AGENDA AND PAPERS FOR PRC MEETING JULY 31, 1978

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002000160002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 28, 1978
• Content Type: MF

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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CONFIDENTIAL (SECRET--XGDS(1) Attached)
July 28, 1978
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management
and Budget
U.S. Representative to the UN
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
forwarded under separate cover..
yD a_ r -T-4
SUBJECT: Agenda and Papers for PRC Meeting
July 31, 1978
Attached herewith are the agenda and discussion papers to be
? used for the PRC Meeting scheduled for Monday, July 31,
1978, 4:30-6:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room.
Tab 1 to the Agenda Paper, Intelligence Assessment, will be
Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary
NSC review completed
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SECRET
PRC Meeting on Somalia
July 31, 1978
The sole issue for consideration is whether we
should continue to pursue a military supply relation-
ship with Somalia; most immediately, we need to de-
cide how to proceed with respect to a military survey
team visit to Somalia.
Attached are an intelligence assessment (Tab 1)
and an options paper (Tab 2).
Background and recent developments:
-- On April 29, Somali President Siad provided in
writing the assurances we had requested that Somalia
would not use force against its neighbors. In early
July, Siad informed us through his Ambassador of his
intention to rein in the Ogaden insurgents following
the (now-concluded) OAU summit;
-- A high level of insurgent activity has in the
meantime resumed in the Ogaden, Somalia has vocally
supported the insurgent cause (including through Siad's
OAU summit pledge of "moral and material" support for
liberation movements), and
continued Somali logistical support (including arms
and training for the insurgents;
-- Ethiopia has reacted sharply to the resumed
high level of incidents in the Ogaden, including air-raids
on Somali towns and,
planning for a retaliatory ground strike into Somalia;-
-- On July 3 we informed the Somali Government of
our decision to delay "for at least two weeks" the
vi'Sit of a U.S. military survey team that had been
scheduled to arrive in Mogadiscio on July 10. We
were concerned that the team's visit might have been
interpreted as U.S. acquiescence in continued Somali
support for the Ogaden insurgents at a time of esca-
lated violence in the Ogaden.
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-2-
-- The Somalis have communicated their urgent
desire for some tangible demonstration of U.S. support
in the defense field. They have invited U.S. naval ship
visits, the accreditation of a U.S. military attache,
etc. (a ship visit is being scheduled as a means of
maintaining momentum in the U.S.-Somali relationship
pending further decisions). Siad has told visiting
congressmen and European leaders that time is running
out for a U. S. response, and has wondered aloud if the
U.S. delay is not consciously intended to undermine his
position.
4
-- We are under pressure from the Saudis, Egyptian
President Sadat, and the Europeans to proceed with a
military relationship with Somalia.
Attachments:
Tab 1 - Intelligence Assessment.
Tab 2 - Options Paper.
c7'_ '7'p
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PRC Meeting on Somalia
July 31, 1978
ISSUE: Should we continue to pursue a military
supply relationship with Somalia?
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS:
Factors favoring steps toward a military supply
relationship with Somalia:
- To consolidate the Western position, in Somalia;
- To preempt the possibility of a Somali accom-
modation with the Soviets (either under Siad or, more
? likely,.a pro-Soviet replacement);
- To defer to the desires of our European allies
(the Germans and British have urged us to proceed with
the survey team visit; the French have told us they are
themselves considering providing "defensive arms" to
Somalia);
- To demonstrate U.S. willingness to resist Soviet
penetration of the region (President Sadat, President
Nimeiri, Saudi-Crown Prince Fahd, and other conservative
leaders in the Middle East favor U.S. support for
Somalia);
- To (conceivably) provide us with the leverage to
end Somali support for Somali irredentism.
