(SANITIZED) CIVIL DEFENSE OVERVIEW REPORT SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002000140003-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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FE 1A DOE..I EVIEVV COMPLETED
PRM/NSC-32 CIVIL DEFENSE
OVERVIEW REPORT
Summary
This summary is not designed to be a section by section precis of the
Overview Report. It is rather designed:
N REVIEW ' 1PLEITEC o present a brief summary description of current US and
Soviet civil defense programs;
2. to provide answers on the basis of the Overview Report to
the key questions posed at the beginning of that report;
3. to lay out briefly the options for US civil defense policy
and programs set forth in Chapters V and VI of the Overview
Report.
US strategic doctrine has consistently emphasized deterrence of
nuclear war, rather than effective defense. The US civil defense
program has been viewed as insurance providing some capability to
enhance population survival should deterrence fail, thus fulfilling
the government's statutory responsibility under the Federal Civil
Defense Act of 1950 (as amended).
The Soviets integrate civil defense into an overall scheme of the likely
origins, course, and consequences of nuclear war. Soviet strategy
relies on convincing potential enemies that trey ^an w ^ uuG1e '
war a i USSR. Should nuclear war occur, civil defense is meant
to help: (1) maintain a functioning logistical base for operations by
their armed forces to "win" the war; and (2) enable Soviet recovery
from war damage, to improve their postwar position vis-a-vis the US
and other adversaries.
At the present time US civil defense efforts are directed primarily to
population and leadership protection. These programs, currently divided
among several federal agencies, are now scheduled to be consolidated with
natural disaster functions in on independent agency. Civil defense
responsibilities are shared with state and local governments. The
population protection program is slowly being modified to shift the
emphasis from reliance on in-place fallout protection to crisis
relocation planning for high-risk areas. Either program would take
about a year's "surge" preparation during a crisis period to reach
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We concur that they have ambitious goals, but they have
not made them explicit.
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Soviet leadership shelters are harder than ours. About
half a dozen of our regional shelters are 30 psi hard.
All the Soviet shelters range from 50 psi upward.
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full effectiveness. Essential governmental functions will be protected
by dispersal of personnel, some by relocation to hardened facilities;
the hardened facilities are relatively few in number and relatively
vulnerable to direct attack. Minimum efforts are being directed to
the protection of industrial plaints and equipment and to preparations
for rehabilitation and recovery. Federal expenditures for the
above programs are about $140 million per year; state and local gov-
ernments spend an additional 80 million.
Soviet civil defense efforts are much more comprehensive. The Soviet
program has established ambitious goals to protect the civilian
P leadership, shelter a portion o t e essential industrial labor force,
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under military leadership, and civil defense goals are influenced by
military objectives. The activities of the Soviet civil defense
organization include: the development of evacuation and shelter plans;
training for civil defense units, leadership and the population at
large; coordination of civil defense exercises; testing and evaluation
of command and control; shelter construction; and implementation of
general directives from the central leadership. The effectiveness of
Soviet civil defense measures is highly dependent on the amount of_warning
time available. Soviet civil defense doctrine also espouses effective
prose ion of industry through hardening and dispersing, but such
measures are being implemented slowly or, in some cases., not at all.
It would cost about $2 billion per year to duplicate the Soviet civil
defense program in the United States; about three-fourths of this amount
would be personnel.
The most probable results of a massive US-USSR nuclear exchange in
1978 involving an initial Soviet CF-CV attack on the US and a US
CR-CV response with non-generated forces are set forth in Table S-1.
EXPECTED RESULTS FROM MASSIVE US/USSR NUCLEAR EXCHANGE,
1978
Population Survival US (In-Place) USSR (Evacuated)
Initial Survivors (%)
Immediate Fatalities (106)
35-65%
72-137
Leadership Survival
Personnel Uninjured Less than 40%a
Facilities Undamaged Less than 20%a
Economic Survival Low
80-90%
23-50
aAssuming EOCs are not targeted.
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II. KEY QUESTIONS
A. What is the Role of Civil Defense in Strategic Policy?
Significant differences exist as to the role of civil defense
in relation to strategic policy. Some analysts argue that civil
defense capabilities influence an opponent's perception of the
strategic balance and may, in the extreme, reflect on the credibility
of a deterrent. They further contend that the lack of population
protection could reduce stability and inhibit decision-making.
