BRIEFING BOOK FOR PRC MEETING ON CENTRAL AMERICA (S)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002000010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 8, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
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National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
SUBJECT : Briefing Book for PRC Meeting on Central America
1. Action Requested: The material in this,.briefing book is
designed to assist you in making a five to ten minute intelligence
assessment of the situation in Central America, particularly in
Nicaragua where guerrilla action is increasing in incidents and
intensity, and.to discuss the intelligence ramifications in the
ensuing discussion. The PRC meeting, which is scheduled to be chaired
by Secretary Vance, is scheduled to be held in the White House Situation
Room from 1530 to 1700 hours on Monday, 11 June 1979.
2. The briefing book is divided into the following sections:
Tab A - The Agenda
Tab B - The Intelligence Assessment (to be inserted on
Monday morning so as to include the latest developments)
Tab D - Maps of Central America and each of the countries
of concern
3. You will note that the PRM contains four annexes related to
(1) Regional Linkages and Conflicts, (2) Country Situations, (3) Nicar aqua:
Game Plan for Stimulating Peaceful Transition, and (4) El Salvador:
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4.I --J of the Office of Political Analysis, will accompany 25X1
you to the meeting of the PRC to provide you with substantive support and
latest intelligence received. Should you desire a pre-brief, let me know,
and I will arrange one at your convenience. 25X1
Acting National Intelligence Officer
for Latin America
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TEGUCIGALPA
Masaya
Pacific Ocean
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
MEMORANDUM
NICARAGUA: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION
Summary
Although President Somoza's National Guard will likely
overcome the latest phase of guerrilla insurrection in
Nicaragua, one can hardly escape the sense that time and
history are against him. The Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN) is gaining steadily in strength and popularity,
..at home and abroad.
Any effort to project how long Somoza will retain power
would ignore a complex of variables and suggest an analytical
precision that simply is not possible. He might manage to
serve out the last two years of his term, but the spiraling
violence and economic dislocation would likely have brought
the country to the edge of chaos. At some point, barring
external action or a National Guard coup, the possibility
of an FSLN military victory looms large. No internally
generated peaceful solution presently appears possible.
If external actors weighed in and somehow induced Somoza
to resign, the fighting might be stopped and the FSLN's
This memorandum was prepared by the Latin America
Division of the Office of Political Analysis. It was
requested by the Assistant Secretary of State of Inter-
American Affairs. Information in this memorandum includes
all reports received through 10 June. Questions and com-
ments may be addressed to
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role in se,&sor .regime cou=ld- perhaps-::be_ limited, but
hardly denied. On the other hand, even the most careful
effort to structure Somoza's departure could create
unstable situation that the FSLN might dominate.
In the present fighting, oraoza still appears to hold
an overall militar' edge, though the qu.eri a ave a,~number
Sizaign ~i~c an `tactica -advantages. Even if the Guard pre-
vails, it w l`1?`-b--e-weake ned=hyy-the effort more than the FSLN.
If forced to fall back, the guerrillas will be discouraged
and even intimidated but they will be back. Both sides
have access to sufficient outside sources of materiel, but
over time the FSLN is expected to be able to draw on a
greater reserve of manpower as the Guard becomes in-
creasingly discredited.
The current fighting appears to be focused in Leon,
Masaya, and Matagalpa, but outbreaks elsewhere are possible
at any time. Some serious fighting in Managua can prob-
ably be expected, which even if overcome should significantly
boost the FSLN's confidence, prestige at home and abroad,
and popular appeal. Unless the current guerrilla effort
sparks a civil insurrection, the offensive should crest in
no more than a few weeks. The Guard will systematically
work to reestablish control of the contested areas one at
a time, while maintaining the capital's defenses.
Current Military Picture
There was increased guerrilla activity in Managua over
the weekend, and more serious fighting was expected there
last night.
the guerrillas seemed disinclined to meet the National uar
head on or to carry out major attacks in the capital. Out-
breaks of fighting in other parts of the country are possible
at any time.
Yesterday the insurgents in Managua concentrated on
harassment actions and shows of force in poor neighborhoods.
They demonstrated only occasional boldness, firing at a
Guard plane approaching Las Mercedes International Airport
and hitting the Esso refinery with a rocket, causing. no
damage.
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The Guard has defeated the Sandinista forces at El
Naranjo that spearheaded the guerrilla offensive two weeks
ago. President Somoza's troops evidently have made only
tentative headway in restoring control of the cities of
Masaya and Matagalpa. Leon apparently remains largely in
guerrilla hands.