SECRET
XGDS-1
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Factors opposing steps toward a U.S.-Somali mili-
tary supply relationship:
- Our association with Somali irredentism and/or
aggression against its neighbors could damage U.S.
interests elsewhere in Africa;
- A major Ethiopian reprisal action within Somalia,
resulting from continued Somali support of the Ogaden
insurgents, could place the U.S. in a very difficult
position if we had established a military relationship
with Somalia;
- Unrealistic to expect Somalia to disassociate
completely from the Ogaden insurgency;
- Would alarm the Ethiopians, and, to a lesser
degree, the Kenyans, who would view any U.S. move toward
Somalia in the military field as harmful to their
interests if not a directly hostile act (Ethiopia has
threatened to break relations should we supply arms to
Somalia);
- If Siad is toying with a military relationship
with South Africa (Ethiopia has publicized reports to
this effect),-.the political costs of our proceeding in
the military fields with Somalia would be virtually
prohibitive;
- Siad's failure to obtain U.S. arms might under-
mine his regime, leading to his replacement; a successor
might be more willing/able to establish the conditions
which would permit us to have a military relationship
with Somalia.
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THE OPTIONS
1. Offer Somalia an impact package of military
equipment, without sending a survey team.
- Demonstrates to Somalia and the Saudis et al
our willingness to counter Soviet actions in the
area;
- Fulfills our earlier offer to Siad of a $10-15
million immediate impact package;
- Avoids the potential problem of a survey team
recommending more in the way of military supply than
we might be prepared to provide.
- Would be difficult to explain to Congress, which
.has been told we intend to send a survey team before de-
ciding on a military package;
- Could stimulate further Somali requests, possibly
including renewed demands for aircraft, artillery and
tanks;
- Would strongly provoke the Ethiopians (and
Kenyans), who would view this step as reflecting a
deliberate U.S. decision to provide a dramatic gesture
of military support to Somalia;
- Providing FMS financing, if necessary for the
package, would be extremely difficult (reprogramming for
Kenya has already strained FY 78 resources, and the FY
79 budget is highly uncertain in view of the 20 percent
reduction in the House appropriations bill).
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2. Reschedule the survey team's.visit, while
reiterating to the Somali Government that further
evidence of Somali involvement in the Ogaden might again
force postponement. (We would stress to Siad that we
were setting the date sufficiently far ahead--e.g. four
weeks--to enable him to implement his stated intention
of reining in the Ogaden insurgents after the OAU
summit.)
- Provides a positive response to Siad, the
Saudis et al, demonstrating U.S. good faith and
maintaining momentum in the U.S.-Somali relationship;
- Sets a specific time period for both sides to
decide whether to proceed with the relationship on the
basis proposed;
- Brings pressure to bear on the Somali Government
to curb the insurgents;
- Preserves our ability to pull back if the
situation on the ground develops in unacceptable
ways.
- Unlikely to result in an unambiguous improvement
of the situation in the Ogaden, thereby requiring a
further difficult go/no-go decision as the new date
approached;
- Would again raise Somali expectations of U.S.
support, possibly to unrealistic levels;
- If we ultimately again postponed the visit,
this would be seen by Siad as proof of U.S. unrelia-
bility or even a deliberate attempt to humiliate and
weaken him;
Would provoke the Ethiopians (and Kenyans).
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3. Inform the Somali Government explicitly of the
conditions under which we would be willing to send the
survey team. (In addition to the basic requirement of
no military support for the insurgents, our conditions
could include Somali restraint in public declarations of
support for the insurgents, a public statement or other
steps showing Somali Government interest in discussions
with the Ethiopians on the border question, or even the
stationing of observers to monitor Somali dealings with
the Ogaden insurgents.)
- Removes the ambiguity in the current situation;
- Places the responsibility on the Somali side,
rather than the U.S., for any continued deferral of
the team;
? - Brings pressure on Somalia for restraint in its
relations with both the Ogaden insurgents and Ethiopia;
- Demonstrates U.S. interest in a peaceful reso-
lution of the Ogaden conflict.