This conclusion rests on the following assumptions:
1) Defensive as well as offensive capabilities contribute
to the strategic balance. Civil defense will therefore i
be calculated into the balance of forces.
2) The amount of population protection will figure into the
cost/risk thinking of an opponent.
3) There is a positive correlation between surviving popu-
lation and a nation's ability to recover.
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4) Deterrence rests, in part, on a willingness to act. An
inability to protect a population will inhibit decisions
to act, by inducing doubts and increasing the perception
of risks.
5) The Soviet ability to provide civil defense might put them
in a position to coerce the United States. An asymmetry
in civil defense capability will undercut US confidence in
a crisis and will encourage Soviet risk-taking and in
transigence.
In contrast, others contend that civil defense plays no role in the
perception of a nuclear balance. They argue that population protection
that civil defense can provide is insignificant in light of the magnitude
of destruction following a nuclear exchange. Moreover, they argue that
civil defense gets no consideration in crisis decision-making and has
no impact on stability.
This argument is based on the following assumptions:
1) Given the magnitude of offensive power passive defense
will receive little or no consideration in calculating the
strategic balance.
2) Given the massive levels of destruction contemplated,
the amount of population protection will be insignificant
in an estimation of costs and risks.
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3) There is no demonstrable correlation between population
survival and national recovery.
4) The ability to protect a population has had little impact
in calculating the potential willingness to use a deterrent.
In past crises the availability of civil defense has had
no influence on crisis decisions or the willingness of US
leaders to act.
5) The absence of a US civil defense effort would not pose
a threat significant enough to inhibit or coerce policy-
makers.
Still a third group argues that civil defense contributes to the
instability of the nuclear balance by fostering among policy-makers the
illusion that the destruction resulting from nuclear war can be limited
and hence encouraging them to take greater risks. of nuclear conflict.
This argument rests on the assumption that a major gap will exist between
civil defense capabilities in reality and the perceptions of them by
policy-makers.
$: Can civil defense measures make a significant difference in
the outcome of a nuclear exchange?
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There remains considerable uncertainty as to the extent that
civil defense measures would make a difference in the outcome of a
nuclear exchange. Questions center on each nation's ability to fully
carry out plans in times of crisis and on the longer-term prospects
for recovery and reconstitution. Civil defense measures would not
prevent massive damage to each nation's economic, political, social,
and military structure, given the immense nuclear arsenals possessed
by the US and USSR and the immovable physical plant associated with
each of these areas in a modern industrial society. Civil defense
measures designed to improve immediate population, work force and
leadership survival through a combination of dispersal and fallout
protection would be effective to the extent that plans could actually
be implemented (attack timing, availability of transportation, etc.,
are uncertainties). In-place shelters hardened against blast and
fallout would provide good protection unless directly targeted.
Spontaneous evacuation, a phenomenon often postulated for the
automobile-rich US, could reduce immediate casualties if the net result
was movement out of risk areas. Long-term prospects for the immediate
survivors in both nations would depend not only on the availability
of subsistence levels of food, medical supplies, etc., but also on
how quickly they could adapt to what would probably be a radically
unfamiliar environment and social structure.
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Specifically, properly implemented civil defense measures could:
(1) enhance population survival against the immediate effects of
a nuclear attack (blast, radiation, fallout). Given sufficient
warning time (about a week) and a successful evacuation (80% was used
in the analysis)from urban industrial targets, the majority of each
~" nation's population would survive the immediate effects of a massive
US/USSR nuclear exchange. For a mid-1980's massive nuclear exchange,
analyses of the attack-related effectiveness of civil defense show
that:
a. In the US, successful population evacuation (for which the
US does not currently plan) would provide for initial
survival of 60-90% of the population, compared with
35-65% survival for the population in-place and protected
only from fallout.
b. In the case of the USSR, survival levels would be about
80-90% with the population evacuated, for which the USSR
does now plan, compared to 60-80% survival with population
in-place. The differences between estimated US and USSR
population survival rates are due primarily to the differences
in megatonnage assumed to be delivered by each nation.
