FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW MEETING
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP81B00401R002100040014-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 15, 2004
Sequence Number:
14
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 1, 1978
Content Type:
NOTES
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Foreign Policy Review Meeting
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Following this note are a number of pieces of backup material which
are listed on the sheet of paper following this note. I'm not sure
which of these will be useful to you so I'm describing below my best
guess as to how this meeting evolved in hopes of helping you decide your
priorities.
Last week the East-West Discussion Group met to discuss NIE 11-4.
Iliad told to lead the discussion and to focus
on t e policy implications of the NIE so 0 said in effect, 25X1A
"Let's suspend disbelief for now and assume the NIE
is right. Then what might be appropriate US policies
for operating in such a world? How do they compare
with what the US is doing?"
The discussion that followed mostly concerned strategic forces and among
other things the following points came up.
-The Soviet may be operating very much as the US would operate
if the JCS were making policy, i.e. doing things that are prudent
from a military perspective such as building forces to do the
best they can against a perceived military threat even if the
chances of "success" appear small.
-Maybe US initiatives in SALT and elsewhere are not having much
influence because the benefits from the Soviet perspective of
going along are not all that great and neither are the costs of
not going along.
-The psychological and political implications of the "perceived"
US-USSR military balance are as important or more important
than the "real" implications.
Somehow out of this emerged the idea of this Foreign Policy Review
Meeting. However, Secretary Brown decided to use the meeting as a
vehicle to get a Presidential decision on DoD spending limits for the
next five-year defense program (FYDP). Accordingly he set his people to
developing a paper describing the base case FYDP (which is roughly the
one described in the papers here on the DoD Consolidated Guidance), the
incremented FYDP and the decremented FYDP. This paper which we may get
before Tuesday will lay out some thoughts on these programs. Secretary
Brown probably wants to show what these programs mean on some absolute
scale. But my impression is that the differences in perceptions among
OSD, the Joint Staff and the Services are too great for this to happen.
Furthermore, as of Friday evening they aren't thinking in terms of
addressing really significant changes in Defense programs if such would
be called for by the worldview captured in NIE 11-4.
S E C. R E T
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? The above suggests two possibilities. The first is, in spite of
having talked to Dr. Brzezinski and the President about it, Dr. Brown is
not in tune with the function of a meeting to discuss a question like,
"How would we restructure our Defense programs if we let the NIE 11-4
view drive them?" The second possibility is, although the Foreign
Policy Review Meeting emerged from the East-West Discussion Group
exchange, its character was changed fundamentally by Dr. Brown's conversations
with Dr. Brzezinski and the President so that the meeting will be a
discussion of the FYDP.
In anticipation of the possibility that meeting might focus on
fundamental changes I have asked to think
about any significant changes that might result in intelligence collection
programs if the NIE 11-4 view was to drive intelligence. They will
feedback any ideas on Monday.
?
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` S E C R E T
A. NIE 11-4-78
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-Your Presidential Briefing Talking Points
-NIE 11-4-78
Briefing Paper
B. NIE 11-3/8-77
-Your 17 Jan & 31 Jan Presidential Briefing Talking Points
-The NIE Cover Memorandum
-Vol. I of NIE 11-3/8-77
C. NIE 4-1-78
-Your 10 Apr & 23 May Presidential Briefing Talking Points
-NIE 4-1-78
D. Theater Nuclear Forces
-Material for the PRM-38 23 August SCC Meeting
-Assessment of Theater Nuclear Forces
E. Sino-Soviet Military Balance
-Assorted material on forces along the Sino-Soviet border
F. Defense Department Planning
-SECDEF's Discussion of the Guidance -~ ~NIyy
G. Soviet Air Defense
-Your Presidential Briefing Talking Points
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SECRET
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