UNITED STATES POLICY IN ZIMBABWE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002000050003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 11, 1979
• Content Type: MF

11 April 1979
State Dept., NSC reviews completed
MEMORANDUM FOR: Hamilton Jordan
FROM Allard Lowenstein
SUBJECT United States Policy in.Zimbabwe
1. -Time .is about to run out for an electoral resolution of the
conflict in Zimbabwe. .The best chance left for achieving the Anglo-~
American principles is to adapt the general approach accepted by every-
one for iiamibia. If the Transitional Government and the Patriotic
Front are ever to be persuaded to accept UN-supervised elections, a
number o- urgent steps will have to be taken before the opportunity of
influencing attitudes toward elections on both sides is further eroded
by outside events. _
2. Two of these events are about to occur: the United Kingdom
election Un 3 May, and the votes on the Hill on lifting U.S. sanctions.
Until these events change the equation, the possibilit of 1ift7~-g
sanctions can influence both sides to negotiate Tn good faith toward
the UN-supervised elections .which everyone says they favor in principle.
The Transitional Government would also have to be persuaded to make
additional concessions, three of which I discussed with Ian Smith and
hluzorewa in February: (i) the redefinition of the ~.pril elections as ,,.
transitional (a la December elections in Namibia}; (2} an agreement to
rene9otz.ate the- Consti tuti on, and to__submi t i t far__approval to the __- '- __
entire electorate, including black voters; and (3} the resignation of
Smith. The Transitional Government viewed these items as bargaining
chips,-3nd we seemed headed toward an acceptable quid pro quo when it
,, ._
o forward.
was decided in Washington thati_discussions should not g __ _
3. This general approach had gotten off to a hopeful start before this
decision was made. Kaunda said it was the most useful proposal in a
long tune, and urged that I ga back to Salisbury at once to '?bell the cat."
Callaghan was encouraging, and both Bothas were unspecific but encouraging.,,
Hayakawa, McGovern and other '' _ __ _
significant figures on the Hill were favorable; even Congressmen Bauman
-and Solarz, who are not natural allies on this ar anything else, were
both receptive. ~ -
4. It is very 1ate,,~ossibly too late, to reverse tI'ie course of
events, But the stakes, iri South Afrid'a'"and in the United States as
well as in Zimbabwe itself, are too high not to make the most effective
effort possible. For this approach to have any chance now, very diverse
elements would have. to cooperate, including the Front Line Presidents,
the South African and British governments, and the Congress, especially
conservative supporters of the Transitional Government. The first steps
t~p~r~ve6li~dn~tel,~af~'eiSOQ~~T~IW-RI~~TB~(~~~d6~~ action
on sanctions, and to check vrith Nverere.
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5. Of course no initiative is more viable than the chemistry
induced by whoever puts it together: how viable would the Sadat-Begin
lo
?
l di
macy
p
negotiations have been had they been left to traditiona
The situation in southern Africa and the nature of this initiative
require that the first steps 6e undertaken at once, and by someone
whose commitment to African liberation cannot be questioned, whose
concern about the future of whites in southern Africa is trusted by
the white leadership there, and whose credentials are respected ors
the Hi 11. .. -
6. The .proposal outlined above grew out of my 1 ong i nvol verr~enir
i.n both Liberation movements~in southern Africa and the political ?
pressures of Congress and public life in the United States.'~Z believe
ht be
till mi
d
g
s
it is politically realistic at home and abroad, an
1 tirrate
it
s u
successfully 1 aunched.~ I am far l ess sanguine about
k
h
en
as
fate, but one of its strengths is that each step that is ta
value in itself even if something goes wrong--further dawn the road.
