CHRONOLOGY OF FNLC INVASION PLANNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002100020009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Approved F r Release 2003/06/05: CIA-RDP81 00401 R002100020009-1
Chronology of FNLC Invasion Planning
--According to debriefed
after the March 1977 invasion, the rebels -esumed a con-
ventional strike launched into Shaba from Angola would suc-
ceed because the Zairian army would not fight and Mobutu
could not garner sufficient international support to repel
the invaders. The plan was to send an initial column of
1,000 rebels armed with rifles, grenades; and mortars, down
the Benguela Railroad into Shaba. As soon as Mutshashi and
Kolwezi were captured,,Angolan troops with heavy equipment
including tanks, armored vehicles, rockets were supposed to
reinforce the rebels. The FNLC soon became demoralized,
however, when it appeared the Angolans would not support
them Zairian planes attac.Ked them'. and Moroccan troops were
committed to the battle.
u ans were providing sop isticated
training, weapons, and transport so that a second attack
could be quick and decisive.
--In late August, reported
that 4,000 to 6,000 FNLC insurgents were being taught guer-
rilla tactics by experienced Katangan officers and that once
this training was completed they would receive special
instruction from Angolan, Cuban2and Soviet advisers. Accord-
ing to this source,,the FNLC concluded by June that last
year's invasion failed because conventional tactics were
,.used. He said the insurgents had decided to rely much more
heavily on guerrilla operations in the ho'p of provoking a
popular uprising. A major effort would be made to organize
popular support around Sandoa and among the urban poor in
Lubumbashi.
--In early August, 1 1,
reported that the FNLC an airian
forces in Western Shaba by crossing northern Zambia with
trucks and artillery to strike directly at Lubumbashi. The
FNLC leaders said they would launch the attack as
mission was obtained from the Zamhianc
territory.
soon as per-
h 0 i Y
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I said the rebels were
counting on help from colleagues a ready in place in
Lubumbashi. They hoped that the capture of Lubumbashi would
so demoralize the Zairian soldiers that resistance in other
parts of Shaba would quickly collapse.
--In Au ust
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type training for the Katangans near Cazombo.
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--In October, reported that
FNLC plans to invade Zaire had been delayed for several
months because of Angolan refusal to directly support, another
invasion, harrassment from UNITA guerrillas ?\shortageslow
morale, and general confusion.
--In mid-October,
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he expected a FNLC attack into Zaire
in mid-December. The attack was,to be launched from Caianda
directly into Zaire and from Cazombo and Calunda northeast
into Zaire, presumably through-Zambia. The infiltration of
troops had already begun.
said the FNEU wou d
not hazard an second invasion-like attack into Zaire without
a major overt Angolan commitment. As this was unlikely, he
expected a major infiltration of guerrillas who would begin
a more classic guerrilla, struggle.
before the US, France, or other Western powers could respond.
of
ea a e FNLC
was planning a? .u -sca e invasion of Zaire with the full
participation of Cuban military units in the next two or
three months. Plans-.-which 'were in the final stages of
preparation--focused on achieving quick military victory
--In early May
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were not seeking the overthrow of Mobutu but to initiate
a long-revolutionary struggle in Zaire from which a new
leader can emerge. He said they wanted to,create a "secure
--area" from which to export revolution to Rhodesia and South
Africa.
Approved For Release 2003106/05 .j . CIA-RQR81600401 R002100020009-1
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 Approved For Release 26M MO OW9'S : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002100020009-1
25X1 --On 4 or 5 Ma ,
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to infiltrate a large num er of rebels from Angola to Zaire
through Zambian territory.
e Cubans were already organizing the movement of a large
number of FNLC troops from northeastern Angola toward the
Zambian border and that Cuban advisers were accompanying
this force. They had no confirmation the Cubans planned to
stay with the rebels once they left Angola.
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Z,UUU rebels involved in the attack on Kolwezi had in-
filtrated into the city during the previous six months. They
said large amounts of arms and equipment were cached in
and near Kolwezi prior to the attack and that 1,500 rebels
.had been involved in the fighting elsewhere. They said
that two Cuban and four Angolan advisers accompanied the
rebels as they started.to move out of their camps'in Angola.
--According to
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about 100*FNLC guerrillas who were attempting to return to
Angola via Zambia. The few that have cooperated with Zambian
interrogators have stated that the Kolwezi invasion was but
the first phase of a."many-layered" plan of attacks through
out the Shaba region. Hundreds of armed guerrillas now
in place in Shaba are preparing soon to attack other towns
including. Likasi, Lubumbashi, and Kipushi. The guerrillasr
are supported by secret bases and supply centers throughout
the region. The aim of the rebels was to terminate once and
for all the Mobutu's oppression of the Luanda people.
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