- The conditions would be very difficult both to
implement and to monitor; if the Somalis were to agree
to the conditions we would probably again be faced with
the necessity of deciding whether to send the team under
ambiguous circumstances;
- Faced with additional conditions for. a military
relationship after he had met our previous conditions,
Siad could well conclude that we are not seriously in-
terested in pursuing a relationship with him but ra-
ther in undermining his position in Somalia;
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Siad might further conclude that Somalia cannot
meet our conditions, thus cannot expect to acquire from
the West sufficient arms to enable it to defend itself
and must, therefore, seek its security through an ac-
commodation with the Soviets;
. - The Saudis et al and some of our European allies
would be disappointed
4. Defer any decision on the survey team.
- Buys time (our position with all concerned would
be that we are still reviewing the situation.);
- Ambiguity in the present situation may be in our
interest, keeping both Somalia and Ethiopia uncertain of
our intentions;
- Should we ultimately decide that we cannot pursue
.a military supply relationship with Somalia, offers a
tactical alternative to directly informing the Somalis
(and others, including Somalia's enemies) of a negative
decision.
Is unlikely to help resolve our basic delemma of
whether to send the team or not;
- May not buy much time, and will further enhance
Siad's suspicions of our intentions.
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5. Cancel the survey team outright and inform
Siad that U.S. will not enter into a military supply..
relationship with Somalia.-
- Avoids prolonging unrealistic Somali expecta-
tions of U.S. military supply, and corresponding
frustration over U.S. delays;
- Allows Siad to devote his efforts to making
other arrangements for military supply;
- By leveling with Siad, preserves U.S. credibil-
ity in our dealings with Somalia;
- Would be reassuring to both Kenya and Ethiopia;
- Would bring pressure on Somalia to seek nego-
tiated settlements with its neighbors.
- Would be seen by Siad as reneging on our
offer of aid, and perhaps as a deliberate attempt to
humiliate or weaken him;
Could de-stabilize Siad's regime by demonstrat-
ing his inability to procure external military assist-
ance after cutting ties with the Soviets;
- Could influence Somalia in the direction of an
accommodation with the Soviets;
- Would be viewed by the Saudis and some others
as showing lack of U.S. resolve;
- Would be seen by Ethiopia as justifying its
reprisals against Somalia for Ogaden incidents, in-
viting further reprisals.
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6. Take other actions to demonstrate continued
U.S. interest in the U.S.-Somali relationship.
These actions could be combined with any of the pre-
vious options, and could include:
- open an attache office; tell Somalis the Attache
has authority to discuss arms supply;
- expedite expansion of our development assist-
ance to Somalia;
- pursue of Congressman Leggett's proposal for
a series of major development projects in Somalia to be
managed by the Corps of Engineers with Saudi financing
(both the Somalis and the Saudis expressed moderate
interest in this concept when Leggett floated it during
his recent visit to the region).
- Would provide visible evidence (to both the Somalis
and others) of continuing U.S. interest in Somalia;
- Offers the basis for a continuing U.S.-Somali. rela-
tionship (with or without an additional military supply
aspect) which could both be.of benefit to Somalia and
help maintain Western influence.
- Would not be considered by Siad (or other Somali
leaders) as an adequate substitute for a defense supply
relationship, which remains the primary interest of the
Somali Government at this time.
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28 July 1978
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. TAB A
2. Assessment: Aspects of the Ethiopian- TAB B
Somali Situation
3. TAB C
4. TAB D
5. TAB E
6. Maps and Charts
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27 July 1978
ASPECTS OF THE ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI SITUATION
Introduction
This assessment has been drafted by the NIO/AF following consul-
tation with a group of working-level analysts and specialists in the
intelligence community. It responds to questions put by the Africa
Bureau of the Department of State in preparation for a review of US
policy regarding arms transfers to Somalia.
Who is Fighting in the Ogaden?
The guerrilla warfare in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia is being
carried on by ethnic Somalis and other indigenous irregulars supported
by cadre and advisors rom the regular Somali army.