had Smith resigned and had the April elections been
For instance
,
redefined as transitional., a possibility not pursued in February, the
Administration's position both on the Hill and at the UN would now
be less di~ficult -- even if UN-supervised elections and. a renegotiated
constitution had never materialized. __
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CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01, CAPE T fd~i867 112020E
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FM AMCONSUL CSPk TOWN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CAPE TOWN 867
ACTION SOUS-rasa
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cones 1 fl~4F? I~ ~QFIE~
FROM E,MdASSY CAPE TUwrr
OcPT PLtA5E PASS WHITE tiDUSE
E.O. 12ia65: XOS-3 4/11/59 (EDMONUSONs h,H,) OR?M
TAGS: PURGr Y~A~ 5F
5Ub.iECT: NAr~ItilA: P.w, t1OTHA'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT CARTEf~
i. CCONFIUENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. FOLLOWING IN PAF3AGRAPh~ 3 bELOri IS TEXT ~OF~ LETTEk
DATED APRIL 11r 1979 FROM PRIME MINISTER F.w, BOTtiA
TO PRESIDENT CA~t7ER. THE SIGNED ORIGiNAL~ wt~ICl# vcAS
tiANUED TO EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR BY DFA LIAISf~N
OFFICE'~t NEIL YAN tiEEKUEN (ACTING FOk UFA SECRETARY
B.G. FOuRIE wti0 IS UN EASTER VACATION) i5 iiE"ING FOR-
WARDED tiY POUCH, VAN HEERDEN~S GcNERiiL COi~MENTS UN
NAMIBIA AFtE kEPURTEG SEPTEi.i hI5 ONLY CCiMMENT AaDuT THE
LE7TEk PER SE riAS THAT i~,1~. MAq RtGARUEt~ FkESIOENT
CARTErt'S LETTER OF APRIL 6 AS A ThkEATr ALThDUGtt AN
INUUI~tY TU AMt3ASSADUR SOLE IN WASriINGTOty hAU 6RnUGHT
THE REPLY 7hAT NU 7FrHEAT i~AS iNTEN(3ED. ThIS IS P~E-~oved~ FTor'~~I~~s~e 2~U41'O4/~~ :' 0174=R1~p~fiB~'O~#i~'i ~d0~~bOd~'O~o~~'~$ C tJ i i V c ~ ~ % ; A ~ Y
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CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE b2 CAPE T P10867 112~G20Z
THAT THE 5ECKtTAkY ~ENERAL~S REf'O~tT OF FEBRUARY 26f
1979 INTRi1UUCEU U~nACCEPTABLE DEVIATIDI~S FiiOt~ THE UN
PLAty~ SI'E.CIFIGALLY Ui~ THE' ISSUESr OF MONITORING 51roAPU
6A5E5 AND aLLG4~iNC~ THE E:STAbLISMMt+vT OF 5UCh EASES IN
NAMIBIA. 7ME LETTER DISMISSES THE CLARIFICATIONS RED
BOLTING FRUr~ THE ktGENT PRUXIMI7Y TaLKS ANV sAYS T~tAT THE
SAG WILL BE INFLUENCtR csY THE CUNSULTATiONS IN WHICH ..A
NAMIBIA~5 "DEr~OCFtATiC PARTIES" ARE CUkRtNTLY Er~GAGEU.
IT IS AN UNGNL:UUFtAGINGa ESScNTIALLY NEGATIVEo REPLY,
3. 6EGIN TEXT OF LETTER: "DCAR MR PRESIDENT
THANK YUU FUR YOUR LETTER OF 6 aPRIL 1979 wHlCti WAS HAN[aEG
TO r~E 6Y AMbASSAUGR EDMGNUSON ON 9 aP~cIL 1979.
I APPRECIATE YGuR CANDOUR AirD AM SUkE YOt1 EXPECT 7ME SAME
FRANKNESS FKUrS ME, I ALSG aGkEE ?~ITH YGU TnAT wE ARE A7
A POIi~T WHE+tE l1hDERSTANOING EACH UTiiEt~ IS OF EXTRAOR[~INARY
IMPORTANCc.
