MINUTES OF THE MARCH 6, 1979 SCC MEETING -- NECESSITY FOR A PRESIDENTIAL FINDING FOR THE (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R001500040001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 20, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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/SENSITIVE/HVCCO
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Addtee. R.epIr to the
D:tiaioe Indicated
and Rdee to Inidaltand Number
OLC:KCB:ca
MEMORANDUM TO THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT-TO TE3 PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Re: Minutes of the March 6, 1979 SCC Meeting --
Necessity for a Presidential or
The Minutes of the March 6, 1979 SCC Meeting state
that it was agreed that no Hughes-Ryan Finding was needed
sed joint CIA-NSA SIGINT assistance program to
On behalf of the Department of Justice, I
did not agree with that conclusion at the meeting. It was
suggested at the meeting that the SCC approve the proposal
and note Justice's opinion. I agreed with that suggestion,
assuming the minutes wou_d show that we.believed a Finding
was required. (TS/HVCCO)
The Hughes-Ryan Amendment requires a Presidential Finding
before any funds may be expended t - ; CIA for operations in
foreign countries unless the operation is "intended solely
for obtaining necessary intelligence." (Emphasis added).
-There is no ambiguity in the word "solely" and there is
nothing in the legislative history of the Amendment to support
a conclusion that Congress did not mean what it said when it
used that word.. While there is no doubt that the primary purpose
of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment was to require reporting to Congress
.about "covert actions", the legislative history clearly shows
.that the provision was designed to cover "covert and other
activities which may have important foreign policy implications."
H.. Rept. 93-1471, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 44 (emphasis added).
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The Hughes-Ryan Amendment is. not limited to classic covert
action, but was intended to cover other CIA activities. Thus,
the legal issue in this case is a rather simple one: is the
proposed activity one that is intended solely to gather
necessary intelligence? (U)
The presentation of this proposal to the SCC did not show
that it was intended solely to gather intelligence. The thrust
of the presentation was that desired, for its ovgr,X1
interests, to expand its SIGINT capabilities and that our
Government desired to assist them in this undertaking as part,
of a comprehensive program designed to improve intelligence
liaison reassure the of United States support, and
assist I land ei hbors to resist militar
activities undertaken by the Th45X1
proposal stated that CIA had terminated a joint SIGINT program
with .in 1976 and had previously been "unwilling to
participate in, a major joint collection effort-" The Director
of NSA candidly told the.SCC that our Government does not expect
to get much intelligence from this program. Finally, neither
the Director of Central Intelligence nor any other senior
intelligence official has, to our knowledge, stated that the
program is being undertaken solely to gather necessary
intelligence.*/ On the basis of these facts, I am unable to
.conclude that the proposal is undertaken solely to gather
necessary intelligence and I therefore believe a Finding is
required under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. (TS/HVCCO)
orneym viser
Office of Legal Counsel
/
c: Director of Central Intelligence
*/ In this connection it is useful to contrast this proposal
with an earlier pro osal to provide satellite photographic
information to (CIA Paper No. 77 25A).
That proposal s tivity solely related
to the collection of intelligence." No such statement has been
made in connection with this proposal.
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Sec ?v LIdk CL&
27 CA'19
FO .jr S
5 E PREVIOUS
5 lU1 EDITIONS
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7905228
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
March 22, 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
The White House
FROM: Cyrus Vance
SUBJECT:
Request for SCC Meeting to Consider
Standards for Sensitive Collection
Operations (Sections 1-303 and
1-306 of E.O. 12036)
As I indicated before you left for the Middle
East, we need to submit proposed standards under
Section 1-303 to the President for his consideration.
Staff efforts to reach agreement on.a draft have not
been successful; I suggest that the SCC meet on this
issue very soon..
In my view, the standards and procedures should
be governed by the following principles.-
1. The DCI should refer all proposals for
sensitive collection to the SCC Chairman in writing.
The criteria for determining which collections are
"sensitive" should distinguish between operations that
must be referred to the SCC. Chairman (collections in which
a Read of State is the source or target, for example),
and those that the DCI has discretion to refer.
2. Sensitive collections normally should be re-
viewed and approved in advance by the SCC at a meeting,
pursuant to written proposals. in exigent circumstances
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS
3/20/85 (Vance, Cyrus)
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CONFIDENTIAL
where time is of the essence, proposals can be reviewed
and approved by SCC members by secure telephone, followed
by written confirmation.
3. The SCC may determine that certain categories
of sensitive collections are routine, and may be approved
by the SCC Chairman. The SCC should review records of
such operations periodically, perhaps quarterly.
4. The annual review required by Section 1-306
should include a review of ongoing operations as well
as a review of the DCI's categorization of operations
as sensitive.