The total number of irregulars who are available for armed action
is not known, but we estimate it to be in the range of 15 to 20,000.
The character of the warfare makes it impossible to estimate how many
of these are actively engaged at any one time, and our figure includes
guerrillas who cross back and forth over the border. This figure is
substantially higher than the number of irregulars we estimated a year
ago or even six months ago; the increase is due both to new informa-
tion raising the size of the guerrilla forces and to re-evaluation of
who and what a guerrilla is, in this situation.
Our estimate of the Ethiopian force opposing the guerrillas in the
same region is much firmer -- 75-80,000 (of which 16-17,000 are south
of Jijiga in the Ogaden, and 22,000 in Bale-Sidamo) plus 8,000 Cubans
(all currently located in the Jijiga, Harar, Diredawa area).
Somali Support
The Somali army's support apparatus for the guerrillas was re-
established in April 1978 along lines very close to those which had
been developed in the period prior to early summer 1977, when the then
guerrilla forces were subordinated to the Somali army. Two groups of
Somali regular military personnel are involved:
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-- Inside Somalia, Somali officers and enlisted personnel
who have been assigned to a central unit responsible for the
overall support and coordination of the guerrilla effort. We
do not know the size of this group, but we believe that 500 is
a conservative estimate. It is top-heavy with officers, as it
should be given its function.
-- Inside Ethiopia, Somali officers and enlisted men
seconded as field advisors to guerrilla units. We have no
estimate of the number of such personnel.
These support elements are in addition to those elements of the Somali
military establishment inside Somalia whose duties include activities
which support the guerrilla effort. This last category includes two
commando battalions reported to be in training this month (July) to
provide more experienced personnel to the guerrilla effort.
Trends in Somali Involvement in Support Activity
i
We have seen n ither an ex ansion ion of the
suu ort structures or o t e numbers of personnel involved, since the
apparatus was re-established in April.
The 1 activity has fluctuated since
April. peak for this activity so far
was about mid-June. Three months is, of course, a relatively short
period, and while we have no evidence that specifically correlates this
fluctuation with any other developments, we believe that it most likely
stems from the tactical military situation, particularly a shift in
tactics by the Ethiopians from relatively open and lightly guarded
movements of supply columns through guerrilla-held countryside to more
cautious and heavily armed convoys which provide more difficult and
less frequent targets for guerrilla attack.
Siad's Position
We have seen no evidence (other than some of his own statements)
that suggests to us any attempt by President Siad to limit Somali govern-
ment support for the guerrillas during this period or to restrict guerrilla
operations for political reasons. There is evidence that Sian , gkjng,
through cer_sonnel shifts and structural chan
es, to tight
over the guerrillas, but t is has c aracterize is poTi.tical actions
generally since the defeat of the Somali army in the Ogaden last winter.
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There are also SIILW j S rnnt i ntiig
support for the querrillas,, even while the guerrillas complain that
he has stood in the--way-of their receiving such support directly. We
believe that Egypt, and possibly China, are responding to Siad's
approaches. It is extremely difficult, however, to distinguish foreign
arms transfers to the Ogaden guerrillas from materiel arriving for
Somalia's own use, although mines and anti-tank rockets, neither of
which are produced in Somalia, evidently are being used by the guerrillas
along with small arms.
If Siad chose to "turn off the valve,"to cut off supplies from the
guerrillas and remove Somali personnel now supporting them, we believe
there would be a gradual, rather than immediate or total, cessation
of guerrilla activity. He is not in a position to order such a cessa-
tion, even for a short period, unless the guerrillas could be persuaded
that clear and substantial benefits to their cause were immediately at
hand. Moreover, the benefits he promised would have to materialize
almost at once if his order were to continue to be obeyed.
As we see his situation, however, Siad is impelled to continue to
support the guerrillas by several considerations aside from his personal
inclinations:
-- his generally l ess assur d otition in the wake of
military defeat, which requires him to demonstrate that his
leadership is not failing and that he is still actively pur-
suing a policy to which virtually all Somalis subscribe.
