(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002300040005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 11, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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SECRETARY OF DEFENS O
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 ,~,A
October 11, 19790
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: SR-71 Cuban Overflights (TS)
.(TS/TX) The DCI and I agree that we will require a repetition
of SR-71 missions over Cuba in the near future. As I indi-
cated in my memorandum of 1 October, we need authority for
use of the SR-71 as a continuing supplement tol _j The
criteria set forth by Admiral Turner in his memorandum are
useful guidelines by which to schedule the missions.
(TS) In lieu of a single mission during the next week, I
recommend that DOD be granted the authority to overfly Cuba
with SR-71 up to the limit of the presently scheduled six
contingency. missions per month without further recourse to
the President or the SCC. We will still be able to provide
? you approximately 24 hours' notice of the intent to fly a.
-..mission,-which will allow feedback on possible political
sensitivities.
(TS) It is further recommended in light of the very low risk
assessment, that the two pass mission versus the one pass
mission be flown. The opportunity for collection is almost
doubled on the two pass mission, because of the multiple
coverage of the priority one and two targets. If there is
scattered but. significant cloud cover, -a two pass mission
substantially increases the probability of useful "take".
(TS/TK) The decision to fly the SR-71 will be contingent'on
25X1D the adequacy of or on other time-sensitive
intelligence indicators o the key targets in Cuba, including
the nine Soviet ground?forces tar ets. The SR-71 will be
scheduled to fly to fill gaps in or provide
added coverage of those targets as required. e SR-71 will.-
fly when scheduled or as soon therea ter as-weather permits.
25X1D if there is this would provide
multiple. coverage of the Soviet targets and broad area coverage
of Cuba.
? Classified by DOD Instr S-5210.51
Review on. 1. Oct 1999
NRO and USAF review(s) completed.
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(TS/TK age of the nine Soviet ground forces targets
by the and the one SR-71 flight has largely been
inadequate due to weather. As I see it, the maximum frequency
with which we will be overflying Cuba is every sixth day.
25X1
NRO
cc:, Secretary of State
Director, Central Intelligence
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WASHINGTON, D.C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR October 5, 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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NRO
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t5X1AA
-SUBJECT: Final Report
I am submitting herewith my final report as Director of-the National
-Reconnaissance Office, a post which I assumed on August 3, 1977 and
will leave on October 8, 1979. I am pleased to report that overall
the National Reconnaissance Program is in good condition. We have
been able to substantially increase the budget, develop several impor-
tant, new technical programs and maintain generally good relationships
with the elements of the Intelligence Community who depend upon our
work. I also believe that we enjoy the respect of the people who review
and approve our programs both in the Executive Branch and in the Congress.
I thought that it might be useful at this point for me to recount some
of the things that have been done and then, perhaps, put down some
thoughts about the future.
After a thorough examination of the National Reconnaissance Program
shortly after I became Director of the National Reconnaissance Office,
I came to the conclusion that the National Reconnaissance Program was
substantially underfunded when compared to the results expected of
the satellite systems operated by the National Reconnaissance Office.
This condition was probably a result of the fact that between 1968
and 1977 the dollar level of the program was set at approximately II
very year in terms of uninflated dollars. This l an,
or course, that when inflation was taken into account the National
"Reconnaissance Program suffered a substantial decline in resources
during those years. (The funding history of the National Reconnaissance
Program in uninflated dollars is shown in Table 1.) My first priority
as Director, therefore, was to reverse this trend and to see whether
the purchasing power available to the National Reconnaissance Program
could be increased.
During my first testimony before the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence in November 1977, I stated that the National
Reconnaissance Program budget would have to be significantly increased
in a few years if the capabilities necessary to support our intelligence
requirements were to be properly developed. Among -other things, I
said that:
I
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NRO
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 "I would like to make it very clear that we are
looking at, perhaps in the next five years, very
substantial increases if we make these commitments."
2
I am very pleased to report that the objective of significantly
increasing the National Reconnaissance Program budget has been achieved.
As shown in Table I, the National Reconnaissance Program budget has
been roughly doubled since FY 1978 (in uninflated dollars) if the recom-
mended FY 1981 program is approved at approximately the proposed level.
