CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 28 JANUARY 1980 (Sanitized)

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP81B00401R002300070003-0
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 16, 2003
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 29, 1980
Content Type: 
MFR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP81B00401R002300070003-0.pdf85.65 KB
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Approved For Release 2003/ r~1 :i,6P81 B00401 R002300070003-0 29 January 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary and De ut Secretary of Defense, 28 January 1980 1. Only the Deputy Secre was present for the entire meeting; Secretary Brown came in late. I promised to send Deputy Secretary Claytor a copy of the memo 1. read the. other day summarizing our views on. this subject and concluding that we had only two reports from a source that had been unreliable in the nact I I 3. The Deputy Secretary expressed appreciation of our support for their program on preemptive releases. I emphasized that we were all for it as long as intelligence equities were well considered. I note in the last paragraph of the Brown terms'of reference for the new group it says that release will only be made after comments are received from the head of the intelligence agency who produced the report. That's fine, but I think we ought to add to that "and the DCI" since the DCI is responsible for all sources and methods. I I Approved For Release 2003146167 : "CIA=R0_*1 800401 R002300070003-0 ~> >Y: "~ `w -rte 25X6 25X1 D ? 5. Secretary Brown raised a concern with NIE 11-3/8. We show a range of possible outcomes in number of Soviet warheads if the Soviets adhere to the SALT limitations (the one RV versus ten RV issue). We do not show any range for the no-SALT cases. The Secretary is concerned that this gives an impression that we are more confident of the no-SALT numbers than we are of the SALT numbers. Of course that is not the case in fact. We should look either at putting a.shaded area on those curves or some words in the text to emphasize that there are considerable uncertainties here, but that the r nap nf uncertainties cannot be as easily defined as that under SALT. 25X1 6. 1 discussed thel issue with Secretary Brown who had the same inclinations as myself an 25X1A 7. We discussed the intelligence initiative legislation in considerable detail. I failed to ask him if there were any special things we ought to-try to get through for DIA at this time. I'd like a tickler to raise that again with General Tighe and with Admiral Inman. I wonder if.this might be a moment to ask if they couldn't have the same exceptions from .Civil Service hiring rules, that we do. 8. I discussed thel The Secretary wasn't quite aware that there was a problem with the security. 9. I gave him the articles by Jim Stockdale. 10. The solid propellant issue. didn't . come. up. F 25X1 25X6 25X .25X' 25X1A WANSFIELDVTURNER Director 25X ? ILLEJ Approved For Release 2003/10/07 CIA-RDP81 800401 R002300070003-ET 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002300070003-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002300070003-0