-- his need to defend himself from the. charge that he
mismanaged the campaign against Ethiopia and that his political
strategy is a failure; sentiment along these lines appears to
center in elements of the Somali army, which are restive on
other grounds as well, notably his turning to his own clan in
his domestic appointments.
-- his continued need for economic support from abroad,
which he justifies on the ground that he is stiff in eield
against the Soviets and their Ethiopian tools; this is an
argument he uses especially with conservative Arabs, although
the interest of the Saudis and others in the Ogaden itself has
never been overwhelming.
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Closing the valve would thus be a major shift in policy which
would put Siad in jeopardy, and this jeopardy would increase if he
did not come up with some countervailing success of a striking kind.
He is, however, a tough and wily operator, and he is taking steps
to insulate himself from hostile elements inside and outside Somalia.
He should not be counted out easily, whatever his difficulties.
If Siad fails to establish an arms supply relationship with the
US, we believe he would not, by this development alone, be placed in
jeopardy beyond where he is now, primarily because the Somali military
do not have great expectations for the American connection Siad's
1position would be more seriously endangered if he became unable to
obtain substantial supplies of arms from any non-Soviet source --
Western, Arab, or private commercial. He is not yet in this situation,
although he apparently is having to search farther afield for particular
items.
Intelligence analysts see no specific candidate to replace Siad.
On the whole, we doubt that any replacement would pursue a significantly
different course in foreign relations, nor in regard to the Ogaden
guerrillas. While we foresee that over time, and with some movement
toward cooling the problems of the Horn generally, there should be some
normalization of Somalia's relations with the USSR, we thin a lurch
to the left is unla-kel a_s a result of a failure to obtain arms from
e S. Moreover, there are no indications that the USSR is interested
in modifying its policy to permit such a development at this time.
Ethiopian Reactions
If, as we expect, the guerrilla campaign in the Ogaden persists and
continues to have Somali support, we believe the Ethiopians will be led
to attempt to retaliate by military action on the ground as well as by
an expanded air effort. While Soviet, and therefore in this instance
Cuban, policy is a constraint on Ethiopian retaliatory action, we doubt
that the Soviets can argue against a ground attack indefinitely, and
we do not believe they would object strongly in any event to an opera-
tion in which a force hit guerrilla camps inside Somalia and then pulled
out promptly. Cuban combatants would be unlikely to accompany the
Ethiopians across the border but would probably be willing to support
such an operation indirectly from Ethiopian territory. The Northern
Somalia Liberation Front is also available to the Ethiopians, but we have
no reading on how effective it would be.
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There are other constraints on Ethiopian action against Somalia.
One certainly is the campaign in Eritrea, to which the Ethiopians'
best forces are devoted and from which they could not be diverted
without substantial costs. Another is the military posture of the
Somalis in northern Somalia. While Ethiopian reconnaissance is reported
to have found the road to Hargeisa wide open, and in a narrow sense
this is likely accurate, our information is that the Somalis are working
hard to reorganize their forces in the northern sector and that there
are now significant defensive elements on the northern flank of what
would be the Ethiopian axis of advance.
Despite Ethiopian warnings, we do-mt-be_l _eue. that the arrival of
a US military survey team in Somalia or the announcement of an arms
transfer agreement w d hying a break in US-Ethiopian diplomatic
relations. To some extent, recent press publicity re Ethiopian protests
has ma-e a stronger reaction more necessary psychologically, and some
further limitation of the size of the US mission in Addis Ababa would
be a strong possibility, particularly following an. announcement *of an
agreement.
Kenyan Reactions
We believe the Kenyans have made their point about arms transfers
to Somalia, and that the recent visit of the US survey team will mute
their objections, even though they certainly have not changed their
views of Siad or of Somalia's ultimate designs on. Kenyan territory,
and might use this development as an argument for additional help from
the US.
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