TALKING POINTS TO BE USED WITH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REGARDING NIE 11-3/8-80 (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002300120003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 6, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
VIA: Deputy Director. for National Foreign Assessment
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Talking Points-to be Used with the Secretary of
Defense Regarding NIE 11-3/8-80 (U)
REFERENCES: (a) Memcon of DCI/SecDef on NIE 11-3/8-79, dated 11 March 1980
(b) SecDef Memorandum X07843, dated 15 April 1980
(c) Memorandum for Record, SP-95/80, dated 6 June 1980
(Comments of Key Consumers of NIE 11-3/8, Soviet
Strategic Nuclear Capabilities)
1. Action Requested: That you use the attached talking points at an
upcoming meeting with the Secretary of Defense to discuss our plans for
producing NIE 11-3/8-80. (C)
2. Background:
a. The production of NIE 11-3/8-79 was delayed somewhat by
incorporating the SAGA study findings in the Estimate, then removing
both the SAGA study and US No-SALT forces at Secretary Brown's request
(Reference a).
b. We believe it is incumbent upon us this year to complete the
NIE by early November.
--In the last two years, the complexity of producing NIE 11-3/8
has resulted in its being issued several months after the November
completion date desired by consumers. Moreover, preparation of the
NIE has been burdensome on every one involved in its preparation.
We wish, therefore, to complete this year's NIE on schedule.
OSD has no objection to
declassification and release. 111801
CX Jun2QOQ_
B9al.6
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SUBJECT: Talking Points to be Used with the Secretary of Defense
Regarding NIE 11-3/8-80
--Some of our consumers, particularly in the DoD, report
that the delays of recent years. have complicated matters for US
force planners.
--In a. Presidential election year it is desirable to have
our annual analysis of the strategic situation in print in
November, the normal scheduled date for issuing the NIE.
c. It would,-therefore, be highly desirable for you to discuss
with Secretary Brown requirements for US force.data and projections
for this year's NIE.
--We would prefer to follow this year's example of not
including results from the JCS/SAGA analysis in the NIE which
Secretary Brown clearly favors.
--We propose-including the several types of indexes comparing
Soviet and US forces, including residuals, in this year's NIE as
a basis for general conclusions about trends. We would include
residuals among the indexes, despite the objections of DoD
intelligence agencies. Aside from the issue of turf about net
assessments, this approach is consistent with Secretary Brown's
position in his 15 April 1980 memorandum (Reference b, attached)
that no single set of exchange calculations can depict the US-USSR
strategic balance. (Key, consumers are divided on the issue of net
assessments in NIE 11-3/8. See Reference c attached.)
--In contrast to NIE 11-3/8-79, we need to compare Soviet
No-SALT projected forces with a US No-SALT force(s). A future
strategic environment is at least as likely without SALT II as
with it. Moreover, the President's recent request for additional
SALT/No-SALT comparisons reinforces. the need for the DoD to
provide-us both US SALT-limited and No-SALT forces.
--We have not yet decided on the rationale and assumptions
for alternative projections of Soviet forces with and without
SALT II. Secretary Brown may have some views about the alternative
Soviet force options he would like the NIE to contain.
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SUBJECT: Talking Points to be Used with the Secretary of Defense
Regarding NIE 11-3/8-80
d. We are preparing to launch the production of NIE 11-3/8-80
on a schedule which will achieve an early November completion date.
-Secretary Brown's.agreement to provide us US force data and any views
he may have about alternative Soviet force projections will assist
us greatly in our efforts to carry out this task. (S)
3. Recommendation:. That you use the attached talking points to
discuss our plans and requirements with Secretary Brown. (U)
David S. Brandwein
Attachments
cc: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
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SUBJECT: Talking Points to.be Used with the Secretary of Defense
Regarding NIE 11-3/8-80
Distribution:
Cy.1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
'.3-ER
4 DD/NFA
5 - DD/NFAC
6 - Chrt/NIC
7 - NIO/SP
8 - NFAC/AS
9 - NFAC Registry
261A DSBrandwein:rnat6Jun80)
SECRET
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 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
I? March 1980
SUSJECT:.;"Conversation with the Secretary of De;ense, 11 March 1980
1. We disposed of the NIE 11-3/8 problem very
Secretary we were taking the US No SALT projections and. all.SAGAtmaterial.
He said to me then, "It will be just like last year." I said yes, it
will be just like last year, upd4tgd. He seid that was fine with him.
The Secretary incidentally said that he had no objection to our doing
net assessments. He just didn't'want them in NIE's because of the stature
they had. In talking with General
argumentation against continuing even m~tour h also, I detected the line of
be that the NIE has such-stature andthese gare~soysubjectntoymisinter-
pretation that we shouldn't risk that. (S/iIOFOR^N)
STANSFI.E D TUR? ,_R
Director
ORIGINAL cL BY /G '9 l7
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 1 5 APR 1380
SUBJECT: Assessments of the Strategic Balance
'Attached are two. analyses of trends in indices, static and dynamic, of the.
strategic balance. Both report calculations of force exchange outcomes
..under a range of assumptions. One was prepared by SAGA under the super-
vision of.a Net Assessment Advisory Committee, and addresses itself to the
:future .strategic balance under SALT 11. The other was prepared by PA&E to
provide a more thorough discussion of the strategic balance calculations
which appeared in the Department of Defense Annual Report.