In other words, the purchasing power of the funds available to the 2 5*RO
National Reconnaissance Program will have grown by about E in three
years. The FY 1980 figure shown in Table I is now in the final stages
of approval in Congress and will differ at most by a few million from 2580
25X NP, Although the FY 1981 submission of I
Qj have recommended has not been approved by the Executive Branch, I believe
2 5X RO that, given the commitments made in the FY 1980 program, it is unlikely
to be very much smaller than the figure I have recommended.
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"The important point I would like to make here
is that this increase we are requesting is the start
of the series of increases that we will have to have
.if the Congress approves the program that we are
presenting today."
and, further on in the testimony:
"A commitment to the program that we are going to talk
about today, will mean funding increases in the succeeding
years in order to carry out the initiatives that we are
going to propose."
and, finally:
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in the two years that I have served as Dir
t
ec
or of the National
Reconnaissance Office, I have had ample opportunity to observe the
organization, how it works and what might be done to i
mprove it. The
most important feature of the National Reconnaissance Office organization
is that it consists of three different program offices that belong
to three different federal agencies. Although such an arrangement
might seem awkward on the surface, it actually has some very real advan-
tages. If the natural competition between the program offices belonging
to different agencies can be channeled into technical areas in a construc-
tive way, then the current organization has the potential of producing
really superior technical satellite systems. It is important for the
management of the National Reconnaissance Program to be fully aware
of this potential and to make use of it whenever possible. The reporting
structure of the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office is
also an advantage. Direct access to both the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and the Secretary of Defense is most important for the smooth
functioning of the program. I strongly believe both of these features
need to be continued. It is also important to preserve the streamlined
procurement practices that are used by the National Reconnaissance
Program. My estimate is that these procedures out approximately one
year out of the time it would otherwise take to bring a satellite system
into being.
Although somewhat complex, the funding procedures for the National
Reconnaissance Program work reasonably well. Perhaps the most important
problem in this area that should be considered is how to develop procedures
for joint funding of vari
N
ous
ational Reconnaissance programs, both
2 5X1 by the National Foreign Intelligence Program and by the Department
of Defense. I believe it is most important to try and develop means
ANRQfor doing this that-
we have at are more standard and acceptable than the ones
>1 ro e.,,
f, 11
e tactical data processing for the ve r 25X1
and in the Fiscal Year 80 program, Na t is was approve drf for rd
the collection capability of the Post doublin
very much that partial funding o e I hope 25X1
productive arrangement for the it orce anddthe1NationaleReconnaissance
Program. In 1978, an initiative to use U.S. Army funding to su o t
th
of the Navy y e Department
will eventually be approv hat the protocols which NRO
determine joint agency funding will be expanded.
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I want now to turn toward two of the longer term problems that
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will be faced by the National Reconaissance Program management in the
coming years. The first has to do with the "normalization" of the
National Reconnaissance Office. Since the National Reconnaissance
Office was established in 1962, it has been a covert organization whose
very existence is classified. In the last few years, there has been
a significant "de facto" change in this situation. The activities
of the National Reconnaissance Office are now generally fairly well
known through a combination of espionage, leaks to the press and dgliber-
ate decisions to declassify some of the functions of National Reconnais-
sance Office satellite systems. I believe this trend will continue.
At the same time, the budget approval process for the National Reconnais-
sance Program has also been "normalized." When the National Reconnais-
sance Office was established, the budget approval process was very
"'streamlined" in the sense that not many people needed to be consulted
to secure budget approval. Today this is no longer true. The National
Reconnaissance Program has exactly the same budget approval process,
both in the Executive Branch and in the Congress, that applies to other
similar advanced technical programs. I believe the time is not too
far distant when the National Reconnaissance Office will become overt--
that is the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office as an organi-
zation will be acknowledged--and that we must begin to think about
how to react to this event. Perhaps it might even be advisable for
the management of the National Reconnaissance Office to lead an effort
to declassify its existence so that any undesirable features can be
ironed out ahead of time. There are some organizational arguments
that would tend to favor declassification of the existence of the National
Reconnaissance Office. At. the present time, charters defining the
functions of various organizations in the intelligence community are
being developed in the Congress. There is no formal charter currently
planned, however, for the National Reconnaissance Office because of
the classified nature of the organization and there is at least some
reason to believe that this circumstance will eventually hurt the National
Reconnaissance Office. However, the most powerful argument in favor
of declassifying the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office
is based on the simple fact that it is already well known to the knowledge-
able public that it exists. To continue to keep ..the National Reconnais-
sance Office secret will eventually lead to a situation where everyone
in the government will believe that the National Reconnaissance Office
is secret and everyone else in the country will be like the famous
little boy who knew, really, that the emperor had no clothes.
