BRIEFING BOOK SCC MEETING 12 APRIL 1979 WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 12, 1979
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DCI
BRIEFING BOOK
SCC MEETING
12 April 1979
White House Situation Room
BRIEFING NOTE
A - SCC AGENDA
B - SCC WORK PROGRAM
C - US OBJECTIVES
D - CIA THREAT/BALANCE BRIEFING
E - DIA THREAT BRIEFING
F - ARMS CONTROL ISSUES
G - SOVIET OBJECTIVES
H - DECISION/TRACK
I - BILATERALS/HLG CONCLUSIONS
J - HLG CONSENSUS
K - HLG/NPG
State Dept., DIA reviews completed
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25X1A
Acting NIF or conventional Forces
11 April 1979
BRIEFING NOTE
12 April 1979
25X1 C
This SCC meeting follows the decision last Friday by the NAC to
accept a proposal that a Special Group be established under US
chairmanship to deal with Theater Nuclear Forces arms control and related
matters.
The purpose of the meeting is to discuss:
-- the proposed work program for the Special Group (Tab B)
-- a State paper outlining possible US objectives and
principles in TNF arms control (Tab C).
The main issues for discussion are marked in the SCC agenda (Tab A)
and cross referenced to the text of the State paper (Tab C).
CIA has two papers in the works that are proposed for transmittal
to the Special Group at the 1~9 April meeting- One deals with the Soviet
TNF threat and the European balance (Tab D ; the other with possible
Soviet objectives and approaches to TNF (being drafted).
JCS (DIA) has prepared a threat briefing (Tab E) which focuses only
on principal Soviet theater nuclear de every systems (MR/IRBMs, SLBMs,
and LRA bombers), all systems with ranges in excess of 1000km. The CIA
threat/balance briefing treats TNF systems more systematically, because
Soviet/Pact systems with ranges of 100-1000km are capable of striking
strategic targets in Europe, and includes force comparisons with US/NATO
systems.
dep] ments. We believe this proposal is out of keeping with present
Agency po icies and should be rejected.
S viet TNF atir~l rlimatP fnr NATO TNF
An issue requiring your decision relates to a request that CIA
consider how its clandestine service might be employed to ublicize the
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CONFIDENTIAL- entire text
MEMORAND
UM TO: NSC - Mr. Thomson
DOD - Mr. Woodwor h
JCS - BGen. Vesse
ACDA - Mr. Clinard
EUR - Mr. Fuerth
PM/ISP - Eric D. Nessom''`
SUBJECT: Issue Paper on TNF Arms Control Objectives and
Principles
25X1A
The attached is a first cut at the issue paper
wlan
to circulate to the Allies in the Special Group to~Stimulate
discussion of broad TNF arms control issues. It is derived
from the State paper "TNF Arms Control Objectives and Princi-
ples," which will be the subject of the SCC.discussion tomor-
row.
This draft is circulated to give agencies a sense of how
we plan to structure the paper, in order that Principals may
approve presentation to the Allies of a version. of it for the
Special Group discussion We would appreciate our
ments on this version by COB Thursda y con:-
we might circulate a new draft on Friday for interagencyrre-
view.
CONFIDENTIAL
U-7/71T78 3
April 11, 1979
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 Approve+?ItrIAqqftset K8,L046 I -~M1f~004INCIPLES10001-7
Issues for Discuss-Ion
One of the most difficult tasks for the Special
Group will 'be to produce in a relatively short period
a realistic and comprehensive stance on TNF arms control.
We believe the most sensible and expeditious way to do
this would be by suggesting some broad TNF arms control
issues for discussion. As we shape and refine these
issues in our deliberations, they should eventually
emerge as basic objectives and principles which might be
adopted by Ministers this fall as the basis for dealing
with theater systems in arms control.
This preliminary paper does not representIUS posi-
tions. It is offered as a vehicle for discussion. It
could be successively revised after each meeting of the
Special Group, leading to the development of a consensus
on TNF arms control principles and objectives,-which
could be the core of the Special Group's Report. to
Ministers.
1. Should our objective be rimaril to constrain,
and if possible, reduce the Soviet nuc ear threat to
Europe, or show d we aim for more ambitious, co re en-
sive obiect_ves7 I
TNF arms control should have a reduction o' the
Soviet nuclear threat to Europe as its paramount
objective. An unconstrained TNF competition in; Europe
could result in continued Soviet preponderance with
much higher levels of TNF on both sides. Larger
numbers of NATO long-range systems would imply q
changed role for TNF as part of the NATO deterrgnt,
and increased perceptions of the decoupling of US
strategic forces from Europe. Limiting the Soviet
long-range theater nuclear threat would deprive the
Soviets of political and military leverage stemming
from irceptions of unconstrained Soviet theater:
deployments, against which the West lacked the will to
respond.
2. How can we use a TNF arms control a roach to
stren then A ance co esion and cou in t rou
active A _-led artic ation in the arms contro com-
ponent of Alliance security?
TNF arms control enhances Allied security to the
extent that it is a common policy, worked out together
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on t>E'`i' has s o a common ?framework. No single ally can
pursue that policy without the active support and par-
ticipation of the others. An Allied consensus is an
essential outcome. It cannot be imposed, but must be
the result of thorough discussion. Such a consensus
would nave an ancillary benefit, allaying fears of de-
coupling, whether through modernization or arms control.
3. How can we manaqe the relationshi amb
SALT and MBFR n ways t at will improve t e pr spects
or SALT and MBFR?
Direct relationships exist between TNF modernization
and arms control on the one hand, and SALT and!
MBFR on the other. Recognizing these relationships in
advance may help managing them with care.
There may be no way to disconnect TNF arms control
from.cALT. The Soviets, despite recent hints to the ALT
contrary, may insist on securing limitations orj US "PBS" CrU1s4.f .st,%,.
as a precondition for further reductions in its central ?1-4 .,L.1
systems. We have made it clear to the Soviets ;that any
limitations on US TNF must be accompanied by a fit:{
PPropriato te ~:?.-t Sit
limitations on related Soviet systems.
MBFR remains the negotiation with the potential
for having a direct impact on the conventional threat toM_~~'
NATO sec i
u
t
r
y in Central Europe. The conventional
balance is crucial and must be calibrated in careful
coordination with the theater nuclear b
l
a
ance. ;Nego-
---- tiations on TNF must be handled so that the MBFR
4. How should TNF arms control relate to TNF
modernization: are t e e ements o an overa strata
or is it possible to purse th
e
em ndependently
Our TNF arms control effort must be serious, and
aim at constraining the Soviet long-range TNF threat.
Yet the fundamental instrument for coping with the
C
political and militar bl
is an evolutionary ems posed by this threat
Y deployment by NATO of additional
long-range TNF. TNF arms control should not be allowe
to -impede those deployments which we decide are neces-
sary-to restore confidence in the viability of NATO's
spectrum of deterrence.
TNF arms control must be a complement to, not a
substitute for, TNF modernization. We must avoid the
dangers of making actual deployments host
ae to the
outcome of arms control negotiations or of
gchoosing an
arms control posture simply to camouflage modernization.
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Either position would give the Soviets less incentive
to negotiate in good faith over constraints in its
deployments. Both positions would engender divisive
political controversy in the Alliance. Development
of a realistic TNF arms control posture should not lag
behind decisions on a TNF modernization program. A Nasuk, ~'-~
credible Allied TNF arms control stance will bg essen-
tial for improving the political climate for irpitial
NATO deployments. If successful, it could reduce the
need for still further deployments in order to sustain C I-1 a credible deterrent in Europe.
5. As Allies with common interests in the'securit
of all, ow can we best share responsibility or
developing a TNF arms control posture?
TNF arms control cuts to the heart of secLrity
interests in Europe. In the long run, no single country
can carry the burden or developing an arms control
posture on its own. While some Allies may be content
to see others take the lead and others may be impatient
with the indecision and confusion of reaching a. common
stance, all must be willing to sharein decision-
making.
6. Does maximum bargaining leverage re uire that
decisions on TNF modernization be taken in a way that
olds in the prosepct of further deployments?
NATO's initial TNF modernization program will be
"evolutionary" in character. It will satisfy intrinsic
requirements of deterrence, within current policy and
doctrine; it could only be cut back to the extent that
the Soviet TNF threat was constrained.
Some systems currently under development ptobably
will not be included in the initial modernization
package. The size of deployments will also be modest.
Yet, if we are to maximize bargaining leverage ogainst
Soviet TNF, decisions on the initial modernization
program will have to be taken in a way that doe$ not
rule out additional systems or increments in the future.
This has implications both for the public promulgation
of the decisions and for ongoing development prggrams.
We want to be able to link subsequent NATO restraint in
deploying additional systems or larger numbers of TNF
to equivalent Soviet restraint.
7. Should our TNF arms control approach sress
simplicity, or s --it-possible to negotiate an rear
comprehensive agreement on a broad range of TNF{systems?
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always commensurable in capabilities and numbers, make
TNF arms control negotiations an exceptionally complex
undertaking. Attempting to include every system in
those negotiations may prevent agreed limits on the
most threatening developments from being reach in a
timely way.
Focusing the negotiations only on the modern SS -~
long-range theater systems of both sdies which have
caused the greatest political and military concerns '~2 ft
should, provide the most mar4ageable framework for
negotiations and an agreement, and would lessen per-
cenptions of decoupling inherent in a more sweeping G(.CM
"Eurostrategic" negotiation.
There are some potential probems with this; ap-
proach: it would leave out a lot of old long-range C S--f jss-
TNF on the Soviet side, as well as all of the short-
range systems which the Soviets could move forward to SS.fL/iL 25X16
increase coverage of western Europe and which are expanding and modernizing along with long-rangei Soviet
TNF; if the limitations applied to European-based systems Sc+r-a
only, the Soviets would have a large breakout
potential in their non-European deployments of modern, U 3 0"04 R%-O^+?
mobile systems such as the SS-20. ~-y` ti-w. A'i L
8. Should Allied systems be excluded
front
theater
ceilings or limits? If so, should there be
an
compen-
sation for Allied systems in any negotiated
ce
ings?
Excluding Allied systems without compensation for
them will keep TNf negotiations more manageale, Yet
there are difficulties with this approach: the Soviets
will likely argue that their long-range TNF arp a
counter to Allied nuclear systems, and that they cannot
agree to limit such systems in the absence of limits
on French and British systems, or at least numerical
compensation for them via a larger Soviet ceiling. If
Allied systems are excluded, this will raise non-circum-
vention and non-transfer issues, which will inevitably
be more complex and difficult than in SALT II..
9. Must TNF ceilings be equal, without qny de jure
asymmetries?
Politically, parity of ceilings and right is
essential. Yet there are difficulties with purity. For
one thing, parity could be perceived as establishing a
formal "Eurostrategic" balance, and thereforelbe de-
coupling. If the focus were on a narrow class of modern
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of formal par ty wou
negotiation. Moreover, formal parity in rights need
not imply actual numerical parity in deployments. The
ceilings would be on a narrow class of modern systems;
older Soviet systems would be excluded (though over
time, as older systems were retired, equal ceilings in
modern systems could lead to actual parity). Mpreover,
were NATO not to exercise its right to deploy up to the
permitted ceiling, that could make the exclusion of UK
and French forces more palatable to the Soviets. Con-
versely, the existence of those excluded Allied, systems
could relieve political problems arising from actual
inequality of deployed forces.
10. Should our aim be to negotiate a ceilling on
Soviet deployments of modern ong-range TNF at ;a rea istic
evel?
If our goal is to be modest and realistic,; while
we could press for some reductions, we probably should
not expect to reduce deployments of modern Sovilet systems
significantly below what we believe are planned levels.
in any case, we will need to preserve room for carrying
out-our own modernization plans. Setting a ceiling would
be an important achievement in enhancing NATO security.
It woulld avoid an unlimited regional competition in which
the Soviets would have many geographic and political
advantages. An unconstrained Soviet build-up could
undermine the strategic balance, change completely the
role of theater forces in NATO's deterrent posture by
necessitating deployments going beyond an "evolutionary"
adjustment, and alter the character of SALT. A ceiling,
perhaps with some reduction in the level of anticipated
Soviet deployments, could set the stage for future, more
constraining TNF limitations.
The difficulty with pursuing the modest ok#jective
of a ceiling on deployment of only certain modern Soviet
long-range systems is that is might be seen by some of
our Allies and by arms control supporters here as arms
control tokenism, doing nothing to reduce the threat to
Europe or to control the deployment. of new, destabilizing
systems. The Soviets, too, might se a ceilin4 -- combined
with unconstrained UK and French forces -- as merely
codifying a NATO TNF buildup of a dangerous new strategic
threat to the Soviet homeland, while constraining their
ability to respond through larger deployments than planned.
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ou we a prepared to discuss our teater
systems in SALT III only if the Soviets are p_ep red
to negotiate on their theater systems?