(2) enhance work force survival against the immediate effects of
nuclear war. Losses among those remaining in industrial target areas
during an attack would be high; however, the losses among those who
had been evacuated out of target areas would be low. In one sample of
Soviet industrial facilities, however, hardened shelters existed for
12 to 24% of the work force. As in the case of a general population
evacuation, the US does not currently have an operational plan to
protect its work force through either evacuation or hardened shelters.
(3) enhance leadership survival among those elements of national/
local leadership not directly targeted. Leadership in shelters identified
and targeted directly would not be expected to survive; however, leadership
in shelters not targeted and reasonably hardened (as in the Soviet
civil defense program) would have a good chance of surviving.
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On the other hand, civil defense measures would not:
prevent massive damage to each nation's economic, political,
social, and military structure, that is, damage levels of
70-90% against the identified industrial target base of each
nation. Protection of industrial and most military facilities
against nuclear attack is virtually impossible or prohibitively
expensive. Only in the case of extremely hard facilities
(ICBM silos, for example) can a facility remain as a nuclear
target and maintain a chnace of survival. Protection of some
critical economic equipment and supplies might be feasible
and might aid in postwar recovery. However, such efforts
would be effective only in peripheral areas, not in areas
directly attacked.
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Combined analytical results for a massive nuclear exchange occurring
after the current US and Soviet civil defense programs are projected
into the mid-80s and implemented as planned (i.e., Soviet evacuated
and US in-place, with 10% spontaneous evacuation) are summarized
below in Table S-2. A US evacuation scheme is expected to increase
initial survivors to 60-90%. Spontaneous evacuation out of risk areas
in excess of 10% would lower US in-place casualty figures.
MID-80s CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS
Population Survival
US (In-Place)
USSR (Evacuated)
Initial Survivors (%)
35-65%
80-90%
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Immediate Fatalities (10 )
75-145
25-55
Leadership Survival
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Personnel Uninjured
Facilities Undamaged
Low
Low
Probably high
Probably high
Economic Survival
Low
C. What civil defense measures appear to be most useful? Can
these measures be countered by altering the attack?
Civil defense measures that attempt to reduce vulnerability
through in-place hardening (rather than by redistribution, which
proliferates potential targets and increases the cost, in terms of
weapons required, significantly for attaining a given level of damage)
tend to be less effective and more sensitive to changes in the attack
lay-down. For example, in-place sheltering and hardening measures can
be overcome by changes in the type and/or number of weapons used against
a given target, changes in weapon height-of-burst, etc., or by targeting
As noted previous, only through extreme hardening can a resource
remain a target of value and maintain a chance of survival.
Civil defense measures that distribute leaders, people, and industrial
resources, as significantly to reduce the efficiency with which these
elements can be targeted, are the most useful and less susceptible than
other measures to being overcome by alternatives in the attack laydown.
For example, population evacuation that significantly reduces the number
of people at risk to a given nuclear weapons not only enhances popula-
tion survival against an economic attack, but also retains significant
effectiveness should an attacker re-target.to kill population per se
(see Table S-3).
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These are ACDA numbers. They are based on a much larger
attack and do not assume careful Soviet planning.
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Table S-3
IMMEDIATE SURVIVORS OF A MAJOR NULCEAR EXCHANGE IN THE MID-1980s
(% OF TOTAL POPULATION)
Population Status
US
In place and targeted
25-40%
In place and not targeted
35-65
Evacuated and not targeted
60-90
Ev cuated and targeted
50-70
it would Caue_~0 iIIil 1 i on +nnra fatal i t : thy- an attack _?, m
evacuation was complete. The use of megaton weapons also
increase blast and residual damage and subsequently increase fatalities.
Detonating weapons on or near the ground could result in an additional
15 million fatalities in the Soviet Union due to early fallout. `~
There is uncertainty about the feasibility of sustaining population
evacuation for a long time (more than about a moot ,either in a
continuing crisis with no nuclear attacks or one with nuclear attacks
repeated every few days. Soviet evacuation planning aims to keep
industry in operation, but many feel the discomfort and inconvenience
of temporary housing and the transportation problems engendered in
moving workers to and from their factories would lead to great
inefficiencies, low national morale, and eventual economic stagnation.