In making the suggestion that we should seriously consider declassi-
fying the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office, I want to
make certain that this is not misinterpreted. Declassifying the existence
of the office does not mean declassifying the things it does. I have
argued consistently that we need to be more discriminating in developing
the proper classification levels for satellite systems. Some of the
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things we do are well known and could be declassified or at least decom-
25X1 partmented. Most of our imagery program belongs in that category.
IRO On the other hand some of the things we do in communications intercepts
are exceedingly sensitive.
The second long term problem faced by the National Reconnaissance
Office is the conversion of satellite systems managed by the organization
to the new Space Shuttle system. In general, there has been some reluc-
tance by the people in the National Security Community, both in the
Department of Defense and in the National Reconnaissance Program, to
commit to using the Shuttle. There are two reasons for this. One
is a genuine concern that many people have regarding the technical
feasibility and the economic viability of the Shuttle. These concerns
have been heightened this past year by the problems encountered by
NASA in the technical development of the program. The other concern
has been a fear that a common launch vehicle such as the Shuttle, which
will be used by all agencies having business in space, will lead to
a loss of control over the program and ultimately produce adverse impacts
on the national security. Both of these fears are, in my opinion,
,legitimate and they need to be dealt with squarely and faced in an
honest way. If this is not done, the program managers responsible
for National Reconnaissance payloads will reluctantly go along with
conversion to the Shuttle but they will not take advantage of the unique
capabilities of the vehicle.
Ibelieve that in spite of-current problems with the Shuttle the
nation will renew its commitment to converting our launch vehicles
from the currently used expendables to the new Shuttle system. Further-
more, I believe this commitment will be more or less independent of
the political situation as it develops in the coming year. Thus, I
believe that the National Reconnaissance Program must maintain the
strong commitment that it has made to take advantage of the unique
properties of the Shuttle. I also believe the National Reconnaissance
Program and the national security community generally must act to see
to it that proper organizational arrangements are developed so that
the national security community retains adequate control over Shuttle
operations. At this time I have no concrete suggestions on this matter
but there is no question whatsoever in my mind that it is of the utmost
importance to start to develop the necessary institutional arrangements
to accomplish this objective. What is most important is that the national
security community maintain a strong commitment to the Shuttle so that
the members of the community will continue to have a strong influence
on how it is eventually employed.
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Let me conclude by saying that I have very much enjoyed working
with the people in the National Reconnaissance Office. I would like
to thank both of you, Dr. Brown and Admiral Turner, for your continued
strong support of the program. I would also like to add my personal
thanks to members of the National Reconnaissance Office Staff, specifi-
cally Dr. Charles W. Cook, the Deputy Director of the National Reconnais-
sance Office and Mr. Jimmie D. Hill, the Director of the Headquarters
Staff, and also to the project managers, Major General John E. Kulpa,
Jr., U.S. Air Force (Program A); Mr. Leslie C. Dirks, Central Intelli-
gence Agency (Program B); and Rear Admiral Grover Yowell, U.S. Navy
(Program C). It has been a great pleasure for me to have the opportunity
to work with all of these people during the past two years and I hope
that their efforts will continue to be properly recognized.
With best wishes,
Sincerely yours 25X1
NRO
25X1A
cc: Mr. Frank Carlucci
I
r. Gerald Dinneen
Adm Daniel J. Murphy
Mai Gen John E. Kulpa
Mr. Leslie C. Dirks
Rear Adm Grover Yowell
General Lew Allen
Dr. Robert J. Hermann
Mr. Jimmie D. Hill
Dr. Charles W. Cook
Hon W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
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