We will need a posture on theater systems at
the opening of SALT III negotiations. The Soviets
are almost certain to raise Protocol-limited cruise
missiles, FBS and Alliedd systems. Our basic posture
should be to "put into action" our formulation on
theater systems ("Any future limitations on US systems
principally designed for theater missions should be
accompanied by appropriate limitations on Sovieta theater
systems"). We would indicate that we were prepared to
discuss our own theater systems (not Allied systems),
but only if the Soviets were prepared to discus$ their
theater systems. This would establish a direct/linkage
between our TNF and Soviet theater systems. This posture
would at least allow us to respond to a Soviet initiative.
The Soviets may be prepared to agree to our formula-
tion at the outset and propose that negotiations begin
immediately, before we had agreement in the All!iance on
a negotiating approach. This tactical difficulty could
be managed by focusing early discussions in SALT III on
the objectives and principles for negotiations on this
new class of systems, and on the structure and
modalities of negotiations. Moreover, we can put
the burden on the Soviets to come up with the opening
proposals. But, we will also retain the optio of
initiating a proposal near the outset if we ar
ready
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 Approved. For Release 20? 11
Long-Range Theater Delivery Systems
(Over 1,000 Kilometers Range)
Deployed or Deployable by 1983
25X1 B
25X1 B
4.
I
5. The range of these aircraft does not take into consideration the intrinsic
range of the ASKS which they carry. See Table 2 for this information.
6. French All IRBKS and SLBKA
have adequate range to reach far
7. The role and range of the Backfire is subject to some disagreement. Bence
the number of aircraft here represents those aircraft which would be avail-
able if ^lI were assigned to the theater strike role.
8. These are based in %he UK. The Strategic Air Command variant, the FB-212,
is based in the US, It is designated a
'non-central- syste a con ext, however.
9. The totals for Backfire, Badger, and Blinder Include Soviet Naval Aviation
aircraft.
10. This is a US carrier-based system, and as such Its launch point cannot be
determined.
11. The total for bombers Is considerably smaller than the number of ASKs
which many carry as their principal weapon. The number of ASKS is
provided on Table 2.
SEULT c srflvf
t.IOT RELEASABLE 10
EOREION NATIONALS
Aircraft Radius/
Missile Range
(KM)
1978
No.
25X4
Summary: 10 current systems
including France: as many as
176 SLBMs, 18 IRBMs, and 271
aircraft.
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SENSITIVE
NOT RELEASAPLE TV
ECRFK3N NATIONALS
Table I
1978
USSR No.
Some ICBMs (incl SS-11)1,3 Unk
Bear Bomber/AISM Carrierl,5 Unk
Bison Bomber Unk
SS-20 JRRM 36
SS-5 IRRM 64
Backfire Bomber/A'1SM Carrier5,7,9 80
Some SS-N-6 SLBMs Unk
Badger Bomber/ASM Carrier5,9 411
Blinder Bomber/ASM Carrier5,9 168
SS-4 MRBM 39i
SS-N-5 SLBM 30
Probable New ALCM 0
Summary: At least 11 current systems:
492 M/IRBMs, at least 659 bombers
(of which 533 are ASM-capable) ,11
at least 30 SLBMs, and an unknown
number of ICBMs.
1. Designated -central systems" In strategic arms limitations talks.
2. Approximately 48 SSBKs.
3. At one time, about 120 SS-11 variants were assesse as a ng targeted on
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25X1 B
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NOT RF.~+'?.ILE 10
JOREiuh N:.IIONALS
Median-R.umc Theater Delivery Systems
(100 to 1,00(1 Kilos tern I1 inge)
Deployed or Ik-ployahle by 1983
1978
No.
25X4
25X4
USSR/Pact No.
Fencer A rtrbmbr 60
S9-12/22 SSIPI 72
Foxhat B Ftrbmhr 30
Fitter C/11 Ftrbmbr2 100
Flogger Ftrhnlhr 315
A.S-3 A1.(T1 (on Bear)3 45
SS-N-4 SLB'14 6 3
SS-N-12 SLC"! 32
Brewer B/C 45
Prob. New Antiship SLO1 0
AS-4 AUT1 (Backfire,
Blinder)3 306
SS-N-3 SLQ+i5 196
Fishhed Ftrbmbr 225
Fitter A Ftrbmbr2 110
A5-6 ALC'l (on Badger)3,8 540
SU-25 New Ftrbmhr 0
SS-1C (Scud) SS1*17 456
AS-5 AI.CA! (on Badger)3;e,e --
AS-2 ALQ?1 (on Badger) 72
SS-21 SSBM 6
SS-N-9 SLCh16 122
.Summary: 19 current systems: 885 aircraft,
and 534 SSBMs, with the potential for as
many as 963 ALCMs and 350 SLCMs (many in
secondary land strike role).
1. A carrier-based aircraft.
2. Poland is believed to operate 10 Fitter A and 10 Fitter C/D, and Czechoslovakia
25 Fitter A, in the nuclear role.
3. ALCM range is based upon launch from optimal altitude. The number of ALCMs is the
maximum potential launch rail capacity of all aircraft assessed as ALCM-capable.
The ??.oviet LRA and SNA bombers appearing on Table 2 are the only aircraft which
carry the ALCMs listed here.
4.
These missiles may have been Withdrawn from service.
5. All but 16 SS-N-3Cs are assessed as having a primary anti-ship role.
6. Assessed as having a primary anti-ship role.
7. It is assumed that all SS-IC Scud, regardless of Pact user, will be operated in a
nuclear role.
8. It is assumed for the purposes of these tables, that the longer-range AS-6 will be
carried in preference to the AS-5, or AS-2, except for one model of the Badger, which
can carry only AS-2s. The AS-5 and additional AS-2 missiles remain in the inventory.
however.
9. All ALCMs are carried as primary armament on long-range aircraft delivery systems
SEC. MTJ
N 1 RELEASAIILE TO
WREIGN NATIONALS
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EURLIGN NALIONALS
lhbic 3
Short-Range Nuclear Syetens and Artillery
(Less than 1(10 F:ilaueters Range)
Ucploycnl or 11uployable by 1983
25X4
1978
Missile/Projectile 1978
Range O USSR/Pact No.
MM-7 Rocket 4 598
SS-N-7 SLC.1 72
203-mm iowitz9r2 144
240-frtn Mortar 144
Summary: 4 current delivery means: 670
Rockets and missiles, and 288 artillery
tubes.
2. No Soviet nuclear capable artillery is known to be deployed outside the USSR.
4. It is assumed that a -7s, regardless of Pact users will be operated in
a nuclear role.
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AGENDA PAPER
SCC Meeting -- TNF Arms Control
Thurs., Apr. 12, 1979, 2:30
PURPOSE
The first meeting of the new US-chaired NATO Special Group will be
-held April 19 and 20. This initial meeting of the NATO Group is
intended to set in motion a process leading to Alliance agreement on
a set of TNF arms control. objectives and principles to guide the US
in SALT III. (S)
The primary purpose of this SCC meeting is to have an initial
discussion of possible US principles and objectives in TNF arms
control. The State April 5th paper, "TNF Arms Control Objectives /
Principles," forms the basis of the SCC discussion.- (S)
It is not intended that the Us wouia tauxe Lne state p$ptr an L[te ns.a..
Group; rather, we would table an issues paper derived from the State
paper and based on the SCC discussion. Each objective / principle
would be reformulated as an issue and appropriately modified for
European consumption; some might be dropped. US participants in the
NATO meeting would deal. with these issues at NATO on the basis of this
SCC discussion. (S)
I. Work program for the initial Special Group meeting.
II. Objectives/Principles
For each of the following objectives and principles, two
questions arise:
-- Does this reflect current US thinking?
-- How should the US deal with this issue at the initial
Special Group meeting?
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i. Constrain, and if. possible reduce, the Soviet nuclear threat to
Help improve the political climate for NATO deployments.
Exercise US leadership and reinforce European confidence in
the existing NATO security frameWOrk.
4. 5txengthen Alliance cohesion and eauplfssg through Allied
participation in managing the arn~ec control component of
Alliance security.
5. Improve the prospects for SALT and MBFEi..
L. TNF arms control should compTes~ent TNF moderaization.
Principles
Europe.
Our opals in SALT IIT central - system reductions, TNF
modernization and T*rF arms control should be soderate in
scone and mutuzlly supportive.
E. The Allies must share the responsibility for developing a TNF
arms controi posture.
()
Maximizing bargaining leverage requires that decisions on
modernization be taken in a way that holds open the prospect
of further deployments.
~. Our TNF arms control approach should stress simplicity..
fi. Allied systems should be excluded from theater ceilings or
limits, and there should be too coe~pensation for Allied systesas
in any negotiated ceilings.
TNF ceilings must be equal; no de ure asymmetries.
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;_,.~ The aim should hc> to negotiate a ceiling an Soviet deninvnAnt~
sf modern long-ran a TNF at a realistic level.
~. We should be Pre~> red to discuss our theater systems fn
SALT III only tf the Soviets are prepared to negotiate on
their theater systems.
We should seek to avoid negotiating linkages between
central - system issues and "1T~F issues.
If the Soviets seek to link central - system issues to TNF'
issues, or refuse to agree to a TNF-for-TNF linkage, we
should propose that TNF issues be postponed while negatiationa
on central systems proceed. (t)
g9tiBT
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CONFIDENTIAL
Work Program for the Special Group
a
fi
The Following is a suggested work program leading *_~~
nal report to Ministers in the fall___9f____t~' s year. 1 t
is
b
ased on the main lines of analysis now uniderway in Lh~:
USG.
Obviously, the Special Group can agree on such ottiec
work
as it deaitls necessary, and individual participants
can
present additional material for discussion.
possible: objectives and principles relating t{o arms con-
trol involving t~ieater nuclear systems.
?. Discussign of a preliminary US issue paper on
L NPU information. ~~-=} C~oZ
1st Me~ti~~ ~f the 3~( (~,~nril 19)
- ,,
~. Agreement on th`sT~work program and agenda.
.~
3. US briefing on projected fiavie~ TL+dF ~hr~at end'r
an update of NATO/Warsaw Pa_,__ct,nuclean forces drawing on
~. In addition, the US will attempt to provide at
this meeting, for discussion at subsequent m~etings, two
other papers:
~, ~
a preliminary US paper on TNF
I
army
cont~'~l
issues. -
i
~-'
I
a preliminary US paper on possibl soviet
objectives $n a~roacheS-to invo vement of
theater systems iz1 arms control. ~;~,~.:~ ~-~,GZ
~. Tasking of additional work.
' - 1
2nd Meeting of the SG (Week'' before May M'inis~.erials)
A. Discussion of a?rq~fined version of U~ paper on T~l~'
arms control principles and 'objectives presented at April
19 session. ~?
,.
B. Discussion of an expanded,?US papez o~ TNF arms
control issues ywhich~ wduld:
j
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1. consider the political, military end nego-
tiating implications of some alternative
illustrative arms control packages, in
light of the work of,the HLG;
2, illuminate and support further detailed con-
sideration of the TNF arms control issues pape~t
presented on April 19.
C. Discussion of the US paper on possih'le Soviet ob~~.c-
_____ ..~ _.~.,T ___ , _ _ ~,
tives and approaches___ to a~cts,~control .nego_t_atzons __i.nvo~:vlnq r
tFieater nuclear systems.
D. Discussion of tactical issues and public opinion,
iiicludiny the question of the AlliaTce `s public sta:tce on
TNF arms control.
j
~,
n
3rd anti 4th Meetin s of the SG (mid-J'une art Stiiid-Jul ~)
A. Discussion of revised and re#ine3 p~per on ax:as
control objectives/principles. The aim wou3~d be to reach
an SC agreement on a set of objectives and principles
which could be recommended to Ministers for'dealin~r with
TNF issues in SALT III.
R. Discussion of a paper defining the ~ublic rationale
for pursuing arms control involving theaterlnuclear systcrns,
including its relationship to TNF mode~nizatrion anu its
role in the detente process.
C . Further discussion of the US? papers ~ on axms oo^.t.r~ l
issues and illustrative arms.,control packages.
D. Consideration of the relationship b~tween SALT,
theater nuclear systems and MBFR.
E. Update SG work program, incluciirig d.~scussion of th~~
form and content of a~ d~?aft report to Minis~ers.
5th Meetinn of the SG (earl?V Sep~~mber) j .
D1bC11S~lUri of draft repo~'t, t,o Minister, encompassin~a:
1 ? i
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CO FIDENTIAL '
A. Conclusions on abjectives%pri-~~2ple~ dz'aw,~ froL-~t S3's
analysis and discussion, for deaiinc} With 'y';3F j? g:~T-~ ZIi.
B. Assessment of likely Soviet postctt-e cars irvol?~?ir.g
theater systems in arms control negotiations.
6th Meetinq_ of the S_ G (mid-September)
?
Discussion and a ~ ~I
pproval of Final SC re~+art to ?~in~s:.e.:5?
December Ministerials
Discussion of SG report and objectives and princio;~~
for dealing with TNF in SALT III.
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MEMORANDUM TO:
April 5, 1979
NSC -
Mr.
Bartholomew
-
Mr.
Ermarth
DOD -
Mr.
Slocombe
-
Dr.