The government's counteroffensive may be delayed for
some time. President Somoza is keeping his best unit--the
General Somoza Combat Battalion under Colonel Smith--in
Managua until the threat there is diminished. He will
then probably work systematically to restore control of
the contested areas one at a time while maintaining the
capital's defenses.
Assessment of Short-Term Prospects
The present level of insurgent activity is probably
insufficient to overcome the pure military superiority that
Somoza's National Guard forces still hold over the Sandinistas,
even though that margin is narrowing at an accelerating
pace.
There are two probable scenarios other than assassina-
tion by which a Sandinista military campaign might remove
Somoza. The first would involve a successful Sandinista
assault on a major provincial military garrison or on a
series of small outlying posts, creating a snowball effect
before Somoza's stretched-thin troops could move in their
methodical fashion to retake towns one by one. Even if
Somoza were still holding Managua, he might then be re-
moved by the military. In the second sequence, the
Sandinistas would mount successful attacks on Managua
where Somoza's control has never been tested--most likely
first attacking power or communications installations or
attempting to stir mob action rather than risking a frontal
assault on Somoza's crack troops. Somoza would probably
put down the first uprising in Managua, but that could set
in motion the final unravelling of the regime.
Both of these scenarios, while real possibilities,
would likely require several weeks to unfold. The
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Sandinista tactics so far suggest that while they are com-
mitting significant resources in an effort to create the
momentum to topple Somoza, they are not willing to risk de-
cisive defeat in an immediate all or nothing effort. The
populace is still more frightened and caught between
opposing forces than willing to cast its collective lot
with a guerrilla opposition whose victory is far from
assured. This accounts for our bottom line assumption
that Somoza is probably assured of several weeks survival
on the strength of his military forces alone.
With most of the present clashes taking place in
towns some distance from the borders, logistics and re-
supply may again be a telling problem for the FSLN guer-
rillas. This has been a major constraint on large-scale
operations in the past. This problem might be offset, if
the Sandinistas can keep up the pressure, by growing man-
power. There are presently no indications that the civilian
population--largely anti-Somoza but cautious and intimidated--
is sufficiently persuaded of the FSLN's military capabilities
or the National Guard's impending defeat to rise up. Never-
theless, if the current pace of fighting continues for several
weeks, and the guerrillas can replenish their ammunition either
from caches in Nicaragua or stocks abroad, the FSLN should be
able to recruit more, albeit untrained and inexperienced,
combatants. The Guard, at the same time, will be harder
pressed to replace its losses.
The fact that the FSLN labels this its "final offensive"
probably does not mean its leaders have ruled out tactical
retreat. They may be impatient and even prepared to take
heavy losses, but they are not likely to put themselves in
a position to be decisively defeated. It is too easy for
the guerrillas to escape into the hills or neighboring coun-
tries, or go underground. In the Nueva Guinea campaign a
few weeks ago, the Guard publicly claimed an enemy body
count three times the number it actually confirmed. If
such inflation is customary, then the FSLN has probably
been more successful than generally assumed at escaping
Guard encirclement. Nevertheless, the guerrillas probably
have suffered more casualties than the Guard.
The guerrillas may, however, rarely suffer net losses
from larger scale operations and urban occupations. When
evacuating towns or neighborhoods they have held for several
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days, they probably leave with quite a few new recruits,
willing and otherwise. Some youths may go along because
they fear that when the Guard reenters an FSLN-held area,
it executes the younger men it finds for suspected collab-
oration.
Consequently, even if the FSLN loses this round, and
that is far from assured, it will probably not be as
weakened by the effort as the Guard. The guerrillas may
be discouraged in the aftermath, but given time to mend
their wounds in safehavens abroad and to replenish arma-
ments, they will be back in force.
Assessment of Longer-Term Prospects
Although Somoza may prevail in this "battle," and
others to come, there is little prospect that he can win
the "war." With the country set irreversibly on the path
to change, the dynasty seems likely eventually to succumb.
Even if Somoza retains power until 1981--and his chances
are declining--the country would be on the edge of chaos.
The FSLN is not going away; indeed it is growing stronger.
Materiel acquired by the guerrillas abroad is one key to
their success, and the volume and pace of these acquisitions
will determine if and how quickly the FSLN will be able to
overtake the Guard in military capability. As the struggle
endures, recruitment--the other key--will come naturally.