MiE STAND 6Y THE U.N. SETTLEMEItiT PLAN wHICh CATEGDRICALLY
PROVIDED Fqk THE MOIVITOKIhG OF SWAPO tiA5ES ANU DIi1 ~;OT
PROVIDE FUR TtiE ESTAE~LISHMENT AFTtR CEASERFIRE DF SUCH
BASES Ire THE TEKKITURY.
ANY OB3ECTIVE ANALYST WaULD AGrZEE Th+AT THE SECRtTARY~
GtNEFiAL~S kt:PURT OF 26 FEBRUAhY 1979 II~TRUUUCED DEVIA7IOPvS
t~HICri MATERIALLY ALTER 7HE PRUPGSAL wMlCri kE pRIGINALLY
ACCEPTED AND INGKEASE THE ALREAi}Y CUNSIUERABLE RiSK5 IN?
VOLvED TO A POINT -vF1E~tE TriE SAFETY GF TnE F'cOPLE OF
SOUTH V+E5T AFKICA CAN NO LONGER Bt GUARANTEED.
7ME 16 POINiS WHICH ~!ERk SUE35EWUENTLY SUBMITTED TO US
E3Y THE FIVE FuRkIuN MINISTt-iS, GO NUT AI:FECT THESE
GONFIDE~vTIAL
~T ; ~I~~%;e;~;~s~~3~~~~i~~k~~Q~~-~A,~~~~~~,4~~QQ~P~~I~UTi V E S~c~rTA~Y
 CONFIDENTIAL
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I~e~i~rt~nert of S't~te ..~
THE: SOu7h AFRiGAN GOYERivMENT >AS STATEQ ALL ALONG THAT IT
WOULD ti E:. GUiOE:U E3Y THE ialShtE:S Of? 7HE F'EGPLE. THE LkAi~EArtS
OF THE DEMDGKATIC PAaTIE:S AkE CUR-~ENTLY EErGAGEQ Irv Ct~NS~dL?`
TATIONS ON ThcSE IMPORTANT MATTERSo THE SOUTF+ AFt~ItrtArv
GOVERroh;ENT VeILL [f t: 1NE?LtJENGEt) f3Y 7NEIk VIEWS.
I WAS PERTUKBEU bY.YOUR 13EFERENGE To THE IMPLIGATIGNS~ Fi~R
OUR RELATIONS WITn THt UNITED STA7ES ANU THE. IN'tVZTAt~ZL,ITY
OF U.~v. aCTiUf4 aGAIr,ST SOUTM AFRICa, AS ThIS ~EEHE(3 TO
ME 70 tat A pIRECT THREAT. Tr~IS I IMMI"OlATELY faOlrlTtoC~ E~t~T
TO Y-OUR AME3ASSAUOR. SUE~SEQuENTLY, UUK Ar3EiASSAROR I+~
WASr9INGTON wA5 iNFURMED 7hAT NO THREAT -vAS INTE"NDEIDR I
~+OULD 6E GKATcFUL 'f 1J KECEIVE YOUR CUNFIRMATZON.
AS IN THE PASTo wC itEMAIt~ READY 70 UISGtdS5 TAPE TMEaLEcMtfaN""
TaTION OF TrtE ORIGINAL SETTLEt1ENT PF~OPOSAL AS WELL AS
SOEJTHERN AFRIGAIv ISSUES Irv GENEKALo Y;iTr'tOuT I~GGE,PTING
THE RItaH7 OF UThERS TO uIGTA7t TO Ufa Sliv~rmRE4~Ya
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FM AMCUNSUL CAPt TOwN
TU SECSTATE WA5t1UG NIAC'f IMMEDIATE ti339
S E C R E T CAPE TOWN 83~D
NUDIS FUR ThE StCRETARY
DRUM EMBASSY CAPt: TOWN
DEPT ALSO PaSS WHITt HUUSE
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SUBJECT: (5) NAMIBIA= DELIVERY Ufr PRESIDENT CAt~Tf