PREPARATIONS FOR NSC MEETING AND PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFINGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002400040004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 27, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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27 September 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Presidential Briefing Coordinator
SUBJECT : Preparations for NSC Meeting and Presidential
Briefings
1. Attached are more materials related to an NSC meeting on
Africa (which is still scheduled for Monday, but we hear rumors that it
might slip). Included are materials Mr. Carlucci used briefing the
President on 26 September which you will want to review for background.
There is also some new material from NIO/AF.
2. You have several packages on possible briefing topics for 3
October. The following comments are pertinent.
A. Panamanian Foreign Policy. Dr. Brzezinski suggested
and the President concurred during Mr. Carlucci's briefing
that an early briefing would be in order. I believe
"early" should be interpreted as "3 October unless we
simply can't make it." 1 -1 has prepared material 25X1A
to allow you to begin to think about this.
B. I Dr. Perry is scheduled25X1A
to testify before Senator Jackson's Committee the morning
of 3 October. He'll be out of the country 10 October.
I have told his office not to try to change his schedule 25X1A
for now.
3. Also included here two briefing topics you may want to review
for future briefings.
A. Soviet Command & Control.
B. Latin American Trends. You noted before that you had
not been able to focus on NIO/LA's proposal. It is
submitted here with some backup material so you can see
if you agree with the proposed thrust.
25X1
S E C R E T
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4. Finally I have attached the results of my reading on allied
landings in Norway in World War II in response to your question after
your meeting with SECDEF.
25X1A
cc: DD/NFA
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t _
Although the official United Kingdom history of the Second World
War and Norwegian histories are not explicit about each case, the
following is clear concerning allied landings in Norway in World War II.
--Apart from putting guerrillas or agents ashore, all allied
landings in Norway took place in April-May 1940.
--Of these landings several were made at small ports and a few
on beaches near Narvik an
--All of them were unopposedministratiye landings, e.g. General
Mackery hid his soldiers between Wicks w ern UN transport
moored on 14 April at Harstad, a small port near Narvik, until
he ascertained that the natives were friendly.
The Allies could land light infantry at will in fishing villages, but in
the end their hold on the sea was too tenuous to allow bringing in heavy
artillery or establishing effective aerodromes. So after weeks of heavy
pressure ashore; periodic air, surface and subsurface attacks at sea;
and finally disaster in France (read "Central Region") the Royal Navy
evacuated the English, Canadian, French, Polish and Norwegian troops who
were fighting around Narvik and Trondheim.
There are similarities between the 1940 Norwegian campaign and what
might develop on NATO's northern flank. Geographically the campaigns
are mirror images; the Germans came from the south, the Russians would
come from the north. German land-based aircraft had clear air superiority
over Norway; the Rusians would too. In 1940 the Royal Navy was strong
enough in adjacent seas to grasp local control of the air over coastal
towns for a few hours at a time, but never could operate with impunity
in the Norwegian Sea; this is the best NATO navies can expect.
The following freely-rendered "quotations" are drawn from Andenas,
Riste & Skodvin's, Norway and the Second World War, Oslo, 1966.
..i:n the Seekriegsleitung (Naval War Staffl on 3 October
[1939], Raeder brought up for discussion the topic of naval bases
in Norway and it was decided... that Raeder should inform Hitler
of the considerations of the navy... A few days after the discussion
in the Naval War Staff the German submarine chief, Admiral Doenitz,
submitted a memorandum on the issue from the viewpoint of submarine
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warfare. After enumerating the three prerequisi.tes...an ice-
free port, accessible by rail and situated outside. the narrow
passage between Norway and the Shetlands, he limited the choice
to Narvik and Trondheim... Raeder... took the opportunity of
putting the issue to Hitler at a conference on naval affairs
on 10 October... Since it is known that Hitler was fully aware
of the importance of submarine warfare from forward bases in the.
case of a prolonged war, his lack of interest in Raeder`s suggestion.
indicates that his mind at this stage was occuppied with - the idea
of a short war based on a rapid offensive in the west. __Cpp. 29,31Y
"Actually increasingly reliable, reports of a major breakout
of the German navy had reached London already, on 6 and 7 April .iis401 ,
But the Admiralty, apparently exclusively worried about posstble
threats to their Atlantic supply lines, allowed their ships at
sea to proceed on a course-which in effect prevented all but
chance encounters with the German invasion fleet Ibound for
Norway].. .the surprise effect of the Germay assault was. achieved,
(pp. 48-49.)
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