The longer range pressures on Somoza--aside from the
military challenge--are considerable. The economic outlook
is bleak. The country may be able to limp along, but pro-
longed fighting will cause further disarray. The disrup-
tion of next year's harvests would raise the possibility
of economic collapse.
Diplomatic pressures on Somoza are growing. To date
these have been largely symbolic: Mexico's severance df
relations, the statement of concern by the Andean Pact
summit, the refusal of the OAS to act in support of
Somoza's charges against nations backing the FSLN. As
time.passes, however, Somoza will become more interna-
tionally discredited and eventually this will.impinge on
,his ability to acquire munitions and financial resources
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rr n.
abroad. Some of the countries that support him will in-
creasingly find their relationship distasteful and em-
barrassing, and in any event, could not take up the slack
of an economic or arms sales embargo.
The political opposition groups--except for those
allied with the FSLN--are essentially despairing and im-
mobilized bystanders being carried along by the sweep of
events. Without any capability to affect the situation,
most politicians and businessmen look to the US to halt
the drift. There is growing concern among them that the
opportunity to bring about peaceful change may have passed.
Somoza probably intends to step down in May 1981, but
not beforehand. Although some in Somoza's Liberal Party
and National Guard recognize he is "the problem," no one
seems inclined to act against him now. But if in the face
of growing international antagonism and economic disloca-
tion, defeat were apparently imminent, a coup would become
a possibility, though it might come too late to prevent an
FSLN victory. The National Guard, on the other hand, could
simply collapse, sparked--like a run on a bank--by a major
break in ranks or a key figure fleeing the country. Somoza,
however, does not appear to be a strong candidate to break
and run. He might be killed--he occasionally overflies
scenes of fighting--but any of a host of scenarios could
then ensue.
It is no longer assured that if Somoza could be per-
suaded to resign and the fighting ended, a middle would
emerge. The FSLN has momentum and is too large, too well-
armed and organized, and too popular to defer completely
to the moderates. Somoza's departure, however, would
probably effectively reduce popular support for the'
.guerrillas. Such a scenario would have the advantage
perhaps of forestalling the immediate and total assumption
of power by the FSLN?through military victory, and limiting
its participation in a successor regime. There is no
assurance, on the other hand, that even a carefully struc-
tured transition would survive the disruptive pressures
that Somoza's departure might unleash. If the National
Guard were not maintained as a cohesive force--a challenging
task in itself--the FSLN could emerge in a dominant position.
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C'L'lU L'?1? I 1
Current Military Balance
The Guard continues to hold significant military ad-
vantages over the Sandinista guerrillas: superior logis-
tics, communications, firepower, materiel, training,
leadership, and command and control. The FSLN has the
tactical advantage of forcing Somoza to respond to its
thrusts and feints when and where and how it chooses to
fight. In the process, Guardsmen fall into costly traps.
Given FSLN sanctuaries outside Nicaragua, Somoza is unable
to strike at the roots of the guerrilla movement, which
means that time and historical momentum are with the FSLN.
The Guard probably has just under 10,000 men,'but in
view of its responsibilities ranging from police and customs
to post office and telegraph, the number of potential combat
effective personnel is probably closer to 7-8,000. Many
of these troops man garrisons throughout the country and
are not well-trained or equipped. For this reason, the
customary response to an FSLN assault on a town is for the
troops in place to draw back into their garrison and await
reinforcement from Managua's well-trained and disciplined
ready reaction forces.
The Guard is currently drawing on all possible reserves.
The Civil Guard has been mobilized--it is a private pro-Somoza
organization that may be able to muster as many as 4,000
men to relieve regular Guardsmen of routine duties. Somoza
has ordered the recruitment of civilian volunteers in the
sparsely populated, more pro-government east coast area.
The number of FSLN guerrillas is uncertain
. The FSLN has the advantage
of greater potentia reserves as the tide of public opinion
against the government swells.