Davis
JCS - BGen. Vesser
ACDA - Mr. Newhouse
CIA -
EUR - Mr. Goo y
FROM: PM - David C. Gompert~~
SUBJECT: (S) TNF Arms Control Objectives/Principles
(S) Attached is a revision of the TNF Arms Control
Objectives and Principles paper, taking into account
interagency comments. The paper is still cast as an
internal US document intended for discussion by the Prin-
cipals. As noted in the text, it would have to be appro-
priately revised for use with the Allies:
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GDS 4/5/85
25X1A
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TNF Arms Control Objectives/Principles
Tn its present form, this paper is a candid statement
of US objectives and principles in pursuing TNF arms control.
Mast of these objectives and principles would be suitable
far discussion with the Allies--though perhaps they would
better be advanced as "propositions" or "issues" for
discussion in the newly-formed NATO Special Group on Arms
Cantrol. Tn certain cases, it could be inappropriate or
tactically unwise to pursue specific objectives or principles
in discussions with the Allies, at least until we determine
haw their thinking is developing. After appropriate
revision, the paper would be a major vehicle for discussions
with the Allies of the elements which could form the basis
of. an Alliance-supported TNF arms control policy.
The paper briefly outlines the military and political
components of the theater nuclear problem, and describes
some basic political and negotiating objectives the US might
pursue in managing the theater nuclear arms control question
in the Alliance and in SALT. This is then followed by a set
of substantive and tactical principles which should guide
and inform fhe US approach to theater nuclear arms control.
TNF Military/Political Problem
The basic military problem in the theater concerns
deterrence and escalation control. It stems from perceptions
that in the era of strategic parity US use of its strategic
forces in defense of Europe is less credible than before;
NATO therefore requires more credible in-theater escalatory
options to strike Soviet territory in order to deter Soviet
use of its long-range theater nuclear systems and other
farces. The absence of an appropriate NATO theater nuclear
capability to respond might lead the Soviets to believe they
could use their perceived advantage in long-range TNF to
dominate a theater nuclear conflict, in which both the US and
the Soviet Union were deterred from, using strategic nuclear
weapons. This possibility has been increased by Soviet
deployment of the SS-20 and Backfire.
NATO's main means to deal with this military problem
is the linked continuum of conventional, theater nuclear
and strategic nuclear forces. We are moving toward enhancing
NATO's escalatory capability through a modest, evolutionary
deployment of long-range TNF. This would afford greater
credibility to NATO's capability to threaten effectively
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the Soviet Union with limited nuclear strikes without having
only recourse to US strategic systems, whose use might be
thought less credible -- and therefore less deterring.
The political problem is more complex. The principal
concern in the Alliance is that the existing "gap" in
NATO's theater nuclear capabilities could expose Europe to
nuclear intimidation by the Soviets during a crisis. There
is also concern that failure of NATO to respond to the
continuing Soviet deployment of new long-range theater
systems could weaken NATO's political will and solidarity.
Behind these concerns lies the more fundamental political
problem of the long-term health of the US-European security
connection, stemming from questions about the steadiness
and determination of US leadership on the one hand, and
worry about the consequences of strategic parity and the
credibility of the US nuclear guarantee on the other.
There is also a conflicting fear expressed by some that a
determined NATO military response to Soviet deployments
could jeopardize detente, result in decouplina, set off an
unconstrained theater nuclear arms race, and upset the
political and military equilibrium among the Western
European states. TNF arms control could contribute to a
strategy for managing these problems, if undertaken in
conjunction with an appropriate TNF modernization response,
and if US leadership and Alliance unity are sustained.
The following is a discussion of broad objectives the
US should pursue in developing a TNF arms control policy,
and of a set of principles which could provide the initial
basis for discussions with the Allies, leading ultimately
to the development of an agreed Alliance TNF arms control
approach.
Political and Military Objectives
1. Constrain, and if possible reduce, the Soviet nuclear
threat to Europe ..
TNF arms control should have as its central
objective to constrain, and if possible reduce, the growth
of the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe. If we can limit
Soviet deployments, we will have achieved an important
political and military goal of setting boundaries on a
significant part of the TNF threat to NATO. The net result
of an unrestrained competition in Europe could be continued
Soviet TNF preponderance at much higher levels on both sides,
a changed role for TNF in the NATO deterrent, and, with a
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large number of NATO long-range systems, increased
perceptions of the decoupling of US strategic forces from
Europe. Limiting the Soviet long-range theater nuclear
threat would also deprive the Soviets of political and
military leverage over our European Allies which would
arise from perceptions of unconstrained Soviet theater
nuclear deployments, against which the West lacked the will
to respond.
2. Help improve the political climate for NATO
deployments
A credible TNF arms control approach is a sine c~ua
non for virtually all European governments in being able to
'build domestic support for TNF modernization. Nearly all
Allied leaders have told us that a TNF arms control approach
which complements -- and protects -- essential TNF moderni-
zation offers the best chance they have to convince their
Parliaments and publics that a new and destabilizing
regional nuclear arms race is not being launched.
3. Exercise US leadership and reinforce European
confidence in the existing NATO security framework
Events over the last several years--Vietnam, Water-
gate, economic problems, recognition of strategic parity,
Allied perceptions that the US accords priority to the US-
Soviet bilateral relationship over NATO, the ERW matter --
have damaged the US-European security tie. Allied unease
over perceived US indecisiveness or uncertainty about its
role as leader of the West has made positive Alliance action
izz the security field -- particularly in the nuclear area --
more difficult. Many of these doubts are manifest in the TNF
issue. If this issue is not resolved successfully, which
will take US leadership, Alliance cohesion could be shaken.
European confidence in US leadership could suffer a signifi-
cant decline. The greatest danger is the FRG could begin to
question the reliability of the US,and NATO as the basis of
its security.
4. Strengthen Alliance cohesion and coupling through
Allied participation in managing the arms control
component of Alliance security
Much of the European unease and concern over the
theater nuclear balance has come from the perception of
some that the US is managing its security through its own
strategic force developments and the bilateral SALT process,
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~- -
without sufficient concern for Europe's security, which is
deeply affected by decisions in both these areas. The FRG
in particular has been concerned that negotiations on central
systems in isolation from other elements of the NATO
deterrent are inherently decoupling and politically divisive.
The Europeans want to be active participants in this security
structure, and arms control is a vital part of it. We have
seen this most clearly in the last two years of SALT II,
where there has been steadily growing Allied, particularly
German, pressure to be consulted more clearly in the SALT
process. To maintain a strong security relationship between
Europe and the US, we must be prepared to accede to greater
European participation in the management of the East-West
arms control as it extends increasingly into areas directly
affecting Allied security. We should, consistent with our
own national interest in preserving a leading role in
directing the overall process, aim through negotiations on
TNF to bring the Europeans more directly into managing the
East-West strategic relationship in SALT TII.
5. Improve the prospects for SALT and MBFR
There are direct relationships between TNF moderni-
zation and arms control, on the one hand, and SALT and MBFR
on the other. These relationships must be recognized in
advance and managed carefully.
TNF connects with SALT very directly. The Soviets,
despite recent hints to the contrary, may insist on securing
limitations on US "FBS" as a requirement for further
reductions of central systems. We have made it clear to
our Allies that any limitations on US TNF should be
accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater
systems. However, the expansion of SALT III beyond the
central-system issues dealt with in SALT II promises to
complicate the negotiations. We must seek to avoid a
situation in which further reductions from SALT II levels
are held hostage to the very difficult issues involved in
the TNF area. ~~
MBFR Option III could place a numerical limitation at
a relatively low level on US Pershing missile launchers - -
a principal option for TNF modernization. Similarly, a
codified Option III would place limits on US DCA and war-
head levels in the NGA, while analogous Soviet systems
would be unconstrained. Thus, MBFR has clear implications
for TNF modernization.
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MBFR remains the core negotiation with the potential
for direct impact on the conventional threat to NATO
security in central Europe. In the context of the strategic
and TNF situation, the conventional balance is crucial and
must be codified in careful coordination with the evolution
of the theater nuclear equation. Negotiations on TNF must
be handled in such a manner that the basic N1BFR process
is sustained while reconciling the dilemma posed by the
non-reciprocal nature of MBFR Option III.
TNF Arms Control Principles
1. _Our goals in SALT III central-system reductions,
TNF modernization and TNF arms control should be moderate
in scope and mutually supportive.
Two components of our national security policy--Allied
cohesion and a stable strategic balance--converge most
conspicuously in the area of SALT and theater nuclear
modernization. The interrelationship of these two important
areas of US foreign policy bears directly on planning for
SALT III and TNF modernization and arms control issues.
On the one hand, it seems that US willingness to accept
same limits on our theater nuclear systems which can strike
the Soviet homeland will probably be a precondition to
Soviet agreement to any substantial reductions of central
strategic systems. But our ability to meet this precondition
is bounded by the need to respond to Soviet theater-range
force improvements--especially the SS-20 and Backfire. If
we fail to take adequate steps to bolster NATO's own long-
range theater systems, we will stand accused of allowing one
rung of the escalation ladder to weaken so unacceptably as
to place the continuum of deterrence in doubt.
Yet there are doctrinal, as well as practical, limits
on our freedom of action here, as well. For if we exploit
our TNF modernization options to a,degree which seems to
point toward matching Soviet theater forces, we run the risk,
at least in European perceptions, of decoupling our strategic
forces from those based in Europe. Further, if in SALT III
we seek sweeping reductions in central systems, Europeans
may fear a different sort of decoupling; they could see the
US and the Soviets as shifting the emphasis in nuclear forces
from central to theater systems. This fear would be parti-
cularly acute if we accompanied deep central-system
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reductions with a major build-up of long-range US systems
on the continent of Europe.
The interrelationships outlined above seem to point
toward moderation in the relevant aspects of US policy.
Steps taken to improve the long-range component of US
theater nuclear forces should be modest in scope so as to
avoid creating perceptions of decoupling among our NATO
Allies. (The implication is perhaps our central-system
goals in SALT III ought to be moderate also to help avoid
the risk of being seen to move the focus of nuclear con-
frontation to Europe).. Finally, we should be prepared to
accept some limits in SALT III on US long-range TNF, both
so as to make it possible to limit Soviet theater forces
such as the SS-20 and to meet the inevitable Soviet demand
for some limits on US "forward based systems" as a probable
condition on acceptance of meaningful central-system
reductions.
2. TN_F_ arms control should complement TNF moderni-
zation
The fundamental instrument for coping with the political
and military problems caused by Soviet long-range TNF
deployments must reside in an evolutionary deployment of
additional long-range TNF. TNF arms control will be a
complement to modernization, not a substitute. It should
not be allowed to impede those deployments deemed necessary
to restore confidence in the viability of NATO's deterrent
continuum. However, our TNF arms control effort should be
serious, and aimed at constraining the Soviet long-range
TNF threat. Development of a realistic TNF arms control
approach should not lag behind decision on a TNF moderni-
zation program. A credible TNF arms control position will
be essential in improving the political climate for initial
NATO deployments. If successful, it would prevent the need
for still further deployments to sustain a credible deterrent
in Europe. A danger is that some ,A,llies, in an effort to
cope with internal political debate over modernization,
will seek to make actual deployments hostage to the out-
come of arms control negotiations. If this course were
adopted, the result could be no modernization at all. Also,
there is a danger that an arms control position could be
chosen only for political camouflage; such a position would
probably be non-negotiable, damage or delay SALT negotiations
on central systems, and engender further political controversy
:in the Alliance.
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3. The Allies must share the responsibility for
developing a TNF arms control posture
The temptation for us to cut through indecision and
confusion by simply "laying it all out" for the Allies
will be strong; there have been indications that some
Allies would like us to do this and give them political
cover. However, this question goes to the heart of
European security interests, and in the long run we cannot
carry the burden alone. The political risks in pursuing
TNF arms control (and modernization) are too great for us
to appear to have induced the Allies to go along. Even
in following our lead, the Allies must clearly accept a
share of the decision-making. This necessarily will entail
increased Allied involvement in SALT III ^^ assuming TNF
negotiations will take place in the SALT framework -- and
in our decisions on US theater nuclear programs.
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4. Maximizing bargaining leverage requires-that
decisions on modernization b_e taken iri a way that holds
open the prospect of further~deAloyments.
NATO~s initial modernization program will be "evolu-
tionary" in size and character. It will be a floor,
intended to satisfy intrinsic deterrent requirements,
within current policy and doctrine; it could only be cut
back to the extent that the Soviet threat was constrained.
Some systems probably will not be included in the initial
modernization package; the numbers will also be modest.
If we are to have maximum bargaining leverage against
Soviet TNF, the decision on the initial modernization
program will have to be taken in a way that does not rule
out additional systems or larger numbers in the future. We
want to be able to link subsequent NATO deployments of
additional systems or larger numbers to Soviet restraint.
This will require a US willingness to continue at least
some programs for systems which were not included in the
initial program, or only in limited numbers. Since we
cannot know whether TNF arms control will successfully
limit Soviet deployments, or how the Soviets might react
in force posture terms to NATO deployments, preserving
the capability -- and the presumption of Alliance readi-
Hess -- to deploy additional long-range theater systems
will be necessary in any case.
5. Our TNF arms control approach should stress
simplicity.