Adopting a repeated attack policy could be difficult for the US since,
as presently configured, many of our strategic forces are not now
suitable for retaliatory strikes extended over long periods of time.
(With respect to the Minuteman force, this situation will be substantially
changed by 1983.)
USSR
50-65%
60-65%
30-90
70-8.0
r the US launched an attack at the id-point of a Soviet evacuation.
D. What important aspects of civil defense and attack strategies
remain unexamined?
The relationship between survival and recovery poses unexplored
questions. Some argue that initial survivability is not a good measure
~f longer-term recovery and reconstitution, and that, for example, a
large initial surviving population would quickly deplete strategic
stockpiles and may so overburden the severely damaged medical and industrial
resources of a nation's postwar economy that recovery could be hindered
rather than helped. Others speculate that manpower is the most basic
of a nation's recovery resources and military strength, and that initial
differences in leadership and population survivability will probably
be translated into similar differences in reconsitution.
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Another question concerns the relationship between initial survival
and longer-term survival. Some predict that longer-term problems
and "neglected" effects will be so severe that very few initial
survivors will ever live to usefully contribute to postwar recovery.
Others predict that initial survivors have a good chance of eventually
returning to useful work.
Uncertainty also exists about the feasibility of sustaining population
eJacuation for a long time (more than about a month), either in a
continuing crisis with no nuclear attacks, or one with nuclear attacks
repeated every few days and so forcing population to remain sheltered.
Finally, this assessment of civil defense is based on calculated
assumptions-about the size,. extent, nature, and impact of nuclear
exchanges between the US and the Soviet Union. A number of potentially
important alternative possibilities have not been carefully examined.
They include:
1) The nature of protracted nuclear campaigns;
2) The effects of forward based systems, reserve forces and/or
third country forces;
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3) Major differences in weapons yield and level of attack from
those we postulated.
These issues will require further study before their implications for
civil defense can be determined.
Civil defense policy sets forth the assumptions, goals, and
rationale underlying program choices. Four alternative policies were
identified in the analysis and are briefly summarized here.
1. The Myth of Civil Defense: This policy option is based on the
assumptions:. that civil defense would be ineffective in protecting
population, given the characteristics of the US and Soviet nuclear
arsenals.and the longer-term effects of a massive US-Soviet nuclear
exchange; that civil defense is neither a significant element of the
strategic balance nor a significant factor during a crisis; and that
there are no indications that the civil defense postures of the
superpowers have a significant effect on the perceptions by other
countries of the strategic balance..
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For some, the implications of adopting this policy go beyond merely
eschewing a civil defense program. They would claim that the analytical
results presented in Table S-2 are dangerous because they could lead
to false conclusions about limiting casualties and thereby weaken
deterrence. They would prefer declaratory policy stressing that the
massive absolute levels of destruction expected in a nuclear exchange,
coupled with the longer-term effects, make recovery and survival of
the two societies a moot question. Such a declaratory policy could
also assert the US intention to monitor closely the Soviet civil defense
program and to make adjustements in our offensive forces or targeting
policy in order to negate Soviet future civil defense improvements as
necessary.
2. Insurance: This policy is based on the assumption that the
government's statutory responsibility to protect its, population and
enhance national recovery, coupled with the chance that a large number
of initial survivors might live long lives thereafter, is adequate
jusr'.fication for making the modest investment in a workable program to
increase the number of initial survivors among the US population. In
the same light, it is argued that, because initial survival of federal
leadership and related continuity of government functions will likely
enhance population survival in the longer term, a small investment to
enhance leadership survival is also prudent. This policy of "insurance
against the failure of deterrence" assumes that civil defense will have
neither a positive nor negative effect on deterrence nor a significant
impact on crisis management. It also assumes that there is no need
to relate US civil defense policy and programs to those of the Soviets.
Instead, the scope and character of the US program should be made,
like decisions on insurance generally, on the basis of: (1) the
type and severity of the damage that could occur; (2) the probability
of the damage occuring; and (3) the costs of the insurance. Different
judgments on each of these factors can lead to different conclusions
as to what insurance is desirable. The insurance rationale was used
to support both the FY 1962 Kennedy program ($550 million in FY 1979
dollars) and as well as the modest Nixon program of FY 1974 ($115
million in FY 1979 dollars).