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Guard Morale
This anti-Somoza sentiment may already be having an
effect. Lt. Col. "Tachito" Somoza--the President's son--
was having trouble recruiting
The fighting over the.past year and a half has taken
a toll in various other ways. Statistics show an overall
trend of increasing losses and desertions which will be
harder over time to offset with enlistments.
losses during the current offensive--Somoza publicly
conceded 200 killed and wounded in two --cannot be
indefinitely.. E: 7
Even in the face of these factors and the probable
weariness of the Guard's best fighting forces, morale re-
portedly remains high. Continued heavy losses, however,
will have a negative impact eventually. There have been
signs of growing discontent in the enlisted ranks over
payroll delays and among younger officers concerned that
corrupt senior officers be retired. In annual personnel
actions on Armed Forces Day, however, Somoza did not re-
tire the top echelon of the Guard, but did try to placate
the mid-levels with a large number of promotions. Although
some officers acknowledge that Somoza is a liability, they
speak of his voluntary departure in 1981 rather than a coup.
There are, in fact, frequent references in the Guard and
the government these days to the lessons of Iran, in terms
of how Somoza's supporters could expect to be treated if
defeated.
Guard Materiel and Foreign Support
There are no indications that the Guard faces short-
ages.of materiel, save perhaps aircraft. The FSLN offen-
sive last September evidently caught Somoza a bit by sur-
prise, so he has built up munitons during the past eight
months in anticipation of another challenge.
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Somoza has lost several aircraft in the past two
months to guerrilla groundfire. Stories circulate con-
stantly that he is trying to purchase more planes in the
US and elsewhere.
Other stories.a ege a
northern tier Central erican governments have placed
some of their aircraft at Somoza's disposal. To date, all
of the aircraft participating in the fighting for the
government are known to be in the Nicaraguan Air Force
inventory.
Reports for some time have indicated that Guatemala,-
.worried about the domino effect of a Cuban-supported revolu-
tion in Nicaragua-would reluctantly intervene to prevent
Somoza's defeat and would expect help from El Salvador and
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Honduras, as well as possibly Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay.
Somoza believes his northern neighbors would come to
his aid in a crisis. Modest assistance would not be sur-
prising if Somoza's position deteriorates. Direct inter-
vention with troops, however, would be a very tough
decision for Guatemalan President Lucas, whose lead El
Salvador and Honduras would probably follow. Lucas has a
reputation for indecisiveness. Given the confusion that
could be expected to accompany Somoza's decline, Lucas
might wait for stark alternatives that would not appear
FSLN Support
The FSLN also can expect to continue to receive
foreign assistance, but probably not intervention on its
behalf by foreign powers. Without attempting to catal+bgue
the extent of materiel support the FSLN has received in
recent months, we can say it has been extensive. The
pattern is similar to that employed last fall--Panamanian
aircraft ferry arms and guerrillas to Costa Rica for the
FSLN, while Costa Rican officials look the other way.
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held by the guerrillas.
pretext of defending Costa Rica from Nicaraguan incursions.:
Neither is Cuba likely to commit any forces-to Nicaragua.
under present circumstances-.occasional unconfirmed reports
suggest that a e 'sers may be with FSLN units
in Nicaragua.
It is impossible to determine the quantity of arms
Although unpredictable, he probably will not provide per-
sonnel, except in terms of supporting civilian volunteers
like the small Panama International Brigade or under the
Panamanian Guard Commander Torrijos appears to remain
committed to supporting the guerrilla effort against Somoza.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI
The attached memorandum was prepared for
Assistant Secretary Vaky. You might find it
useful to review it prior to the PRC meeting
this afternoon.
Chief, Latin America Division
OPA
FO M 5-75 101 EDITIONS IOUS USE PREV
STAT
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(-=
D R A F T
1. Consult with Andean nations, Mexico and others to
share our appraisal of gravity of Nicaraguan situation,
and to secure support for an OAS meeting.
2. Join others in calling (or call, if necessary)
for OAS meeting of Foreign ministers, on an urgent
basis, to consider present Nicaraguan situation as
a threat to peace. (U.S. would make a statement
calling for a negotiated transition of power and
free elections, as soon as feasible, and expressing
U.S. willingness to assist.)
3. Take steps (if possible through the OAS) to
halt arms flow to both sides so that the parties
can be persuaded to negotiate.
4. Instruct Ambassador Pezzullo, upon arrival in
Managua, to
(a) join others in helping to build an
effective moderate opposition, to provide for
a transition of powdr.as- soon as feasible,
(b) point out to Somoza the necessity of
accepting a negotiated solution with free
.elections, and the steps to achieve same,
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(c) encourage National Guard and Liberal
Party to support negotiated solution.
5. Maintain present "cool" position with respect to
economic and military aid.
6. Take other available steps to support moderate
opposition and promote negotiated solution.
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