The simpler our arms control approach, the more
manageable the negotiations should be. We have no indi-
cations so far that the Allies would object to keeping
negotiations bilateral and the Soviets will probably
favor a bilateral negotiation as well. Moreover, the more
theater systems involved in the negotiations, the less
chance of success and the more likely that central-system
negotiations would be delayed. Focusing the negotiations
only on the modern long-range theater systems of both
sides which have caused the greatest political and military
concerns should provide the most manageable framework for
negotiations and an agreement, and would lessen perceptions
of decoupling inherent in a more sweeping "Eurostrategic"
negotiation.
There are potential problems with this approach: it
would leave out a lot of old long-range TNF on the Soviet
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side, and all of the short-range systems which the Soviets
could move forward to increase coverage of Western Europe
and which are expanding and modernizing along with long-
range Soviet TNF; if the limitations applied to European-
based systems only, the Soviets would have a large breakout
potential in their non-European deployments of modern, mobile
systems such as the SS-20.
6. Allied systems should be excluded from theater
ceilings or limits, and there should be no compensation for
Allied systems in any negotiated ceilings.
This relates directly to the aim of keeping TNF negotia-
tions manageable, and our desire to preserve the bilateral
character of SALT. Politically, there is no present possi-
bility of including French systems, and the price for in-
cluding UK systems would be British participation in the
negotiations. Moreover, we may have strong reasons for
excluding Allied systems as a counterweight to excluded
alder Soviet systems such as the SS-4s and 5s. Formal com-
pensation for Allied systems in the US totals is equally un-
acceptable.
There are difficulties with this approach: the Soviets
will likely argue that their long-range TNF are a counter to
Allied nuclear systems, and that they cannot agree to limit
such systems in the absence of limits on French and British
systems, or at least numerical compensation for them via a
larger Soviet ceiling. If Allied systems are excluded, we
must be able to resolve satisfactorily for ourselves and for
the Allies the non-circumvention and non-transfer issues,
which will inevitably be more complex and difficult than in
SALT II.
7. TNF ceilings must be equal: no de jure asymmetries.
Politically, parity of ceilings and rights is essential.
However, there are difficulties with parity. For one thing,
parity could be perceived as establishing a formal "Euro-
strategic" balance, and therefore decoupling. This has been
a strong French and British fear, and the HLG itself has
declared that parity in numbers should not be an objective
in TNF modernization.
However, if the focus were on a narrow class of modern
long-range systems, the decoupling connotations of formal
parity would be smaller than in a broader negotiation. More-
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over, formal parity in rights need not imply actual numerical
parity in deployments. The ceilings would be on a narrow
class of modern systems; older Soviet systems would be ex-
cluded (though over time, as older systems were retired,
equal ceilings in modern systems could lead to actual parity).
Moreover, NATO might not exercise its right to deploy up to
the permitted ceiling, which could make the exclusion of UK
and French forces more palatable to the Soviets. Conversely,
the existence of those excluded Allied systems could relieve
political problems arising from actual inequality of deplo~~ed
forces.
8. The aim should be to negotiate a ceiling on Soviet
de la ents of modern lon -range TNF at a realistic level.
Our goal should be modest and realistic, in order to
promote the prospect of agreement and thus to protect negotia-
tions on central systems from being blocked by TNF negotia-
tions. Although we should press for some reductions, we
probably should not expect to reduce deployments of modern
Soviet s~~stems significantly below what we believe are planned
levels. In any case, we will need to preserve room for carrying
out our own modernization plans. Setting a ceiling would be
an important achievement in enhancing NATO security. It
would avoid an unlimited regional competition in which the
Soviets would have many geographic and political advantages.
An unconstrained Soviet build-up could undermine the strategic
balance, change com?~letely the role of theater forces in NATO's
deterrent posture by necessitating deployments going beyond an
"evolutionary" adjustment, and alter the character of SALT. A
ceiling, perhaps with some reduction in the level of antici-
pated Soviet deployments, could set the stage for future, more
constraining TNF limitations.
The difficulty with pursuing the modest objective of
a ceiling on deployment of only certain modern Soviet long-
range systems is that it might be seen by some of our Allies
and by arms control supporters here as arms control tokenism,
doing nothing to reduce the nuclear threat to Europe or to
control the deployment of new, destabilizing systems. The
Soviets, too, might see a ceiling -- combined with unconstrainE=d
UK and French forces -- as merely codifying a NATO TNF buildup
of a dangerous new strategic threat to the Soviet homeland,
while constraining their ability to respond through larger
deployments than planned.
9. T~7e should be prepared to discuss our theater systems
in SALT III only if the Soviets are prepared to negotiate on
their theater systems.
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We will need a posture on theater systems at the
opening of SALT III negotiations. The Soviets are almost
certain to raise Protocol-limited cruise missiles, FBS and
Allied systems. Our basic posture should be to "put into
action" our formulation on theater systems ("Any future
limitations on US systems principally designed for theater
missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on
Soviet theater systems"). We would indicate that we were
prepared to discuss our own theater systems (not Allied
systems), but only if the Soviets were prepared to discuss
their theater systems. This would establish a direct linkage
between our TNF and Soviet theater systems.
This posture would have at least three important
advantages:
-- A consensus on it in the Alliance. might be possible
by the opening of SALT III.
-- It would afford us an Alliance-endorsed posture an
TNF arms control by the beginning of SALT III even
if we had not developed a detailed TNF negotiating
package by that time.
-- It would put the burden on the Soviets to reply
to our position, rather than leave us with no
response to their opening demands.
The Soviets may be prepared to agree to our formulation
at the outset and propose that negotiations begin immediately,
before we had agreement in the Alliance on a negotiating
approach. This tactical difficulty could be managed by
.focusing early discussions in SALT III on the objectives and
principles for negotiations on this new class of systems, and
on the structure and modalities of negotiations. Moreover,
we can put the burden on the Soviets to come up with the
opening proposals. But, we will also retain the option of
initiating a proposal near the outset if we are ready.
10. W_e should seek to avoid~~negotiating linkages
between central-system issues and TNF issues.
We do not know how to relate or make tradeoffs between
central and theater systems and there are serious risks in
attempting to do so. The issues inherent in further central-
system limitations will be difficult and complex enough with-
out trying to deal with negotiating linkages between central
and theater systems. irTe have important goals for central
systems that we do not want to have held hostage to limits
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a on theater systems, and vice versa. Separating the issues
would tend to strengthen the link between our TNF and
Soviet TNF. We also want to keep Allied involvement in
developing negotiating approaches confined to TNF issues,
and avoiding negotiating linkages between TNF and central
systems will facilitate this. The Soviets may also have
this concern; but it is far more likely that they will want
to predicate further reductions in central systems on limits
on our theater systems (and possibly Allied systems). Dis-
cussion of TNF in SALT III may be centered for some time on
this question.
There are many obvious difficulties with avoiding TNF
and central system negotiating linkages. Obviously, the
Soviets, and we also, will relate the two aspects of the
negotiation in formulating positions. The Soviets will
doubtless link the timing of resolution of issues and of
agreement in one area to resolution of issues in the other.
Our Allies will also relate developments in these two nego-
tiating areas. Indeed, the very idea of not linking TNF and
central system issues could cause difficulties with the
Allies, who would be concerned that such an agreement would
codify a separate European theater balance and lead to de-
c;oupling. Avoiding TNF and central system linkages also
runs directly contrary to recent German thinking about an
'"overall strategic balance" including long-range TNF, and
the notion of using US central-system advantages, such as warheads
to negotiate limits on Soviet TNF. Despite these problems, because
~' __-- of the importance of protecting negotiations on central systems,
and of facilitating the prospects for TNF-TNF linkage, estab-
lishing a negotiating framework which avoids TNF-central system.
_linkages should be a US objective. But, because of the strong
r_rosscurrents of interests involved, it is nat an idea which
we can thrust on the Allies and the Soviets. We should maneuver
to bring this about, using Soviet interest in preserving SALT
and Allied interest in achieving limits on Soviet TNF. This
principle should not be included in the discussion paper for
the Allies. It should be allowed to develop out of the arms
control analysis in the NATO Special Group, where consideratior.~
of the practicalities of negotiations and political realism
should lead to it.
11. If the
Soviets
seek to
link
central-system issues
to TNF issues, or
re use
to agree
o
a - or- in age,
we s ou propose
a
issues
e
pos pone w i e nego ia-
~ions on cen ra
sys ems
procee .
This tactic would be driven by our interest in not
allowing negotiations on central systems to be delayed while
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SECRET
_~-
the TNF question is sorted out. It may be difficult to put
into practice, because of our own TNF objectives and because
of the strong linkage we can expect the Soviets to make
between further central-system limits and US FBS. It could
also result in little progress on both clusters of issues
for a time. Nevertheless the TNF-for-TNF linkage is of
sufficient importance that we must have an answer to Soviet
delaying tactics. .And, we have important levers to build
pressure on the Soviets not to delay resolution of these
questions too long:
-- The Alliance will be making concrete modernization
decisions.
-- US theater programs will be continuing (and in some
cases, e.g., Pershing II) may be accelerated.
-- The Protocol clock on cruise missiles will be
running.
These factors will confront the Soviets with the prospect
of an unconstrained NATO deployment of long-range theater
systems in Europe targeted on the Soviet Union. We will be
holding out to them the opportunity of negotiating so~m_e
limits on such deployments. If the Soviets have any inten-
tion of seeking to constrain NATO deployments through arms
control, they cannot wait too long. But, how serious the
Soviets would regard such pressures would depend critically
on how the Alliance shapes decisions on modernization: if
the decision is such that it is clear to the Soviets that
future deployments of larger numbers or of new systems is
highly unlikely for political reasons, pressure on them for
~% early agreement to our basic TNF approach in SALT III would
be far less.
There are also Alliance problems with this tactic.
Offering to set aside temporarily TNF issues could heighten
fears that the theater nuclear question is a peripheral one
for the US, and that we accord greatest priority to progress
on central-system issues. Moreover, using the prospect of
growing NATO TNF deployments as a lever over the Soviets may
create severe political strains for some NATO countries, who
will be having difficulty enough adhering to a NATO consensus
for modest deployments without having also to support such
a hard-nosed, "stonewall" approach to TNF in SALT III. There-
fore, this principle is not one which should be raised with
the Allies at this stage, and would not be included in a
"principles" paper for the Allies.
SECRET
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 SF;CRET/NOI~ORN
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So~rict Long Ran c Thc~itcr \uclear L orce~Y
--Soviet long-range nuclear forces have long consti-
tuted an important part of the tVarsati~i Pact's capa-
bility to execute nuclear strikes against European
NATO. Ten yyears ago these forces--measured both in
numbers of delivery systems and on-target weapons--
were comparable in magnitude to Soviet inter-
continental range "central systems."
Graphic I
Trends 1969-1979:
--The present mix of nuclear systems which the Soviets
can bring to bear on the continental United States
and European NATO, reflects the emphasis they have ~ ~ {'/
placed on the deployment of modern intercontinental ~~~
range weapons. Dramatic growth has also taken place,
however, in Pact medium-range theater nuclear forces,
which have doubled since 1g69, ;'
--Growth in LRTNF over the past 10 years has been less
dramatic. In fact, the number of delivery systems
oriented on European NATO has actually declined
since 1969 and currently stands at a level o_f almost
1200 missiles and medium bombers. However, the number
of deliverable bombs, air-to-surface missiles and
warheads has increased somewhat and currently totals
nearly 2000.
~PR'~t-3$ an3'subsequent working groups have employed the NATO Nuclear
Planning Group usage with respect to theater nuclear forces. According,
throughout this text, Long-Range Theater P;uclear Forces (LRTNF) are those
theater nuclear systems with missile range or aircraft radius of over'
~QO kil m ters Medium-range systems (~~~TNF) are those with range or
~b
e~re n lIl1Z1000 kilometers, and short-range systems (SRTNF)
radius of
~
anges of less than ll-i0 kilometers.
are those with
! /
.SECRET/NOFORN
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Pact Nuclear Forces Orient ~n the IJS and NATO,
in .1 9, 1 an ro~ecte
o~
~~!
15;000
10,000
5,000
LRTNF
Central
System(CS)
1. Includes "central systems" plus those medium and long-range (_? 100 km) theater
nuclear forces oriented on Europe.
2. Projections are consistent with NIE 11-3/8-78 .and NIE 11-6-78.
I5?38
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Coin;~arison s~~ith :~;~17'0:
-The magnitude of Soviet LP,T'eP itiith i~esrect to
N.'1T0 forces has not changed significar.tl}~, since
19h9 e-vertM~~~11 the x111 ies - -notably the French- -
h~~aave deployed several ballistic missile submarines
the US-has a~1s-o deployed F-111 aircraft to bases
in the UK.
Graphic II
--Currently the number of in-place Soviet LRTNF
delivery systems--as well as weapons--exceeds NATO's
by a ratio of about ~ The composition of the
NATO and Soviet force i ers greatly, however, as
exemplified by the relatively large share of Soviet
weapons carried by land-based ballistic missiles.
--It is this .specific set of Soviet LRTNF which concern the
US and NATO and will be the focus of ar*ns control
efforts. In addition, it is the NATO LP.TNF set repre-
sented on this graphic which is presently being
considered for enlargement and modernization.
