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December 20, 2016
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October 26, 2006
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February 21, 1980
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Approved For ease ??dFll iI:AtiAiP81 B0040 02400110 21 February 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence FROM : PB/NSC Coordinator SUBJECT . DCI Testimony before SSCI and Senate Budget Committee (U) 1. You are scheduled for the following appearances: a. SSCI: Monday, 25 February, 1400-1700 b. Senate Budget Committee: Tuesday, 26 February, 1400-1700 (U) 2. Approach. Your Worldwide Wrap-up, as previously given to the HASC and HAC Defense Subcommittee, has been modified in two ways: a. It has been updated. OA 1 b. Certain additions have been made which are tailored to specific Committee interests. (Most of these additions are in response to Budget Committee questions and these have been noted by a blue line in the right hand margin. You may want to skip these sections when briefing the SSCI. There is one section--the last part of the Overview --which pertains to the SSCI only, and this has been noted by a green line in the right hand margin.) It is felt that this would be the simplest, most direct way to prepare for two different Committee hearings on successive days. (U) 3. Backup. Both of these hearings are, by comparison with your previous appearances, for only a relatively short time (.2-3 hours), and no second day has been schedulpd- ThPrP ore it is planned that only and Bob Ames will accompany you. will also go along and I believe will accompany you,for ay is appearance before the Budget Committee.). Concur Non-concur (U) 25X1 4. Background. We have had both correspondence from these Committees 25X1 and some personal discussion with staffers. Approved For Release 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP81 Ba CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN Approved Fo lease 2007/03/ 8 : CIA-R P 1 6004 6 002400110043-0 Re SSCI: ? Attached at TAB A is a copy of the letter from the Committee. This letter describes both the intent of Monday's overview session and Wednesday's NFIP presentation before the Budget Subcommittee. ? The letter notes three points to be addressed at the overview session: key trends; their significance; and implications for investment. - On the first two, your overview and the Soviet, Strategic, GPF and Middle East briefings should suffice. - With respect to the lait item, after talking with RMS, it was\dec'~ ed to address the point briefly in the Ov r iew (this is the last section). RMS felt that if a y further elaboration was made it would gel nto the arena of your budget presentation. ? As in the case of your previous Committee appearances, OLC has met with SSCI staffers Miller and Eisenhower to discuss your intentions at the hearing. They were also provided a courtesy copy of your draft Overview to share with the Co-Chairmen only. b. Re Budget Committee: ? Attached at TAB B is the letter from Senator Muskie requesting your appearance and specifying certain items of interest. - Since this briefing is a first, not only for this Committee, but also for many members who are not on any other major Committee we brief, we got together personally with the two key staffers: John Tillson, majority staffer, formerly of OSD/PA&E where he wrote Defense Guidance; and Bob Helms, staffer to Senator Bellmon. - The request for your appearance was generated by Senator Bellmon's interest in having some benchmark against which to measure the Defense budget. - Tillson has subsequently become involved in a major way by trying to get a DoD-type Soviet Threat brief; but, since he doesn't trust DoD, he wanted such an assessment by the DCI. His thrust is clear when you read the questions in Senator Muskie's letter. -2- Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R002400110043-0 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN Approved Fo*lease C {7MN~IEI QVZ@i iB004,002400110043-0 - Based on our meeting, however, he agreed to our approach, understanding that we would address his concerns in your briefing. This has been done, and those parts that have been specifically added for the Budget Committee are marked in blue in the right hand margin. ? Attached at TAB C is an additional list of questions that Tillson provided us today. Again you can see where his focus is (some of these questions, if asked, are more in the policy arena). - Basically, most of the answers to their concerns are addressed in the briefings as modified. - However, tomorrow night we will forward to you for review a complete set of Qs and As for both TABs B and C. (C/NF) 5. Miscellaneous. a. We learned that General