S. To insure proper security, access to records
maintained for purposes of Section 1-303. and Section 1-306
should be tightly controlled, and such records should be
stored at the CIA when they are not being used.
cc: The Attorney General
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 You have asked for enumeration of
additional outstanding issues, not-
already addressed in SCC deliberations
thus far or in any of the issues papers
currently under development, and in
xesponse.to that. request Rick has. produced
the attached memorandum. I agree that this,
memorandum fairly enumerates'-the
remaining issues.
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 f,- Hpprovea r- or r'eiease zuut/uo/ it : uitA-KUrzs i tsuu4u i rcuw iouuu4uuu i-4
Assistant General Counsel
SUBJECT Additional Charter Legislation Issues'for
the SCC
1. As'you know, the SCC has addressed the issues
relating to collection of foreign intelligence that concerns
U.S. persons, and issue papers are in various stages of
development'as regards review and approval of'sp'ecial activ-
ities and certain foreign intelligence collection'or counter=
intelligence activities,-collection of counterintelligence
information that concerns U.S.'persons, "physical and personnel
security invest igations " (presumed by me to include inquiries
into violations of security regulations and procedures, pre-
employment and security clearance investigations, and investi-
gations into threats to facilities or activities and personnel),.
and recruitment and source investigation activities. We
pointed out to the NSC staff that it may be necessary to
address additional issues relating to other types of ac-'
tivities and Sam Hoskinson has asked that we supply him an
"informal" list of such areas. I have listed below the
various remaining areas I perceive, based largely on a
review of the working group's Title II Issue Paper, along
with a suggestion for the responsible agency, for your con-
sideration and communication to Sam. The SSCI positions
noted are derived from the Bill Miller letter annexed to the
Title II Issue Paper.
2.. Retention and Dissemination (DOD/FBI): Whether the
statute should include'detailed retention provisions,. only a
"relevant" standard, or include no standard, leaving it to
collection and dissemination controls and the Privacy Act to
limit the nature of information that is obtained and the-
uses to which it may be put. Similarly, whether the dis-
semination provisions should be detailed, include only
general-principles, or be governed by Attorney General
procedures. The SSCI also has noted issues in this area
concerning controls on dissemination to foreign governments,
and provision of intelligence" to Congress (although this
latter may be wrapped up in the as-yet-unresolved Title I,
?152 issue).
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3. Collection (CIA/DOD): Even after the SCC?has con-
sidered collection of foreign intelligence (including
narcotics, presumably), counterintelligence (directly or
indirectly, including counterterrorism, presumably), "security
investigations," and potential source collection, there may
be several miscellaneous issues remaining in the collection
area. There is still the issue, raised also by the SSCI, of
whether collection, concerning foreign persons in the U.S.
should be regulated. In addition, although this may be
accounted for in procedures, the SSCI has restated the need
for initial approvals, periodic renewals, and annual AG
review, of all collection that concerns U.S. persons. Also,
the issue of "catch-a11" collection authority may remain,
although this type of provision may be unnecessary if flex-
ibility of the same sort'provided by authorizing NSC deter-
minations of "essential" and "important" foreign intelli-
gence is carried through to the other types of collection.'
Finally, there is the question of whether there should be-
authority for the collection of information relating to
communications security and whether it should be outside AG
procedures governing other types of collection.
4. Other Intelligence Activities: There are several
other aspects of intelligence activity that appear to raise
substantial issues.
a. Cover and U.S. Organizations (CIA/FBI): There
is the issue of whether and to what extent unwitting,
unconsenting U.S. organizations should be used'for
cover purposes by intelligence entities. Unless fully
encompassed, which I doubt, by the SCC determination as
to "placing" agents in U.S. organizations for foreign
intelligence collection purposes, this issue would
include*as a factor the exclusion, itself an issue, of
the FBI from the definition of "cover." A related
issue, also raised by the SSCI,' concerns the authority
for undisclosed participation in U.S. organizations in
order to develop cover (assuming that it has not already
been decided that this activity should be authorized
and governed only by AG procedures).
b. Relations with Certain Professions (CIA): The
permissibility,-and appropriate scope, of use for
intelligence purposes of persons associated with the
Peace Corps, exchange programs, academic and religious
institutions, and the media, are issues raised by the
SSCI and executive branch agencies.
C. Information Programs (CIA): This is the
"blowback" problem, i.e., the-control of information
.distribution programs abroad by intelligence entities
where there is'a risk of redistribution in the U.S.
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 basis for an action should be limited to circumstances where
the "primary purpose" of the activity was such a violation,
and whether the DOJ amendments to the Tort Claims Act should
be adopted.
should be limited to nonforeign agents, whether the proper
6. Miscellaneous (DOD): The issues here would relate
to whether the DNI should be-involved in the development, of
AG-approved procedures, what restrictions the President
should be empowered to waive and in what circumstances
(raised by the SSCI), and whether expert assistance to law
enforcement entities. should be subject to AG procedures.
U -OGC Subj LEGISLATION (ARC holding) n.i.
1-ARC Signer
1-OGC Chrono
Or Addressee V 17
OGC/ARC/lv
Distribution:
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