--In addition to the in- la e NATO LRTNF, the US has
committed ,_t_Q SACEUR. The missiles
which carry ese weapons are already SALT constrained, a
however, and would therefore not be the subject of
any LRTNF negotiations.
--Other long-range forces not represented on this
graphic include the FB-11-1 medium bomber force, based
in the US, as well as SACLANT-assigned and other
US aircraft carrier nuclear strike forces.
Importance of Pact MRTNF:
--Soviet and Eastern European operated medium and short-range
forces opposite NATO have recently exhibited sub-
stantial growth. They are of increasing importance
in considering the numerical balance of Pact and NATO
theater nuclear forces. ~ - .
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,Comp~.rison of Pact and NATO Theater iclear Forces in Europe in 1979
by , gel, 2 , 3 - -^~_
NOTE: For all line items, the first figure indicates number of
delivery systems, and the second ( ) the number of weapons.
Long-Range
(Systems Over 1000 KM)4
SLBP~
MRjIRBM
Aircraft
Soviet
30 (30)
4b9(595)
694(1363)
1193 (1988)
Pact NATO
Rockets
Tubes
Other
Medium-Range
(Systems 100 KP4 to 100' !~`'1?
592
288
72
1.779 L1839~__
1. Concept used is that of an unreinforced "one-time only" exchange. Aircraft and missile launcher rn1~-~?~ a~~
not included. 25X4
2. Geographic are _ wes ern-mos mi i ary ~stric`s -~ i:',c~
Soviet Union, the two western LRA commands, and the three western Soviet fleet areas.
3. Includes French systems. ~ '?~~~?"`"~'??~""'"~'~" ..._~~.-..,-~-.,--.~,. - -"
4. Some "central system" missile tubes- oviet UK and French.
5. Excludes committe o SACEUR, but already taken account of as central systems.
6. In accordance with PRM-3E3, only "SACEUR nuclear-tasked aircraft are counted rather than nominally nuclr~,r-
..._ r,~ ?-ate
capable. For the Pact, only those aircraft for which nuclear trained ilots are currently available lrc,
counted. Counting based upon ominall nuclear capable aircraft would result in Pact/P1AT0 totals :~~ ':>'.~~-?14
delivery systems, respectively. ~,~ _.__._
~
___ _.
~
7. SLCM launch rails on Soviet ships, submarines and,znissile fast-boats:'` /ate. ~ ?~-
3. Nike-Hercules SAMs modified to be secondarily capable o~ surface=to-surface strikes.
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25X4
Pact
SSBr~i 534 (534)
Aircraft 885 945 6
Other 359(359
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t'vith the recent Soviet deployment of nuclear
artillery, the Pacf has enhanced its short-range
t?Zeater nuclear forces, which now slightly out-
number those of NATO.
--Soviet and Pact MRTNF now exceed the in-place
medium-range forces of NATO by a ratio of about
in delivery systems and in weapons. In
num ers, the Pact possesses nearly 1,800 "
delivery systems capable of delivering about the
same number of weapons. About half the delivery
systems are dual-capable tactical aircraft, most
of which have been deployed within the past 10
years.
--The significance of asymmetrical geographic
circumstances is illustrated by the fact that ~'
from forward bases in Eastern Europe, Pact ~ ~.~ ~,~~~.~-
MRTNF can strike nrartirally nvorv +.
,,..,~?+ ,..~
_
consec{uence in ~t~estern Europe, while NATO MRTNF ~"~~"'~'"~.
._aii 1 Ccll..ll villy d. rew mad or targets on the
~+!es-tern fringes of the Soviet Union.
--These Soviet and Pact medium range systems will
not be considered in arms negotiations which are
definitionally restricted to LRTNF. In addition,
most of the Soviet tactical aircraft are deployed
within the Soviet Union, and are hence. ,not presently
treated in the MBFR forum.
Projections in Soviet LRTNF
--Refocusing on Soviet LRTNF... As noted earlier,
the actual number of delivery systems in this
category has decreased since 1969. This decrease
.will continue, and it is projected that by 1985
only about 900 -systems will be operational opposite
Europe . * ~."`~_ y
~ These projections are based upon the moderate level of effort de-
ployment pattern described in NIE 11-6-78. A larger 1985 force
could result-from a higher level of effort than anticipated, or
the retention of SS-4/5's in the force for arms control bargaining
purposes.
-3-
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c~.?-ems
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~ f ~
rn ( r~
r-1 P ~t
~ to ? r-I
"`J O H
O ?~ N
d ,-i ?,~ ~ v .~
cd ~ R: v +~
Lq }.i .,i
~I_?~(~-I~ I~ IOU
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Gra=~h i s l 1 I
--These relatively modest quantitative changes in
Soviet LRTNF are overshadowed, hoti~ever, by signi-
ficant, conct.irrent qualitative chanties in the
Soviet force. Principal among these arc con-
tinued deployments of the Backfire medium bomber
and the SS-20 IRBM.
--There are presently about 100 Backfires operational
with the Soviet Northwest and~Southwest bomber
commands and the three ~Uestern fleet"_areas. Some
230 will probably be operationally deployed in
these areas by 1985, and will be distributed
about equally between Soviet naval and long-range
aviation, largely as replacements for older air-
craft.
--The low altitude and supersonic capabilities of
the Backfire, as well as its improved avionics,
and its stand-off ALCM armament, render it.
particularly suitable in the naval strike role,
or as a complement to ballistic missiles in the
land attack role.
--The first SS-20 IRBM launchers probably became
operational in 1977, and about 60 are now thought to be
oriented against Europe. It is projected that
almost 200 will be arrayed against NATO by 1985.
--Its three to~o~ur~-i~n._dependent~ targetable war-
heads are significantly more accurate than"the
single SS-4/5 warhead, and its mobile basing ~~'
mode renders it vastly more survivable. It uses
solid fuel, and for this and other reasons has a
faster reaction time than the SS-4/5. The system
probably will ultimately be deployed with two
refire missiles_
-----__
Graphic IV .
Importance of SS-20 Refires
?--Given currently planned NATO TNF modernization
programs, Soviet LRTNF--even without SS-20 refire
missiles--will by 1985 exceed NATO's by a factor
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 Approv
ed For Release 2002/09/0~~ `C1A1RL?3P8~004018001500010001-7 GRAP1 t I C I t'
Co arison of Soviet a NATO LRTNF in Euro e
in 1985, Wit an ~9it out -20 Re lresl,2
NOTE: Fo
de
r all line items, the first figure indicates the number
livery systems, and the second () the nur,~ber of weapons
of
.
Wi
thout SS-20 Refines
With SS-20 Refires3
2 5X4
Pact NATO
Pact N:1'I'{~
SLBhI
25X4
--
3 (3)
3 (3)
fi4R/IR~t
22
9 (688)
625 (2002) 3
Aircraft "67
1406
~ ~ Aircraft
675 1406
LRTNF 90
7(2097)
LRTNF
1303(3411)
CentraZ~ System
Supplements UNKS
Central Sz~stem
Supp Zements UlJK
Total 90?+(2097+)
2303+(3411f)
1. Soviet Projections are based upon NIE 11-6-78.
2. Assumes NATO TNF modernization programs of currently forseeable character and pace.
3. Based upon a projection of 2, refines per SS-20 launcher. It is felt that that about one-third
of the SS-20 force will be equipped with 4-MIRV warheads.
4. Reflects projected changes in French theater nuclear inventories. In 1986 a sixth French
55BN will probably be operational, and will provide an additional 16 missiles.
5. An unknown number of Soviet ICBMs and intercontinental range SLBMs may be targeted on Europe.
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in on-tarhet ~veanons. i'tihen refire
missiles are incorporated into the analysis,
~t_ - ---_
--The inclusion of the into
this comparison is o o a un cnoivn egree
by the "central system" ICBMs and SLBMs which
the Soviets. are believed to have targetted
against Europe.
Graphic V
Implications
--Improvements in Soviet and Pact theater nuclear
forces at all levels are important in several
ways...
--The growth and modernization of medium-range
TNF enhance the Pact's ability to wage war in
Central Europe at whatever level NATO or they
themselves choose, without having to resort to
USSR based bomber or missile forces.
--Once the mobile SS-20 is deployed in larger
numbers, the increased survivability character-
istics of this f r it practically
This in turn will
ena e t e onsets to behave with g~eat_er__c
fdence and restrair~.~ in a nuclear or r~ar-
,
s
__._. T _..._._~...R . ~. __.
~_,_._~.
tion of tar ets in I'~estern furo e P ruc-
~,,.~ __-...__~. _.. _ _ ..-_. .____. _ ..-- - _ P..
would insure a hi h robabilit of P
~ P y prom t =de
t
~,_
--If USSR-based TNF are employed, the ~ar~e_~umber'
of SS-20 warheads--including refires--and the``?,
high accuracy characteristics of that wea on
nuclear conflict. ~~_,
25X4
25X4
massive nuclear pre-emptive strike, or response ~~ ~~~
to NATO's first use. In recent years, Soviet
planners h b ~~ ~ ~~~
ave
previous strategic doctrine which visualized a
t
--In theory. these developments increacP ~?t,~+~,,,-;.,,,.,`=. /i?
een? examining such nuclear options an d
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Implications of. Sovi~. act TNF Improvements
--Increased ability to wage nuclear war in Europe without escalating
t0 USSR-based forces.
--If USSR-based TNF are considered...
'high survivability characteristics of SS-20 will permit the Soviets
to behave with greater confidence and restraint.
'Large numbers of SS-20 warheads/refires and high accuracy character
istics insure high probability of prompt target destruction.
--In theory these developments...
'Enhance Soviet capabilities to execute limited nuclear options.
'The Soviets are presently exploring such options.
--Currently, however, Soviet planners appear pessimistic about prospect
of containing intensity and geographic scope of any nuclear conflict.
--Crowing Soviet/Pact nuclear superiority at all levels could cause Sovic~
to believe that NATO might be reluctant to employ nuclear weapons in
response to a conventional attack.
'Current NATO TNF modernization programs would not be viewed as a]-term,
these trends.
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--These doctrinal. reviei,~s noth~,?ithstanding, soviet
writings and other evidence indicate that
Soviet planners see little prospect of con-
taining the intensity and geographic scope
of a conflict once the nuclear threshold
has been crossed by either side.
--Perhaps the most significant implication of
the growing Soviet and Pact nuclear-superiority--
at all levels--is the prospect that the military
a~d.vantages to NATO of introducing nuclear wea-~
pons into combat have._~scxeased.~ Consequently,
tie Soviets may believe--increasingly--that NATO
,.might be reluctant to employ nuclear weapons
in response to a conventional attack.
--Currently programmed NATO modernization steps
would probably not be viewed as altering these fore
seeable and--for the Soviets--favorable nuclear
force trends.
~ 7-- -~? r
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`t~1Y BRIEFING WILL ADDRESS SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES OPPOSITE
AND Is CLassIFIED ToP SECRET. i WiLL BE DISCUSSING SoYtET
UELIVERY SYSTEMS WHICH COULD 8E USED DURING A NUCLEAR CONFLICT
Ifs EUROPE, FOCUSING IN TODAY'S PRESENTATION UPON THE LONGER
kAfJGE SOVIET SYSTEMS. `I WILL HIGHLIGHT THE QUALITATIVE AND
t~UANTITATIYE IMPROVEMENTS WHICH ARE UNDERWAY, PRESENT OUR
CURRENT ESTIMATE UN THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (BOMBS AND
WARHEADS) ASSOCIATED WITH THESE DELIVERY SYSTEMS, AND PROVIDE
SOME BRIEF COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET CONCEPTS ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF
WUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE.
~_ `IT SHOULll BE NOTED THAT SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABLE FORCES FOR
A EUROPEAN CONFLICT CAN BE DIVIDED INTO TWO CATEGORIES:
T}iE FIRST IS COMPRISED OF LONG RANGE SOVIET ,~,TRATEGIC PERIPHERAL
;,K FORCES LOCATED WITHIN THE USSR AND THE ADJACENT SEa
AREAS wHlCti ARE INTENDED FOR USE IN A EUROPEAN THEATER OF
WAR. THESE PURGES WOULD BE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF
Tf1E SUVIET`~iENERAL STAFF, EXERCISED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE
FORCE HEAll9UARTERS, IN SUPPORT OF THEATER RE9UIREMENTS? THE
SECUNll CATEGUkY CONSISTS OF TACTICAL SYSTEMS l~lHICH ARE,
GENERALLY, OF SHORTER RANGE AND WOULD BE UNDER THE DIRECT
CUiJTRUL OF A PACT FRONT OR FLEET COMMANDER- SINCE THE LATE
1960'S, BOTH CATEGORIES OF FORCES HAVE UNDERGONE IMPORTANT
CHANGES IN BOTH SIZE AND CAPABILITIES.
~ _ `I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THE STRATEGIC FORCES TODAY.