Rogers, in briefing the SASC the other day commented on the fact that the USSR had surpassed the West in all types of conventional and nuclear weapons. a He further noted that they had outproduced NATO 2-3:1 in most major weapons over the last 15 years. ? Two members of the Budget Committee, Gary Hart and Janus Exxon, and two members of the SSCI, Scoop Jackson and Barry Goldwater, are on the SASC. ? We are therefore tr in to get copies of his testimony and will have prepare answers in anticipation 25X1 of any questions. (This will be provided tomorrow also.) b. The Senate Budget Committee does not plan on having any briefings by DIA; however, you are only one witness in a series who will address the world situation and especially the Soviets. On Tuesday morning, before your testimony, they will hold an open hearing with George Kennan and Richard Pipes. F_ I will 25X1 attend this session to be better prepared for anything you might be hit with as a result of the Kennan/Pipes testimony. c. Re Strategic Briefing: Immediately following the briefing which you have given before (with certain revisions to address Budget Committee questions) is a rewrite of the last 4 pages. This rewrite represents a substantive 1J change to what you have briefed before--it is based on recent changes made to 11-3/8. New rough graphics which would have to be made to accompany this version are also attached. Approved For Release 2007/037A: CIA-RDP81 B00401 R002400110043-0 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN V 1W ? Use revised briefing and new graphics Use basic briefing d. Notations have been made on the graphics as to which are being revised. Also, each of the briefings has been underlined and bracketed in red just as you had before. (C/NF) 6. I think that, on balance, you can go with the revised briefings as you have in the past. You don't have much time and there is no need to give a distinctly different briefing to each Committee. Between the material in the briefings and the preparation done by the NIOs based on information received you should be in good shape to say what you want and still address their concerns/questions. (U) 25X1 Annrrn,crl Fo le...CW4AW>3I449; 816004 002400110043-0 Approved For Release gW f%WJ CLl R@1 B00401 R002400110043-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002400110043-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002400110043-0 EDM JO S. MUSKA~1pIoVelease 2007/03/08-: CIA-RDP81 B0040~ 02400110043-0 DOME WARREN G. MAGNUSON. WASH. Y BELLMON, OK NI 1 N M ETE V C . -- ERNEST F. HOWNGS. S.C. P LAWTON CHILES, FLA. BOB PACKWOOD. OREG. I I JOSEPH R. BIDEN. JR., DEL. WILLIAM L ARMSTRONG, COLO. J. BENNETT JOHNSTON. u. NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, KANS. Crtirf eb ,~f of es ,~erraf e JIM SASSER, TENN. RUDY BOSGHW H. MIN GARY HART, COLO. ORRIN G. HATCH. IRAN HOWARD M. METZENBAUM. OHIO LARRY PRESSLER. S. OAK. DONALD W. RIEGLE. JR., MICH. COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, N.Y. J. JAMES EXON, NEBR. WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510 JOHN T. MC EVOY. STAFF DIRECTOR -- ROBERT S. BOYD, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR Admiral Stansfield Turner Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 January 29, 1980 6: jv I'm looking forward to your testimony before the Senate Budget Committee on Tuesday, February 26. We are particularly anxious to hear your personal views on the imnact__of the threats facing the United States on U.S. defense needs and priorities since your testimony will provide the background for our review of the defense budget request. The Committee will be interested in several lines of inquiry and I want to take this opportunity to inform you of them in advance. I would appreciate it if you would be prepared to address each of these issues in your statement. Since we are always pressed for time and want to keep as much time as possible for dialogue between you and the Committee Members, I would appreciate it if you would limit your intro- ductory remarks to no more than fifteen minutes. The following issues will be of particular interest to the Committee: 1. What are the Soviet goals in Afghanistan and in the area of the Middle East and South Asia as a whole? What priorities do the Soviets assign to these goals? What circumstances cou d lead the Soviets to employ military force against Pakistan or Iran? How do the Soviets view U.S. forces in tfie area? 2. What events or conditions could lead the Soviets to initiate a war in the third world, with-N TO using conventional or theater nuclear forces, or with-the United States using strategic nuclear forces? How do the Soviets think'a war with the United States might start? Under what conditions would the Soviets consider :making a "bolt out of the blue" attack on U.S. strategic nuclear .forces? How oul-- cracterize Soviet willingness totakee steps that risk. war with the United States? ,.Do -Soviet -military and political leaders express the same views on these issues? 