RHODESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002100070013-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: January 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Rhodesia
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Soviet activities in southern Africa indicate that the
Soviets look at Rhodesia as another opportunity to further.their
influence in the area.
A. Moscow is not deterred by the prospect that achieving its
aims in Rhodesia will be more difficult in Rhodesia than
it has been in previous Soviet adventures in Africa.
B. Moscow, the principal supporter of Joshua Nkomo, appears
prepared to increase its support for the anti-Smith
guerrillas; the Soviets already favor an expanded Cuban
involvement with the guerrillas.
C. The Soviets are hampered, however, by the Frontline states
suspicions of Soviet intentions and that current unwilling-
ness to permit a major expansion of the Soviet presence.
For its part, Moscow has doubts about the reliability of some
of the frontline presidents, particularly Zambia's Kaunda.
Angola
Moscow and Havana remain the dominant foreign influences
in Angola but the relationship among the three is not untroubled.
A. Moscow and Havana are concerned about their inability to
halt the UNITA insurgency. UNITA is not able to bring
down the government but it is highly disruptive, which
aggravates the economic problems confronting Neto and
his foreign backers.
B. The continuation of the insurgency and the deteriorating
economic situation have fueled anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban
? sentiment among the and
Nom, still harbors
suspicions that Moscow was behind last year's unsuccessful
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Alves coup.
?
?
Namibia
Moscow presently regards Namibia/SWAPO as secondary to
its major interests in southern Africa--Angola and Rhodesia.
A. Moscow provides political and military support for SWAPO
but the level of military assistance is less extensive
than that provided the Rhodesian insurgents.
B. Moscow will accept a negotiated settlement as long as it
believes it will enhance SWAPO's chances for taking power
in Namibia.
C. Moscow believes that a SWAPO government could ultimately
decrease the opportunity for South Africa to provide aid,
via Namibia, to opposition groups in Angola.
D. Nonetheless, Moscow is concerned that a negotiated settle-
ment would enhance the US image at the expense of the
USSR. The Soviets have not supported the current round
of negotiation for this.-..-reason and because they have been
cut out of the politicking.
The' Horn
The USSR's relatively low profile on the Eritrean insurgency
is in marked contrast to its extensive and highly visible
role in behalf of Ethiopia during the Ogaden war. Cuba..
has also taken a less active role in Eritrea.
A. Mengistu's preference for a military solution in Eritrea
has caused some tension with Moscow and Havana who
? continue to prefer a negotiated settlement for political
as well as military reasons.
B. Another source of tension between Moscow and
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is Mengi.stu's reluctance to form a Marxist-Leninist party
along lines acceptable to Moscow.
C. Such tensions are not insurmountable and it appears that
Moscow will be able to establish a long-term relationship
with Ethiopia. The Soviets are already heavily investing
in naval facilities for their ships over the long haul.
D. While Moscow probably hopes for an opportunity to return
to Somalia, it has made no overtures to Siad and would
respond with caution to any signals from the Somalis.
?
Chad
There is no evidence of direct Soviet support for the Chad
Liberation Front (Frolinat).
A. The rebels are equipped with Soviet manufactured weapons
supplied by the Libyans.
B. There is no indication that the Soviets have sought to
prevent the Libyans from transfering this material.
C, This policy gives the Soviets flexibility; if the insur-
gency succeeds, they can claim to have been important
supporters; if the rebels fail, the Soviets have been
detached enough to prevent repercussions and deny respon-
sibility.
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RHODESIA
1. The security situation in Rhodesia is deteriorating gradually, but
the guerrillas do not appear close to a military victory over the
Rhodesian security forces.
A.! The Rhodesian forces are able to defeat virtually any group
of guerrillas they can find, but they are unable to prevent
guerrillas from i fil ratinginto Rhodesia or from operating
in widespread areas of the country.
B. The number of guerrillas inside Rhodesia is growing, and is
believed to be nearly 7,000, but many are lying low or engaging
in banditry.
C. Most guerrilla operations take place in rural areas, and include
attacks on white farms and intimidation of the rural population.
II. Rhodesia's biracial transitional government has placed major
emphasis on an amnesty program to reduce the fighting, but only
a small number of guerrillas have defected to the government.
A. The major internal black leaders, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and
Ndabaningi Sithole, have been contacting guerrillas, but their 4
success in producing defectors has caused friction with Prime
Minister Smith.
B. the failure of efforts to reduce the fighting, and an apparent
foss of black support in Rhodesia by Muzorewa and Sithole,
has led to declining white morale and has caused Smith to
lpok--thus far without success--for alternatives to the
internal settlement.
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III. Although Joshua Nkomo's Zambia-based Zimbabwe African People's
Unison and Robert Mugabe's Mozambique-based Zimbabwe African National
Union are nominally allied in the Patriotic Front, there is virtually
no military cooperation between them.
A. ZAPU and ZANU see each other as rivals for power once black
rule is achieved, and there have been occasional clashes between
their forces inside Rhodesia.
B. Most Soviet and Cubao_aj4 for the Rhodesian nationalists goes
to ZAPU.
ZAPU forces are well equipped with Soviet weapons and
receive training and advice from a few Soviet and at least
50 Cuban military personnel in Zambia.
The Soviets have been critical of settlement negotiations
and have wed Nkomo to increase the military effort against
the Salisbury government.
3. Until now, however, Nkomo has been holding back the bulk
of his forces in Zambia because he wants them available
for possible use in a future power struggle against ZANU.
C. ZANU has a larger force inside Rhodesia than ZAPU, but the ZANU
guerrillas are not as;well equipped.
lj. ZANU receives military supplies from a variety of sources,
channeled to it through the OAU via the frontline African
presidents.
2! ZANU forces in Mozambique apparently are receiving a limited
i amount of help from Cuban military advisers.
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 IV. Although the short term outlook for further Rhodesian settlement
negotiations is not good, the leaders of both the transitional
government and the Patriotic Front remain interested in talks because
of !the shortcomings of their military positions.
A. Smith is now taking a negative position toward further talks
with Nkomo in an effort to appease hardening white attitudes,
but he probably supports the proposed all parties meeting under
the framework of the UK-US settlement plan. Although Muzorewa
and Sithole have been more strongly opposed to such a meeting,
Smith probably believes they will eventually conclude that they
have no choice but to attend.
6. Nkomo and Mugabe apparently are in no hurry for further talks
!because they believe the Salisbury government is growing
weaker. Despite Nkomo's recent public negative remarks about
the all-parties meeting, however, both he and Mugabe probably
can be persuaded to attend.
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Rhodesian Security Forces
Ground Forces
manpower
10-12,000
mobilizable reservists
6,000
armored vehicles
60
artillery
24
Air Force
manpower
combat aircraft
1,500
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Zimbabwe Insurgent Strength Estimates
(as of August 1978)
Trained 12,.000
Under training 10,000.
Available for
training 14,000
36,000
ZANU
Trained 10,000
Under training ,3,000
Available for
training 10,000
23,000
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