SOVIET POLICY SINCE THE FALL OF BAKHTIAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R001500070007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 16, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R001500070007-5
.16 February 1979
Soviet Policy Since The Fall Of 'Bakhtiar
With the fall of the Bakhtiar regime in Iran and the
establishment of the Bazargan government backed by Khomeini,
the Soviets are faced with a new set of problems and oppor-
tunities. They recognize that Khomeini is anti-communist,
but they are.pleased with his anti-Western orientation and
are probably convinced that the unstable situation holds the
promise of future developments even more to their advantage.
At the moment, they appear to be concentrating on under-
mining the US position and preserving their own options to
the extent possible. (U)
The Soviets moved quickly to recognize the new govern-
ment and to herald the triumph of the "democratic revolution"
in Iran. Their favorable coverage of. Khomeini and the
Bazargan government is reminiscent of their cautious line
with respect to the Shah before his demise and is presumably
designed to protect their economic and political assets in
Iran. They appear to believe that Khomeini has the support
of. the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people and is
the man they will have to deal with for the foreseeable
future. (U)
At the same time, the Soviets are treating Khomeini's
victory as the first stage in the course of the revolution
in Iran. Comment has included statements that.the next step
will be to build a free and democratic society in Iran and
that the coming to power of the Bazargan.government has
created "favorable preconditions for the free will of the
Iranian people." On 11 February, a Leningrad lecturer
stressed communist support for Khomeini at "this phase" of
the revolution and compared the current phase to pre-revolu-
tionary Russia and the abolition of serfdom. While this
line could be intended to imply support for movement towards
a post-Khomeini leftist government, it could also be described
as supportive of the current government's policies. (C)
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NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON 235283
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Moscow is clearly hoping to see the groundwork laid
for the strengthening of the Tudeh'Communist Party within
Iran. On 13 February TASS carried a Tudeh statement which
stressed the need to guarantee the "complete freedom of all
political organizations without any political or ideological
discrimination" in Iran. As reported by AFP, the statement
called for the lifting of the ban on Tudeh's formal existence
and stated that the party was ready to "faithfully uphold all
decisions taken" by the Bazargan government.. Tudeh's
15 February call for oil workers to return to work suggests
a current strategy aimed at gaining Tudeh's inclusion in the
Khomeini-led coalition. This is supported by the call by
the clandestine "National Voice of Iran" for the inclusion of
all national and progressive groups in a national front led
by Khomeini. (U)
The Soviet media continued to stress its, anti-US theme.
Among other things, commentary has charged that the US is.
considering using the safeguarding of evacuation as a justifi-
cation for intervention in Iran and has indicated that the
attack on the US embassy was carried out by former SAVAK
agents hoping to create a pretext for new US military inter-
vention in Iran.. The latter may be intended to deflect the
charges that leftist forces, were involved in the attack. (U)
We have no evidence of Soviet contacts with the Peoples
Sacrifice Guerrillas (the Chariks), the group reportedly
responsible for the attack on the US embassy and a Charik
leader has publicly indicated antipathy for the USSR. Nor
is there any evidence of a Tudeh connection with this group.
According to SAVAK.reporting, Tudeh has not established
links with either the Chariks or the Peoples Strugglers
(Mujahedin), the terrorist group with links to Khomeini.
This does not necessarily prove that such links do not exist.
It is possible that the Chariks have received assistance
from other elements which-the Soviets in turn support. The
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There is no evidence.of a connection between either
the Soviets or the Tudeh Party and the new Marxist party
called the Communist Party of Iran which was announced to
the press on 6 February. The leader of this party has in
fact denounced the Tudeh party, saying it is discredited
because it is controlled by Moscow. Similarly, there is no
evidence of Soviet involvement with any of the other sprout-
ing leftist organizations, including the Maoist offshoot of
the Tudeh Party (the Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh
Party) or the Socialist Workers Party of Iran, aTrotskyite-
type organization. '(C)
This lack of evidence does not constitute definite
proof that the Soviets have had no contacts with some of
these extreme-leftist groups. But barring some evidence
to the contrary, our tentative conclusion is that the Soviet
vehicle for promoting leftist influence within Iran remains
the Tudeh Party and that current Tudeh/Soviet policy is
aimed at establishing the party's legitimacy and ability
to maneuver. It seems unlikely that'at this point the
Soviets would risk incurring Khomeini's:wrath by supporting
any direct challenges to his authority. (C)
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/23 CIA-RDP81 B00401 R001500070007-5
DATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
22 Feb 79
TO: The Director
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
You asked to see this "Soviets in Iran"
paper again.
MRRR
FROM:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
1 FERN MA I REPLACES FORM 3"
85 WHICH MAY BE USED.
Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R001500070007-5