I am circulating these analyses because of the interest of other agencies
in assessments of the current and likely future state of the strategic
balance. But these analyses,_while they provide useful inputs to an assess-
ment of that balance, do not in themselves provide a sufficient basis for
such an assessment. Like all suth analyses, they depend for their results
entirely on assumptions about the composition and performance of U.S. and
Soviet forces, unique scenarios and the tactics each would employ.
Assessing the strategic balance requires analysis and judgments that go far
beyond the relatively narrow set of factors and contingencies that current
exchange calculations are able to include. An outstanding example is that
these analyses do not evaluate the effects of attacks on command, control,
and intelligence upon the performance of the forces. Another is that these
analyses focus exclusively on the outcomes of major exchanges in which each
side adopts a highly stylized single set of attack objectives. They do not
compare U.S. and Soviet strategic forces in the other situations where we
expect them to p-lay a role: crisis, theater war, escalation, LNOs, nuclear
conflict which takes place over an extended period of time, and continued
military operations after the major exchange.
Even if these formal calculations were more comprehensive, the adequacy-of
our strategic posture could be assessed only by including judgments about
.how Soviet assessments are likely to differ from ours. Deterrence is our
first objective.. That makes the Soviet assessment, not ours, the critical
issue.
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NFAC #4095-80
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SP - 95/80
6 June 1980
Copy
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Comments of Key Consumers of NIE 11-3/8, Soviet Strategic Nuclear
Capabilities (U)
1. The attachment is a detailed account of a meeting of key consumers
on 29 May 1980 called by Mr. Bruce Clarke to obtain comments on NIE 11-3/8-79,
"Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict in the 1980s." (U)
2. Comments of the participants which are most important to planning
for production of national intelligence on Soviet strategic nuclear programs:
a. An annual NIE is required in the last quarter of the calendar
b. The NIE should contain a comprehensive treatment of all strategic
offensive and defensive forces (a compendium).
c. The NIE need not be completely rewritten each year; it should
be updated as required.
d.. The format, printing and graphics of the NIE are excellent.
e. The participants were divided on the issue of whether net
assessments, that is, the results of exchange calculations depicting the
relationship of Soviet and US offensive forces, should be in the NIE.
Department of Defense participants were adamently opposed. NSC Staff and
Department of. State participants believed the NIE should contain such
assessments, and the ACDA representative implied that they should. All
participants agreed that assessments of the US-USSR strategic nuclear
balance by the US government require improvement.
f. The material in Chapters I, II, III and IV covering Soviet
policies and doctrine, offensive and defensive forces and operational
capabilities are most important to consumers and should receive priority
attention.
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SUBJECT: Comments of Key Consumers of NIE 11-3/8, Soviet Strategic Nuclear
Capabilities
g. Department of Defense consumers wanted Volume I of the NIE to
be a faithful summary of the longer Estimate. (Other consumers were
silent on this issue and none addressed whether the volumes should
cover only NIE findings of most significance to high level consumers
as-recommended previously by the NIE consultants, or whether it should
summarize the entire Estimate.)
h. Among the suggested topics for improved treatment in the NIE,
the participants placed most importance on Soviet command, control and
communications--capabilities, vulnerabilities, implications. Other
topics mentioned were:
--Launch-under-attack.
--Implications of strategic exercises.
--Effectiveness of possible ballistic missile defense.
--Implications of advanced technology.
i. In content and presentation of material, the participants
recommended that the NIE
--Contain more citations to the evidential and analytical
bases for key findings, particularly on soft, subjective conclusions.
--Contain footnote references to key source studies and
estimates.
--Highlight for the reader substantive changes from the
previous issuance of the NIE. (S)
3. The consumer group did not address the following key issues pertinent
to this year's NIE 11-3/8.
a. Whether our forecasts of Soviet forces should be based primarily
on the assumption that SALT II would not be ratified.
b. The assumptions which should underly our alternative projections
of offensive Soviet forces.
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SUBJECT: Comments of Key Consumers of NIE 11-3/8, Soviet Strategic Nuclear
Capabilities
c. Consumer interest in the integration of developments in Soviet
strategic programs into a broader assessment of overall Soviet military
capability and its implications for Soviet foreign policies. (S)
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David S. Brandwein
National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs
Attachment
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SUBJECT: Comments of Key Consumers of NIE 11-3/8, Soviet Strategic Nuclear
Capabilities
14 - OSR/SF
Distribution:
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3 - Chm/NIC
4 - AChm/NIC
5-8 - NFAC/SRP
9 - NI0/GPF
10 - NI0/USSR-EE
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- Leicester W. Cook, State/INR
- Michael P. Elcano, Army/ACSI
- Eugene E. Rodenburg, Navy/OP-009F
- LTC. Verne V. Wattawa, Air Force
- NIO/SP
- NFAC/AS
- NFAC Registry
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