3. Equivalent Survivability. Equivalent survivability exists
if the proportions of the leadership, population, and economy of the
USSR surviving a nuclear exchange are roughly equal to the proportions
of the leadership, population, and economy of the US surviving the
exchange. [This policy starts from the finding that at the present time
US policies and programs do not provide for equivalent survivability.
Such a goal is, however, in US national interests and is a necessary
corollary a-f US strategic forces policy. Achievement of that goal
requires new civil defense measures.
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Current US strategic policy is directed towards the maintenance of
essential equivalence. A marked asymmetry in the vulnerability of
strategic forces would be incompatible with this goal. So also is
marked asymmetry in the vulnerability of leadership and population,
which would make it difficult or impossible for the US to achieve an
outcome of a nuclear exchange "on the most favorable terms possible"
or one likely to maximize US postwar power relative to the enemy.
Marked asymmetries in survivability could also undermine the credi-
bility of the US nuclear deterrent with our NATO and Japanese allies.
Inasmuch as the Soviets believe that effective defenses are essential
to deterrence, a marked difference in the potential survivability of
US and Soviet leadership and population might also lead them to doubt
the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. Equivalent survivability as
a policy does not necessarily imply similar or equivalent programs
since survivability is also a function of the nature of the society and
of the attack. directed against it.
4.. Equivalent Programs: This policy is based on the assumption
that US civil defense can assure adequate security and contribute
effectively to deterrence and crisis management only if it is sub-
stantially similar to and equal to the Soviet civil defense program.
While it is essential to have equivalent survivability in terms of
outcome indices, it is equally important, given the uncertainty about
exactly how offsetting US advantages might be perceived, to have
equivalent programs in terms of input indices. A marked unfavorable
discrepancy in programs would lead the Svoiet and others to question
the credibility of our nuclear deterrent.
The following represent five alternative civil defense programs
(one with two variations) ranging from the very austere to the very
comprehensive. Material on the relation between these programs and
the policy options, the costs of these programs, and their effectiveness
is provided in Tables S-4, S-5, and S-6.
Alternative 1: Minimal Civil Defense. Maintain little or no
civil defense (e.g., warning only) for population protection,
and combine and curtail other civil defense activities
Alternative 2a: Current Level and Program. Maintain a modest
base of civil defense activities with dual use applications.
Continue current modest start on evacuation planning, with
plans to be developed by the mid- to latter 1980s. Supporting
systems needed for effective evacuation operations would not
be enhanced.
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Alternative 2b: Current Level with Emphasis on Evacuation
Planning. Maintain a modest base of civil defense activities
with dual use applications. Reorient program, within current
ceiling, to focus more on evacuation planning.
Alternative 3: Enhanced Population Evacuation/Continuity of,
Government Capability. Increase capabilities for crisis.
relocation and for continuity of government so as to expand
substantially protection of -RORL_J.atigA and _leadersbip.-and..sa .a-&- to
be able to implement plans on one-two weeks' notice. This
capability is to be obtained_by the mid-1980a.._
Alternative 4: Major Civil Defense Capability (Long Term).
Over the next two decades, develop and maintain a capability
that matches the civil defense program of the Soviet Union,
through the systematic incorporation of fall-out and blast
shelters in new construction.
Alternative 5: Major Civil Defense Capability (Short Term).
Over the next five years, develop a civil defense capability
that matches or surpasses that of the Soviet Union, by the
construction of blast shelters (100 psi) in risk areas and
of fall-out shelters in non-risk areas.
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Program
Policy
Equiv.
Survivability
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CIVIL DEFENSE POLICY/PROGRAM COMBINATIONS
Myth
Program
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COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS
($ million)
Average Annual Costs.FY 198'0-1984
Program
Federal
State &
Five Year
FY- 1980-84
Population
Local
Total
Federal
Protection
COG
T.o.tal
1
11
8
19
30
49
95
2a
105
35
140
80
220
700
2b
105
35
140
80
220
700
3
240
88
328
90
418
1,640*
4
950
88
1,038
90
1,128
5,190**
5
13,000
88
13,088
90
13,178
65,440
Requires $500 more in FY 1985-86 to complete program.
**
Requires $16,450 more in FY 1985-99 to complete program.
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