3. If SALT II fails to, be.-ratified,, do --you -expect the .Soviets to make a major increase in their strategic-:nuclear forces? -there iWhat kind of ;improvements .ar.:e -1-i?kely? = Ihat ?co'nstraints are Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R002400110043-0. 'Adm r a1 Stansie lo~uei ne 007/03/08_ : CIA-RDP81 B0040002400110043-0 January 29, 1980 Page 2. to these improvements? 4. What considerations have prompted the continued Soviet arms build-up in recent years? What do the Soviets consider to be the major threats facing them? In what order of danger do they view these threats? 5. How do the Soviets perceive U.S. intentions and capabili- ties? What is their view of the capabilities of our strategic nuclear forces? Do they fear a U.S. first strike? What is their view of the role of U.S. general purpose forces and theater nuclear forces in Europe? What is their likely response to our decision to increase defense spending by 5%? 6. What missions and what priorities do the Soviets assign to their ground forces, their air forces, and their naval forces? In particular, what priority do they assign to attacking the sea lines of communication between the United States and NATO during a NATO war? What priority would they assign to naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific? 7. How do NATO and Warsaw Pact defense spending levels compare?_ Please provide comparisons of NATO and Warsaw Pact spending for intercontinental strategic nuclear offensive forces, for ground forces, tactical air forces, and naval forces, and for Research and Development. If there are questions about your appearance, please have your staff contact Mr. John Tillson, 224-0553 or Mr. Bob Sneed, 224-9284 of the Budget Committee staff. Edmund S. Muski;-_ Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R002400110043-0 Approved Foo lease 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP81 800400 02400110043-0 REPLY REQUESTED DATE 21 February 1980 SPEED LETTER LETTER NO. YES NO TO : Deputy ! e^i sl a ti ve Counsel FROM: 25 ATTN: I saw John T i i l son this morni nn and he nave m - a list of questions which are 1.;, el to. be asked. th-? DCI when he annears be Fore the Se nate Cori ,tee on Budget on 2 Fehr iary (Attac I will be passing a copy to 0 also. 25 I also ran into Bob Helm. He passed me word that Senator Hatch (R., UT) plans to as whether or not the trend of spending on Covert Action is coins up or down. h n I noted the Senator might be too y -the MI that he cannot discuss such sub ects, Bob replied that he personally was interested only in letting.re know ; a nuestion tioulcl be pug t0 t' e CCI and not in the DCI `s resoonse. I thanke t h-i7 for the /!hea't's un'. b I also discussed the time the OCT might allot to his opening statement and -there was agreement between Bob and John that 4+0 minutes seems about the right (Covent: I note the questions, which will he passed out to the Majority Seg. tors, deal al-most exclusively with the Soviets.) 25, 1Ac: V SIGNATURE REPLY J OATE SICNATURj - ...... .... n.. Approved For Release 2QO -:F - -. COR M USE PREVIOUS 5-67 1831 EDITIONS Approved Forelease 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP81 B00404F 02400110043-0 QUESTIONS FOR SOVIET HEARINGS 26 February 1980 Issue I: The Soviet View of Their Role in the World WHAT IS THE LIKELY SOVIET RESPONSE TO A U.S. DECISION TO INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING BY 5 PERCENT? a WHAT IS THEIR-LIKELY RESPONSE TO A U.S. DECISION TO INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING BY 10 PERCENT, OR MORE? HOW SHOULD IL.._S. POLICY BE CHANGED TO R E C 0 G N I Z E THE L ITY F RI SUPERIORITY? WILL THE SOVIETS ALLOW US TO REGAIN 7 SUPERIORITY? T DEA O . SOVIET MILITARY EQUALITY? MUST WE REGAIN WHAT MILITARY STEPS WOULD YOU TAKE IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN? WHERE IN THE WORLD WOULD YOU EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO TAKE MILITARY INITIATIVES IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS? HOW CAN THESE STEPS BE DETERRED? 