THE LONGER RANGE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS CONSIST OF THE USSR-BASED
MFI~IUM RANGE AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCE
.~~-
~ JOB NUMBER: 0117 TOP JEGPET~.. ~~v~~~~`'v~~ C;~~ J
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WHICH IS DEDICATED TO NUCLEAR ATTACKS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER;
'.T, THE USSR-BASED BOMBER FORCE WHICH IS INTENDED PRIMARILY
FOR THEATER EMPLOYMENT;; AND LASTLY AT THOSE NAVAL BALLISTIC
MISSILE SUBMARINES WHICN APPEAR TO HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF
STRIKING EUROPEAN TARGETS.
~ '90~ OF THE SOVIET MR AND IRBM LAUNCHERS ARE DEPLOYED
IN THE WESTERN USSR AND ARE CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING AGAINST
WESTERN EUROPE- THE REMAINDER ARE TARGETED AGAINST EITHER
--THE PRC OR UTNER PERIPHERAL TARGETS- THIS MAP SHOWS THE
GENERAL LOCATION IN WHICH MOST OF THE MR/IRBM LAUNCH COMPLEXES
ARE DEPLOYED.
THE SS-4 MRBM WAS INITIALLY DEPLOYED IN LATE 1958, AND
IS LAUNCHED FROM EITHER A SOFT OR HARDENED SITE- ITS RANGE
'= COVERAGE AGAINST NATO TARGETS IS INDICATED.
THE SS-5 IRBM BECAME OPERATIONAL IN 1961, AND, LIKE THE
SS-4, IS LAUNCHED FROM EITHER SOFT OR HARDENED LOCATIONS. IN
FACT, APPROXIMATELY 80 PERCENT OF THE SS-4S AND SS-5S ARE
llEPLOYEll AT SOFT SITES, EACH OF WHICH HAS THE CAPABILITY TO
FIRE A SECOND MISSILE 2-4 HOURS AFTER THE FIRST MISSILE HAS
6 BEEN LAUNCHED. ?A NEW MISSILE, THE SS-20, NAS BEEN DEVELOPED
AND THE FIRST BASE OPPOSITE NATO ATTAINED AN OPERATIONAL
CAPABILITY IN THE SUMMER OF 78? THIS SYSTEM HAS A GREATER
RANGE THAN THE S~-5, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY: IT IS MDRE ACCURATE,
IT IS A ROAD-MOBILE SYSTEM M[TH AT LEAST A LIMITED OFF-ROAD
CAPABILITY ON FIRM, REASONABLY LEVEL TERRAIN; IT HAS A
MULTIPLE REFIRE CAPABILITY, AND HAS A MIRV'ED WARHEAD MITH
NREE REENTRY VEHICLES- WE EXPECT THAT EVENTUALLY THE SS-20
1YARNfNG NOT1CE - 1N?r' ! ~"~"'^~
$Ot1RCES Ai~lO ML3HODS uti'~ ~.LVF~
TOP SECRET ,.a,;,~
'9~j r~~,'n~?~~ ~ n -, ~
II~Juu~~L~~~;~,1 Lr~~ ~~
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 ~ vi ~L~~r11L
HI LL REPLACEA~~I~ov~~ ~~R~I1~s~~0e2r0~rv~: e1i~~2DP~~Bal~01~8'~,~00010001-7
198U'S, IT K1 LL BE THE MAINSTAY OF THE LAND-BASED BALLISTIC
M LE FORCE FOR THEATER USE.
'SEVEN OPERATIONAL SS-20 MOBILE MISSILE BASES HAVE BEEN
IDENTIFIED TO DATE LOCATED IN THE WESTERN HALF OF THE USSR,
AS SHOWN. (PAUSE)
'THE CURRENT NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL MR/iRBM3JJCHERS IS
SHOWN HERE. (PAUSE)
t AS CAN BE SEEN ON THIS CHART, THE CONTINUING DEPLOYMENT
OF THE SS-20 WILL RESULT IN A AUANTITATIVE INCREASE IN THE
WUMBER OF REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH CAN BE TARGETED AGAINST
EUROPE. IN THE EARLY 1980'S, WHEN THE SS-20 FORCE IS FULLY
DEPLOYED, AND THE ANTICIPATED REFIRE MISSILES ARE INCLUDED,
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF RV'S WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER THAN
T' ':URRENT LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 1200?
'HERE IS A MORE DETAILED TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER OF
REENTRY VEHICLES ASSOCIATED WITH THE MR/IRBM FORCE. THE TOTAL
INCLUDES A REFIRE MISSILE FOR EACH OF THE SOFT-SITE SS-4 AND
SS-5 LAUNCHERS AND A REFIRE MISSILE FOR EACH SS-20 LAUNCHER.
ADDITIONALLY, THE SS-20 FIGURE ACCOUNTS FOR THE THREE INDEPEN-
DENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES ON EACH MISSILE.
'1N ADDITION TO THE THE MR/IRBM FORCE, THE SOVIETS HAVE
L ABOUT 1,400 ICBMS, SOME OF WHICH COULD.BE~BROUGNT TO BEAR
AGAINST EUROPEAN TARGETS IF NECESSARY. IN THE LATE 1960s,
THEY BUILT 120 SS-11 LAUNCHERS WHICH WERE ORIENTED SO AS TO
PROVIDE BETTER COVERAGE OF WEST EUROPEAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN
--=1AKGET-S ? ALTHOUDH SOME OF THESE Mi SS I LES HavE BEEN REPLACED
t NEWER SYSTEMS, THE SOVIETS MAY CONTINUE TO ALLOCATE SOME
OI=~HE ICBM FORCE TO EUROPEAN TARGETS- ALL THE USSR'S NEw
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ICBMS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO BE LAUNCHED IN NEARLY ANY DIRECTION
IN ADDITION, ALL BUT THE SS-18 ICBM NAVE BEEN TESTED AT
REDUCED RANGES.
`THE LARGE SOVIET INTERMEDIATE RANGE BOMBER FLEET OF LONG
KAWIiE AVIATION (LRA) HAS EXISTED PRIMARILY FOR OPERIONS
AGA1tJST NATO FORCES. INDICATIVE OF THIS IS THE FACT THAT 75~
OF THIS FLEET IS DEPLOYED IN THE WESTERN USSR, WITHIN THE
COMBAT RADIUS OF EUROPEAN TARGETS MfITHOUT AERIAL REFUELING OR
STAGING.
THE BADGER, WHICH ACCOUNTS FOR ABOUT TWO-THIRDS OF THE
FORCE, ENTERED SERVICE OVER 20 YEARS AGO AND HAS NOT BEEN
PRODUCED SINCE 1959? NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS ARE SEEKING
TU EXTEfJD THE USEFUL LIFE OF THESE AIRCRAFT 8Y EQUIPPING
_M WITH IMPROVED AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES.
-~ `THE BLINDER, A DESIGN OF THE LATE 1950s, BEGAN TO ENTER
THE FORCE IN 1962 AND KENT OUT OF PRODUCTION IN 1969?
`THE FORCE BASED OPPOSITE NATO NOW CONSISTS OF ABOUT 139
BLINDERS ANll 237 BADGERS. 168 BADGERS OPPOSITE NATO ARE
E9UIPPED WITH AS-5 oR AS-6 MISSILES BUT CAN ALSO BE USED AS
FREEFALL BOMBERS. THE OTHER 69 STRIKE-CONFIGURED BADGERS
HAVE ONLY A FREEFALL BOMBING CAPABILITY. ABOUT 64 OF THE
BLINDERS CARRY THE AS-4 AIR-TO-SURFACE~MI~SSILE AND DO NOT
HAVE A BOMBING CAPABILITY. 75 BLINDERS ARE CONFIGURED AS
GRAVITY BOMBERS ONLY.
THE LRA FORCE IS BEING UPGRADED MITH THE INTRODUCTION OF
THE NEW BACKFIRE BOMBER, WHICH BECAME OPERATIONAL IN 1974; 50
CURkENTLY OPERATIONAL WITHIN LRA?
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 `THE BACKFIRE HAS SWINGWINGS NHll.hl tNA~tt_t 11 iu I.KUIJC ni
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SPEEDS AT LOW ALT[TUDES? IT IS EQUIPPED WITH ECM EQUIPMENT
FACILITATE PENETRATION OF MODERN AIR DEFENSES. THE
~>iACKFIRE CAN CARRY EITHER NUCLEAR BOMBS OR AS-~,:~SMS?
- ONES BASED AT POLT~VA iN THE USSR
~ BACKFIRES, SUCH AS THE
MOULD BE AIiLE TO FLY A HIGH-SPEED, LOW-LEVEL PENETRATION
MISSION, WITH THE FLEXIBILITY"TO STRIKE A GREATER NUMBER OF
h10RE llISTANT TARGETS IN EUROPE THAN EITHER THE BADGER OR
BLINllER?
SHOWN HERE ARE THE RESPECTIVE RANGES OF BACKFIRE AND BADGER
ASM CARRIERS. NOTE THAT THE BACKFIRE MISSION PROFILE INCLUDES
A ZUO MILE LUW ALTITUDE PENETRATION WHILE THE BADGER IS AW ALL
HIGI~ ALTITUDE PROFILE.
7 'IIIIS TABLE PRESENTS OUR CURRENT ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER
NUCLEAR WEAPONS (BOMBS AND ASMS) WHICH MIGNT BE CARRIED BY
SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION AIRGRAFT? THE REPRESENTATIVE
WEAPONS LOADINGS USEll To COMPUTE THE TOTALS SHORN VARY FROM
UNE ASM ON THE BLINllER "B" U P TO FOUR NUCLEAR BOMBS WHICH
COULD BE CARRIED BY INE BACKFIRE.
g `TURNING NOW TO SUBMARINES: BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES
HAVING MISSILES WITH RANGES OF UP 1600 NM ARE PROBABLY ASSIGNED
TARGETS IN WESTERN EUROPE AS THEIR PRIMARY MISSION. THE
g GULF-II (PAUSE) AND 'HOTEL-II CLASS S1J$MAKINES INITIALLY SERVED
AS PART OF THE SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK FORCE, BUT BY THE
MID-1970S THE AVAILABILITY OF NEWER, MORE MODERN YANKEE 8 DELTA
CLASS SUBMARINES ALLOWED THE SOVIETS TO BEGIN RELIEVING THESE
ULllER UNITS OF THEIR INTERCONTINENTAL MISSION. RECENT PATROL
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PATTERNS SUGGEST THAT ALMOST ALL OPERATIONAL GOLF-11 AND
N .-II CLASS BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES HAVE SHIFTED TO
THEATER ATTACK MISSIONS.
`IN ].976, THE SOVIETS TRANSFERRED SIX GOLF-11 CLASS
SUBMARINES FROM THE NORTHERN FLEET TO THE LIEPAJA NAVAL BASE
UN THE BALTIC SEA--THE FIRST DEPLOYMENT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE
SUBMARINES TO THAT OPERATING AREA. FROM THE PORT, ITSELF,
G-II CLASS SUBMARINES FITTED WITH THEIR 150 NM SS-N-S MISSILES
COULD COVER TARGETS IN WEST GERMANY, THE BENELUX COUNTRIES,
ANA SCANDINAVIA WITHOUT LEAVING LOCAL WATERS. BY MOVING TO
THE AREA oFF THE COAST OF POLAND, AS SHOWN, THEY COULD EXTEND
f1IS5ILE COVERAGE TO INCLUDE MUCH OF THE UNITED KINGDOM,
FRANCE, AND ITALY. THERE ARE FOUR HOTEL lI CLASS SSBNS BASED
' HE SOVIET NORTHERN FLEET. IT MOULD TAKE THESE UNITS
S~fE TIME TO DEPLOY TO A POSITION WHERE THEIR SS-N-S MISSILES
wuuLD BE wITI11N RANGE OF ALL WEST EUROPEAN TARGETS.
THE 1600 NM RANGE ARC, SHOWN, DEPICTS THE RANGE OF THE
SS-N-6 t1ISSILE CARRIED BY THE GOLF IV SSBN ASSIGNED TO THE
iORTHERN FLEET. `IN ADDITION TO THE GOLF AND HOTEL SUBMARINES,
YAiyKEE AND llELTA CLASS SSBN'S COULD ALSO BE EMPLOYED AGAINST
EUROPE.
`SHOWN HERE IS A SUMMARY OF THE LONG RANGE SOVIET WEAPONS
WHICH wE ESTIMATE COULD BE USED 1N A EUROPEAN CONFLICT.
IN ADDITION TO THE WEAPONS DEDICATED FOR USE IN THE TI~iFATER ,
THE SOVIETS CAN ALSO EMPLOY SOME OF THEIR ICBhIS, INTERCONTINENTAL
~;;
RANGE BOMBERS, AND THEIR YANKEE AND DELTA CLASS SUBMARINES
:MST EUROPEAN TARGETS AS THEY DEEM~t1ECESSARY? (PAUSE)
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 ? ", v t V ~t 1 ,F----
`I W~~P'fP`~~k~rf~l~l~~-'OR~A9~~I~'~D~1~A~4~1~?~~~4~P1~~01-7
SOVIET CONCEPTS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES-
TfIE SOVIETS APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT A WAR IN EUROPE
WILL PKOBABLY BEGIN WITH BOTH SIDES USING ONLY CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS; HOWEVER, THEY ARE CLEAR IN STATING THAT THIS SHOULD
BE VIEWED AS ONLY A PHASE OF OPERATIONS. THE Mi+~.ITARY OBJEC-
TIVES OF DEFEATING NATO MILITARY FORCES AND SEIZING AND
OCCUPYING NATO TERRITORY AND RESOURCES MOULD BE ACHIEVED
THROUGH THE EXECUTION OF A RAPIDLY ADVANCING COMBINED ARMS
OFFENSIVE- A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS,
DURING THE CONVENTIONAL AND/OR A NUCLEAR PHASE OF CONFLICT,
WOULll Bt THE DESTRUCTION OR NEUTRALIZATION OF NATO'S NUCLEAR
FORCES.
