy and plan others.
Sub-Saharan Africa
14. The risk of a takeover of a US embassy or con-
sulate in Sub-Saharan Africa as a result of events in Paki-
stan and Iran is judged to be low. Even in those places
where bilateral relations are strained--such as Ethiopia--
the local governments have provided adequate protection for
US diplomatic posts in the past. Anti-US demonstrations
occur periodically, but they usually are stage-managed and
kept within bounds by the authorities. There are some
countries--Chad and Uganda being the best examples--where
government control is tenuous and the existence of numerous
armed factions and gangs makes the safety of US facilities
somewhat more unpredictable. If the London conference on
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia were to collapse over perceptions that
Britain--and, by extension, the United States--is attempting
to force a settlement that merely legitimizes the current
Salisbury regime, students in several African states,
notably Nigeria and Zambia, might be attracted to the example
set by their counterparts in Iran and Pakistan.
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