0 Issue II: Soviet Goals in the'Persian Gulf and the Third World CONCERNS ABOUT CHINA HAVE HAD IN THE SOVIET DECISION TO 0 INVADE? WHAT EVENTS, CONCERNS.AND OBJECTIVES LED TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN? WHAT-IMPACT MIGHT SOVIET WHAT SHOULD THE U. S DO FORCE THE SOVIETS OUT OF /I AFGHANISTAN? "~t, . _ _ - _ _ _ _ , WHAT ARE THE SOVIET GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA AS A WHOLE, AND WHAT PRIORITY DO THE SOVIETS ASSIGN TO THESE GOALS IN LIGHT OF THEIR OTHER FOREIGN- POLICY OBJECTIVES AROUND THE WORLD? WHAT CAN THE U. S. DO TO DETER A SOVIET MILITARY MOVE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD? WILL THE PRESIDENT'S PLEDGE TO USE U.S. FORCES TO PROTECT U. S. INTERESTS ACTUALLY DETER THE SOVIETS? w iFroli6d Fr(WERetebKE 121073MCIEE:TCIA Ik13004111)Rd024(>COa 1O RT OF PAKISTAN AND THE AFGHAN REBELS? NN rTov&cf F8 [201if1Y i3/b PCRTRl FPo B9 (Ii24l6r11'O 4 O TO CH THE GOALS IN THIS AREA? WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES COULD LEAD THE SOVIETS TO EMPLOY .MILITARY FORCE AGAINST PAKISTAN OR IRAN? 7 WOULD U. S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY HAVE DETERRED THE SOVIETS FROM THEIR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN? WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN A MAJOR SOVIET SURPRISE ATTACK / OF IRAN. HAVE THESE FORCES DEMONSTRATED THE C( CAPABILITYTO CONDUCT THE KIND OF MAJOR OPERATION r THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN AN ATTACK TO SEIZE THE PERSIAN GULF OIL FIELDS? For Admiral Turner only: IN THEIR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN THE SOVIETS USED FORCES THAT ARE NORMALLY DEPLOYED ALONG THE AFGHAN }-- BORDER. THESE ARE THE SAME KINDS OF FORCES THAT HOW LONG WOULD YOU ESTIMATE THAT IT WOULD TAKE THE SOVIET UNION TO MOVE FORCES FROM THE IRANIAN BORDER TO THE OIL FIELDS NEAR THE PERSIAN GULF WITHOUT ANY U. S. OPPOSITION? HOW MUCH WOULD YOU EXPECT U. S. TACTICAL AIR AND B-5 CONVENTIONAL STRIKES WOULD BE ABLE HOSE SOVIET MOVEMENT TIMES? WHAT THREAT DO SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN THE INDIAN .OCEAN POSE TO THE FORCES WE CURRENTLY.HAVE DEPLOYED .].THERE? Issue III: The Soviet Arms Buildup WHY HAVE THE SOVIETS MADE SUCH.A MAJOR ARMS BUILDUP IN RECENT YEARS? NOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ACHIEVED PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES, DO YOU EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO CONTINUE THEIR BUILDUP IN LIGHT OF THE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS THEY FACE? HOW WILL U. S. BEHAVIOR AFFECT THEIR ACTIONS? WHAT DO THE SOVIETS CONSIDER TO BE THE MAJOR THREATS FACING THEM AND IN WHAT ORDER OF DANGER DO THEY VIEW THESE THREATS? Issue IV: The Possibility of War with the Soviet Union WHAT EVENTS OR CONDITIONS COULD LEAD THE SOVIETS TO INITIATE A WAR THAT COULD INVOLVE THE UNITED STATES? HOW DO THE SOVIETS THINK A WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES MIGHT START? Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP81B00401 R002400110043-0 Approved Forlease 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP81 80040402400110043-0 UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD THE SOVIETS CONSIDER MAKING A SURPRISE ATTACK ON OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OR ON OUR FORCES i? NATO? HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE SOVIET :?:ILLINGNESS TO TAKE STEPS. THAT WOULD RISK WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES OR WITH CHINA? DO SOVIET MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS EXPRESS THE SAME VIEW ON THESE ISSUES? DO THE SOVIETS FEAR A U. S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SURPRISE ATTACK? Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R002400110043-0 c Approved For,ase 2007/b310$-: ItIAADP81 B00401W2400110043-0 15 February 1980 1A Xic MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence FROM PB/NSC Coordination Staff SUBJECT . Background Material for NFIB Discussion of the Soviet Brigade (U) 1. At the end of the NFIB meeting scheduled for 29 February, you will be discussing the paper prepared by NFAC in response to your questions about the state of the Community's analytical efforts on the brigade. The folder contains the material you wanted returned as background for that discussion (lef side). I've also followpd un on the two questions you posed for the 2. 0 and I have also been very concerned about the numbers that NFAC has been using in connection with Soviets in Cuba. So we asked for NFAC's current breakdown (civilian and military) and this is also provided (following the DDO material). As the width of the ranges suggests, these numbers (with the exception of the brigade) are--very soft. We think a priority effort should be made either to improve our confidence in these numbers or to make clear (via the PDB) that the best we can do is estimate ranges, that it is unlikely we will be able to come up with hard numbers over the next 6-8 months, that we expect I Attachment 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X Approved For Release 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP81,B00401R.Q02_400110043-0_y S E C R E T