FINALLY, BUT PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT FOR TODAY'S DISCUSSION,
)E SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT EVEN IF THE WAR BEGINS CONVENTIONALLY,
ESCALATION TU NUCLEAR CONFLICT IS VERY LIKELY. THUS WE SEE A
MAJOR CONCEKtd OVER THE TRANSITION FROM CONVENTIONAL TO NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS, WITH A STRESS UPON THE NEED FOR FORCES TO BE
CONSTAtJ~Y PREPAREll TO MAKE THE TRANSITION WHILE RETAINING THE
INITiTATIVE IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. IN THIS REGARD, THE
SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT NUCLEAR ~IEAPONS ARE MILITARILY IMPORTANT
AND ADVANTAGES WILL ACCRUE TO THE SIDE WHICH FIRST USES THEM
DECISIVELY- THUS THERE IS CONSIDERABLI='EMPHASIS UPON BEING
PKEPARED TO PREEl1PT NATO IN THE LARGE SCALE USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPOtrS-
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?IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT LARGE-SCALE PREEMPTION DOES NOT
~.~~~SSARILY E9UATE TO INDISCRIMINATE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF
WESTERN EUROPE. ON THE CONTRARY, CURRENT SOVIET NUC,j~EAR
TARGETING STRATEGY APPEARS TO $E BASED ON COUNTER-MILITARY OR
CUU~JTER-FORCE TARGETING. SUCH A STRATEGY IS A LOGICAL OUTGROWTH
OF THEIR MILITARY AND POLITICAL GOALS WHICH WOULD BE THE
DESTRUCTION OF NATO MILITARY FORCES AND THE OCCUPATION OF
WESTERN EUROPE. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE AC9UISITION OF THE
EUROPEAN ECUNOMIC-INDUSTRIAL BASE WOULD OFFER THE SOVIETS A
MAJOR ADVANTAGE IN THE POST-WAR BALANCE OF POWER RELATIONSHIPS-
`ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS EMPHASIZE LARGE-SCALE PREEMPTIVE
EMPOYMENT OF WUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEY DO HAVE OTHER OPTIONS
" ~lLABLE? APPARENTLY BEGINNING AS EARLY AS 1971, THE SOVIETS
k~,OGNIZED THAT EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS OTHER THAN RELIANCE UPON A
LARGE-SCALE, THEATER-WIDE STRIKE MIGHT BE NECESSARY.
THE~ON-GOING IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET NUCLEAR DELIVERY
SYSTEMS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL FLEXIBILITY ARE SUCH THAT
THESE rJUCLEAR OPTIONS COULD BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED IN A
EUROPEAN CONFLICT. HOWEVER, PREEMPTION, DECISIVE LARGE-SCALE
USE, AND llISBELIEF IN THE CONCEPT OF GRADUATED ESCALATION
REMAIN AS MAJOR TENETS OF SOVIET MILITARY?DOCTRINE?
'IN CONCLUSION, THE SOVIETS CLEARLY BELIEVE THAT NUCLEAR
WEAPONS ARE DECISIVE AND THAT THEY MUST BE PREPARED TO WAGE
NUCLEAR WAR EFFECTIVELY IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER SHOULD IT
BE NECESSARY. THE LONGER RANGE SYSTEMS WHICH I HAVE ADDRESSED
HIND NOTICE - IPi?~ ~ I~c?-~rr jp P S E~ R ET-
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")DAY tAS HELL AS THE SNORTER RANGE TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS)
ARE BEING IMPROVED BOTH OUANTITAT[VELY AND 0llA LITATIVELY AND
THE SOVIETS ARE CONTINUING TO EXAMINE THEIR CONCEPTS FOR THE
EMPLOYMENT OF THESE FORCES.
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SECRET 1
S0191#T Ri~LITARY SYRATEGI~ ~ON~EP7a
?48L'~'EARJ f9~1fLIfT
OP~~lii~G GO~IVE~fTIONAL PHASE
c~ GOf.~BIi~1ED A~M~ OFFENSIVE
o DEFEAT MILITARY FORCES
o SEIZE A~lD OCCUPY TERRITORY/RESOURCES
o DESTROY ?FJEiJiY PdUCLEAR NiEAillS
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 Appr~'~$~~~~2fd~~~~l~~~>~I'~'b'~~~7~'f`~b~~( 001-7
April 9, 1979
MEMORANDUM
TO: See Distribution
FROM: ACDA/ISP - John Newhouse 1
SUBJECT: TNF Arms Control Issues Paper
(C) Attached is a draft paper entitled "Issues in Theater
Nuclear Arms Control." It is intended for presentation to
the Allies at the April meeting of the SG, along with the
papers from State and CIA. Much of the language of this paper
was taken from the interagency-cleared State/ACDA paper of
last October, which was prepared for (but never presented
to) the November 20 NAC.
(C) Because the paper will be discussed at this Thursday's
SCC meeting,. we would appreciate it if you would send your
comments to Robert Nurick (Room 4494, 632-7439) by COB
Wednesday, April 11.
as stated
Distribution
NSC - Reginald Bartholomew
-
James
Thomson
State/PM -
Eric
Newsom
State/EUR -
Leon
Fuerth
OSD/ISA -
Lynn
Davis
JCS/J-5 - BG Dale Vesser
CIA/NIO -
CONFIDENTIAL/W SECRET ATTACHMENT
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 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP81600401R001500010001-7
Issues in Theater Nuclear Arms Control
I. Introduction
The accompanying paper outlines some preliminary US
thinking about the general objectives which TNF arms control might
serve, and about some principles which might guide the Alliance
in considering specific negotiating approaches. The thinking
in that paper reflects in part a US working-level assessment
of larger political, military, and arms control considerations,
but. also of the underlying technical issues which would be
involved in negotiations on theater nuclear systems.
This paper describes these latter issues and presents
important analytical considerations bearing on them. In a
few cases, tentative conclusions are suggested. These
represent US working level views only. More often, our analysis
has narrowed the range of plausible outcomes but has not yet
led. to firm judgments.
II. Major Issues
A. Systems to be Covered
This section describes the systems and forces which
might be candidates for arms control negotiations on theater
nuclear forces. The focus is on long-range US and Soviet theater
nuclear forces in Europe. Systems limited by the SALT TWO
Treaty, as well as British and French nuclear systems are not
considered.
The figures given below for long-range forces include
those deployed in all of Europe, including the USSR to the Urals;
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 2
figs-o.Fgr~gi~~e-~~i/~~/O~a~sRD~~o1~i~~01~Q~50~~00etin the three
Western Military Districts (WMDs). The issue of distinguishing
long-range systems from other systems is considered later.
1. Long-Range Systems
For purposes of discussion, ballistic and cruise
missiles are categorized according to whether they are land-
or sea-based.
Land-Based Missiles
The primary candidate Soviet land-based missile
system is the mobile SS-20 IRBM, of which over 200 firing
units (a transporter-erector-launcher, or TEL, and three
missiles) may be deployed in the western USSR by the mid-1980s.
Aciditionally, about 100 SS-20 firing units may be deployed in
the eastern Soviet Union in this same period. Other candidate
systems are older SS-4/SS-5 M/IRBMs deployed in the western
USSR and intended for use against NATO; these systems are being
retired concurrent with the introduction of the SS-20. Any
future Soviet long-range GLCM would also be a candidate for
limitation.
The primary US candidates for inclusion are the
GLCM and the PIIXR, both with a 1983 IOC.
Sea-Based Missiles ..
Candidate Soviet systems in this category are
current and future SLCMs, and older SLBMs not limited by SALT.
At present, six Soviet Golf II class submarines are deployed
in the Baltic, each with three SS-N-S ballistic missiles.
Candidate US systems include possible future land-attack SLCMs.
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 3
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Soviet long-range theater aircraft are currently
deployed with the forces of Long-Range Aviation (LRA) and
Naval Aviation (SNA). Available for use in Europe are the
Backfire medium bombers and the older Badgers and Blinders of
the lst (Smolensk) and 2nd (Vinnitsa) LRA Armies, and those in
SNA deployed in support of the Baltic, Northern,and Black Sea
fleets. Additionally, LRA bombers deployed with the Far East
Bomber Corps (Irkutsk) and SNA bombers with the Pacific Ocean
Fleet Air Force might be considered.
On the US side, and apart from heavy bombers
limited by SALT, the system of greatest concern to the Soviets
is the F-111 fighter bomber (and the FB-111, if limits are
world-wide or if .it is deployed in the theater); 175 F-llls
(156 UE plus 19 float) are currently based in the UK,with a
larger number based in the US.
2. Other US and Soviet Theater Nuclear Systems
Other US and Soviet theater nuclear systems which
might theoretically be included in negotiations are nuclear-
capable tactical aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles and
rockets, and nuclear-capable artillery.
US aircraft which are considered nuclear-capable
anal based in Europe are the F-111 (discussed earlier), the F-4,
and the carrier-based A-6 and A-7. These are the aircraft
which the Soviets have explicitly identified as "forward-based
systems" in the SALT context. Because Soviet practices with
respect to nuclear delivery aircraft differ from those of the
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 4
US, ~~tf?~~ ~2r1R~@~~ ~t~'~~'~~1 B~Q`~c~~~~50a0~Q~000udged to be
nuclear-capable. These aircraft include Fishbed (Mig-21 J/K/L),
Flogger B (mig 23), Flogger D (Mig 27), Fitter A (SU-7),
Fitter C (SU-17), Foxbat (Mig-28), Brewer (Yak-28), and Fencer
(SU-24). Approximately 2,500 of these types of aircraft are
deployed with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and the Western
Soviet Union. Only about one-third of these aircraft are
presently nuclear-qualified and assigned, although the percentage
is expected to rise steadily through the 1980s.
Both the US and the USSR have tactical missiles
deployed in Europe. US nuclear-capable systems comprise
11.5 Pershing Ia launchers (108 UE plus 7 float) with 198 missiles
(the more accurate Long-range PIIXR could replace the current
system on a one-for-one basis), and 40 shorter-range Lance
launchers, as well as nuclear-capable Nike Hercules SAM
launchers which could be used in a surface-to-surface role.
Soviet forces are presently equipped with the SCUD SSM, the
FROG rocket, and Scaleboard launchers. Replacements for all of
these systems are expected in the 1980s. The Soviets have
completed development of follow-ons for the FROG (the SS-21)
and for Scaleboard (the SS-22). A possible follow-on to the
SCUD is in an early stage of flight?testing.
US forces presently have 155 mm and 203 mm
artillery deployed in Europe, of which about 612 tubes are
nur_lear-certified. Soviet forces in Europe do not have
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 5
nucl~~r~egb~bd.Re~1~~104:~IA$~1~~4~'~0~1~7t the
Soviets have the technology to develop a nuclear projectile
far the 152 mm artillery, but no evidence exists that they
have fielded such a capability. Soviet 203 mm artillery and
2~0 mm mortars apparently are nuclear-capable, but these
systems are presently deployed only in USSR.
3. Factors Influencing Inclusion/Exclusion of Systems
Decisions as to which systems should be included
in, or excluded from, actual negotiations on theater nuclear
farces will reflect both political and military considerations.
Political Factors
Political considerations could center on those
longer-range and more modern systems which have been the prin-
cipal source of concern in the Alliance about the dynamic trends
in. theater nuclear deployments, and which have acquired
significant political "visibility" as a result. Immediately
obvious examples include the Soviet SS-20 IRBM and Backfire
bomber, and US ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles and
PIIXR. These systems are not only the focus of current political.
attention, but also--by virtue of their long-range and
technological sophistication--represent qualitatively new
factors in the overall nuclear balance. Appropriate limi-
tations on this relatively narrow set of systems would thus
be responsive to the military implications and attendant.
political impact of Soviet TNF modernization. Moreover,
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focusing on these modern systems could directly strengthen
the arms control objective of stabilizing the European nuclear
balance over the long term, on the grounds that it is precisely
these highly "visible" long-range systems which have the
greatest potential to generate an uncontrolled action/reaction
cycle. Finally, such a focus might reinforce the SALT process
by seeking to control theater asymmetries which could otherwise
undermine strategic parity.
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Broader Military Factors
Although the particular features of an arms
control approach may also be determined by political criteria,
fundamental to the consideration of TNF arms control
approaches would be the military desirability of possible
negotiated outcomes. Military criteria will play a central rolE.
in determining: (a) what limits would be acceptable on
what Western systems; and (b) the overall acceptability of a
negotiated outcome, especially in comparison with the outcomes
expected in the absence of any negotiated limitations.
Important military factors include: (a) the
adequacy of permitted US and NATO forces to fulfill the
requirements of NATO doctrine; and (b) the degree of threat
posed by specific Soviet/Warsaw Pact weapons systems, including
those not limited in an agreement.
For instance, military effectiveness criteria
(similar to those applied by the HLG to its consideration of
TNF modernization) will bear on the assessment of what limits
would be acceptable on what US systems. These criteria include
inter olio: the maintenance of a broad range of escalation
options; adequate target coverage; the suitability of permitted
systems for escalation control; ability to penetrate defenses;
adequacy in numbers; and survivability.
With respect to candidate Soviet systems, it will
be important to evaluate the military and political
significance of systems not covered by an agreement. For
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exam ~~, ~ ~~n ~r~an imitations were placed on systems above
a given range (e.g., 1,000 km), the Soviets might increase
deployments in Eastern Europe of shorter-range systems, or
redeploy current shorter-range systems to provide greater
coverage of NATO territory. These systems could in some
respects pose as great threat to targets in NATO Europe as do
longer-range systems based in the USSR, even though they have
so far attracted relatively little political attention.
Choices among .alternative range threshholds are
thus likely to be of central importance. To illustrate some
of the considerations bearing on this choice, two arbitrarily-
chosen range threshholds are briefly examined here:
1,000 km: A range floor (below which a nuclear
delivery system would not be limited) of 1,000 km would, in the
case of missiles, catch principal modern systems on both sides,
and exclude current Pershings and Scaleboards. Such a threshhold
would probably be easier to verify than a lower threshhold,
and would provide greater flexibility for shorter- range systems.
It would also include fewer US systems for which there are
Allied analogues, thereby making it more difficult for the Soviets
to argue for compensation/for, or inclusion of, Allied systems.
By the same token, however, it would tend to shrink the US
aggregate if applied at an early date, and since the USSR can
place West European targets at risk with systems of relatively
short range, if they are deployed in Eastern Europe, would
increase Soviet potential to circumvent the limitations. In
this case, the Alliance might want to consider whether some kind
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of separate ceiling on NGA deployments of sub-1,000 km missile:
would be feasible or desirable.
500 km: A 500 km range floor would bring such
systems as Scaleboard and current Pershing under limitations,
thus increasing the US aggregate and offering greater
negotiating leverage in an early negotiation. It might also
somewhat reduce Soviet ability to exploit geographical
asymmetries through East European deployments of shorter-range
systems, although by the same token it might reduce US flexibility
as well. It would also probably pose greater verification
laroblems, however.
Other Factors
There are two major additional factors which will
affect which systems are included in or excluded from potential
TNF arms control negotiations. First is Soviet criteria for
inclusion/exclusion; Soviet perspectives on TNF arms control
are discussed in an accompanying paper. Second, negotiating
approaches will have to be assessed for their verifiability.
Verification questions are likely to be very complicated; they
are discussed in section II-D below.
Technical Criteria
Finally, there is the question of developing
appropriate criteria to identify systems for inclusion in the
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lim~~~~'bvec~$o~~(~a~e 2?(~9/64~:~19~-8~0?4(~'I~D0~5d~'01~9[~=11c'X'af t and
missiles by means of a simple range criterion, by range/
take-off weight or range/payload formulae, or by means of a
generic listing (as for "heavy bombers" in SALT). A 1,000-km
range floor would create many ambiguities: there are many
systems having an assessed operational radius of close to
1,000 km, and the nominal range estimates for aircraft are
very sensitive to profile and load assumptions. It is
possible to eliminate these ambiguities for aircraft, and
still catch major systems of interest, by .raising the range
floor to 2,000 km, but this could create the presentational
problem of justifying different range criteria for missiles and
aircraft. (If PIIs are to re used for negotiating
leverage, then the range floor cannot be set higher than about
1,500 km.) In any case, explicit agreement as to what systems
are to be limited would probably be necessary to avoid
misunderstanding. A generic listing on the SALT precedent, with
agreement on what types are covered, may thus be preferable.
B. Geographic Sco e
There are several types of geographic constraints
which could be applied to theater nuclear arms control limi-
tations, e.g., Western Europe and Eastern'Europe, excluding the
USSR; Europe to the Urals; or constraints which encompass US
and Soviet territory, either explictly or in terms of limits
on world-wide inventories. A related question is whether specific
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ocea~i areas should be included in any arms control approach
involving sea-based systems. Although the geographic scope of
an agreement would be linked to the types of systems that would
be covered, an important consideration would be that a
significant portion of Soviet theater nuclear forces are stationed
on Soviet territory.
Therefore, an agreement would have to include at
least Eastern Europe and most of Western Russia (by convention,
"to the Urals," though it could be defined by longitude or
distance from the western border).* For reciprocity, the
Western side would have to include at least all of Western
Europe (for forces of the type and nationality covered).
This "Europe-only" focus would not include any further geo-
graphic areas, nor impose world-wide limits on testing,
production, or deployment.
There are several possible problems with a
restricted geographic focus. First, most of the weapons under
consideration are more-or-less mobile; even if removed from
a specific area, they could rapidly be reintroduced. This is
particularly true of aircraf t; long-distance movement of
mobile missile launchers would take somewhat longer. (In
addition, most such missiles are also dependent upon ground
support facilities which are both extensive and fixed).
Nevertheless, much of the effects of such an agreement would be
on peacetime deployments only (as is the case for MBFR). This
has both advantages and disadvantages.
*The SS-20 poses a particular problem, in that it can be
based somewhat east of the Urals and still strike NATO territory.
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imi~a ions on sea- asec~ systems could also present problems.
Although world-wide inventories of either surface or submarine-
based systems are reasonably verifiable, restrictions on deploy-
ments within limited areas (e.g., the North, Norwegian, and
Mediterranean seas) would be hard to verify for surface systems,
impossible for submarines, and circumventable in a crisis.
one possible approach to deal with these problems would
be to seek global limits in combination with regional sub-limits.
Sur.h an approach might be particularly attractive if aircraft
are to be limited, or if the agreement is to be of relatively
long duration. For example, there could be a global limit on
aircraft plus missiles, with a sub-limit on missile deployments
in Europe.
' C. Types of Limits
1. Possible Form of Controls
The forms of controls which might be placed on
long-range theater nuclear forces include:
-- quantitative limitations, such as ceilings,
freezes, and reductions. One approach would be to establish
an overall numerical ceiling on the limited systems, and
allow flexibility within that ceiling. Thus, the SALT I
Interim Agreement set limits on the number of SLBM launchers
on each side, and the SALT II aggregates are ceilings and sub-
ceilings on various types of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
-- geographic deployments limitations. These would
essentially be quantitative limits applied to specified areas.
As noted above,. they would present special problems in the case
of mobile systems such as ships, aircraf t, or air-transportable
systems.
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Approved_Eor~el~?a2~Q'~~9~~ s ~~ ~ BQ4fk91 ~@q'.~o4~'~44Q~-7
limitations, restrictions on testing, limits on payload and
launch weight, and limits on modernization and "new types."
Qualitative restrictions could apply to the characteristics
of the systems (size, throw weight, fractionation, missiles-
per-launcher, etc.) to the activities associated with the system,
or to both. SALT experience has shown both the difficulties
and the potential of defining and negotiating qualitative
restraints.
-- supplemental measures to reinforce the effects
of other limitations or to enhance verifiability. Such measures
could include production limitations and cooperative measures
to assist in verification.
2. Equal vs Asymmetrical Outcomes
An issue of great importance in formulating a
negotiatine* approach is w'~eth~r or not t'^e T? Iiar_ce should
seek equal aggregate outcomes. Factors to be considered include
the following:
-- An outcome which appeared to contractualize
a large Soviet numerical superiority might be very difficult
to sustain politically.
-- Given the numerical asymmetries between US and
Soviet LRTNF, equal ceiling levels which might be both acceptable
to the West and negotiable with the USSR may be difficult to
set. In addition, given Soviet deployments against
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China, ~~5.2~id~~~gle~~~~@Q~Q~0~:16~D@~'ti~~1~0~~0~10@~p~cially
difficult to negotiate.
--Equal aggregate outcomes at relatively high levels
might create political pressures for additional and otherwise
unnecessary US deployments. On the other hand, the fact that
the agreement permitted this option might be an important
political asset, even if the option were not exercised.
--It might be argued that equal aggregate approaches--
even when applied to a limited number of systems--would risk
creating perceptions of a separate "Eurostrategic" balance.
A major issue related to an equal aggregates approach
is the treatment of the numerous older Soviet systems,
especially SS-4/5s and Badgers. To include these systems in
the limits would, in most cases, drive the ceilings to
extremely high levels, while to exclude them by means of an
age cut-off would appear to concede a near-term advantage to
the Soviets.
However, although the near-term effect of such
exclusion ("grandfathering") would be roughly equivalent to an
agreement with asymmetrical ceilings, the resulting balance
would move toward parity over time. (This effect can be
reinforced by replacement rules, if negotiable, to contrac-
tualize the retirement and dismantling of older systems.)
Thus, the lower ceilings which grandfathering allows would
inhibit Soviet modernization over the long run, while focusing
our negotiating leverage o.n limiting the modern Soviet systems
of greatest concern.
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In addition to the general issues noted above, a ke
question in determining what types of controls should be sought
on LRTNF is whether the actual item limited should be the
launcher (or aircraft, as appropriate), the missile, or the
warhead. For reasons of verifiability, it may be desirable to
limit missile launchers rather than the missiles themselves.
Both SALT and MBFR have taken this approach. However, the
Alliance may also wish to consider the desirability and
feasibility of collateral provisions to limit reloads, MIRY
fractionation, etc.
D. Problems of Verification
The verification problems raised by given limits would
depend not only on the .systems to which they are applied but
also on the nature of the overall agreement. Nevertheless,
there are a number of general observations which can be made.
--quantitative limits on land-mobile systems could pose
problems of verification with national technical means, depending
primarily upon how the systems are deployed. Most mobile
theater missiles have thus far been deployed during peacetime
in reasonably-sized units (not autonomous launchers) based at
known secure locations. Such peacetime deployments provide
the opportunity to monitor missile activities over time, and,
if continued, would considerably enhance the verifiability of
deployment limits. (Thus, for example, we have a good idea of
the number of SS-20 launchers being deployed.) Verifiability ~
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might ~~~Yel~~~ {~~@@ a~0~b~(~ ~~Ipb~D2~~.~~~~ 51~fl4~~~ , where
negotiable. However, if deceptive deployment practices were us~
then quantitative limits on land-mobile missiles--both ballistic-
and cruise- -would present serious verification problems.
--'verifying Quantitative limits on Soviet theater nuclea~_
aircraft might require agreement on definitions and a mutual data
base, in view of the differences between Western and Soviet
approaches to aircraft nuclear capability and assumption-
dependent range estimates.
--nuclear vs. non-nuclear capability cannot be
distinguished for missiles, nor are there any technical
requirements for nuclear-capable aircraft that produce
externally observable differences. Crew training activity and
storage site signatures can be indicators of nuclear mission
for Soviet aircraft which in turn implies capability, but they
are not necessarily reliable or consistently available
indicators of such capability.
E. Participation; Forums
1. Participation
There are two broad issues involved in the choice
of a forum for potential negotiations on long-range TNF:
the nationalitiesof the forces covered, and the implications
for progress in other on-going arms control negotiations.
We have assumed that only the US and the Soviet
Union would negotiate on theater nuclear issues and consider
limits on their forces. We recognize, of course, that Soviet
pressure for either inclusion of or "compensation" for Allied
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 sys ?temAsp~rsOVgci~@i].~elg~s~~U0~~018.C1~r~}UP~9 BDO#~11~OOt~00~QOD~I-An the
long-range French and British national systems because they are
not dependent upon US warheads and are capable of striking
Soviet territory. Apart from direct Saviet efforts to seek
Allied negotiating participation, Soviet proposals for
"compensation" for such systems could conceivably take other
forms. In SALT, the US has not agreed to such compensation.
For instance, the US rejected the Soviet attempt in SALT I to
count increases in UK or French strategic forces against
the US strategic limits.
We will also have to consider the implications of
TNF negotiations for progress in other on-going arms control
efforts. In general, the SG will have to consider the extent
to which attempts to advance the objectives of theater nuclear
arms control are likely to enhance, complicate or impede
pragress in SALT III or MBFR.
2. Forums
Limiting the scope of TNF arms control negotiations
to US-Soviet systems argues strongly for using SALT III as
the forum:
--the issues are likely, in any case, to arise
--using a separate forum could appear to isolate
TNF issues from broader strategic questions.
-- using A".BFR would greatly complicate the problem
of limiting Soviet systems on Soviet territory,while avoiding
limits on non-US Allied forces.
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SALT might make it easier to negotiate limits restricted to
certain long-range US and Soviet theater systems.
However, we would have to achieve Soviet acceptance
of our unilateral statement that theii TNF, not just ours,
must be subject to any limits. We would also have to deal with
predictable Soviet arguments about circumvention/transfer,
given Allied non-participation.
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SOVIET 0?JECTIUES
Being Drafted.
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 P
on~ultstion Track for TNF
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